Nomorehotair…please!

Withamassivegapbetweenrhetoricandreality,

countriesdraftnewclimatecommitments

ExecutiveSummary

EmissionsGapReport2024

?2024UnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme

ISBN:978-92-807-4185-8

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DOI:

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Nomorehotair…

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Withamassivegapbetweenrhetoricandreality,countriesdraftnewclimatecommitments

Executivesummary

EmissionsGapReport2024

EmissionsGapReport2024:Nomorehotair…please!

Executivesummary

Alleyesonthenextnationallydeterminedcontributions

Thedeadlineforcountriestosubmittheirnextnationallydeterminedcontributions(NDCs)withmitigationtargetsfor2035isonlyafewmonthsaway,atthetimeofwriting.ThefifteenthEmissionsGapReporthasaspecialfocusonwhatisrequiredfromtheseNDCstomaintainthepossibilityofachievingthelong-termtemperaturegoaloftheParisAgreementoflimitingglobalwarmingtowellbelow2°C,whilepursuing1.5°Crelativetopre-industriallevels.Itscoremessageisthatambitionmeansnothingwithoutaction–unlessglobalemissionsin2030arebroughtbelowthelevelsimpliedbyexistingpoliciesandcurrentNDCs,itwillbecomeimpossibletoreachapathwaythatwouldlimitglobalwarmingto1.5°Cwithnoorlimitedovershoot(>50percentchance),andstronglyincreasethechallengeoflimitingwarmingto2°C(>66percentchance).ThenextNDCsmustdeliveraquantumleapinambitionintandemwithacceleratedmitigationactioninthisdecade.

Themagnitudeofthechallengeisindisputable.Atthesametime,thereareabundantopportunitiesforacceleratingmitigationactionalongsideachievingpressingdevelopmentneedsandSustainableDevelopmentGoals.Technologydevelopments,particularlyinwindandsolarenergy,continuetoexceedexpectations,loweringdeploymentcostsanddrivingtheirmarketexpansion.Theupdatedassessmentofsectoralemissionreductionpotentialsincludedinthisyear’sreportshowsthatthetechno-economicemissionreductionpotentialbasedonexistingtechnologiesandatcostsbelowUS$200pertonofcarbondioxideequivalent(tCO2e)remainssufficienttobridgetheemissionsgapin2030and2035.Butthiswillrequireovercomingformidablepolicy,governance,institutionalandtechnicalbarriersaswellasanunprecedentedincreaseinthesupportprovidedtodevelopingcountriesalongwitharedesigningoftheinternationalfinancialarchitecture.

1.

Globalgreenhousegasemissionssetanewrecordof57.1GtCO2ein2023,a1.3percentincreasefrom2022levels

?

Theincreaseintotalgreenhousegas(GHG)emissionsof1.3percentfrom2022levelsisabovetheaveragerateinthedecadeprecedingtheCOVID-19pandemic(2010–2019),whenGHGemissionsgrowthaveraged0.8percentperyear.TheriseisinallsourcesofGHGs,exceptlanduse,land-usechangeandforestry(LULUCF)CO2,andacrossall

sectors.In2023thepowersector(i.e.electricityproduction)continuedtobethelargestglobalcontributortoemissionsat15.1GtCO2e,followedbytransport(8.4GtCO2e),agriculture(6.5GtCO2e)andindustry(6.5GtCO2e)(figureES.1).Emissionsfrominternationalaviation,whichdroppedsignificantlyduringtheCOVID-19pandemic,showedthehighestgrowthat19.5percentin2023from2022levels(comparedwithanaverageannualgrowthof3.1percentfrom2010to2019)clearlyindicatinganearbounce-backtopre-COVID-19levels.Othersectorsthatgrewrapidlyin2023(i.e.atarateofmorethan2.5percent)includefugitiveemissionsfromfuelproduction(oilandgasinfrastructureandcoalmines),roadtransportation,andenergy-relatedindustryemissions.

FigureES.1TotalGHGemissionsin2023

57.1GtCO2ein2023

26%

11%

Power

Industry

Energy

Aviation

Road

15%6%

10%

9%

11%7%4%

TransportBuildings

Fuel

production

Industrialprocesses

Other

OilandgasSolidfuelsOther

Cement(excludingcarbonation)

Process

Chemicals1%MetalsOther

Agriculture,forestryand otherland-usechange(AFOLU)

Livestock

Agriculture

Biomassburning,soilsandrice

LULUCF

2%2%

Solidwaste

Liquidwaste

<1%Other

Waste&other

(IndirectN2Oandfossilfuelfires)

2%

11%

2%

3%

4%

3%

3%

2%

4%

6%

5%

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EmissionsGapReport2024:Nomorehotair…please!

