PRIMER

AUGUST2025

COUNTER-

www.cenjows.in

UNMANNED

AERIALSYSTEMSARCHITECTURE

BRIGANSHUMANNARANG(RETD)

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PRIMER–COUNTER-

UNMANNEDAERIALSYSTEMS

ARCHITECTURE

Abstract

TheIndianPrimeMinisterModi’sannouncementon15August2025ofIndia’sindigenous“SudarshanChakraMission’,rivallingIsraeliIronDome,forcreatingadefencewallagainstmulti-domainthreatsisthemostneededdefencecapabilityenhancementinthenextdecade.Inadronesinfestedenvironmentwithtacticalbattle-spacemajorlydominatedbyMulti-DomainUnmannedVehicles(MDUVs),CounterUnmannedAerialSystems(C-UAS)architectureisthemostessentialcomponentoftheoverallRockets-Artillery-Air-Missiles-Drones(RAAMD)defensiveshield“SudarshanChakra”toprotectIndia’sstrategic,civilianandhighvaluelocationsfromattempteddronestrikesbyouradversariesandanti-nationalelements.TheC-UASkillchainprimarilyinvolvesdetection,identification,trackingandmitigationofallincomingdrones,MDUVsandevenswarms.Withanever-growingvarietyandcontinuoustechnologicaladvancementindrones’domain,C-UASsolutionsare

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alreadylaggingbehindandnosingletechniquecanprovideacomprehensiveanti-dronesolution.Hence,thenationalmulti-frontC-UASarchitecturerequiresmulti-layeredandmulti-disciplinarydetectionsystemsspreadacrossalllevels,multi-tieredandmulti-domaintrackingandidentificationandmostimportantlyahybridmixofsoft-killandhard-killoptionstomitigatedrones’threatwithoutanycollateraldamage.

Theeasyaccessibilityofdronesanditscomponentshasmadethedrones’threatubiquitousinternallyandexternally.Hence,theC-UASconceptsareapplicableacrossthenation-centralandstategovernments,military,border/coastaldefenceforces,para-militaryandpoliceincludingCRPFandCAPF.Thisprimeron“C-UAS”architecturehasthusexaminedthecurrentdrones’threat,evolvingdronesandC-UAStechnologies,tacticalconcepts,C-UASstructures,andthenrecommendedtheC-UASconceptualcontours,platformsandorganisationsforbuildingacomprehensiveC-UASarchitectureaspartofthenational“SudarshanChakraMission”.

KeyWords

C-UAS,UVs,RAAMD,Kill-Chain,UnmannedAerialSystems(UAS),ArtificialIntelligence(AI),ElectronicWarfare(EW),RadioFrequency(RF),Indigenisation

BasicTerminology.It’sveryimportanttosimplifythekeytermsforalaymanbeforeprogressingaheadwiththisprimerastheyhavebeenusedinthisdocument.

?UV–Anyvehicleinanydomainwhichisunmanned.

?UAV–Anyaerialvehiclewhichisunmanned.Alsocalleddrone.

?UGV–Anyvehicleonlanddomainwhichisunmanned.

?USV/UUV–Anyvehicleonseasurface/underwaterwhichisunmanned.

?UAS–AsystemwhichincludestheUAV,agroundcontrolstation(GCS)tocontroltheUAVandobserveitsmissioninformationandthecrew.

?sUAS–SmallUASorsmalldrone.AlsocalledGroup1UAVwithlessthan9kgweight

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?MALE/HALE–MediumAltitude/HighAltitudeLongEnduranceDrone.

?UCAV–AnyUAVwithacombatexplosivepayloadonit.AlsocalledweaponisedUAV.

?LoiteringMunition–AnyUAVdesignedtosearchforatargetwhilebeingairborneandstrikethetargetoncedetectedandtriggertheintegrated

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payloadtoexplode

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IranianShahedisanexample.ThesearealsocalledOneWayAttack(OWA)orkamikazedrones.

?FirstPersonView(FPV)Drone–AUAVwiththetargetviewbeingprovidedonthegogglesofthepilotdirectlyiscalledaFPVdrone.

