CriticalandEmergingTechnologiesIndexJUNE2025 HARVARDkennedyschoolBELFERCENTERforscienceandInternationalAffairssecurityandtechnologywhilepreparingstudentsandfellowstobepublicserviceleaders.Formore,visit/programs/defense-emerging-technology-and-strategy.EricRosenbachisaSeniorLecturerattheHarvardKennedySEmergingTechnology,andStrategyProgramattheBelferCenterforScienceandInternationalAffairs.HeservedastheChiefofStaffoftheU.S.DepartmentofDefensefrom2015toSecretaryofDefenseforHomelandDefenseandGlobalSecurityfrom2014to20ShewaspreviouslyaseniorconsultantworkingoPhilosophy,PoliticsandEconomicsfromtheUniversityofOxfordandanMPhilinEconomicsfromtheUniversityofCambridge.EleanorCraneisanAssistantProfessorofQuantumComputingatKing’sCollegeLondonandaVisitingFellowattheBelferCenterforScienceandInternationalAffairsattheHarvardKennedySchool.ShewasapostdoctoralfellowattheMassachusettsInstituteofTechnology,holdsaPh.D.fromUniversityCollegeouslyworkedasaresearchassociateattheChicagoCouncilonGlobalAffairsandinternedatU.S.Indo-PacificCommand.HegraduatedfromtheUniversityofMichiganin2020.LukaszKolodziejisaMasterinPublicAdministrationgraduate,FuFellowattheHarvardKennedySchool.Previously,heworkedattheEuropeanCourtofAudiBusinessAnalyticsfromtheUniversityofWarwick.EthanLeeisaResearchAssistantattheBelferCenterforScienceandInternationalAffairs.Previously,hewasanAssistantEditorandDavidM.RubensteinEditorialFellowatForeignAffairs.HegraduatedwithaB.A.inPoliticalScienceandhonorsinInternationalSecurityStudiesfromStanfordUniversityin2023.AlexandreMeyerisa2024graduateofHarvardUniversity,wherehewasanArthurSachsFellowandabothinthetech/AIindustryandinthepublicsector.CynthiaY.Tongisa2025MasterinPublicPolicygraduate.Shewastheco-chairofMoonshot,adent-runprofessionalinterestclubonspaceissuesandpolicy.PriortotheKennedySchool,shespentfouryearsworkingintheU.S.SenateastheDeputySchedulerandAssistanttotheChiefofStaff.BelferCenterandservesasaFacultyAssistanttoProfessorEricRosenbach.ShegraduatedUniversityofTexasatAustinwithaB.A.inInternationalRelationsandGlobalStudiesandGovernmentin2024.2CriticalandEmergingTechnologiesIndex3CriticalandEmergingTechnologiesIndexDelaneyWehnworksattheU.S.DepartmentofStateandhasledpolicyandcommunicationseffortsforFortune500leaders,a2024presidentialcandidFulbrightScholaranda2024PresidentialManagementFellowFinalist.TheteamextendssincerethankstotheexpertswithinandbeyondtheBelferCenterwhocontributedtothisproject.Inparticular,thedraftersareverygratefulforthesupportofOliviaLeiwantandsharedinsightsWearealsogratefultotheBelferCenter’scommunicationsteam:ShannonSpence,SarrahQureshi,HannahWood,andBennettCraig.Theirtimeandassistancewithmediastrategydevelopmentandimple-Finally,thepublicationofthisIndexwouldneverhavebeenpossiblewithoutthehardworkofresearchersandanalystsacrosstheworldwhocreatedandpubliclysharedkeydatasets.Ourteamisgratefulfortheirhardworkandbeneficence.4CriticalandEmergingTechnologiesIndex 2AbouttheAuthors 2 3 4 5Introduction 7 7 ArtificialIntelligence Background AdditionalFindings Background AdditionalFindings Background AdditionalFindings 26Background AdditionalFindings Quantum 30Background 30 AdditionalFindings 34 36ChoiceofIndicators 36DataCollectionandProcessing ArtificialIntelligenceMetricsOverviewasofMay2025 39BiotechnologyMetricsOverviewasofMay2025 SemiconductorsMetricsOverviewasofMay2025 44SpaceMetricsOverview 50QuantumMetricsOverviewasofMay2025 