2.

?

Therearelargedisparitiesbetweenthe

current,percapitaandhistoricemissionsofmajoremittersandworldregions

GHGemissionsacrosstheG20membersalsoincreasedin2023andaccountedfor77percentofglobalemissions.IfallAfricanUnioncountriesareaddedtotheG20total,morethandoublingthenumberofcountriesfrom44to99,totalemissionsincreasebyjust5percentagepointsto82percent.ThesixlargestGHGemittersaccountedfor63percentofglobalGHGemissions.Bycontrast,leastdevelopedcountriesaccountedforonly3percent(tableES.1).

?Despitesignificantchangesinthepast20years,largedisparitiesremainbetweenthecurrentaveragepercapitaandthehistoricalemissionsofmajoremittersandworldregions(tableES.1).Forexample,averagepercapitaGHGemissionsareclosetothreetimeshigherthantheworldaverageof6.6tCO2eintheUnitedStatesofAmericaandtheRussianFederation,whiletheyremainsignificantlybelowitintheAfricanUnion,Indiaandleastdevelopedcountries.Consumption-basedemissionsalsoremainhighlyunequal.

TableES.1Total,percapitaandhistoricalemissionsofselectedcountriesandregions

TotalGHG

emissionsin

2023

Changeintotal

GHGemissions,

2022–2023

PercapitaGHG

emissionsin

2023

HistoricalCO2emissions,1850–2022

MtCO2e(%oftotal)

%

tCO2e/capita

GtCO2(%oftotal)

China

16,000(30)

+5.2

11

300(12)

UnitedStatesofAmerica

5,970(11)

-1.4

18

527(20)

India

4,140(8)

+6.1

2.9

83(3)

EuropeanUnion(27countries)

3,230(6)

-7.5

7.3

301(12)

RussianFederation

2,660(5)

+2

19

180(7)

Brazil

1,300(2)

+0.1

6.0

119(5)

AfricanUnion(55countries)

3,190(6)

+0.7

2.2

174(7)

Leastdevelopedcountries(47countries)

1,730(3)

+1.2

1.5

115(4)

G20(excl.AfricanUnion)

40,900(77)

+1.8

8.3

1,990(77)

Note:Emissionsarecalculatedonaterritorialbasis.LULUCFCO2emissionsareexcludedfromcurrentandpercapitaGHGemissionsbutareincludedinhistoricalCO2emissionsbasedonthebookkeepingapproach.SomecountriesintheAfricanUnionarealsoleastdevelopedcountries.

3.

?

?

Progressinambitionandactionsincethe

initialNDCsplateauedandcountriesarestillofftracktodeliveronthegloballyinsufficientmitigationpledgesfor2030

OfthepartiestotheParisAgreement,90percenthaveupdatedorreplacedtheirinitialNDCfromthetimeofadoptionoftheParisAgreement.However,mostofthisimprovementcameinthelead-uptothetwenty-sixthsessionoftheConferenceofthePartiestotheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(COP26)in2021.DespiterequestsfromthelastthreeCOPstofurtherstrengthen2030targets,onlyonecountryhasstrengtheneditstargetsinceCOP28.

Undercurrentpolicies,global2030emissionsareprojectedtobe57GtCO2e(range:53–59),whichisslightlyhigherthanlastyear’sassessment,and

around2GtCO2e(range:0–3GtCO2e)abovetheunconditionalNDCsand5GtCO2e(range:2–9GtCO2e)abovetheconditionalNDCs(tableES.2).ThisgapinimplementationofpoliciestoachievetheNDCsfor2030isaboutthesameasinlastyear’sassessment.

?Collectively,theG20membersarealsostillassessedtomisstheirNDCtargetsfor2030,withcurrentpolicyprojectionsexceedingNDCprojectionsby1GtCO2ein2030.ElevenG20membersareassessedtobeofftracktoachievetheirNDCtargetswithexistingpolicies,andtheG20membersprojectedtomeettheirNDCtargetbasedoncurrentpoliciescurrentlyarethosethatdidnotstrengthen,oronlymoderatelystrengthened,theirtargetlevelsintheirmostrecentNDCs.Further,collectivelytheNDCtargetsoftheG20isfarfromtheaverageglobalpercentagereductionsrequiredtoalignwith2°Cand1.5°Cscenarios(figureES.2).

