1、 資本價格與經濟結構外文文獻翻譯中英文 2020 英文The relative price of capital and economic structureRoberto SamaniegoAbstractAre trends in the price of capital technological in nature? First, we find that trends in the relative price of capital vary significantly across countries. We then show that a multi-industry grow

2、th model, calibrated to match differences in economic structure around the world and productivity growth rates across industries, accounts for this variation 一 mainly due to variation in the composition of capital. The finding indicates that the rate of change in the relative price of capital can be

3、 interpreted as investment-specific technical change the extent to which productivity growth is relatively more rapid in the capital-producing sector. The model also accounts for the empirical dispersion of investment rates, but not of rates of economic growth.Keywords: Investment-specific technical

4、 change, Multi-sector growth models, Structural transformation, Capital goods pricesIntroductionDeclines in the relative price of capital are viewed as an important factor of economic growth in the United States (US). See for example work by Hulten (1992), Greenwood et al. (1997), Cummins and Violan

5、te (2002) and Oulton (2007). These studies typically identify the decline in the price of capital as being technological in nature, reflecting faster productivity growth in the production of new capital than in the production of consumption and services - a phenomenon known as investment-specific te

6、chnical change (ISTC). However, the extent to which the relative price of capital declines in other countries is not known. In addition, it is not known whether trends in the price of capital around the world can be given a technological interpretation, such as ISTC. An alternative hypothesis is tha

7、t these differences are due to the presence of barriers to capital accumulation, as proposed by Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) to account for differences in levels of the price of capital.We begin by documenting that the rate at which the relative price of capital changesover time varies significantly

8、 across countries. We find that the median growth rate of the price of capital is zero. In addition, the price of capital increasesin as many places as it decreases. This indicates that, if there is a technological explanation for this phenomenon, technical progress in capital relative to other sect

9、ors must vary widely around the world.If the explanation is indeed technological, however, one would expect such glaring differences in productivity to be evidence of draconian barriers to international technology transfer (or trade). The alternative possibility is that capital and consumption are t

10、hemselves highly disaggregated, and that there are substantial differences in the composition of capital and consumption around the world that account for the aggregate differences in the trends in the relative price of capital.We ask whether this variation can be accounted for by differences in ind

11、ustry composition. The reason we do this is as follows. It is well known that rates of technical progress in the US differ significantly not just between capital and non-capital, but also across types of consumption, services and capital. Thus, even if productivity growth rates are constant across c

12、ountries for each industry, the rate of change in the relative price of capital may be different if the composition of capital or the composition of consumption and services is different. Indeed, we find that the composition of capital is skewed towards high-TFP growth capital types in countries whe

13、re the price of capital declines rapidly. We therefore ask: to what extent can differences around the world in industry composition account for variation in the rate at which the relative price of capital changes?To this end, we employ a canonical multi-industry growth model. In the model, the compo

14、sition of the economy evolves as a result of changes in prices of different goods or services that agents consume, as well as changes in the prices of different capital goods. In turn, these are determined by differences in productivity growth rates across industries.We calibrate the model using det

15、ailed productivity growth data from theUS, as well as data on the initial composition of economies around the world in the year 1991. We use constant productivity growth rates for a given industry in all countries partly because of data limitations; however, as mentioned, significant barriers to tec

16、hnological transfer would have to exist to significantly deviate from this assumption. Composition is a key part of the “ no barriers ” hypothesis.Strikingly, we find that the model delivers a close match to the rate of change in the relative price of capital, as measured using the Penn World Tables

17、 (PWT) version 7.1. In a statistical sense, the model can account for the entirety of the magnitude of variation of the growth rate in the relative price of capital over the period from 1983 to 2011, simply based on industry TFP growth rate differences and on differences in industry composition acro

18、ss countries. Not only does the model match the extent of variation, but also the correlations between model-generated capital price growth rates and those in the data are highly significant. We conclude that differences in the relative price of capital around the world can be interpreted as a techn

19、ological phenomenon ISTC and that a key factor behind these differences is industry composition.The link between composition and the decline in the relative price of capital could be for two reasons: differences in the composition of capital, or in the composition of non-capital. We refer to these p

20、ossibilities as the capital hypothesisand the consumption hypothesis, respectively. We study the importance of each hypothesis by removing productivity growth differences in the capital producing industries, and then separately removing them in the non-capital producing industries. We find that the

21、capital hypothesis is mainly responsible for cross-country variation in ISTC: removing productivity growth in non-capital makes very little difference to the results, whereas removing productivity growth in capital-producing industries results in model-generated statistics that bear little relations

22、hip with the data.Finally, we ask to what extent a growth model driven solely by these factors can account for differences in aggregate behavior across countries over the sample period. Specifically, we look at investment rates and rates of economic growth. This is a non-trivial task, as it requires