635CriticalandEmergingTechnologiesIndexNewsheadlinesoftenmakesweepingclaimsaboutthegeopoliticsoftechnologytoday—forinstance,suggestingthatChinahasfarsurpassedtheUnitedStatesinadvancedtechnologies,orthatEuropeislosinggroundintechnologycompetition.Yetitisdifficulttofindrobust,cross-sectordatatosupportsuchcomparisons.TheCriticalandEmergingTechnologiesIndexhelpsfillthisgapbyenablingpolicymakers,strategists,andresearcherstoassessthetechnologicalpowerof25countries.Builtusingthousandsofpublicandcommercialdatapoints,theIndexisaquantitativemodelpresentedthroughaninteractivedash-boardthatbenchmarksprogressinArtificialIntelligence(AI),Biotechnology,Semiconductors,Space,andQuantum.Thedashboardfeaturesadjustableindicatorswithineachsector,allowinguserstocustomizethemodelandgaininsightsintotherelativestrengthsandshortcomingsofeachcountry.ThisreportprovidescontextandanalysisthathelpmakesenseofthedatavisualizedintheIndexDashboard.Itoffersuniqueinsightsintothewaysinwhichthegeopoliticsoftechnologyarechanging,bothwithinandacrosssectors.?TheUnitedStatesleadsChinaandEuropeinallsectorsoftheIndex,primarformanceislargelypoweredbyeconomicresourcesandhumancapital,reflectedinthescaleofAmericanpublicandprivateinvestmentanditsheterogeneousresearchworkforce.Thecountry’sdecentralizedinnovationecosystem—whereresources,ideas,andauthorityaredistributedacrossamyriadofgovernmententities,universities,start-ups,andcorporations—enablesactorstoexpedi-entlypoolexpertiseandscaleinnovations.?AlthoughChinastilltrailstheUnitedStates,itremainscompetitiveandisclosingthegapacrossseveralsectors.ChinalagsinsemiconductorsandadvancedAIduetorelianceonforeignequipment,weakerearly-stageprivateresearch,andshallowercapitalmarkets,butitisfarclosertotheUnitedStatesinbiotechnologyandquantum,whereitsstrengthslieinpharmaceuticalpro-duction,quantumsensing,andquantumcommunications.Backedbyeconomicresources,humancapital,andcentralizedplanning,Chinaisleveragingscaletoreducedependenceonimports,attractinnovationwithinitsborders,andboostindustrialcompetitiveness.?EuropeiscompetitiveincriticalandemergingtechnologiesrelatiEuropeisthirdinthecontextofAI,biotechnology,andquantumtechnologies.YetChinaandRussiaductors.Indeed,Europe’sshortcomingswithsemiconductorssignificantlylowerEurope’soverallstandingcomparedtotheUnitedStatesandChina.Theregion’sabilitytofulfillitstechnologicalpotentialwillultimatelydependontheintegrationofgovernanceandcapitalacrosstheregion.?CollaborativepartnershipswithEurope,Japan,andSouthKonificantlymorepowerfulincriticalandemergingtechnologies,particularlyinthecontextofquantum,semiconductors,andbiotechnology.TheUnitedStatesispowerfulacrossallsectorsbutdoesnothavefullsupremacy;forinstance,nocountryhascomplete,end-to-endcontrolofasupplychainforadvancedsemiconductors.Thesegapscreatecriticalchokepoints,limitingtheabilityofanyonecountrytoshapetheglobalbalanceofpoweralone.ToensurethattheWestremainscompetitiveandresilient,theUnitedStatesmustdeepencollaborationwithitsalliesandpartners.6CriticalandEmergingTechnologiesIndex?TheUnitedStateshasaconsiderablenificantprogressandhaveuniqueadvantagesthatwillchallengetheAmericanAIleadinthenextdecade.TheUnitedStatesdominatesintermsofitseconomicresources,computingpower,however,demonstratedthattheU.S.leadChinaleadsintermsofdataandhumancapital;theseadvantageswillhelpitclosetheU.S.edgeinAIifitcanovercometheobstaclespresentedbyU.S.exportcontrols.Europe’sstrengthinAIislargelyderivedfromitsstrongdataandhumancapital,givingitthepotentialtoaccelerateitsAIcapabilitiesifitimprovesitsregulatoryenvironment.?AmongthetechnologiesexaminedinthisIndex,ChinahasthemostimmediateoppoovertaketheUnitedStatesinbiotechnology;thenarrowU.S.-Chinagapsuggeststhatfdevelopmentscouldquicklyshifttheglobalbalanceofpower.TheUnitedperformsimilarlyinbiotechnologyoverall,withChina’sstrengthsunderpinnedbyitshumancapital.TheUnitedStatesexcelsinsecurity,geneticengineering,vaccineresearch,andagriculturaltech-nology,bolsteredbyprivate-sectorinnovationandpublic-privatepartnerships.Chinahasdomi-nanceinpharmaceuticalproductionthroughextensive,large-scalepublicinvestmentsandstate-backedmanufacturing.?Thedominanceofthepersistsatcriticalchokepointsofthesupplychain:advancedmanufacturingandfabrication,chipdesignandtools,andequipment.ThesepillarshavethegreatestvarianceamongallinclinthisIndexduetohighcostsandtechnicalbarriers.Whilemanycountriesareinvestingheavilytoclosethesegaps,capitalaloneisunlikelytobesufficienttoestablishanend-to-endsemiconductorproductioncapability;ifcountriesaimtobreakfreefromdependenceonthecurrentleaders,theywillneedtosimultaneouslysecureequipmentandadvancechipdesign.?TheAmericanprivatesectordrivestheUnitedStates’strongleadinspace,thoughitsvul-nerabilitiesinorbittoChineseandRussianmilitarycapabilitiesincreasestrategicrisk.Washington’sedgestemsfromproductivepublic-privatepartnershipsthathavehelpedtheUnitedStatesdramaticallyincreaseitslaunchfrequencyandpayloadcapacitywhilereducingper-missioncosts.However,theUnitedStatesisasymmetricallyvulnerableinspace,relyingheavilyonspace-basedsystemsformilitaryoperationsandforsupportingcriticalsectorsoftheAmericaneconomy.ChinaandRussiaarealsofieldingformidableanti-satellitecapabilities,offsettingtheUnitedStates’leadinspaceandincreasingitsstrategicexposure.?Quantumtechnologiesremaininanearlyresearchphase,withcurrenteffortsfocusedlessondeploymentandmoreonadvancingearly-stageconcepts.Thisrelativelackofihascontributedtothefragmentedandregion-specificdevelopmentofquantumecosystems.IntheUnitedStatesandEurope,universitiesleadfoundationalresearch,startupsdevelopspecializedtoolsandsystems,andlargecorporationsscaleengineeringandinfrastructureforquantumtech-nologies.Chinatakesamoreopaque,state-ledapproach,withlessseparationbetweenresearch,development,andindustry.7CriticalandEmergingTechnologiesIndexThispublicationintroducestheinauguralCriticalandEmergingTechnologiesIndex,designedtohelppol-icymakersandstrategistsassessnationalpowerinandacrosscriticaldomainsoftechnology.Builtusingpublicandcommercialdata,theIndexisvisualizedthroughaninteractivedashboardthatbenchmarksadvancementsacross25countriesinArtificialIntelligence(AI),Biotechnology,Semiconductors,Space,andQuantum.TheDashboardfeaturesadjustableindicatorswithineachtechnologicalsector,empoweringuserstomakecustomchangesandobtaininsightsintoeachcountry’srelativestrengthsandshortcomings.Powerisdifficulttodefineandmeasure.Whilesomepolicymakersseeitprimarilyintermsofmilitarymight,otherspointtoeconomicstrengthorideationalandculturalinfluenceasmorerelevantindicators.1Thisreportdefinespowerastheabilityofanationtoachieveitsnationalintereststhroughthecontrolofresources,material,andideas.2Inaworldincreasinglydefinedbyinnovation,criticalandemergingtechnol-ogiesareintegraltonationalpower.Afterall,technologicalevolutionisaprocesslargelyshapedbygeo-politics.3Science,innovation,technology,andindustryhavecatalyzedsocietaltransformationsthroughouthistory;thesedevelopmentssubsequentlyinfluencedthewaysthatstatesdevelopedandemployedtech-nologies.4Themostpowerfulnationshavebuiltadvancedinnovationecosystems,supportedbyresearchandbothpublicandprivateinvestment.Theseecosystemsformacriticalfoundationoftheirtechnologicalpower:thecapacitytoharnessinnovationandemploynewtechnologiestomodifysystemsandcatalyzechangeontheglobalstage.Asgeopoliticalcompetitionunfoldsinaneraofinterdependence,technologicalpowerenhancessovereigntYet,despitegrowingpolicyinterestincountries’advancementswithcriticalandemergingtechnologies,therearefewtoolstofacilitatecomprehensivecomparisonsacrossinterconnectedtechnologysectors.SomenotableeffortsincludetheStanfordInstituteforHuman-CenteredAI’sArtificialIntelligenceIndexReport2024,theAustralianStrategicPolicyInstitute’sCriticalTechnologyTracker,andtheLowyInstitute’sAsiaPowerIndex.TheprimarygoaloftheIndexistofillthisgap,facilitatingcomparative,cross-sectortechnologyanalysisforinformedgeostrategicdecision-making.ItpresentsdatathroughaninteractiveDashboardwithadjustableparameters,enablinguserstogeneratetailoreddatavisualizationonthegeo-politicsoftechnology.ApolicymakerorstrategistcanusethisIndexDashboard