LH,Chapter22,23,24,BankruptisforIndividual;InsolvencyisMaintypesofcorporateinsolvencyadministrations(alsocalled‘externaladministrations’--someonecomeinfromoutsidetotakecontrolofcoyforthepurposeofcarryingoutthisparticularinsolvencyadministration.Socalled“ExternalAdministrations”)Receivership–LHChVoluntaryadministration(VA)–LHChDeedofarrangement(DOCA)–LHChLiquidation–windingup–LHCh一、AimsofInsolvencyPriortocommencementofexternaladministrationIfadebtorfailstopaydebtscreditorsentitledtobringlegalproceedingstopayment如Whereadebtorhasmanycreditors,thosethattakeearlyenmentactiongetpaidevenifthismeansthedebtorhasinsufficientfundstopayremainingcreditors—”firstin,bestAftercommencementofexternaladministrationIndividualcreditorenmentactionrecedbycollectiveprocedurecontrolledbyindependentinsolvencyexpertFair&orderlyprocessfordealingwithfinancialaffairsofinsolventdebtor公平有秩序地處理欠Subjecttoexceptions,generalrulethatunsecuredcreditorsofaninsolventdebtortreatedequallyGeneralRule:1.Securedcreditor(有抵押債權(quán)人:指持有人財(cái)產(chǎn)或其中的按揭、押isrankedaheadofUnsecuredcreditor.2.AmongtheUnsecuredcreditors,theyaretreatedEqually.B/4externaladministrationbegins,someunsecuredcreditormaygetadvantagesoverotherunsecuredcreditors.Butafterexternaladministration,allunsecuredcreditorsareranked二、AimsofInsolvencyExternaladministrationofinsolventcompanies ernedbychapter5(ss410–600F)CorporationsAct–applytocompaniesBankruptcy ernsinsolventpeople–applyto三、receivershipisundercontrolofreceiverwhoisaregisteredinsolvencypractitioner.Theroleofreceiveristotakepossessionofcertaincoy’sproperties,inparticularSecuredAssets.SothepowerofthereceiverislimitedtotakingpossessionofSecuredAssetsonly.WhatisaReceiver受益人Independent,experiencedinsolvencypractitionerappointedtotakepossessionofsomeorallofa’sproperty.ReceiversusuallyappointedbysecuredCreditorswithsuperiorbargainingpower出眾談判能力(egbanksmayinsistonthattheyaregivensecurityforloans.--Loancontractgivesthecreditorsecurity(charge)oversomeorallofdebtor’spropertyIf (ieborrowercoy)breachestermsofloan,thecontractgivessecuredcreditortherightToappointareceivertotakepossessionofsecuredpropertyonbehalfofsecuredcreditor,sellitandrepaysecuredloanoutofsaleproceeds.如果欠債人沒(méi)有履行,那么ReceiverManagers&Wherethesecuredpropertyincludesthedebtor’sbusiness,loanagreementmayalsogivereceivertherighttomanagethebusinessappointedcalled‘receiverandLoanagreementmayalsogivesecuredcreditortotakepossessionofsecuredpropertyallyorappointanagenttodosoCreditorwhodoesthiscalled‘controller’®ulatedinsamewayasWhydoSecuredCreditorsappointReceiversSpeedypossessionofsecuredproperty;RelativelyCheapCourtapprovalisunnecessarynoneedgotocourt);appointedmustbeexperiencedinmanaginginsolventcompanies–s418(1)(d);被任命的人必須在管理公司方面有經(jīng)驗(yàn).Securedcreditordecideswhowillbeappointed,theyhavecontrolonwhotheywillappointasreceivers.債權(quán)人決定誰(shuí)將被任命,他們有任命權(quán).Powers&DutiesofReceiversreceiversaresubjecttoverysimilardutiesasdirectors.s420(2)Powerssetoutinloanagreement&提出協(xié)egPowertosellsecureds420A:DutytotakereasonablecareinsellingsecuredpropertymorethanitsmarketAftersecuredcreditorsarepaidout,receivershipcomestoend.Thenreceivergetshisrevenue,andtheremainingbalance(surplus)isgivenbackto.dutytorepaydebtowedtoappointingsecuredcreditorandpaysurplus(ifany)toReceivershipterminates--Debtduesecuredcreditor--Receivershipexpenses--Surplus(ifany)paidEffectsofappointmentofReceiverscontinuestoexistaslegalDirectorsremaininoffice—butwithgreatreducedpowerofloanagreementlimitstheirpowerswithrespecttosecured Unsecuredcreditorsretain(保留)usualrightsagainstdebtor toen ofdebts—unsecuredcreditorsmustwaituntilsecuredcreditorsarepaidout.無(wú)擔(dān)保債權(quán)人必須等到maybeinliquidation&receivershipatthesametime—soliquidatormuststandaside&waitthereceiverfinisheshisjobthenliquidatorcandoliquidation.