23、 solving for investment patterns in a model where conditions for a balanced growth path do not hold in general. We find that the model generates investment rates that are strongly correlated with investment rates in the PWT 7.1 data and the PWT 9.1 data, although they underpredict the extent of empi

24、rical variation in investment rates. Thus, the model is able to capture cross-country variation in both ISTC and (to a lesser extent) investment rates, solely based on differences in industry composition. However, the model does not generate a good match to variation in rates of economic growth in t

25、he PWT 7.1 data, nor in the PWT 9.1 data. We conclude thatthere is widespread divergence in the rate of ISTC around the world, and that this accounts for variation in investment, but that economic growth rates are due to other factors. Interestingly, when we give each country an aggregate productivi

26、ty trend that exactly matches its economic growth rate in the data, investment rates are no longer correlated with those in the data, suggesting that whatever factors do underlie rates of economic growth are not simply captured by a trend in productivity.The results contribute to a long-standing deb

27、ate regarding whether or not changes in the efficiency of investment are an important factor of growth. This debate goes back to Solow (1962), Abramovitz (1962) and Denison (1964). Greenwood et al. (1997) find that, in the US, more than half of economic growth can be accounted for by ISTC in a gener

28、al equilibrium growth accounting framework. We provide a clear answer to the question about whether differences in the relative price of capital can be attributed to barriers or to technological factors, indicating that changes in the efficiency of investment are an important factor affecting growth

29、 rates. This is not to say that there is no scope for barriers to be important for the relative price of capital; however, their impact might not be direct, but rather indirect, through their influence on economic composition. More broadly, this suggests that future work on the manner in which facto

30、rs of economic growth might be affected by policy through the channel of economic composition could be fruitful.DiscussionComments on institutionsWe find that the model without barriers accounts well for the empirical magnitude and variation in log? gq, solely on the basis of economic composition. O

31、n the other hand, our findings do leave the door open for institutional factors or other barriers to influence log? gq indirectly, through any impact they might have on economic composition.What might these determinants be? There is a precedent in the literature for the idea that policy or instituti

32、onal factors may affect composition. For example, Samaniego (2006) shows in an open-economy context that labor market regulationcan affect comparative advantage in industries depending on their rate of ISTC, skewing industrial composition towards industries that use capital types with low values of

33、gi (an effect termed high-tech aversion). Also, Ilyina and Samaniego (2012) show that when technology adoption requires external financing, financial underdevelopment also skews industrial composition towards low-tech industries. This begs the question as to whether any policy or institutional indic

34、ators might be statistically related to our findings. Of course, there is a question of reverse causality: political economy considerations imply that countries that depend on technological transfer rather than de novo innovation for growth mightadopt particular kinds of institutions, see for exampl

35、e Boldrin and Levine (2004). Given this, we briefly explore whether there is suggestive evidence of a link between log? gq in the data and institutions, without taking a stand on the direction of causality.Following Samaniego (2006) we look at firing costs (drawn from the World Bank, firing costs pa

36、id by workers with at least one years tenure, FC). We also look at other forms of regulation that have been found to be important for aggregate outcomes - namely product market regulation, measuredusing entry costs paid as a share of GDP, EC, as reported by the World Bank. See Moscoso-Boedo and Muko

37、yama (2012). Another possibility suggested by Ilyina and Samaniego (2012)is financial development, which we measure using FD, the credit-to-GDP ratio, as in King and Levine (1993). Data on FC, EC and FD arefrom the World Bank 1960 W010.In addition, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) and others argue that f

38、inancial development is ultimately derived from the state of contracting institutions and property rights institutions. We measurethe strength of contracting institutions using the negative of the index of legal system formality from Djankov et al. (2003), which we call CONT. We measure property rig

39、hts enforcement using the index developed by the Property Rights Alliance (2008), PROP, averaged over the available period 2007 -2013. Finally, we also look at intellectual property rights, which have been related to the generation and diffusion of technology, see Samaniego(2013) for a survey. We me

40、asure intellectual property rights IPR, using the patent enforcement method developed in Ginarte and Park (1997), as reported by the World Bank, averaging over the available sample. Ilyina and Samaniego (2011) find that copyright enforcement specifically is a form of IPR enforcement that bears the s

41、trongest relationship to financial development - see also Samaniego (2013). The BSA (Software Alliance) publishes the rate at which unlicensed software is used in different countries. Following the Property Rights Alliance (2008), we take this measure (times- 1) as an indicator of copyright enforcem

42、ent. Finally, we also look at human capital, HC, using the standard Barro and Lee (2013) schooling-based measure averaged over the period. While this is not an institutional measure as such it is an important country characteristic which could be related to the need or ability to produce or import h

