EUROPEANCENTRALBANK

EUROSYSTEM

HannahS.Hempell,FátimaSilva,

ValerioScalone,TamásBorkó,

WandaCornacchia,DomenicaDiVirgilio,AurélienEspic,SalomónGarcia,MarcelHeires, LuisHerrera,SamuK?rkk?inen,LukeKent, StefanKerbl,SebastianL?he,VitorOliveira, SpyrosPalligkinis,AnatoliSeguraVelez,PaulinaSteikūn?

OccasionalPaperSeries

Implicationsofhigherinflationandinterestratesformacroprudentialpolicystance

No358

Disclaimer:ThispublicationshouldnotbereportedasrepresentingtheviewsoftheEuropeanCentralBank(ECB).TheviewsexpressedarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyreflectthoseoftheECB.

ECBOccasionalPaperSeriesNo3581

Contents

Abstract2

Non-technicalsummary3

1Introduction6

1.1Context6

1.2Macroprudentialpolicyinanevolvingmacro-financiallandscape7

BoxA.Overviewofmonetarypolicyconcernsinmacroprudentialnotifications9

2Macroprudentialpolicygivendifferentmonetarypolicystancesandinflationary

dynamics13

2.1Systemicriskatthecurrentjuncture13

2.2Effectivenessofmacroprudentialpolicy15

2.3Interactionswithdifferentmonetarypolicystances17

3Capital-basedmeasuresunderdifferentinflationandmonetarypolicyregimes22

BoxB.Inflation,monetarypolicyandrule-basedcountercyclicalbuffer28

BoxC.Bufferrelease:howmonetarypolicyandinitialbankcapitalisationinfluenceits

effectiveness30

4BBMsundervariousinflationandmonetarypolicyregimes32

4.1BBMsintheeuroarea/EU32

4.2BindingnessofBBMsgivenmacro-financialconditionsandmonetarypolicystance

33

BoxD.BindingnessofBBMsamongeuroareahouseholdsinthecurrentenvironment–

microsimulationsongranularhouseholdsurveydata38

BoxE.Costsandbenefitsofmacroprudentialpolicy:theroleofmonetarypolicyandofthe

structuralfeaturesofthemortgagesector40

5Conclusions44

References48

ECBOccasionalPaperSeriesNo3582

Abstract

Inrecentyears,monetarypolicyandinflationconsiderationshavebeenplayingan

increasinglyimportantroleformacroprudentialauthoritiesintheirpolicysetting.This

paperaimstoassesstheimplicationsofhighinflationandrisinginterestratesformacroprudentialpolicystance.Theconceptualdiscussionsandmodel-based

analysesincludedinthispaperreflectontheappropriatedirectionandimpactofmacroprudentialpoliciesatthedifferentstagesoffinancialandbusinesscycles,givencross-countryandbankingsystemheterogeneities.Inthiscontext,akey

objectiveofthepaperistoassesstowhatextenttheinteractionbetween

macroprudentialandmonetarypoliciesdiffers,giventheheterogeneityacrosseuroareacountriesexposedtoahomogenousmonetarypolicy.Whilebothpoliciesaretoalargeextentcomplementary,monetarypolicymaygeneraterelevantspilloversduetoitsimpactonthefinancialcycleand,potentially,onfinancialstability.Thepaper

arguesthattherecentfocusofmacroprudentialpolicyonresilience,whenbanking

sectorconditionsensurenounwarrantedprocyclicaleffectsofmacroprudential

tightening,suggestsanexpansionofthenotionof“complementarity”withmonetarypolicy.Specifically,withthebuild-upofresilience,macroprudentialpolicyactsde

factocountercyclically,supportingmonetarypolicyinitspursuitofpricestability.In

thisregard,thepaperstressesthatthesourceoftheinflationaryshock(supply

versusdemandside)andthemonetaryenvironmentprimarilyaffecttheintensity,

speedandextentofbufferbuild-uporreleasewithineachstageofthefinancialcyclewhileaffectingborrower-basedmeasuresintheirbindingness.