V

EmissionsGapReport2024:Nomorehotair…please!

?TheadoptionandimplementationofadditionalandtheireffectsonGHGemissionsin2030,anditis

morestringentpoliciesarethusrequiredacrossthereforenotpossibletoassesswhethertheG20

countriesandsectorstoachievetheNDCtargetsmembers’newpolicies(adoptedbetweenJune2023

for2030.WhileclimatepolicyhasadvancedinmanyandJune2024)arelikelytosignificantlyaffectglobal

countries,thereisstillalackofstudiesthatevaluateemissionsin2030.

FigureES.2ThelandscapeofcurrentNDCtargetsandimplementationgapsfortheG20memberscollectivelyandindividuallyby2030,relativeto2019emissions

Changeinemissionsunder

currentpoliciesin2030

(relativeto2019levels)

+60%

Lesslikely

toachievetheNDC

+40%

Türkiye

+20%

RussianFederation

Argentina

Mexico

0

SouthAfrica*

Australia

-20%

Canada

UnitedStatesofAmerica

-40%

-50%

RepublicofKorea

Japan

UnitedKingdomEuropeanUnion

Currentpolicies=UnconditionalNDC

in2030

Morelikely

toachievetheNDC

Indonesia

SaudiArabia

India

China

Brazil

-50%-40%-20%0+20%+40%+60%+80%

Post-peakcountriesPre-peakcountriesG20average

ChangeinemissionsunderunconditionalNDCin2030(relativeto2019levels)

GHGemissionsin2019:

2,000MtCO2e

5,000MtCO2e

500MtCO2e

Note:*ConditionalNDC

VI

EmissionsGapReport2024:Nomorehotair…please!

4.

?

?

5.

?

ImpliedemissionstrajectoriesoftheG20

memberstowardsnetzeroshowreasonsforconcern

Asat1June2024,101partiesrepresenting107countriesandcoveringapproximately82percentofglobalGHGemissionshadadoptednet-zeropledgeseitherinlaw(28parties),inapolicydocumentsuchasanNDCoralong-termstrategy(56parties),orinanannouncementbyahigh-levelgovernmentofficial(17parties).AllG20membersexceptMexicoandtheAfricanUnion(collectively)havesetnet-zerotargets.Overall,however,limitedprogresshasbeenmadesincelastyear’sassessmentonthekeyindicatorsofconfidenceinnet-zeroimplementation,includinglegalstatus,theexistenceandqualityofimplementationplansandthealignmentofnear-termemissionstrajectorieswithnet-zerotargets.

PeakingGHGemissionsisaprerequisitetoachievingnetzero.SevenG20membershavenotyetpeakedemissions,definedashavingreachedmaximumemissionsatleastfiveyearsbeforetheyearforwhichthelatestinventorydataisavailable(China,India,Indonesia,Mexico,SaudiArabia,RepublicofKorea,andTürkiye).Forthesecountries,effortstopeakemissionsearlierandatalowerlevelwithrapidreductionsthereafterwillfacilitateachievementoftheirnet-zerotargets.FormostofthetenG20memberswhereemissionshavealreadypeaked(Argentina,Australia,Brazil,Canada,EuropeanUnion,Japan,RussianFederation,SouthAfrica,UnitedKingdomofGreatBritainandNorthernIreland,UnitedStatesofAmerica),theirrateofdecarbonizationwouldneedtoaccelerate–insomecasesdramatically–after2030toachievetheirnet-zerogoals,unlesstheyaccelerateactionnowandoverachievetheir2030NDCtargets.Forthesecountries,acceleratingprogressintheneartermwillreducecumulativeemissionswhileavoidingrelianceonunfeasiblyrapiddecarbonizationrateslater.ThecurrentNDCsandnet-zerotargetsthatcountrieshavesetthemselvessuggestamuchnarrowerwindowoftimebetweenpeakingandnetzeroforthecountriesthathavenotyetpeakedthanforthosethathave.

Theemissionsgapin2030and2035remainslargecomparedbothwithpathwayslimitingwarmingto1.5°Candto2°C

TheemissionsgapisdefinedasthedifferencebetweenthelevelofglobalGHGemissionsresulting

fromfullimplementationofthemostrecentNDCs,andlevelsunderleast-costpathwaysalignedwiththeParisAgreementtemperaturegoal.