43、igh-tech capital goods.Comments on tradeThe model abstracts from international trade. Eaton and Kortum (2001) find that machinery is often imported by developing countries, which might suggest that the price of capital could be significantly affected by trade rather than by domestic output, and that

44、 domestic output shares might not be indicative of the composition of capital. However their data is for 1985, so it is not clear that their findings are relevant forthe relative price of capital in more recent data. Indeed, using data for 1995, Caselli and Wilson (2004) find that the composition of

45、 imported machinery is very highly correlated with the composition of domestically-produced capital, both in developed and developing countries. Nonetheless, it would certainly be interesting to explore the extent to which trends in the price of capital might be affected either by trade flows or by

46、changes in trade costs. In particular, Mutreja et al. (2018) argue that reductions in trade costs may lower the relative price of capital by allowing countries to more easily access capital from countries that might produce them more efficiently. This suggeststhat one factor that might contribute to

47、 the dispersion in investment rates could be trade costs.Concluding remarksWe document extensive differences in the rate of change in the relative price of capital around the world. We then show that these differences can be accounted for on the basis of differences around the world in economic comp

48、osition, without recourse to any barriers or frictions. We also find that a general equilibrium model economy accounts for a significant portion of the variation in the rate of change in the relative price of capital and for differences in investment rates around the world, although not for differen

49、ces in rates of economic growth. We conclude that these differences can be given a technological interpretation,based on differences in composition among industries with different rates-spec“ificintevcehsntmiceanl tof technical progress. As a result, the term progress, w” hich the literature widely

50、identifies with declines in the relative price of capital, is appropriate. Given the key role played by industry composition in this phenomenon it seems important to understand what are the deep determinants of industry composition. Is it due to comparative advantage or other trade-theoretic mechani

51、sms? Is due to policy distortions, as suggested by Samaniego (2006) or Ilyina and Samaniego (2012)? Or does it result form hysteresis, for example, based on the date at which the process of development began in earnest and the speed of transition, as in Ngai (2004)? These are likely useful questions

52、 for further research.中文資本相對價格與經濟結構羅伯托薩曼涅戈摘要資本價格的趨勢本質上是技術性的嗎？首先， 我們發(fā)現(xiàn)各國的資本相對價格趨勢差異很大。然后，我們表明，為適應世界各地經濟結構的差異和各行業(yè)生產率的增長而進行了校準的多行業(yè)增長模型， 可以解釋這種變化- 主要是由于資本構成的變化。該發(fā)現(xiàn)表明，資本相對價格的變化率可以解釋為特定于投資的技術變化， 即在資本生產部門中生產率增長相對較快的程度。該模型還考慮了投資率的經驗分散，但沒有考慮經濟增長率。關鍵字：特定于投資的技術變革，多部門增長模型，結構轉型，資本價格引言資本相對價格的下降被視為美國經濟增長的重要因素。 參見格

53、林（Greenwood）等人的 Hulten （1992）的著作。 （1997）,康明斯和維奧蘭特（2002）和奧爾頓（2007） 。這些研究通常將資本價格的下降識別為技術性的， 這反映出新資本生產中生產力的增長快于消費和服務業(yè)生產中的增長-這種現(xiàn)象被稱為投資特定技術變革（ ISTC ） 。 但是，尚不清楚其他國家的資本相對價格下降的程度。此外，尚不清楚是否可以對國際資本價格趨勢進行技術解釋，例如 ISTC 。另一種假設是，這些差異是由于存在資本積累壁壘，如 Restuccia 和 Urrutia（2001）提出的，用以解釋資本價格水平的差異。我們首先記錄下來， 各國的資本相對價格隨時間變化的

54、速率差異很大。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，資本價格的中位數(shù)增長率為零。另外，資本的價格在減少的地方增加。這表明，如果對此現(xiàn)象有技術上的解釋，相對于其他部門，資本在技術上的進步在世界范圍內必須相差很大。但是， 如果這種解釋確實是技術性的， 人們會期望生產率的這種明顯差異將成為國際技術轉讓（或貿易）的嚴峻障礙的證據(jù)。另一種可能性是， 資本和消費本身被高度分解， 世界各地的資本和消費構成存在實質性差異，這說明了資本相對價格趨勢的總體差異。我們問這種變化是否可以由行業(yè)構成的差異來解釋。 我們這樣做的原因如下。 眾所周知， 美國的技術進步速度不僅在資本和非資本之間存在顯著差異， 而且在消費， 服務和資本的類型之間也存在顯