Keywords:Financialstability,banks,macroprudentialpolicy,monetarypolicy,capitalbuffers,borrower-basedmeasures

JELcodes:E52,G21,G28

ECBOccasionalPaperSeriesNo3583

Non-technicalsummary

Thispaperaimstoassesstheimplicationsofhighinflationandrisinginterest

ratesforthemacroprudentialpolicystance.Monetarypolicyandinflation

considerationshaveplayedanincreasinglyimportantroleformacroprudentialauthoritiesintheirpolicysettingsince2022,asindicatedinnotificationstotheEuropeanSystemicRiskBoard(ESRB)andtheEuropeanCentralBank(ECB).

Againstthisbackground,theanalysesreflectontheappropriatedirectionandontheimpactthatmacroprudentialpolicieshavethroughoutthedifferentphasesoffinancialandbusinesscycles.Thisrequiresanexaminationoftheimpactthat

macroprudentialpolicieshaveonthemitigationofrisksposedbymonetarypolicy

tightening/loosening,consideringalsocross-countryandbankingsystemheterogeneities.

De-synchronisedbusinessandfinancialcyclesandinflationarysupplyshocksinthecontextofthepandemicandgeopoliticaltensionshaveposeda

challengetotheclassicalnotionof“complementarity”between

macroprudentialandmonetarypolicies.Forsynchronisedfinancialandbusinesscycles,asobservedinthemostrecentquarters,wherebothcycleshavestartedtocontractinmosteuroareacountries,complementarymacroprudentialandmonetarypoliciesmaylargelymoveinthesametighteningorlooseningdirection.Bycontrast,de-synchronisedcycles,asobservedinthecontextofthepandemicandthe

inflationarysupplyshocks,havecomplicatedtheinteractionbetweenmacroprudentialandmonetarypolicies.

Macroprudentialpolicybuildsupresilienceand,initsinteractionwith

monetarypolicy,bothpoliciesaretoalargeextentcomplementary,althoughtheremaybetrade-offsintheshortrun.Byincreasingthelossabsorption

capacity(viacapital-basedmeasures)andsafeguardingthelendingstandardsofborrowers(viaborrower-basedmeasures,orBBMs),macroprudentialpolicybuilds

upresilienceamongbanksandborrowers,thushelpingtosupportandstabilisetheflowofcreditinadownturn.However,monetarypolicymaygeneraterelevant

spilloversgivenitsimpactonthefinancialcycleand,potentially,onfinancialstability.

Macroprudentialauthoritieshaverecentlyfocusedonresilience,whichmightsuggestanexpansionofthenotionof“complementarity”withmonetary

policy.Byfocusingonthe(pre-emptive)build-upofresilienceandmacroprudentialspace,whenbankingsectorconditionsensurethisactionhasnounwarranted

procyclicaleffects,macroprudentialpolicyactsdefactocountercyclically,supportingmonetarypolicyinitspursuitofpricestability.Thus,macroprudentialpolicyprovidesspaceformonetarypolicytopursueitstargetsmoreeffectively,withoutrisking

unintendedsideeffectsonfinancialstability.Thismayresultinasynchronous

directionofbothpoliciesdespiteadiversioninbusinessandfinancialcycles.Overall,sufficientloss-absorbingcapacityinthefinancialsystemallowsforthetwokeypolicyobjectives(financialstabilityformacroprudentialpolicyandpricestabilityfor

monetarypolicy)(largely)nottobeinconflict.Moreprecisely,bothpoliciesprimarily

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focusontheirownobjectivesandmacroprudentialpolicyactsasthefirstlineofdefencetoaddressfinancialstabilityrisks.However,thisdoesnotimplythat

macroprudentialpolicyshouldnotrespondtomonetarypolicystance:ifstrongshiftsinthelatter,irrespectiveofdirection,createadditionalfinancialstabilityrisks,

macroprudentialpolicymighthavetobuildupresilienceagainstsuchvulnerabilities.

Thiscomplementaryroleplayedbymacroprudentialpolicybecomeseven

morerelevantinthecaseofamonetaryunionwithasinglemonetarypolicy

acrossmemberstates.Withitsgranularandtargetedinstruments,macroprudentialpolicyisabletomitigatepotentiallysystemic,asymmetricfinancialdevelopmentsorshocksatthecountry,sectororfinancialinstitutionlevel.Itisthereforeanessentialcomplementtomonetaryunion,byeasingtheburdenofmonetarypolicytofulfilits

pricestabilitymandatebylimitingpotentialunintendedsideeffectsofunion-widemonetarypolicymeasures.