?C-UAS–AnarchitecturetodisruptthefunctioningofadversarialUASoranyroguedrone.

?OFC–OpticalFibreCableisacableusedtotetheradroneandpassingcommandsfromtheoperatortothedrone.

?SwarmDrones–Swarmofdronesistheemploymentoftwoormoredronestechnically.Thus,twoormoredronesbeinglaunchedtogetherindependentlybydifferentpilotsbutinthesameareacanbetermedasaswarm.However,itsclaimedfullformis‘SmartWarfightingArrayofReconfiguredModule’.Thus,amutuallycoordinatedandfunctioninggroupofdronescommunicatingamongsteachotherisactuallyaswarm.

Introduction

“Inthenexttenyears,by2035,Iwanttoexpand,strengthen,andmodernisethis

nationalsecurityshield.DrawinginspirationfromLordShriKrishna,wehavechosen

thepathoftheSudarshanChakra…ThenationwillbelaunchingtheSudarshan

ChakraMission.Theentiresystemshouldberesearched,developedand

manufacturedinIndia,harnessingthetalentofouryouth.Thispowerfulsystem

willnotonlycounterterroristattacksbutalsostrikebackattheterrorists…Indiaaims

todevelopitsownIronDome-likedefencesystem,namedMissionSudarshan

Chakra,designedtosafeguardcriticalsites,includingcivilianareas.”

-IndianPrimeMinisterNarendraModi,15August2025

TheIndianPrimeMinister’sclarioncallfor“SudarshanChakra”defensiveshield,fromtheRedForton15August2025,isaclearindicatoroftheomnipresentdrones’threattoourstrategicsiteswhethermilitaryorcivilianlikedams,andevenournationalpridelocationsorhighvaluetargets.WhileIndiaemergedvictoriousinOperationSINDOORbyleavingPakistanmilitarywithnoresponseoptionsonthemorningof10May2025,thedailyincursionsof300-500ChineseandTurkishdroneslaunchedfromPakistan’s

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soilhighlightedourvulnerabilitiesdespitenosignificantdamageinthose86-90hours.AcomprehensiveC-UASgridisthusanecessitytodayatalllevelswithinmilitaryfromariflecompanytoHQIDSandstrategicsites,incivilfromabordervillagetoourParliamentandsimilarlyacrossallotherentitiesfromdamsonInduswaterstootherHighValueObjectivesfortheadversary.

GreekphilosopherPlato’sproverb“NecessityisthemotherofInvention”isthemostapplicableproverbamidstthetechnologycatandmousegamebetweendronesandC-UASplatforms.Droneswereinventedbytechnologicallyadvancednationstomeetthecriticalnecessityofminimisinghumancasualtieswhichwereincreasinglynotacceptableinprogressivelytransparentbattlespacewhereeveryoperationwaswatchedworldover.UVswereinductedtoreplacethehumancapitalinperformingthedangerous,difficult,destructiveanddulltasks.Nowthatthosedroneshavebecomeextremelydisruptivecausingimmensehumancasualtiesanddestructionofcivilianinfrastructure,thereisaninescapablenecessitytoprotectthehumancapitalbyestablishingamulti-layeredC-UASgrid.Theminiaturisationofdronesunderthelatestcombatproverbof“Bigisn’tBeautifulAnymore”hasasymmetricallymagnifiedthethreatofdisruptivecostimpactwhereinalow-costsmalldronecandestroyamuchlargerextremelycostlyplatform.Myanmar’sresistancegroup’stargetingofmilitary’sMi-17HelicopterbyOFC-controlledFPVdrone,Ukraine’stargetingofexpensiveRussianstrategicbombersbycellularnetworkcontrolledFPVdronesandthetargetingofIranianSAMsitesbyIsrael’sMossadagentsbylocallyassembleddronesamplyprovethisproverbandthatC-UASarchitectureisrequiredacrossthelengthandbreadthofthecountryandnotonlyalongtheborders.