55、著差異。因此，即使各國對于每個行業(yè)的生產率增長率是恒定的，但如果資本的構成（或消費和服務的構成）不同，則相對資本價格的變化率也可能不同。確實，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，在資本價格迅速下降的國家中，資本的構成偏向于高全要素生產率增長的資本類型。因此，我們問：在世界范圍內， 行業(yè)構成的差異可以在多大程度上解釋資本相對價格變化的速率變化？為此，我們采用了規(guī)范的多行業(yè)增長模型。在該模型中，經濟構成是由代理商所消費的不同商品或服務的價格變化以及不同資本產品的價格變化而演變的。 反過來， 這些是由各行業(yè)生產率增長率的差異決定的。我們使用來自美國的詳細生產率增長數(shù)據(jù)以及 1991 年全球經濟的初始構成數(shù)據(jù)來校準模型。我們在

56、所有國家/地區(qū)使用給定行業(yè)的恒定生產率增長率，部分原因是數(shù)據(jù)限制；但是，如上所述，要大大偏離這一假設，就必須存在技術轉讓的重大障礙。組成是“無障礙”假設的關鍵部分。令人驚訝的是， 我們發(fā)現(xiàn)該模型與使用 Penn World Table（s PWT）版本 7.1 測得的資本相對價格的變化率非常匹配。從統(tǒng)計意義上講，該模型可以簡單地基于行業(yè)TFP 增長率差異和整個行業(yè)的行業(yè)構成差異來解釋1983年至 2011年期間資本相對價格增長率的整體變化幅度。國家。模型不僅與變化程度匹配，而且模型生成的資本價格增長率與數(shù)據(jù)中的增長率之間的相關性也非常重要。我們得出的結論是，全球相對資本價格的差異可以解釋為一種

57、技術現(xiàn)象，即 ISTC ，而這些差異背后的關鍵因素是行業(yè)構成。構成與資本相對價格下降之間的聯(lián)系可能有兩個原因： 資本構成或非資本構成的差異。 我們將這些可能性分別稱為資本假說和消費假說。 我們通過消除資本生產行業(yè)中的生產率增長差異， 然后分別消除非資本生產行業(yè)中的生產率增長差異， 研究每種假設的重要性。 我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，資本假設主要是造成ISTC 的跨國變化：消除非資本生產率的增長對結果的影響很小， 而消除資本生產行業(yè)的生產率增長則導致模型生成的統(tǒng)計數(shù)據(jù)很少與數(shù)據(jù)的關系。最后， 我們問一個完全由這些因素驅動的增長模型可以在多大程度上解釋抽樣期間各國之間總體行為的差異。具體來說，我們研究投資率和經濟增

58、長率。 這是一項艱巨的任務， 因為它要求在通常不具備平衡增長路徑的條件的模型中求解投資模式。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)該模型生成的投資率與 PWT 7.1 數(shù)據(jù)和 PWT 9.1 數(shù)據(jù)中的投資率密切相關， 盡管它們低估了投資率的經驗變化程度。因此，僅基于行業(yè)構成的差異，該模型就能夠捕獲ISTC 和（在較小程度上） 投資率的跨國變化。 但是，該模型無法與PWT 7.1數(shù)據(jù)或 PWT 9.1數(shù)據(jù)中的經濟增長率變化產生良好的匹配。 我們得出的結論是， 全球 ISTC 的增長率存在很大差異，這是投資差異的原因， 但是經濟增長率是由其他因素引起的。 有趣的是， 當我們給每個國家一個總生產率趨勢與數(shù)據(jù)中的經濟增長率完全匹配

59、時，投資率就不再與數(shù)據(jù)中的增長率相關，這表明，構成經濟增長率基礎的任何因素都不能簡單地由一個國家來捕捉。生產率趨勢。這些結果引起了關于投資效率的變化是否是增長的重要因素的長期爭論。這場辯論可以追溯到索洛（1962） ，阿布拉莫維茨（1962）和丹尼森（1964）, Greenwood等（1997年）研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，在美國，ISTC可以在一般均衡增長核算框架中解釋超過一半的經濟增長。 我們對以下問題提供了明確的答案： 資本相對價格的差異是歸因于壁壘還是技術因素， 表明投資效率的變化是影響增長率的重要因素。 這并不是說壁壘對資本的相對價格沒有重要意義。 但是， 它們對經濟構成的影響可能不是直接的，而是間接的。從更廣泛的意義上講，這表明未來關于經濟增長因素可能通過經濟構成渠道受到政策影響的方式的工作可能會碩果累累。討論對機構的評論我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，僅基于經濟構成，沒有障礙的模型很好地解釋了log? gq 的經驗大小和變化。另一方面，我們的發(fā)現(xiàn)確實為體制因素或其他可能通過對經濟構成的影響而間接影響 log? gq 的障礙敞開了大門。這些決定因素可能是什么？政策或制度因素可能影響組成的觀點在文獻中有先例。例如， Saman