July2025

focusPAPERNO.9

RethinkingtheEU’sroleintacklinginterconnectedenvironmentalrisksamidgeoeconomicandpoliticalshifts

MargheritaBianchi

IstitutoAffariInternazionali

CulminatingmorethanadecadeofcrisisinEurope,theCovid-19pandemichasopenedanimportantwindowofopportunityforinstitutionalandpolicychange,notonlyatthe“reactive”levelofemergencyresponses,butalsototacklemorebroadlythemanysocio-politicalchallengescausedorexacerbatedbyCovid-19.Buildingonthispremise,theHorizonEuropeprojectREGROUP(Rebuildinggovernanceandresilienceoutofthepandemic)aimsto:1)providetheEuropeanUnionwithabodyofactionableadviceonhowtorebuildpost-pandemicgovernanceandpublicpoliciesinaneffectiveanddemocraticway;anchoredto2)amapofthesocio-politicaldynamicsandconsequencesofCovid-19;and3)anempirically-informednormativeevaluationofthepandemic.

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FOCUSPAPERNO.9

Executivesummary

ThispaperdelvesintotheEU’sapproachtointerconnectedenvironmentalrisks,setagainstthebackdropofevolvinggeoeconomicandpoliticaldynamics.ItfirstaddressestheEuropeanGreenDeal,initiatedin2019,anditssubsequentstrengtheningthroughinitiativeslikeFitfor55andREPowerEU.Theseinitiativessignalastrongcommitmenttodecarbonisationandclimatetargets;however,theimplementationofthisambitiousagendaisbeingchallengedbyfactorssuchashighinflationandincreasingpoliticalre-sistance,withsomegovernmentsexpressingoppositiontoenvironmentalpolicies.TheprioritisationofsecurityanddefencehasalsosomewhatovershadowedtheclimatecrisisacrosstheEUbloc.

Theanalysisexaminesthekeyfeaturesandtrendsofadecarbonisedgloballandscapeandtherequirementsforitseffectivemanagement.ItalsoaddressestheinternalandexternalchallengesthatwillconfronttheEUintheperiodfrom2025to2035.Giventhisbackground,theauthorevaluatesfourprospectivescenarioswheretheEUdoesordoesnothavearoleinaglobalgovernancereformthatdoesordoesnothappen.Inthefirstscenario,thereisareformofglobalgovernancebutwithoutanactiveEUrole;thesecondscenarioforesees‘greenglobalisation’,wheretheEUleadstheglobalgovernancereform;thethirdoneinvolvesastrongEUleadershipbutnotchannelledinaglobalgovernancereform;thefinalscenariolacksbothaglobalgovernancereformandastrongEUleadership.

ThepaperultimatelyarguesthattheEUneedstoadoptinternalandexternalmeasurestopreventthewideningoftheclimateandsocialdivide,bothwithintheEUandbe-tweentheGlobalNorthandGlobalSouth.Itidentifiesseveralcriticalfactors:findingabalancebetweenengagementanddisengagementwithChina,strengtheningEuropeanindustrialproductionwherepossible,anddiversifyinggreenvaluechainsaccordinglybyforgingstrongerpartnershipsintheGlobalSouth.Inthissense,theauthorarguesthattheEUmustengagemoreeffectivelywithemerginganddevelopingeconomiesinpursuingdecarbonisationstrategies.Thepapercautionsthatincreasinginternationalfragmentationcouldleadtohighercostsforaccessinglow-carbonmaterialsandminer-als,anditsuggeststhattheEUshouldenhanceitscompetitivenessthroughitsinherentstrengthswhileavoidingexcessiveandineffectiveprotectionistpolicies.

Keywords:EUClimateagenda;environmentalrisks;decarbonisation;EUgloballeader-ship;justtransition

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Introduction

TheGreenDeallaunchedbythefirstvonderLeyenCommissionin2019putforthanim-pressivesetofregulations,tools,andpolicies.Politically,theprocesshasencounteredsometensionsaroundthestructuralinterestsofEUmemberstates,whichhavesloweddowntheadoptionofcertaindecisions.Itslegislativepathhasalsofacedtwomajorcrises:thepandemicandtheenergycrisisthathasintensifiedsincethe1970s.Despitethesecomplexcircumstances,theEUgreenagendawasreinforcedfrom2020to2024,withresourcesinvestedinthedecarbonisationprocessandtheupwardrevisionofcli-matetargetsthroughFitfor55andREPowerEU(GiuliandBianchi2023).