Thedirection(build-uporrelease)ofcapital-basedmeasuresprimarilyreactstothebuild-upof,and/orstillexistingunaddressedfinancialvulnerabilitiesormaterialisationof,riskstobanks’capitalandprofitabilityconditionsandtothestageofthefinancialcycleinconjunctionwiththebusinesscycle,whilethe

inflationaryandmonetaryenvironmentaffectsthetiming,extentandspeedofthis.Whenthefinancialcycleturnsnegative,macroprudentialpolicyshouldfocuson

strengtheningbankresilience,regardlessofthemonetarypolicystance.The

marginalgainsofincreasingbuffersarelargerforcountriesthatdonothavethemyet.Intheinitialriskmaterialisationphase,authoritiesmaydecideto(partially)

releasecyclicalbuffers,whileinthedisorderlyriskmaterialisationphaseitwilllikelyprovenecessarytoreleasecyclicalbuffers,actinginthesamedirectionasmonetarypolicy.Intheearlybuild-up/neutralphaseofthefinancialcycle,bufferscouldbebuiltuppre-emptively,whereasintheexuberancestage,macroprudentialandmonetarypoliciesarelikelytomoveintandeminatighteningdirection.Thedirectionofcapital-basedmeasureswillalsodependonprevailingandexpectedbankcapitaland

profitabilityconditionsandonanysignsofbindingcapital-relatedsupplyconstraints.Inthisregard,theinflationaryandmonetaryenvironmentwillaffecttheintensity,

speedandextentofthebuild-uporreleaseofcapitalbufferswithineachstageofthefinancialcycle.

BBMshavebecomeoneofthekeyinstrumentsinthemacroprudentialtoolkitoverthelasttenyearswhenitcomestobuildingresilience.Theirprimarygoalistobuildresilienceamonghouseholdsbyreducingtheriskofover-indebtedness,promotingtheadoptionofprudentlendingstandardsandmakinghousehold

financingmoresustainable,thusimprovingthequalityofbankloanbooksand

makingthefinancialsystemmoreresilient.TheeffectivenessofBBMsandtheir

costsfortheeconomydependonthefractionofborrowerswhosedebtdecisionis

ultimatelyconstrainedbythemeasures.Incountrieswheretheyhavebeenactivatedsofar,BBMsarelargelyperceivedasstructuralmeasuresandarenotmeantto

substantiallychangeacrossthefinancialcycle.Whiletheirusehasbecome

widespreadoverthelasttenyears,itstillremainsheterogeneousacrossEuropeancountries,alsointermsoftheirspecificdesignatnationallevel.

ECBOccasionalPaperSeriesNo3585

Thenatureofinflationaryshocks(supplyversusdemandside)andthe

prevailingmonetarypolicystanceaffectthebindingnessofBBMs.Inflationarypressuresrelatedtosupply-sideshocks(demand-sideshocks),aswellasmonetarypolicytightening(loosening)tendtomakeincome-basedBBMsmore(less)binding.Atthesametime,monetarypolicytighteninghasalessdirectandmoreambiguouseffectonLTVlimits.

Thecurrentmacro-financialenvironmentincreasesthebenefitsassociatedwithBBMs,especiallyforcountrieswherefloatingratemortgagesdominate.

Followingasubstantialmonetarytightening,suchastheonewehavewitnessed

overthepasttwoyearsorso,thebenefitsassociatedwithBBMsincrease,

particularlyforcountrieswithpredominantlyfloatingratemortgages.However,toreducepotentialexcessivebindingnessandpossibleundesiredprocyclicaleffects,macroprudentialauthoritiesmightchangeexemptionquotasandmaturitylimitstoadjustthebindingnessofthemeasures.

ECBOccasionalPaperSeriesNo3586

1Introduction

1.1Context

Thispaperaimstoassesstheimplicationsofhighinflationandrisinginterestratesformacroprudentialpolicystance.Ouranalysisaddressestheappropriatedirectionandimpactofmacroprudentialpoliciesatthedifferentstagesoffinancial

andbusinesscycles,givencross-countryandbankingsystemheterogeneities.Oneofthegoalsofouranalysisistoassesstheextenttowhichtheinteractionbetweenmacroprudentialandmonetarypoliciesdiffers,giventhedegreeofheterogeneity

acrosseuroareacountriesexposedtoahomogenousmonetarypolicy.Relevantdimensionsofsuchheterogeneitiesincludetheprevalenceoffixedorfloatingratemortgages,thestageatwhicheachcountryfindsitselfinthefinancialcycleand

levelsofinflation,ortherelativeimportanceofnon-bankfinancialintermediaries.