清盤人必須等到受益人結(jié)束了工作四、Voluntaryadministrationit’sanothertypeofExternalAdministrations”.VoluntaryAdministrationisonlypossiblewhencoyisinsolvent.Aim–sSavecoyand/orbusinessifIfnotpossible,obtainbetterreturnforcreditors/shareholdersthan2phases-LH610Coyentersvoluntaryadministration–phaseCreditors ’sfuture–phaseentersdeedofarrangement;iswoundup;AdministrationPhase1–CoyentersVoluntaryCommenceswithappointmentofadministrator–s435C(1)-whotakescompletecontrolof’saffairs(P627)whocanappointUsuallyappointedbydirectorswithoutanapprovalofshareholders/creditors/courtiftheybelieveisinsolventorsoonwillbe–s436A一般有董事來(lái)任命管理人Directorsaregiventheopportunitiestoappointadministratorsevenb/4coy insolvent,suchactionsmayresultcoyfinancialdifficultiesbeingresolved.TherightstoappointanadministratorislostifwindingupofcoyhasWhoelsecanappoint?–ss436B&liquidators/Chargees,(thereisnoopportunityforCreditorstoappointadministrators)—mostcaseisappointedbycreditors.WhywoulddirectorsinitiateVoluntaryAdministrationAvoidpossible alliabilityforinsolventtradingif goesintoliquidation當(dāng)公司清盤時(shí)避免新的的產(chǎn)生.s588H(5)&(6)defencesAvoidpossible alliabilitytoATOfor ’snon-paymentofPAYG(“payasyougo”)Delayliability alguaranteestosHowlongdoesVoluntaryAdministrationlastUsuallyabout3-4weeks–sTerminatesatconclusionof2ndcreditorsCreditors’Creditors’decision’sRolesoftheadministrator–sgenerallyadministratorisregardedascoy’sagent.SotheactionofadministratorwillbindTakescontrol PowertocarryonbusinessPowerto Investigate&considerfuturecoursesofPreparereportfor2ndcreditors’meeting–sCall2ndcreditors’meetingwhichdecides Moratorium(延期償付onclaimsduringVoluntaryStayofalllegalproceedingsagainst –sNoliquidation/windingup–sSecuredcreditorscannottakepossessionofproperty–sOwners/lessorscannotrecoverproperty–sCreditorscannotsuedirectorswhoguaranteed’sdebts–s五、LiquidationWindingup(samePurposeofliquidationisquitedifferentfromothersschemes.Theendresultofliquidationislifecycleofthecoycomestoanend.Liquidationcanbeseenasadeath/burialofthecoy.ItceasestoexistasalegalVoluntaryAdministratorcanbeappointedbyLiquidator.Butthisisextremelyunusual.Therightsofsecuredcreditorscontinuesevenaftertheonset開(kāi)始o(jì)fliquidation.ThatmeansaReceivercanbeappointedafterthecommencementofliquidation.Thesecuredcreditors’contractualrightsareindependentfromliquidation.ThatisSecuredcreditorsarestillabletoen theirsecurityrights.It’stheliquidatorwhobringtheinsolventtradingactions,notindividualcreditors.(一)、WhatisFormofexternaladministrationthat yresultsinderegistrationBeginningoftheendforaasalegalAppointmentofexperiencedinsolvencypractitioner–liquidator–totakecompletecontrolof’saffairsSecuredcreditorsusuallynotaffectedbydebtor’s(二)、AimsoftofacilitateanOrderlywindingupofcoy’saffairs(toavoidscrabbleofassets/toavoidthosewhothreatenmostpaidfirst)Involvessellingallproperty&dividingproceedsamongensureCreditors(particularlyUnsecuredCreditors)shareEquallydistributionof ’sproperty.確保公司財(cái)產(chǎn)公平地分配(SecuredCreditorsdon’tneedthehelpofliquidatortorecovertheirmoneycoztheyareabletoentheirrightsunderthesecurity.Sothat’sUnsecuredCreditorswhoreallyrelyonliquidators)HopelesslyinsolventcoysceasetoexistandtransferusefulassetsfromthecoyinliquidationtoplpwhoareabletoutilizetheassetsmoreInvestigationofaffairsleadingtoliquidation.Liquidationisopportunityforaliquidatorto efamiliarwithaffairsofcoy.清盤是個(gè)機(jī)會(huì)對(duì)于清盤人去ComparewithaimsofReceivership+VAmaindifference:Liquidationisaimedtoendacoyexistence.終止公司的存在ReceivershipisaimedtheSecuredCreditorispaidoutthedebtowed(inmostcases,receiveractsforthesinglesecuredcreditor).VAissomewhereinthemiddle,administratorconsiderstheinterestofgeneralbodyofunsecuredcreditorsinthesamewayasliquidator.Butifit’spossibletocontinuethecoy’sbusiness/tocontinuepartsofcoy’sbusiness,administratorismuchmoreinthenatureofdealmaker.Administratorisnotlikeliquidatorwhoislookingtojustbringthecoytoanend.