However,thecurrentcontextchallengestheimplementationandfurtherdevelopmentofthisgreenagenda.SpikesinenergypricesandhighinflationhavehitcitizensandindustriesacrosstheEU,whichblamed‘Brussels’inseveralcases,asdidmanypopulistpartiesthatarelatchingontoclimatepolicy.Indomesticcontexts,ageneralresistancetotheimplementationoftheFitfor55planisgrowing,andsomegovernmentsnowshowobstructiveattitudestowardsenvironmentalpoliciesthat–intheirnarrative–fuelinjustice.Moreover,securityanddefencehavesurpassedtheclimatecrisisasapri-orityforvotersanddecision-makers.Thus,theGreenDealisnowcouchedinabroadernarrativefocusedonprosperityandindustrialcompetitiveness(vonderLeyen2024).

Globally,thesecuritisationofsupplychainshasbroughtabouttoughercompetitionandtensionsbetweensuperpowers,furtherhighlightingtheEU’svulnerabilities(FabryandMatelly2025).Aroundtheworld,risingnationalismthreatenstheadvancementofclimateaction;pairedwithmisinformation,itcreatesfurtherdistrustandstalematesinessentialtalkssuchasCOPs.Trump’s‘AmericaFirst’approachmightconstituteaproblemfortheEUbloc,whichhaslimitedleverageinavoidingagrowingEU–USenergypricegapintheshortterm.Inthemeantime,theworldmayexperiencetheendofthemultilateralarchitecturethatemergedafterWorldWarII.TheUShasoncemorewith-drawnfromtheinternationalclimateframework,adecisionthatwillaffectclimatefundingandslowthepaceofenergytransformationworldwide.Trumphascommittedtoreversingcourseonclimatepolicies,scalingbackoncleanenergyinvestments,andimplementinghightariffsonvariouspartners,includingEurope,likelyaffectingmarketaccessandsupplychainsinanunexploredway.Additionally,BRICSnationsarewieldinggreaterinfluence,andtensionsbetweendevelopedanddevelopingcountriesaredeep-ening.

CoupledwiththeEU’sstructuralweaknesses,theseconjuncturaltensionsthreatenbothEurope’sindustrialcompetitivenessandcleantechleadershipambitionsaswellasitsverypathtoclimateneutrality.Risingfragmentationattheinternationallevelmayleadtohighercostsforaccessinglow-carbonmaterialsandmineralsaswellasbasic

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materials(BianchiandSangiorgio2025).TheEU2040emissionreductiontargetisfarfrombeingcementedintolaw,but–onthebrightside–theEUseemsontracktocut54percentofemissionsby2030(EuropeanCommission2025).However,the2040mid-termtargetremainscrucial,asitwillalsoformthebasisoftheEU’s2035updatedNationallyDeterminedContributiontobesubmittedbeforeCOP30inBrazil.

TheEU’sroleintacklinginterconnectedenvironmentalrisksisthusveryuncertain.

Thispaperanalyses(i)themainfeaturesofadecarbonisedworldandtheaspectsofitsorderlymanagementand(ii)theinternalandexternalchallengesfacedbytheEUinthe2025–2035decade.Bycross-referencingtheseelementsandtrendswiththefourprospectivegovernancescenariosdevelopedinthefirstforesightpaperoftheREGROUPproject(Burguete2024),theauthorattemptstodefinetheEuropeanmodalitiesofre-silienceinthefaceofenvironmentalimpacts.

Themainfeaturesofanincreasinglydecar-bonisedworld

Thebroaderdeploymentofcleanerenergyintheworldhasbeguntoreshapepoliticalrelationshipsandredefineenergysecurityconcepts,generatingnewchallengesandop-portunities.Additionalchangeswilloccurasthetransformationaccelerates,andhowEuropenavigatestheseshiftsisvitalformeetingitsclimateobjectivesandensuringanorderly-managedand‘just’transition–bothinsideandbeyonditsborders.