Monetarypolicyandinflationconsiderationshaveplayedanincreasingrole

formacroprudentialauthoritiesintheirpolicysettingsince2022,asindicatedinnotificationstotheESRB/ECB(BoxA).Thenotificationssuggestthathigherinterestratesandinflationwereassessedtohavecontributedtoanincreaseinrisks,

uncertaintyand/orprobabilityofriskmaterialisation.Thisledmosteuroarea/EuropeanUnion(EU)countriestorebuildorevenincreasetheirmacroprudentialbuffersinthefollowingthepandemic.

Asmonetaryandmacroprudentialpoliciesbothoperatetoalargeextent

throughthebankingsystem,theirinteractioncanresultincomplementaritiesandtrade-offstoeachother’seffectiveness.Theoptimalmixofmonetaryand

macroprudentialpolicydependsonthedifferentstagesinthefinancialandbusinesscycle,onthelevelofinflation,onthecapitalpositionandprofitabilityofthebankingsystem,onthenatureandmagnitudeofshocksandexistingvulnerabilities,andonthespecifictypeofpoliciesimplemented(Section2).

Thedirection(build-uporrelease)ofcapital-basedmeasuresprimarilyreactstothebuild-uporexistenceofunaddressedfinancialvulnerabilities,tothe

materialisationofrisks,tobanks’capitalandprofitabilityconditionsandtothestageofthefinancialcycleinconjunctionwiththebusinesscycle.Beyondtherelevantunderlyinginterdependenciesbetweenthefinancialcycleandmonetary

policy,thesourceofinflationaryshocks(supplyversusdemandside)andthe

prevailingmonetaryregimewillaffecttheintensity,speedandextentof

macroprudentialpolicysettingwithineachstageofthefinancialcycle(Section3).

Structuralmodelsallowtoassesshowmonetarypolicycaninfluence

macroprudentialpolicybyaffectingthecourseofthefinancialcycleandthe

costsandbenefitsofphasinginorreleasingmacroprudentialmeasures.Inthisreport,modelsimulationsusingdifferentversionsofastructuralmodel(theso-called“3Dmodel”)highlightthesepolicyinteractionsinvariousanalyticalboxes.The3D

modelisamacro-financialstructuralmodelshowinghowmacroprudentialpolicycanaffectbankresilienceandhowthefinancialsectorinteractswiththerestofthe

ECBOccasionalPaperSeriesNo3587

economy(Clercetal.,2015,andMendicinoetal.,2020).Tostudytheinteraction

betweenmacroprudentialpolicyandmonetarypolicy,theversionsusedintheboxesalsoincludemonetarypolicyshocks(Espicetal.,2024,Mendicinoetal.,2024,andHerreraetal.,2024).1BoxBshowsthatmonetarypolicy,byaffectingthecourseofthefinancialcycle,canhaveindirectimplicationsforthespeedofthecountercyclicalcapitalbuffer(CCyB)build-up,shouldthemacroprudentialauthorityfollowarule-

basedapproach.ThesimulationsinBoxCsuggestthatthereleaseofcapitalbufferscanactpositivelyoncreditandGDPbycreatingmacroprudentialspaceforbanks

(lendingchannel).However,expostlesscapitalisedbankswouldincreasethe

overallriskintheeconomy(riskchannel),partiallyoffsettingthepositiveeffectsof

therelease.Inaninflationaryenvironment,shouldthemonetarypolicyresponsebemoreaggressive,theeffectoftheexpostriskchannelwouldbegreater,makingthereleasemoredetrimentalincaseofinitiallylowbankcapitalisation.Asshown

inSection4,monetarypolicycanalsoaffectthebindingnessofBBMsand,therefore,thecostsofphasing-in.BoxDestimateshowthebindingnessofBBMshasevolvedacrosstherecentmonetarypolicytighteningcycleusingempiricalmicrosimulations.ThestructuralmodelsimulationsinBoxEshowhowchangesinbankprofitability

andinthebindingnessofBBMscanaffectthephase-incostsofcapitalrequirementsandofBBMsrespectively.Asecondsetofsimulationsinthisboxindicatesthat,in

caseofdisorderlyriskmaterialisation,previouslyphased-inmacroprudential

measurescanhelpreducethenegativeeffectsofriskmaterialisationfollowing

monetarypolicytighteningperiods.Therefore,thedesignofBBMsshouldinclude

elementsofflexibility,viaexemptionclauses,sothatadjustmentscanbemadein

responsetothenatureoftheeconomicorinflationaryshocksthattakeplaceandtotheprevailingmonetarypolicystance.