指引你(三)、TypesofVoluntaryWindingVoluntaryLiquidationisvoluntarilyinitiatedbythecoythroughpassingaspecialresolution.membersvoluntary:ifthecoyisSolvent,it’sthememberswhohavetheinterestintheliquidation.It’sthememberswhodeterminewhotheliquidatorisandmakeanappointment.Thecreditorsdon’thaveinterestscozthecoyissolventthereforetheirclaimsaregoingtobemetinfull.creditorsvoluntary:ifthecoyisInsolvent(iecoyhasinsufficientassetstopay,creditorsinfull),it’stheCreditorswhohavetheinterestsinwindingupcozthereisnotenoughleftoverformembersanyway.Somembersarereallynotinterestedinwindingupcoztheyknowthecoyishopelessandtheycannotgetanymoneyfromcoycozthecreditorsarerankedaheadofmembers.It’sthecreditorswhocontroltheliquidationprocessandappointtheliquidator.CompulsoryLiquidation由強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行CompulsoryLiquidationiscompulsorycozthecourtordersthewindingupofthecoy.CourtwillappointaliquidatorfromtheLiquidatorList.Thefeatureofmostcompulsoryliquidationistheprocessleadingtothecourtorderisinitiatedbysomeoneoutsidethecoy(inmostcases,it’sCreditorswhogotothecourttoinitiatetheliquidationprocess,askingcourttopassanordertowindupcoy)otherthanthecoy.inordertoexerciseCompulsoryLiquidationitrequiresApplicationtocourtforwindingupApplicantmustproveGroundsforwindingup--mostcommon+overwhelming(無(wú)法的)grounds459A(windingupininsolvency):onanapplicationunders459P,Courtmayorderthataninsolventcoybewoundupininsolvency.--otherGrounds:s461(1):p542-543CorpsWhomayapplyforwindingupinInsolvency?usuallyit’stheCreditorswhoarethecommonapplicantsandinitiatethewindingups459P(1)(b).applicantcanalsobeamemberofthecoy,soapplicationforwindingupmaynotnecessarilyinvolveInsolventcoy,itcouldbeSolventcoy.ButmostcommonsituationistoapplyforwindingupwhencoyisInsolventandit’stheCreditorswhoarethecommonapplicantsandinitiatethewindingup.(四)、windingupininthewindingupinInsolvencytheapplicant(usuallyCreditorsmustProvethecoyisInsolvent.必須證明公司是的.Howtoprove證明給我看啊s95AdefinitionofSolvency):a issolventif,andonlyif,the isabletopayall ’sdebts,asandwhenthey edueandpayable.如果沒(méi)有 s95A(2)(definitionofInsolvency): whoisnotsolventisInsolvent.(p364-PresumptionsofInsolvencys459C(p645-acoyispresumedtobeinsolventifs459CisEg.s459C(2)(a):acoyfailedtocomplywithstatutoryTimeFrameofwindingupinFailuretocomplywithstatutoryTimeDateofserviceTimestatutory

Datefilingapplicationbycreditors

Date(五)、StatutoryDemandnoneedtoworrytooMostcommonmethodofprovinginsolventforpurposesofcompulsoryliquidationiscoyfailedtocomplywithstatutorydemand.Creditorservesademandonrequiringittopayanoutstandingdebtwithin21days–s459EDebtdemandedmustequalatleast$2,000(debt≥presumedtobeinsolventifitfailstocomplywithstatutorydemand–smustapplytothecourttosetasidestatutorydemandifitdisputesthedebtorhasanoffsettingclaim–s459G(六)、EffectofwindingwhenawindingupWindingupcommenceswhenliquidatorappointed–sbutforcompulsorywindingupthedatewillbewhenthecourtordersthewindingupproceedss523A.Effectsofwindinguponfromthetimewhenawindingupcommences,directorsLosethepowerofoffice.ThecontrolofcoynowispassedtoLiquidator;generalmeetingcannotPassresolutionsbyshareholders,nowisLiquidatorwhocarriesonthecoy’sbusiness;∴Directors+Shareholderslosetheirparticularpowerundercoystillcontinuestoexist,iemeanscoystillcanenterintocontract+beboundbycontract.Alltheobligationsofcoystillexist,it’sjustDirectors+Shareholdersnolongerhavecontrol.Effectsofwindinguponfromthetimewhenawindingupcommences,CreditorsLoserighttoindividuallysuethecoyandtherighttoenjudgements(theyhavetostandinlinewithrestofcreditorsaccordingtothelaw).B/4liquidationcommences,Creditorsdohaverighttosuethecoy.Insomeunusualcases,thecourtleavemaybecertainPre-liquidationantecedent先行的transactions)((七)、Powers&dutiesofLiquidatoristhekeyyerinliquidation.LiquidatorwillbeeitherappointedbytheCourtinCompulsoryLiquidation,orliquidatorwillbeappointedbythecoyinaVoluntaryWindingup.Thecreditorsmaychangewhotheliquidatorisifitproceedsacreditorvoluntarywindingup.Buttheycanalsobeappointedbythecoy(members)inmembervoluntarywindingup.PowersofLiquidatorsCollectcoy’s