AllrecentandongoingconflictshavehighlightedthatonesingleC-UASsolutionwillnotsolvethevariety,quantumanddensityofdronesinfestingthemodernbattlespace.WhetherbeitOperationSINDOORorMyanmar’songoingcivilwarbeingfoughtbybothsideshavingChinesedrones’fleetbutadoptingUkrainiantactics,orthenever-endingRussia-Ukrainewarorthere-occurringIran-Isreal-Houthisdrones-missilesbouts,eachsidehasattemptedtoinnovativelysaturateandexhausttheadversarialADwithleastpossiblecostsandoutsmarttheotherinthetechnologicalfield.MajorstrategicsurprisesandvictorieshavebeenachievedbythesmallestdronesdespitetheexistenceofaneffectiveC-UASgrid.Thus,it’sclearthatC-UASarchitecturemust

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bedynamic,alert24x7detectingsmallestofthreats,warningallimpacted,andmostimportantlymitigatingthethreattemporallyandspatiallywithzerocollateraldamage.

Thisprimerwillthusfirstdescribethedynamicsofthepervasivedrones’threat,andthenidentifythekeycomponentsandtechnologieswithinthedroneswhichcanbetargetedtomitigatethethreat.Inthenextpart,theprimerwillanalysethevariousanti-drone/C-UAStechnologiessuccessfullytestedgloballyandstudyIndia’sprimeindigenousC-UASplatforms.ItwillthendescribethevariousC-UASstructuresvalidatedbytheopposingsidesintheongoingconflicts.ThemajorfocusoftheprimerwillthenbetoproposeacomprehensiveC-UASarchitecturefortheIndian,recommendcertainessentialconcretestepstobeundertakenbyallstakeholdersandsummarisetime-basedC-UASessentialsteps.

ThreatfromDrones

“Thelowcost,easeofavailability,andincreasingautonomyofdroneshavemade

themtheweaponofchoicefornon-stateactorsandinsurgentgroups.Fromthe

smugglingofnarcoticsacrossthePunjabbordertotheairdroppingofarmsin

Jammu&Kashmir,droneshaveproventobeeffectivetoolsforasymmetricwarfare.

The2021JammuAirForceStationdroneattackwasawake-upcall.Inunderfive

minutes,twosmalldronesdroppedexplosivesonthestationpremises—nofighter

pilot,nowarningradarsignature,notraditionalengagementpossible.Itwasn’tjusta

breachofphysicalspace;itwasabreachofperception.Theenemydidn’tneeda

missile—theyjustneededadronewithGPSandintent.”

-GroupCaptainMJAugustineVinod,RetiredandCOO,AutoMicroUAS,23March2025

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Whetherbeitfloodsandearthquakesrequiringdisastermanagementassistance,orcontrollingfiremishaps,cleaningofrailwaytrains,mappingoflandbyurbandepartments,sprayingofpesticidesbyfarmers,repairofelectricitypowerline,trafficcontrolbypolice,deliveryofbloodurgently,aerialphotographyinamarriageorcricketmatch,orcombatreconnaissanceofenemydispositions,dronesaretrulydual-purposeandreplacinghumanswhereverpossibletoundertakeawidevarietyoftasks.Onthecombatbattlespace,smalldroneshavedemocratizedprecisionstrikesby

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becoming“SECTIONCOMMANDERKATOPKHANA”.sUAShavetransformedthebattlespaceandenhancedtheareasofinterestandinfluencemuchbeyondtheareasofresponsibility.Apropos,thecommercialdronemarketisappreciatedtowitnessacompoundannualgrowthrateof25.82%toexpandfromamarketvalueofINR74002croresin2022toINR462489croresby2030

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Thissurgeindrones’industryhassignificantlyenhancedtheaccessibilityofdronesanditscomponents.Thus,rogueoradversarydrones(andevenowndronessimilarlyagainsttheenemy)canperformawidevarietyoftaskswhichautomaticallyspanawidevarietyofthreatspectrumnecessitatinginstitutionalisationofC-UAStoolkit.

?Persistent24x7Intelligence,SurveillanceandReconnaissance(ISR).Withinthemilitary,dronesinconjunctionwithspace-basedsatelliteshavetransformedtheISRmethodologymakingthebattlespacetrulytransparent.Thesayingnowgoes“Ifyouarestillanduncovered,youareboundtogetdetected”.