1.2Macroprudentialpolicyinanevolvingmacro-financiallandscape

Challengesanduncertaintiesarisefromthecurrenteconomicenvironment,withinflationpersistentlyabovetarget,havingtriggeredamoreintenseandlastingmonetarypolicytightening.Thisenvironmentisstillcharacterisedby

uncertaintyregardingtheevolutionofinflation,futuremonetarypolicystanceandfinancialmarketreactions.ThefinancialcyclehasturnednegativeinmostEU

countries,withrealestatepricesandvaluationsreflectingdownwardpressureandcreditgrowthslowing.

Thebusinessandfinancialcycleshavebecomede-synchronisedand

inflationarysupplyshocksinthecontextofthepandemicandgeopoliticaltensionsintheeuroareahaveposedachallengetotheclassicalnotionof“complementarity”betweenmacroprudentialandmonetarypoliciesgoing

1Espicetal.(2024)andMendicinoetal.(2024)featurethreelayersofdefault(banks,firmsandhouseholds).Espicetal.(2024)isusedtostudyhowcapitalrequirementsaffectedmonetarypolicytransmissionin2021-23.Mendicinoetal.(2024)isusedtoassesstheroleofthereleaseintheeconomyanditsinteractionswithmonetarypolicy.Finally,Herreraetal.(2024)isusedtoassesshowmonetarypolicycanaffectthecostsandthebenefitsofBBMsandcapitalrequirements,viachangesinbankprofitability,BBMbindingnessandfinancialvulnerabilityamongagents.

ECBOccasionalPaperSeriesNo3588

forward.Measuresrelatingtotheeuroarea’sbusinessandfinancialcyclessuggestanincreasingdivergencebetweenbothpolicies,bothinrealandinnominalterms

overtheextendedCOVID-19period.Whileforsynchronisedfinancialandbusinesscycles,complementarymacroprudentialandmonetarypoliciesmaylargelymoveinthesametighteningorlooseningdirection,de-synchronisedcyclesandinflationarysupplyshockscomplicatetheinteractionbetweenmacroprudentialandmonetary

policies.

Thelevelofaccumulatedrisksandvulnerabilitieshasremainedsignificant.

Mostnationalauthoritieshaveconsideredmonetarypolicyconcernsfor

macroprudentialmeasurestakenin2022andbeyond,suggestingthatthehigher

interestratesandhighlevelsofinflationhavecontributedtotheincreaseinshort-

termrisks,uncertaintyand/orprobabilityofriskmaterialisationrelevantfortheir

decisions.Especiallyincountrieswithahighproportionoffloatingratemortgages,

risinginterestratesmaybecomeasignificantburdenforhighlyindebtedhouseholds,apartfromslowingdowndemandforcreditandhousepurchases(BoxA).

Sincethepandemic,thebuild-upofcapital-basedmeasureshasfocusedon

preservingbankingsectorresilience.2Mosteuroarea/EUcountrieshaverebuiltorevenincreasedtheirmacroprudentialbuffers(forbothcountercyclical(CCyB)and(sectoral)systemicriskbuffers(s)SyRB))followingthepandemic.3Theyaimedto

furthertightenthepolicystanceoratleasttokeepthelevelofcapitalbuffersinplacetoensurebankingsectorresilienceagainstthebackdropofbuilt-upvulnerabilities.

Thisre-focusonresiliencetookplaceamidthesubstantialcumulatedcyclicalandstructuralvulnerabilitiesandthelikelydeteriorationinassetqualityalongtheentiremonetarypolicytighteningcyclethatwouldconsumebankcapitaloverthemediumterm.Sofar,therehavebeennosignsofchangetothismomentumintheformofreleasesorloweringofcapitalrequirements.