First,inaprogressivelydecarbonisedworld,theconceptofenergysecurityitselfun-dergoeschanges.Attentiongraduallymovesfromsecuringwaterways,pipelines,andphysicalvolumedeliveriestoprotectingelectricitynetworks,storagesystems,andbat-teries,amongothers.Aprogressivereplacementoffossilfuelsmayleadtoreducedconflictsoverenergycontrolduetothelowerenergydensityandgeographicalcon-centrationofrenewables,aswellastheessentiallyinexhaustiblesupply.Renewableenergyalsohasthecapacitytoreduceimpactsonresources(e.g.,water),establishingastrongerfoundationforsecurityandsustainableprogress(InternationalRenewableEnergyAgency2028).Additionally,cleanenergysourcesmaygeneratesubstantialtradebalanceimprovementsforcurrentnetfossilfuelimportingareas(includingtheEU)whilereducingtheirvulnerabilitytosupplydisruptionsandpricefluctuations.Thede-centralisationandregionalisationtrendsofenergyproduction,consumption,anddistri-bution–aswellasthebroaderelectrificationanddigitalisationofenergysystems–willreshapeenergysecurityprioritiesandcreatenewvulnerabilitiesandopportunitiesforcountries(Franzaetal.2021).

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Second,globalenergysystemswillsimultaneouslybecomemoremineral-dependent,sincetechnologiessuchassolarpanels,windturbines,electricvehicles,andbatter-iestypicallyrequiresignificantmineralinputs(InternationalEnergyAgency2022).Theongoingexposureoftechnology,materials,andsupplychainstoglobalmarketfluctu-ationsmakesitvitaltocontrolfundamentalmarketconditionsandpreventsupply–de-mandimbalancesthatcouldtriggerdisruptionsandpriceincreases.Lookingatcriticalrawmaterials(CRMs),theexistingmarketstructurerevealsmultiplesupply-sidevul-nerabilities:geographicconcentrationandpriceinstability,alongwithpolitical,gov-ernance,humanrights,andenvironmentalchallenges(Raimondi2025).Anotherkeyvulnerabilityistime:decarbonisationmusthappenquickly,andallthesedependenciescannotbefixedrapidlyenough.Chinainparticularcontrolstheextraction,refinement,andprocessingofessentialCRMs(GlaserandWulf2023);thus,manyothercountries

havebeenworryingaboutthepossiblestrategicuseofitssuppliesandhavetriedtofindalternatives.

SeekingtodevelopsuchcapacitiesonlywithintheEU,however,iseitherimpossible

–asinthecaseofCRMs–ortoocostly–asinthecaseofatotalrepatriationofcleantech.TheEUcouldactinbetween,dependingonitscompetitiveadvantageandvul-nerabilityineachsector,findingwaystodiversifywhereneededandstrengtheningdomesticindustrieswherepossible.ThisiswheretheEU’sGlobalGatewayinitiative(Tagliapietra2024)–orthenewlyestablishedCleanTradeandInvestmentPartnerships(CTIPs)–mightplayaroleindevelopingresilientgreensupplychains,especiallywithpartnersintheGlobalSouth,becomingtheexportarmofanewEUindustrialpolicywhilehelpingeconomicdevelopmentinpartnercountries.Whilesupplydiversificationisoneelementofreducingvulnerability,technologicaladvancementremainsequallyimportant.Increasedcirculareconomyandinnovationmeansthatnewindustriescanstockpile,reuse,andrecyclecriticalmaterials,aswellasfindlessmineral-intensivesolutions,therebyincreasingoverallefficiencyandloweringgeopoliticalrisks.

Third,decliningfossilfueldemandcreatesrisksforfossilfuel–producingnations.Re-ducedexportrevenuesthreatenpolitical,social,andeconomicstabilityinregionslikeMENAandformerSovietstates.InEurope,poormanagementoftherelationshipwiththeseregionscouldsparksocialandpoliticalunrestwithspillovereffectsbeyondtheirborders.Thisriskrequirescontinueddiplomaticengagementforgradualtransitionsinexport-dependentcountries.Ifproperlymanaged,themoveawayfromfossilfuelscouldalsohelpreducerent-seeking,cronyism,andcorruptioninmanyofthosecoun-tries.Cross-borderrenewableenergytradecouldalsocreatenewinterdependenciesandpartnerships,givensufficientinvestmentsingenerationcapacityandinfrastructure(Franzaetal.2021).

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Fourth,thereisnoglobalmechanismthatcomprehensivelyaddressesthemulti-dimen-sionalandchangingfacetsofenergyandclimateneeds.Currently,forexample,energyiscoveredbyorganisationsthataremultilateralbuthavelownormativity,ororganisa-tionsthathaveselectivegeographicalmembershipor‘partisan’energyinterests(e.g.,consumersvs.suppliers)–somethingthatisclearlyshifting.Furthermore,thereisstillastarkdivisionbetween(national,regional,partisan)energygovernanceandinter-nationalclimategovernance,thelatterbeingmostlycoveredbytheUNFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC).Giventhataroundthreequartersofclimateactionisrelatedtotheenergytransition,itishardtounderstandhowconcreteprog-resscanbemadewithoutgreatersynergy(Franzaetal.2021).Moreover,theincreasingnexuseslinkingclimateandenergywithotherpolicyareas(e.g.,migration,security,justice)areincreasinglycomplextomanage,althoughtheyarecrucial.