?ExplosivepayloadsDeliveryforDestruction.Thesayingfurthercontinuesthat“Ifyouaredetected,youareboundtodie”simplymeaning“DestructionEqualsDestruction”.Thus,ahunter-killercombinationoftwoseparatedronesisbeingusedtoundertakemaximumdestruction.

?Kamikaze/self-destructionbyOWA/Kamikazedrones/LoiteringMunition.It’ssimplyadronewhereinthehuntergoeslookingoutforitskillbutdoesn’treturnasitcarriesoutJapaneseWorld-WarIIstylekamikazemissionsbydestroyingthetargetbyself-destructionoverit.

?Bombing.Likethemuchheavystrategicbomberaircrafts,thelow-costsmalldronesarebeingadequatelyexploitedtobombtargetedareaswithmortarbombs,grenadesoranylocallyimprovisedexplosives.

?SmugglingofgoodsasregularlyundertakenbyPakistanagainstIndia.IndianBorderSecurityForce(BSF)hadseized107Pakistanidronesin2023,neutralised294dronesin2024andhasshotdown175dronesfromJanuarytoJuly2025.WithPakistanismugglersnowflyingChinese

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drones

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atmorethan1kmaltitude,theyhavenowgraduallyincreasedtheincursionsto4-5kmacrossIB

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?ElectronicWarfare(EW)andCommunicationDisruption.Drones

carryingRFandGNSSjammersaspayloadstodisruptcommunicationandnavigationsignals.

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?CommunicationRelay.Dronescarrycommunicationrelayequipmenttoestablishanaerialrelaystationtherebyextendingthecommunicationrange.UkrainiansoftenloadedStarlinksatelliteterminalsonboardthedronestoextendcommunication.

?DirectionofArtilleryFire.Dronesareusedtoincreasetheprecisionofconventionalunguidedartillerybyaccuratelyguidingitonthetarget.

?RaidsorAmbushes.Drones,particularlyFPVvariety,areincreasinglybeingusedforraidsandambushesaswitnessedinattacksbyMyanmar’sresistancegroups’raidsofMyanmarAirForce’smilitaryairfields,duringOperationSPIDERWEBbyUkraineagainstRussiaandOperationRISINGLIONbyIsraelagainstIran.

?Disruptionorinterferencewithenemyoperations.

?Mine-layinganddemining.

?Gunplatforms.TurkishSongardroneshavemountedMGstoengagetroopsonground.

?InterceptionofEnemyDrones/Helicopters.ThisnewmissionwasfirsttestedwhenUkrainiansusedChineseDJIMavicdronestoramRussiandronesinend2022.WhileUkrainianstargetedRussianhelicopterswithdronesforthefirsttimeinJuly2024,

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Myanmar’sresistancegroupscopiedthesametacticstodestroyTatmadaw’sMi-17helicopters.

?DataInfiltrationandCyberHacking.Dronesarenowbeingplannedforlandingonrooftopsofdatacentresforplantingwirelessintrusiondevices.UkrainianshaveeffectivelyusedthemtohackintoCCTVnetworksofRussiantowns.

aThedronesaremainlyDJIMavicseriesmanufacturedatShenzheninChina.Withmaximumaltitudecapabilityof6km,andspeedof75kmph,theyreachmaximumrangeof30kmwithRFcontrolandenduranceof40minutes.Fewclaimsarethatthesedroneshaveevenreached20kmacrossIBonfewoccasions.

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?PsychologicalWarfare.DroneshavebeeneffectivelyemployedbyMyanmar’sresistancegroupstomaintaincontinuouspressureonMyanmarmilitarytroopsthroughfearandintimidation.RussiansandUkrainianshaveuseddronesforrunningtheirdisinformationandpropagandacampaigns.

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?Logistics.

?PopulationControl.ChineseeffectivelyuseddronesforpopulationcontrolandbroadcastingmessagesduringCOVIDpandemic.