BBMshavebecomeoneofthekeyinstrumentsinthemacroprudentialtoolkitoverthelasttenyears.4BBMsencompassprimarilycollateral-basedandincome-basedcreditlimitsandarepredominantlyappliedtomortgages.5Collateral-basedBBMsapplyacreditlimitbasedontheborrower’scollateralvalue(loan-to-value

(LTV)orloan-to-collateral(LTC)).Income-basedBBMsrestricttheamountofcreditordebtinrelationtotheborrower’sdisposableincome(D/LTI)ordebtservice

capacity,whichcannotexceedaspecifiedfractionoftheirdisposableincome

(debt/loanservice-to-incomeratio,orD/LSTI).Inaddition,somemacroprudentialauthoritiesapplymaturitylimitstotheextensionofmortgagesoramortisation

requirements.6

2SeealsoECB(2023a),Chapter5,andBehnandLang(2023),Section2.

3Individualcountrieshavemaintainedtheircapitalbuffersthroughoutthepandemic(e.g.,LUmaintainedtheCCyBandmostcountries,exceptforEE,FI,NLandPL,maintainedtheSyRB).

4ForanoverviewofdifferentBBMsimplementedineuroareaandotherEUcountries,seeLagaria(2023).

5However,insomecases,income-basedBBMsareappliedtoalldebtsoftheborrower.Therefore,theyalsorestrictothertypesofloans,suchasconsumerloans.

6Somecountrieshavealsoimposedspecificrequirementsconcerningtheamortisationscheduleofloans.Forexample,inSlovakia,newcreditagreementsshouldbegrantedwithregularpaymentsofinterestandcapital.InSweden,mortgagorswithlargeloansrelativetotheirincomemustamortiseacertainpercentageoftheirdebteveryyear.

ECBOccasionalPaperSeriesNo3589

Acrosscountrieswheretheyhavebeenactivatedsofar,BBMsarelargely

perceivedasstructuralmeasuresandarenotmeanttosubstantiallychangeacrossthefinancialcycle.Whiletheirusehasbecomewidespreadoverthelasttenyears,heterogeneitypersistsacrossEuropeancountries,alsointermsoftheirspecificdesignatthenationallevel.Forsomecountries,BBMshavebeeninplaceforalongtime(CY,NL,IE,PTandSI),whileothercountrieshaveadoptedthem

morerecently(FR,LU,BE,LVandAT).Alargenumberofcountrieshaveactivated

acombinationofconstraints(L/DTI,L/DSTIandLTV),7whereasothershavefocusedonimplementingauniquelimit(FRforDSTI).

EventhoughpolicydecisionsonBBMshavebeenquitescarcesofar,there

wereafewpolicychangesofalooseningnatureamongEuropeanEconomic

Area(EEA)countriesin2023.Thehighinterestrateandhighinflationenvironmentrendersincome-relatedBBMs,suchaslimitsonD/LSTIandD/LTIratios,more

binding,becausedebtserviceisincreasinganddisposableincomeisdecreasinginrealterms.

BoxA.Overviewofmonetarypolicyconcernsinmacroprudentialnotifications8

Notificationsregardingcapital-basedmeasures

Monetarypolicyandinflationconsiderationswerepresentinthenotificationsofcapital-

basedmeasuresduringbothlowandhighinflationperiodsthroughout2015-23buthave

becomemoreprominentsince2022ChartA.1,leftpanel).Theanalysisofkeywordsrelatedto

inflationandmonetarypolicy9suggeststhatmonetarypolicyconcernswereincreasinglycited

amongtheunderlyingreasonsfornationalauthorities’notificationsoverthe2016-19period(ChartA.1,middlepanel).Thesharethendecreasedthroughout2020and2021amidtheCOVID-19

pandemic,aspandemic-relatedeconomicandfinancialstabilityissuesmovedintofocus.In2022and2023,wheninflationincreasedandmonetarypolicytightened,monetarypolicyconcerns

becamemoreprominentinnationalnotifications(morethan60%ofallnotifications).Duringthesetwoyears,monetarypolicyconcernswerealsocitedbyahighernumberofcountries(ChartA.1,rightpanel).

7SeveraleuroareacountrieswithanLTVlimitinplacehavealsoimposedaD/LSTIoraD/LTIlimit,