Afinalconsiderationconcernstheelementsofjusticeinthetransition.Whiletacklingclimatechangeimpactscanonlybeacollective,globaljob,differentregions,coun-tries,andstakeholdersareapproachingthetransitionfromverydifferentconditionsorcircumstances.Forinstance,richercountries(includingthoseoftheEU)havehistori-callycoupledtheireconomicgrowthwithincreasedemissionsandarelargelyresponsi-blefortoday’sclimatechangeimpacts.Ontheotherside,certainregionsoftheworld

–particularlySub-SaharanAfrica–areunabletomeettheverybasicenergyneedsoftheirpopulationswhilesimultaneouslybeingdisproportionallyaffectedbytheimpactsofclimatechangethattheyhavenotcontributedtocreating.Partiesaroundtheworldhaveindeed‘commonbutdifferentiatedresponsibilitiesandrespectivecapabilitiestotakeclimateaction’–astapleoftheinternationalclimateconsensussincetheKyotoProtocol.A‘just’transitionisthustheonlypossibletransition,anditneedstocon-siderthesedisparities.Linkedtothisdebateisthereformoftheinternationalfinan-cialsystem,whosecurrentimbalancesweighdisproportionallyondevelopingcountries(Bekele2025).

InternalandexternalchallengesfortheEUintherunupto2035

Itisthusclearthatanequilibriumbetweencooperationandcompetitionisneededtoachievethetransitionontime.However,collaborationbetweencountriesisatrisk.Globalisedsupplychainsprovidesignificantlylowerpricesforrenewablesaroundtheworld,resultingintheirextensiveaccessandscalabilityinthepastdecades(Raimondietal.2023).AnewemphasisinEuropeon‘resilience’,‘strategicautonomy’,‘reshor-ing’,or‘friendshoring’someindustrialcapabilitiesduetogrowinggeoeconomicten-sionsisnowareality.Theseattemptstoredrawthemapofmanufacturinghubshave

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givenrisetosignificanttradetensionsthatmayultimatelyimpactdevelopment-ori-entedinvestmentsandthefutureofinclusiveandsustainableeconomicintegration.

Complicatingthesearchforabalancebetweendecarbonisation,trade,industry,andsustainabledevelopmentcooperationgoalsisthegrowingdistrustinmultilateralinsti-tutions’abilitytoaddressthesemulti-dimensionaltensions.Stronginstitutionsshouldinprincipleprovideplatformstoensurethatclimatepoliciesdonotdevolveintopro-tectionism,butitseemsthatthereisstilllittleinterestinadaptingortransforminginstitutionstonavigateanincreasinglycomplexglobalgovernancecontext(GrabbeandTagliapietra2025).

AnotherproblemisthecurrentcentralityofpolicyareasforwhichEuropehasfragileorstillembryonicinstruments–cleanindustrialpolicyinparticular.Formanyyears,Euro-peaninstitutionshaveoftenseenindustrialandcompetitionpolicyasbeingintension,andthepursuitofdecarbonisationgoalsinEuropehasremainedrelativelydisconnectedfromareflectionontheindustrialdimensionofthetransition.Withinthisframework,adifficultbalancingexerciseemergesforEuropebetweenpursuingdecarbonisation,achieving(open)strategicautonomyingreensupplychains,andmaintainingfiscaldis-cipline.Thistrilemmaopensnewareasofcontention,especiallyrelatedtoeconomicinstrumentssuchasrelaxationsinfiscaldisciplineforclimategoalsorthedevelopmentofadditionalcommonfiscalinstruments(GiuliandBianchi2023).Onthisdomain,EUmemberstatesarestillveryfragmented.