?Decoys.DronedecoysarebeingincreasingemployedbyRussianstosaturateUkrainianADtherebyenhancingthepenetrationoftheircombatdronesandmissiles.

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?CivilTasks.Logisticsdelivery,policingdutieslikeVIPsecurity,bomb-detection,trafficmanagementandcrowdcontrol,agricultureetc.IndianMHA’sDronesStudyReportclaimsthat“Droneswithdigitaldognosesensorscouldreplaceactualdogsforsniffingofexplosivesforfindingillegaldrugs;detectinggasleaks;detectingviruses;detectingchemicalweapon/toxicchemicals”

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?CounterInsurgencyOperations.Roadopening,drones’-basedcordonandconvoyprotection.

?MappingandcreatingDigitalElevationModelsespeciallywithLiDAR.

Inadditiontoadversarialdronethreats,thereisalsoapossibilityofant-nationalelementsacquiringaNTPT

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compliantdrone

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forciblyorofunintentionalriskydrones-

?Technicalfailures,lossofcontrolinbadweatherconditionsorbreakdownsduetounknownreasons.

?Inadequateknowledgeofpoliciesandrulesleadingtonon-compliance/violationsinhighsecurityareas

b“NoPermissionNoTake-off”isasoftwarewhichenablesRPA/UASexceptnanocategorytoobtainflyingpermissioninIndiathroughDigitalSkyplatform.Morethan6lakhsunregisteredornonNTPTcompliantdroneswerepresentinIndiaasof2019.

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Havingdiscussedthebroaddynamicsofdrones’threat,it’simportanttounderstandthekeycomponentsofdronesandthemajortechnologicaladvancements.Thenextpartoftheprimerwillthusfocusonthosedrones’componentsandtechnologieswhichcanbetargetedbyC-UASplatformstomitigatethethreat.

DronesTechnologiesandComponents

TounderstandtheconceptualcontoursofC-UASarchitecture,it’sfirstimportanttounderstandthecriticalcomponentsofanydrone/UV/UAV,thecompleteUnmannedAerialSystem(UAS)andthelatesttechnologicaladvancementswhichcanbeeffectivelytargeted.

CommunicationSystems.AnUAVbecomespartofUASwhereintheUAVcommunicateswiththeGroundControlSystem(GCS)toreceivecommandsandtransmitbacktargetinformation/video.Thus,acommanddataandvideotransmissionlinkbetweentheGCSandtheUAVisessentialinanyUAS.Manyprogressivetechnologicaldevelopmentshavehappenedinthisfield.

?RadioFrequency(RF).AllotmentoftwoRFsfromtheexistingelectromagnetic(EM)spectrum–oneforcommandanddatacommunicationandoneforvideotransmissionbackwerefoundessentialinabasicUAS.However,thesewerefixedstandardRF.Theknowndronecommunicationbandsare433MHz,868MHz,915MHz,2.4GHzand5.8GHz

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withinwhichFPVdronesgenerallyuse2.4and5.8GHzbands

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?FrequencyHopping(FH).AstheRFjammersstartedjammingthecommunicationlinkagesbetweentheGCSandtheUAV,theUASgraduatedtoFHcommunication.ByshiftingtoSoftware-definedradios(SDR),droneproducersadoptedspread-spectrumRFforovercomingfixedfrequencyjammingwithoutanyadditionalpayloadconstraints.

?Non-StandardFrequencies.AstheRFjammersalsogotenabledbySDRtoundertakemultipleRFjamming,theUASgraduatedtofrequencymanipulationtoworkonnon-standardfrequenciesoutsidethemonitoringrangeofC-UASplatforms.Hamas,intheir07October2023attack,mostlikelyusedRFintheirdronesbeyondIsraeliRFdetectionsystems

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?DualBandRadios.Droneshavealsoevolvedtousetwoonboarddualbandradiostomaintaintheircommunicationlink.Thus,whileonebandgetsjammed,thedronecanstillcommunicateusingthesecondband.

?CellularMobiles.WiththedesireofRussiaandUkrainebothtousetacticalsmalldronesatstrategicdepths,cellularsimcardsforinternet-basedcommunicationwereincorporatedindronestoenhancetherangesofcontrolbythedrones’operators.