?Theemissionsgapsin2030and2035haveremainedunchangedsincelastyear’sassessment(figureES.3andtableES.2),astherehavebeennosubmissionsofnewNDCswithsignificantimplicationsforglobalemissions,noupdatestothequantificationsoftheirimplications,andnoupdatestotheleast-costpathways.Togetontracktolimitingwarmingtobelow2°C,annualemissionsin2030needtobe

14GtCO2e(range:13–16GtCO2e,>66percentchance)lowerthanwhatcurrentunconditionalNDCsimply,and22GtCO2e(range:21–24GtCO2e,>50percentchance)lowerforawarminglimitof1.5°C.For2035,thesegapsincreaseby4GtCO2efora2°Cwarminglimit,and7GtCO2efora1.5°Climit.IfconditionalNDCsarealsofullyimplemented,thegapsin2030and2035forbothtemperaturelimitsarereducedbyaround3GtCO2e(figureES.3).

?ThefullimplementationofunconditionalandconditionalNDCsreducesexpectedemissionsin

2030by4and10percent,respectively,comparedwith2019levels,whereasa28percentreductionisneededfor2030emissionstobealignedwith2°Canda42percentreductionfor1.5°C.Theseestimatesarealsoequivalenttothoseinlastyear’sassessment.NDCsfor2035needtoreduceglobalemissionsby37and57percentbelow2019levelstobecompatiblewith2°Cand1.5°C,respectively.

?Unlessglobalemissionsin2030arebroughtbelowlevelsresultingfromcurrentpoliciesandfromthefullimplementationofthecurrentNDCs,itwillbecomeimpossibletogettoapathwaythatlimitsglobalwarmingto1.5°Cwithnoorlimitedovershoot(>50percentchance),andstronglyincreasethechallengeoflimitingwarmingto2°C.StartingfromtheglobalemissionsimpliedbythecurrentunconditionalNDCsfor2030woulddoubletherequiredrateofannualemissioncutsbetween2030and2035,relativetoimmediatelyenhancedaction.Specifically,ifactioninlinewith2°Cor1.5°Cpathwaysweretostartin2024,thenglobalemissionswouldneedtobereducedbyanaverageof4and7.5percenteveryyearuntil2035,respectively.IfenhancedactionthatgoesbeyondcurrentunconditionalNDCsisdelayeduntil2030,thentherequiredannualemissionreductionsrisetoanaverageof8percentand15percenttolimitwarmingto2°Cor1.5°C,respectively.

VII

EmissionsGapReport2024:Nomorehotair…please!

FigureES.3GlobalGHGemissionsunderdifferentscenariosandtheemissionsgapin2030and2035

GtCO2e

Emissionsgap2030

(GtCO2e)

Emissionsgap2035

60

(GtCO2e)

22

1829

11

Medianestimateoflevelconsistentwith2°C:41GtCO2e

(range:37–46)

Medianestimateoflevelconsistentwith2°C:36GtCO2e

Medianestimateoflevelconsistentwith1.5°C:33GtCO2e

(range:26–34)

Medianestimateoflevelconsistentwith1.5°C:25GtCO2e

(range:20–27)

14

UnconditionalNDCcase

UnconditionalNDCcase

UnconditionalNDCcase

HistoricaltotalGHGemissions

19

15·26

ConditionalNDCcase

ConditionalNDCcase

ConditionalNDCcase

50

2°C

range

40

Blueareashowspathwayslimitingglobaltemperatureincreasetobelow2°Cwithabouta66%chance

ConditionalNDCcase

UnconditionalNDCcase

(range:31–39)

30

1.5°Crange

Greenareashowspathwayslimitingglobaltemperatureincreasetobelow1.5°Cwitha50%chanceby2100andminimum33%chanceoverthecourseofthecentury

Currentpoliciesscenario

20

UnconditionalNDCscenario

ConditionalNDCscenario

20152020202520302035

2050,andestimated

gapsunderdifferent

Table

ES.2Global

scenarios

totalGHGemissionsin2030,2035and

ProjectedGHGemissions

(GtCO2e)

Estimatedemissionsgaps(GtCO2e)

Medianandrange

Below2.0°C

Below1.8°C

Around1.5°C

Scenario

2030

Currentpolicies

57(53–59)

16(12–18)

22(18–24)

24(20–26)

UnconditionalNDCs

55(54–57)

14(13–16)

20(19–22)