Intheshorttomediumterm,thepoliticisationandpolarisationofclimatepoliciesisoneincreasingchallengeforaspeedytransition.Technologicalprogressandinnovation,fallingclean-techcosts,publicandprivatefunding,andconsumerdemandhavebeentheprimarydriversofcleanenergyadoptionoverthepastthreedecades,andtheywillremainessentialforthecontinuedexpansionoftheseenergysourcesglobally.Theseelementsrequireclearandstablepolicyframeworks,whicharenowchallengedinEuropebystrongerresistancetoclimatepolicies.AlthoughtheEuropeanCommission(whichinprincipleremainscommittedtotheGreenDeal)isthekeyactorinkeepingclimatepolicyonthedefinedtracks,theCommissionitselfisnowshowingamuchmoreprudentapproachtowardsgreendossiers–inmanycases,proposingsimplifiedrulesorwithdrawingproposals(BianchiandSangiorgio2025).

Moneyisanotherfundamentalproblem.Forinstance,awideruseofelectricvehiclesrequirescharginginfrastructure,andmoreefficienthousesneedretrofitting.Theseandmanyotherprocessesrequirefunding.Sustaininghomegrownmanufacturingbaseshasproventobeveryexpensiveaswell:forexample,Northvolt–longconsideredanindustrialchampion–hasfailedtostayoperational.Incentivestoensurethatcitizensandindustriesdrivedemandtowardsdifferent(cleaner)solutionsarealsoanessentialpartoftheequation.Asthepost-Covidfundingwaveends,thedebateaboutcapital

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mobilisationiskey,especiallyastheEUfacesmanyothercontingentspendingpriorities(namely,securityanddefence).SomeoptionshavebeenproposedintheframeworkoftheCleanIndustrialDeal(BianchiandSangiorgio2025),andresearchhasshownthatthereisnotrade-offbetweendefenceandclimatespending(Tagliapietra2025).Ingen-eral,asthechallengeiscommon,itisalsohardtoimaginetherequiredaccelerationofthetransitionwithoutadvancedcountries’financialsupportbeingsteppedup.

Againstthisbackground,theinstitutionalecosysteminEuropeisstillunpreparedtogovernthesechallenges,andtheEUfacesdifficultiesinfindingandprojectingacohe-siveandcoherentresponsebeyonditsborders(GrabbeandTagliapietra2025).Inthepastinstitutionalcycle,theCommissiontriedto‘mainstream’climatepoliciesbothattheinternalleveland,withsignificantlyfewerresults,inforeignpolicy.Thelastdecadehascertainlyseenagrowingnexusbetweenclimate,economy,andenergy,and,inpol-icyterms,‘nexusthinking’hasbeenpermeatingEuropeanforeignandsecuritypolicy.However,theEUisstillfarfromwhereitshouldbe.Despitetheseevidentweaknesses,theEUaimstoinfluenceclimatepoliciesbeyonditsbordersandsupportthemultilater-alclimateagendainajustandorderlyway,anditscontinuationalsoplaysanenablingandlegitimisingrolefordomesticclimatepolicies.Thesecouldtaketheformof‘capandtrade’market-basedmechanisms,carbontaxes,bansonimportingcommoditiesthatdonotrespectcertainstandards,regulations,orfundinginstruments–thespe-cificsdonotmatter,solongassuchpoliciesareeffectiveininducingdecarbonisation.However,manyEUmeasuresimpactingThirdWorldcountriesshouldbetterconsiderthesecountries’perceptionsandpreparednesstonavigateitsimplications(GrabbeandTagliapietra2025).

Possiblescenarios

Giventhestructuralandcontingentchallengesanalysedabove,differentscenariosinthe2025–2035decadearethuspossible.TheEUcouldhaveastrongorweakroleasaclimateleader,itcouldfind(ornot)abalancebetweencooperationandcompetition,andtheblocmayormaynotbecohesiveandreadytoanticipateandaddressglobalrisks.

AfirstscenariowouldseetheEUloseitsactiveroleinthetransitionandhaveaweakglobalrole.Institutionally,climatediplomacyinEuropewouldcontinuetobespreadacrossfunctionsandinstitutions,withoutsufficientincentivestocoordinateeffectively.Similarly,anuncleardivisionofresponsibilitieswouldmakeclimate-relatedactionsalowpriorityinexternalrelations.Intermsofpolicy,theEUwouldabandonitsclimatemainstreamingapproachandreinforceasiloedapproach,withlowprioritygiventoadvancingclimatemitigationandadaptationpolicies.Inthisscenario,theEUfaces