?AIEnabled/ImprovisedElectronics.WiththeadvancementsofSDRjammerstoundertakemulti-bandjamming,drones’producersincorporatedimprovisedelectronicsandAIalgorithmsonboarddronestoevadeEWjammersandspoofers.RussianOrlan-10displayedadvancedautonomousflightcapabilitiesin2023therebymakingUkrainianEWineffective.

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EvenMyanmarJuntathuswentontoprocuretheRussianOrlan10dronesin2024.Intelligentisationofdroneshasallowedittoidentifyjammingpattern,automaticallyclassifythreatsandthereafterrestoredisruptedsignals.Deeplearning(DL),MachineLearning(ML)andReinforcementLearning(RL)methodsfacilitatesmartEMspectrummanagementandintroducewaveformagilitytoevadedetection.

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?OFC.WiththeprogressivecapabilityofjammerstoundertakeAIenabledjamming,dronesgraduatedtoOFCoperateddronesmainlyOFCFPVdrones.ThisconceptthenledtotheevolutionofMotherOFCdroneorevenaUnmannedGroundVehicle(UGV)likeUkrainianKarakurtwhichcancarryandfurtherlaunchOFCFPVdronestherebyachievingmuchlongerranges.

?QuantumProofing.Quantumchipsarenowbeingdevelopedtoquantumproofthecommunicationofdronesmakingithackingproof.

ElectronicComponents.TheelectroniccomponentsaregenerallydominatedbytheChineseincludingthemicrochipsandtransistors.

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Motors.AlthoughmanyChinesedrones’motorsaredefectiveasseenintheTurkishYiha-IIIdronealso,thevastmajorityofmotors,whethercompleteorincomponentsforlaterassembly,arestillprimarilyimportedfromChina.

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Navigation.Classically,mostdroneshaveusedGlobalNavigationSatelliteSystem(GNSS)signalsfornavigationfromvariousconstellationsliketheAmericanGPS,RussianGLONASS,EuropeanGalileoandChineseBeidou.However,GPSsignaljammingandspoofingarethenewnormstointerferewiththedrones.Hence,thedrones’manufacturersarenowadaptingAIenabledalternatenavigationtechnologies.QuantumnavigationisthenexttechnologyadvancementbeingattemptedtoendrelianceonGNSSchips.

AIModules.Withmorebattlespacedatabeinggeneratedwitheveryconflict,AImodulesonboarddrones,arebecomingmorepowerfulinevadingC-UASmeasures,automaticallyidentifyingtargetsandengagingthem.ChinesemadeAImodulesareextremelycheaptoday.AnAutomaticTargetRecognition(ATR)andautonomousflightmoduleforFPVdronecostslessthan500USDonAlibaba.Apostby“AutonomousWarfare”onLinkedInon15August2025amplifiedthatAI-enablementorIntelligentisationindrones,called‘AutonomousWarfareOntology’encompasses“Unmannedsystemsacrossair,land,maritime,space,andcyberdomains;Levelsofautonomyandcontrolmodes;Human–machineinteractionparadigms;Missiontypesundertakenbyautonomoussystems;AIcapabilitiesenablingautonomy;andtheoperationaldomainsinwhichthesesystemsfunction”.Withadiagrambelow,theLinkedInaccountexplainsthesameincaseofloiteringmunitionas:-

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“LoiteringMunition(1.1.1)—OperatingatAutonomyLevel3(2.3)withHuman-on-the-Loop(3.2)oversight,conductingaStrikeMission–Kinetic(4.2.1)usingAI-based

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TargetRecognition(5.5)inaContestedUrbanEnvironment(7.7,7.8).”

Figure1:AICapabilitiesforDrones

(Source-AutonomousWarfare

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)

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AIhasenhancedthedronethreatmanifoldbymakingdronesautonomousorsemi-autonomousthroughvarietyofMLalgorithmsforAutomaticTargetRecognition(ATR),nearreal-timedecisionmakingattacticallevelandswarmdrones’decentralisedcoordination;enhancingISRorsituationalawarenessthroughcomputervision,automaticflightplanning,obstacleavoidanceandautonomousnavigationinGNSSdeniedenvironment;facilitateedgecomputingforreal-timedataprocessing;andthoughnaturallanguageprocessingforenhancedmachine-machineandhuman-machineinteraction.