22(21–24)

ConditionalNDCs

51(48–55)

11(7–14)

17(13–20)

19(15–22)

2035

Currentpoliciescontinued

57(44–62)

21(9–26)

30(18–35)

32(20–37)

UnconditionalNDCscontinued

54(46–60)

18(10–24)

27(19–33)

29(21–35)

ConditionalNDCscontinued

51(43–57)

15(8–22)

24(17–30)

26(19–33)

ConditionalNDCs+allnet-zeropledges

43(38–49)

8(2–13)

16(11–22)

19(13–24)

2050

Currentpoliciescontinued

56(25–68)

36(4–48)

44(12–56)

48(16–60)

ConditionalNDCs+allnet-zeropledges

19(6–30)

-1(-14–10)

7(-6–18)

11(-2–22)

VIII

EmissionsGapReport2024:Nomorehotair…please!

6.

?

?

?

7.

?

Timelostsince2020increasesglobalwarmingprojectionsandreducesthefeasibilityofbridgingthegap

Theassessmentoftheemissionsgapin2030and2035isfoundedonleast-costpathwaysconsistentwithlimitingwarmingto1.5°C,1.8°Cand2°C.Theseassumestrongmitigationactionstartingin2020,resultingindeepGHGreductionsthisdecade.However,followingtheCOVID-19-inducedreductioninemissions,globalGHGemissions,includingmethane,havecontinuedtoincrease.

Thelackofactionandtimelosthasimplications.Ithasreducedtheremainingcarbonbudget,whichin2024isestimatedat900GtCO2forlimitingwarmingtobelow2°C(>66percentchance)andto200GtCO2tostaybelowa1.5°Climit(>50percentchance).Iftheemissionsgapisstillbridgedby2030,additionalcumulativeCO2emissionsintheorderof20–35Gtwillbeemittedduring2020–2030comparedwiththeParis-alignedpathways.Thiswouldresultinwarmingthatisabout0.01to0.02°Chigherthanindicatedbytheoriginalpathways.

Importantly,inactionreducesthechanceofbridgingtheemissionsgapin2030becauseofcontinuedlock-inofcarbon-intensiveinfrastructureandlesstimeavailabletorealizetheemissionreductionsrequired.Itfurtheraddsrisksoftemperatureovershootandcompoundsincreasinglysevereclimateimpacts,someofwhichareirreversible.

Immediateactionmatters:temperature

projectionsbasedontheconditionalNDC

scenarioare0.5°Clowerthanthosebasedonexistingpolicies

Acontinuationofthemitigationeffortimpliedbycurrentpoliciesisestimatedtolimitglobalwarmingtoamaximumof3.1°C(range:1.9–3.8)overthecourseofthecentury.Thefullimplementationandcontinuationofthelevelofmitigationeffortimplied

byunconditionalorconditionalNDCscenarioslowertheseprojectionsto2.8°C(range:1.9–3.7)and2.6°C(range:1.9–3.6),respectively.Allwithatleasta66percentchance(figureES.4).

?Underthesethreescenarios,centralwarmingprojectionsindicatethatthechanceoflimitingglobalwarmingto1.5°Cwouldbevirtuallyzero(figureES.4).Bymid-century,theyimplyglobalwarmingwellabove1.5°Candwithuptoa1-in-3chancethatwarmingalreadyexceeds2°Cbythen.Aswell,warmingisexpectedtoincreasefurtherafter2100asCO2emissionsarenotyetprojectedtoreachnet-zerolevelsunderthesescenarios.

?TheonlyscenariothatgetsclosertothetemperaturegoaloftheParisAgreementisthemostoptimisticscenario,whichassumesthatallthemoststringentpledgescurrentlymadebycountries–inotherwordstheconditionalNDCsandallnet-zeropledges,includingthosemadeaspartoflong-termlow-emissionsdevelopmentstrategies–arefullyimplemented.Thisscenarioisestimatedtolimitwarmingoverthecourseofthecenturyto1.9°C(range:1.8–2.3,>66percentchance).Thisisalsotheonlypledge-basedscenarioinwhichglobalwarmingisstabilizedoverthecourseofthiscentury.