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strongerdistrustfromGlobalSouthpartnersbecauseitsregulations,tools,andpoliciesimpactingThirdWorldcountriesareill-designedandthusperceivedasnegativeandhostile,withmorepenalisingaspectsforpartnerscomparedtobenefits.Asdevelopingcountrieshavemanypartnerstochoosefrom,tieswithEuropewouldnotbeperceivedasapriority.ThisscenariowouldentailweakerESGcriteriaintraderelations:whileinrecentyearstheEUhasmovedtowardssubstantiatingthesustainabledevelopmentchaptersinitstradeagreements,thiswouldnotbeanessentialelementoffuturefreetradedeals.Similarly,theestablishedcarbonborderadjustmentmechanism(CBAM),settoenterintoforcein2026,wouldbeabandonedordiluted,aswellasmanyoth-erregulationsimpactingbeyondborders(e.g.,EUDR).Theprincipleof‘commonbutdifferentiatedresponsibility’wouldcreateevenmoretensionsbetweenGlobalNorthandGlobalSouthpartners,andtheEUwouldnotplayarelevantroleinlevellingthem.Finally,inthisscenario,consensusonthetransitionwouldbelackingbothinternallyandexternally.

AnoppositescenariowouldseetheEUreinforcingitsgreenvisionandtrulyembracingitsleadershiproleinglobalgovernancereformandinthestrengtheningofajustgreenagenda.TheEUwouldworktobreakdowntheremainingsilosattheinstitutionallevelandreinforceitsabilitytocapturethecomplexitiesofclimategovernanceinitsin-ternalandforeignreach.WhiletheEUwoulduseeverypolicyandtoolinitspowertosupportamultilateralorderlymanagementofthetransition,itwouldsimultaneouslysupportandguidethesmallestclimateclubsthatmightwanttospeeduptheirefforts.Inthisscenario,theEUwouldincreasinglysupportmitigationeffortsaroundtheworldandtherelatedfinancialneeds,whileadaptationefforts–stronglyadvocatedforinGlobalSouthcountries–wouldcontinuetolagbehindtheactualrequestsofdevelopingareas.However,attentiononadaptationwouldgrow,andtheEUwouldbeanadvocateandengagewithglobalpartnerstoincreasefinancialflowsonadaptationandlossanddamage,recognisedasfundamentalelementsofajusttransition.Internally,theEUwouldbeabletodefineitscompetitivenessagenda(i.e.,whatsectorsanddomainstowhichitshouldapplyitsattentionandfinancialresources);externally,itshouldaccord-inglysetuppartnershipstominimiseitsremainingvulnerabilities,shiftingitsnarrativefromastrategic‘a(chǎn)utonomy’toastrategic‘interdependence’withincreasingattentiononESGstandardsalongthevaluechains.

AthirdscenariowouldseetheEUadvancingitsregulatorypoweronclimatechangewithoutreallyengagingonasustainableglobalreformorconsideringitsclimateagen-da’seffectsbeyonditsborders.Internally,theblocwouldimplementmeasuresthatimpactThirdWorldcountrieswithoutattentiontothesocial,political,andeconomicimpactsasperceivedbypartners.RetaliatorymeasureswouldthusincreaseagainsttheEU,reinforcingdistrustamongcountriesandworseningcooperation–asidefrom

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ThirdWorldcountries’accesstoEUmarkets.Fiercecompetitioninthecleantechspacewouldalsoarise,makingitdifficulttoachievethetransitionontimeandinacost-effi-cientmanner.Partners’consensusondecarbonisationprocesseswouldfade,alongwithinternalconsensus,asEUcitizensandindustrieswouldbebearingtheeconomicandsocialcostsofcarbonleakage.

AfourthscenarioseestheEUlosinganyleadershipambitioninbothclimateactionandthereformofsustainableglobalgovernance.Here,the‘justice’elementofdecarboni-sationisignored,andthereisnourgencyinadvancingthetransitionbothinternallyandexternally.Consequently,climatefinanceflows–forbothmitigationandadaptation

–areredirectedawayfromthetransitiontowardsotherpriorities.Similarly,theinter-nationalfinancialsystemwouldnotbereformed,anddevelopingcountrieswouldfacegrowingproblemsinrespondingtobothmitigationandadaptationneeds.AttentiontosupplychaintransparencyandESGcriteriawouldfade,leadingtomissedopportunitiesfortheEUandpartnercountries.Suchascenariowouldalsoincreasinglyfuelinstabilityaroundtheworld,aslittlecoordinationwouldbepossibleoninternationaltrade,anddisparitieswouldincrease.

VisualisingarealisticagendaforEurope

Fragmentationisnotanoptionintoday’sEurope.Inthenextmonths,manyimportantGreenDea