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QuantumTechnology.InadditiontoQuantumnavigation,Quantumtechnologyisbeingdevelopedfordronesatadvancedstagesforestablishingquantumcommunicationlinks

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,havingquantumsensorsasISRpayloadsandalsouseQuantumAI(QAI)foradvanceddrones’management.

Payloads.WithavarietyofpayloadslikeISR,SyntheticApertureRadars(SAR),communication,logisticsandmostimportantlytheexplosivepayloads,thevarietiesofdronesaregraduallyincreasingtoundertakethemultitudeofmissionstoperformthedisruptive,dull,dangerous,difficultanddestructivetasks.

FutureDevelopments.TheChineseandfewothercountriesarenowfieldingbiologicallyinspireddroneswhicharereplicatingbirdsorinsectsandsimultaneouslyworkingoncyber-autonomousdroneswhichoperatecompletelyindependentlywithoutanyC2links.

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C-UASTechnologies

Whilethefirsttwopartsoftheprimerfocussedonthedrones’threatandthedrones’componentsandtechnologies,thispartshallundertakeadetailedanalysisoftheC-UAStechnologiesavailableglobally,thesuccessfultechnicaladvancementsandwillidentifythestrengthsandweaknessesofeachofthem.

AsperthemaincomponentsofanyUASdevelopeddiscussedabove,aC-UASgridshouldthusfirstdetecttheUASasadversarialandtargettheconstituentsystemstodisrupttheirfunctioning.Thus,thebasicbuildingblocksofanyC-UASkill-chainor

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evenbetterkill-webare-adetectionplatformtodetectanyUAVnearby;aCommandandControl(C2)systemtopositivelyidentifytheUAVasadversarial;andthenanengagementsystemtoeitherdestroyittermedashardkillordisableittermedassoftkill.

Detection.Detectionofdronescanmainlybeundertakenbyradarsbothpassiveandactivevarietysystems,visually,thermalsystems-electro-optic(EO)andInfrared(IR)bothlong-waveIR(LWIR)andmedium-waveIS(MWIR),RFdetectors,LiDARandacousticsensors.However,thebiggestchallengeforwidearrayofavailablemoderniseddetectionsensorsisthedetectionofsmalldrones(sUAS).Thesearecoveredinthesucceedingparagraphs.

EO/IROpticalCameras.EOcamerasdisplaythereflected/emittedthermalsignalsofthedroneinvariousbands-NearIR(NIR),Short-waveIR(SWIR),MWIRandLWIR

c

.Usuallymountedwithpanandtiltcontrolforautomation,theyhaveamaximumrangevaryingfrom500mto15kmdependingontheavailablelineofsight(LOS).ThecostrangeofEOcamerasvariesfrom20,000to500,000USD

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?Strengths.ThebiggestadvantageofEO/IRcamerasasadetectionplatformarethattheyareveryusefulforvisualclassificationandthenclassifyingdetecteddronebyemployingimagerecognitionVLMs

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?Effectiveinnon-RFenvironmenttoolikefordetectingOFCFPVdrones.

?FacilitateMultispectralfusioni.e.NIR,SWIR,MWIRandLWIR.

?Allowslow-costML/RL.

?Postconfirmationofenemydrone,itsdigitaltrackingiseasy.

?Weaknesses.Themajorweaknessistheadverseimpactofbadweatherandfog

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particularlyforthevisibleandNIRcameras.

?DependentonLOSandcannotfunctionbeyondvisualrange(BVR).HigherzoomisrequiredforsUASandbiggerdronesatlongerranges.

cVisibleband,mostsuitablefordaylightconditionsprovideshorizontalresolutionfrom1280to3840pixels;NIRismostaptforlowlightconditionsandprovidesaresolutionfrom704to2560pixels;bothvisibleandNIRaren