?Theseprojectionshighlightthecrucialimpactofimmediateactiononlikelytemperatureoutcomes,andtheneedforenhancedsupporttoenablecountriesachievingtheconditionalelementsoftheirNDCs.ProjectionsbasedontheimplementationandcontinuationoftheconditionalNDCscenariolowerpeakwarmingbyabout0.5°Ccomparedwiththosebasedoncurrentpolicies.Further,fulfillingnear-termconditionalNDCsenhancesthelikelihoodofachievingnet-zeropledges,whichfurtherreducesglobalwarmingprojectionsbyaround0.5°C.Theseresultsemphasizethecriticalimportanceofnotjustachievingbutoverachievingpledgedemissionreductionsfor2030intandemwithaquantumleapinambitioninthenextNDCs.

IX

EmissionsGapReport2024:Nomorehotair…please!

FigureES.4Projectionsofglobalwarmingunderthepledge-basedscenariosassessed

Peakwarmingoverthetwenty-firstcentury(°C)relativetopre-industriallevels

1.01.52.02.53.03.54.04.55.0°C

Scenarios

.50%chance

●66%chance

.90%chance

2.8

Currentpoliciescontinuing

1.8

●

1.9

2.9

.

.3.8

3.5

3.1

●

4.5

.

2.3

3.6

UnconditionalNDCscontinuing

1.8

●

1.9

2.6

3.4

.

3.7

.

4.4

.

2.3

3.4

ConditionalNDCscontinuing

1.8

●

1.9

2.4

3.3

●

.3.6

●

4.2

2.6

●

2.2

3.

0

ConditionalNDCs+allnet-zeropledges

1.61.7

1.8o1.9

2.

2.3

2.2

.2.3

02.8

Likelihoodofwarmingexceedin

gaspecifictemperaturelimit(%)

1.5°C2°C3°C

Scenarios

Currentpoliciescontinuing

100%

(85–100%)

97%

(28–100%)

37%

(1–80%)

Unconditional

100%94%

22%

NDCscontinuing

(86–100%)(28–100%)

(1–75%)

ConditionalNDCs

100%79%

10%

continuing

(77–100%)(19–100%)

(0–69%)

ConditionalNDCs

77%20%

0%

+allnet-zeropledges

(64–97%)(64–97%)

(0–6%)

8.

?

TheG20hasakeyresponsibilityinclosingtheemissionsgap.Itisbothcost-effectiveand

fairfortheG20toreduceemissionsfasterthantheglobalaverage

TheParisAgreementprovidesflexibilityintranslatingglobalgoalsandmilestonesintonationalimplementation.Globalmodelscaninformour

understandingofwhatisrequiredintermsofnationalcontributionsinthenextNDCstogettopathwaysconsistentwiththetemperaturegoaloftheParisAgreement.Atthesametime,nationaldecarbonizationscenarioscanimproveourunderstandingoffeasibilityattheindividualcountrylevel.Bothapproachesmayincludeconsiderationsofequityandfairnessintheirdevelopmentandassessment.

X

EmissionsGapReport2024:Nomorehotair…please!

?IllustrativefindingsshowthattheG20membersexcludingtheAfricanUnionmustgofurtherandfaster:currentNDCtargetsfortheG20collectivelyareneitheralignedwithcost-effectivenorwithfair-sharepathwaysconsistentwiththetemperaturegoaloftheParisAgreement(figureES.5).

?TheG20isaveryheterogeneousgroupofcountries,alsobasedonhistorical,currentandpercapitaemissions.ThismeansthatsomeG20memberswillneedtocuttheiremissionsfasterthanothers.Inaddition,strongerinternationalcooperationandsupport,includingthroughenhancedclimatefinance,willbeessentialforensuringthattheopportunitiesandeffortsofmeetingglobalmitigationanddevelopmentgoalscanberealizedfairlyacrossG20membersandglobally.

?Nationaldecarbonizationscenariosthatachievenationaldevelopmentprioritiesalongsideambitiousmitigationactionareemergingformanycountries.Severalindicatethatitispossible–bothforG20membersthathavepeakedemissionsandthosewhoareyettopeak–toreduceemissionsin2030beyondtheircurrentNDCtargetsandtosetfarhighernationalambitionfor2035.SuchstudiescaninforminterpretationsofhowcountriescanreflectthehighestpossibleambitionintheirnextNDCs,inaccordancewitharticle4oftheParisAgreement.

?DifferentapproachescangiveverydifferentperspectivesonwhatafairandambitiousNDCwouldentail.Giventhesedifferences,transparencyandclarityfromindividualcountriesaroundhowtheirnextNDCreflectsthehighestpossibleambitionandconsidersfairnesscanenableabetter-informedevaluationofth