suebringactionsagainstdirectors/recoverdamagesfromforbreachofmakecallsonunpaidConvertProperty/AssetstoegsellassetstogetDistributetoUnsecuredliquidatorhastostandasidewhileSecuredcreditorhastheirmetusuallybyreceivers.Afterthat,liquidatorcancomein+distributethoseleftfunds/moneyEquallytoUnsecuredcreditors.Surplus(ifany)toaftersecuredcreditorsgettingtheirclaims+unsecuredcreditorsdistributed,ifthecoyhasanySurplus,thenShareholderswillparticipatelastaftercreditorsaccordingtheirrightsunderconstitution.DutiesofLiquidators(p664-LiquidatorshavethesamedutiesasDirectorscoztheytakeoverthecontrolofcoyfromdirectorsandcarryonthebusiness.Buttherearesomedutiesarespecificto(八)、DistributiontoUnsecuredafterallSecuredCreditorsgettheirclaimspaid,liquidatorwilldistributetheremainingassetstoUnsecuredCreditors.AllUnsecuredCreditorsshareie“PariPassuRule”s555:alldebtsandclaimsprovedinawindinguprankequallyand,ifthepropertyofthecoyisinsufficienttomeettheminfull,theymustbepaidproportiona SomeUnsecureddebtsarerankedinorderofPriorityforrepayments556(PriorityGeneralruleisallunsecuredcreditorsarerankedequally.However,therearesomePrioritiesgiventoparticularUnsecuredCreditorsunders556.2mainPriorityUnsecuredCreditorsare:s556(1)(dd):Liquidatorhimself+Costs/Expensesofs556(1)(de):Liquidator’sprofessionals556(1)(e)~(h):Employeeentitlements,egwages/salaries/unpaidlongserviceleave/leaveentitlementetc.it’srankedafterLiquidatorcostandprofessionalNote:(1).GeneralRule:Debtswithinaclassareranked(2).NoPriorityforunsecureddebtsowed- r/Unsecured- ernment/AustralianTaxOffice(九)、Recoveryofantecedent(先行的Liquidatorsaredifferentfromotherliquidationpractitioners.Aliquidatorhastherighttorecoverassets/moneyfromcertaintransactionswhichoccurredPriortothecommenceofwindingup.That’sAntecedentTransactions.ItallowsLiquidatortorecoverantecedenttransactionswhichtookceb/4liquidation.AntecedentTransactions,whichpriortocommencementofwindingup,cancontravene“PariPassuRule”+Priorityofpreferentialdebts.egUnfairPreferencesthatistheTransactionbetween &existingcreditorthatresultsincreditorreceivingmorethancreditorwouldotherwisehavereceivedonliquidation.iethatcreditorgetsAdvantage/Preferenceoverothercreditorswhohavetowaituntilliquidation.eg. paysadebtduetoaonecreditorbutdoesnotpaydebtstoothercreditors.ifintheliquidationotherunsecuredcreditorsgetback100centsinadollar(thatmeansthereisenoughmoneytopaytheminfull),thentheUnfairPreferencedoesNOTexist.ORIfcoypayscreditors30centsinadollarb/4liquidationandonwindingupcreditorsget40centsinadollar,thenthecreditorsdidNOTreceiveUnfairPreference.Ifcoyinsolventattimethenunfairpreference=insolventtransaction–sUnfairpreferenceifU.P.isanInsolventtransaction=voidabletransaction,ifittookcewithinrelevantperiodifcreditorisunrelatedto,6monthsb/4commenceofwindingup(ie“RelationBackDay”whenfilingapplicationforwindingupwithcourt);orifcreditora‘relatedentity’--s9def,4yearsb/4commenceofwindingup(ie“RelationBackDay”whenfilingapplicationforwindingupwithcourt)Courtcanordercreditortorefundcoytheamountofpreference–s588FE(1)(a)sothatliquidatorcouldrecoverparticularassets/afterrefunding,CreditorissubjecttoparipassumercialTransactionsthetransactiontakesceb/4liquidationandatthattimethecoyisgoingtobeInsolvent.it’sameansoftransferringcoy’sassetsoutofcoytocertainfavouredparties(egrelatives,directors).Itinv