,forinstance,toexplorethesectorsinwhichcountriesleadorlag,evaluatethestrengthsandweaknessesofcountriesacrosstechnol-ogysectors,andassesschangesovertimeasnewdataisincorporated.TheWhiteHouseOfficeofScienceandTechnologyPolicy’s2024updatedlistofcriticalandemergingtech-nologiesguidedtheselectionofthefivesectorsfeaturedinthisIndex:AI,Biotechnology,Semiconductors,Space,andQuantum.5Manycountriesandinternationalorganizations—suchasAustralia,theUnitedtechnologylistshighlightingsimilarsectorsofinterest.6Innovationinthesefiveareashelpsdriveprogressacrossothertechnologysectors;advancementsinonecanfacilitategreaterefficiency,capability,andcom-petitivenessacrossothers.Thesesectorsarealsovitaltothenationalsecurityandstrategicautonomyofstates,helpinggovernmentsnavigatefuturegeostrategicchallengesandseizenewopportunities.78CriticalandEmergingTechnologiesIndexActorsActorsIncludedintheIndexUkraine,UnitedArabEmirates,UnKingdom,UnitedStates.8theIndexArtificialIntelligence,Biotechnology,Semiconductors,SpaceTechnThemethodologybehindtheCriticalandEmergingTechnologyIndexcanbebroadlyseparatedintothreedistinctparts.9First,48keydimensionsacrossallthetechnologysectors—referredtointhisreportaspillars—wereidentified,alongwithcorrespondingsub-metricsdesignedtocaptureacountry’sproficiencyineachsector.Thesepillarsfallintotwocategories:fourtofivefundamentalcross-sectorpillarsconsis-tentlyappliedacrossallcriticalandemergingtechnologies(includingEconomicResources,HumanCapital,Security,Regulatory,andGlobalPlayer),andthreetofivesector-specificpillars,whichvarybysectorandaretailoredtoreflectuniquecharacteristicsofthetechnologiesandsystemsinquestion.IntheIndex’sspacesector,forexample,EconomicResourcesandDomesticLaunchCapabilityserveasfundamentalandsector-specificpillars,respectively.Second,over3,375individualdatapointswerecompiled,organized,andvalidatedtocomprisesub-metricsundereachpillar.Third,thedatawasreviewedandnormalizedtomean-ingfullymeasurecountriesandpreserveeachsub-metric’srelativeimportance.Altogether,thisprocessenabledtheassignmentofweightstosectorsandpillars,whichweremultipliedbyeachcountry’snormal-izedscoresandsummedtogenerateeithersector-specificscoresorfinalcompositescoresforcountriesacrossallsectors.UsingtheDashboard,userscanpersonalizethisprocess,inputtingtheirownsectorandpillarweightstocreatetailoredassessments.(FormoreinformationonthemethodologyoftheIndex,seetheAnnexofthisreport.)ThedefaultsectorweightsusedintheIndexweregeneratedusingastructuredscoringmethodthatreflectstherelativestrategicvalueofthedifferenttechnologysectors.Thismethodbeganwithidentifyingsixcriteriathatdefineeachtechnologysector:geopoliticalsignificance,systemicleverage,GDPcontribu-tion,dual-usepotential,supplychainrisk,andtimetomaturity.10Technologieswerethenratedonascaleofonetofiveacrossthesecriteria;theseratingsweremultipliedbycorrespondingcriteriaweights,withthesumoftheseproductsyieldingacomprehensiverawscoreforeachsector.11Rawscoreswerethennormalizedandroundedtogeneratethefinalsectorweights:35%forSemiconductors,25%forAI,20%formentofthesourcesoftechnologicalpower,thesesectorweightsareprovisionalandintendedasarefer-encepointforfurtheranalysis.9CriticalandEmergingTechnologiesIndexUnitedStatesEuropeJapanSouthKoreaUnitedKingdomGermanyIndiaAustraliaItalyNetherlandsSpainSingaporeBrazilUnitedArabEmiratesNewZealandTurkeySaudiArabiaUkraineNorthKorea01020304050607080AIBiotechSemiconductorsQuantum10CriticalandEmergingTechnologiesIndexTheIndexshowsthattheUnitedStatesisstrongacrossallcriticalandemergingtechnologysectors,withapronouncedleadinspaceandartificialintelligence.TheUnitedStates’performanceislargelydrivenbyeconomicresourcesandhumancapital,reflectedinthescaleofAmericanpublicandprivateinvestmentanditsheterogeneous,world-classresearchworkforce.Thecountry’sdecentralizedinnovationecosys-tem—whereresources,ideas,andauthorityaredistributedacrossamyriadoffederalagencies,stateandlocalprograms,universities,start-ups,andcorporations—enablesactorstoexpedientlypoolexpertiseandscaleinnovationswithoutbeingconstrainedbyasinglecentralauthority.ThisdecentralizationremainsacoredriverbehindAmericandynamismandtechnologicalpower.13However,cutstoacademicresearchfundingandgrowingpoliticalpolarizationarehinderingtheUnitedStates’abilitytostrategicallyshapethepublicandprivateallocationofresources.TheAmericaninnovationecosystemhasdeliveredstrongresultsoverthepastseveraldecades,butitcurrentlystandstolosetalentandfundingduetochangingfederalpolicy.WashingtonmustreversevolatileactionsontradeandendclasheswithacademicinstitutionsifitwantstopreserveU.S.gainsandfurthertheAmericanleadincriticalandemergingtechnologies.TheIndexalsoshowsthatwhileChinalargelytrailstheUnitedStatesincriticalandemergingtechnolo-gies,itremainscompetitiveandissteadilyclosingthegapacrossmultipletechnologicalsectors.Despiterecent,high-profileadvancesinindigenouscapabilities,ChinaremainsbehindtheUnitedStatesinsemi-conductorsandAIduetocontinuedrelianceonforeignequipment,alackofearly-stageprivateresearchecosystemscomparabletotheWest,andshallowercapitalmarketsthanthoseinWesterneconomies.TheU.S.leadoverChina,however,narrowsconsiderablywhenitcomestobiotechnnewer,rapidlyevolvingsectorsthatoperatelargelyoutsidetraditionaltechnologyecosystems.Morespecif-ically,China’sstrengthsinbiotechnologystemfromitsdominanceinpharmaceuticalproductionandman-ufacturing.Inquantum,itsstrengthliesprimarilyinsensingandcommunications.China,liketheUnitedStates,drawsstrengthfromitseconomicresourcesandhumancapital—twofoundationalpillarsthatarenecessarytodriveprogressacrossallcriticalandemergingtechnologies.Thesestrengths,combinedwithChina’snarrowinggapinbiotechnologyandquantumtechnologies,illustratehowBeijingusesscaleandcentralizedplanningtoseizeandcreatenewopportunities:cuttingChina’srelianceonimports,compel-lingforeignfirmstoproduceandinnovatewithinitsborders,andboostingitsindustrialcompetitiveness.14China’sriseasatechnologypowerhouseisalsoreflectiveofagrowingconsensusthatstrategicsectorsneedgovernmentbackingtostaycompetitive,particularlywhenfacingoffagainstheavilysubsidizedrivals.Still,Chinaremainsconstrainedbylargestructuralchallenges:slowinggrowth,mountingdebt,andindus-trialovercapacity,amongothers.15NoothernationrivalstheUnitedStatesandChinaincriticalandemergingtechnologies.AsecondtierofcountriesfollowswellbehindtheU.S.-Chinaduopoly,withscoressteadilydecliningfromonecountrytoIndia,Russia,Canada,Australia,Italy,theNetherlanThisbalanceofpowerincriticalandemergingtechnologies,however,shiftswhenEuropeistreatedasaunifiedwhole.AggregatingthetechnologicalstrengthsofcountriesinEurope—France,Germany,Italy,theNetherlands,Spain,Turkey,andtheUnitedKingdom—givestheregionacollectivestandingthatamountstoroughlyhalfoftheU.S.totalandtwo-thirdsofChina’s.Sectorbysector,EuroperanksthirdinAI,bio-technology,andquantumtechnologies,butcontinuestotrailJapan,Taiwan,andSouthKoreainsemicon-ductors,andRussiainspace.Still,tofostertechnologicalpoweracrossEuropeasawhole,theregionmustdeepenmarketintegration,coordinateandmergepoliticalinstitutions,andcreateinnovationandcapitalmarketsthatencouragegreaterdynamism.11CrIntoday’scurrentgeopoliticallandscape,evensmalladvancements—particularlyinbiotechnologyandquantum—couldhavesignificantramificationsforthefuturebalanceofpower.Afterall,technologicalconvergencemeansthatadvancementsinonesectorcancreatenetworkeffectsthataccelerateprogressinothersectorsandshapefuturetechnologiesinwaysthatarenotimmediatelyclear.16PowerfulAImodels,forinstance,arealreadyhelpingresearchersacceleratedrugdiscoveryandpredictproteinstructures,whilequantumresearchisdrivingthedevelopmentofimprovedsemiconductormaterialsfornext-generationcomputerchips.Thesepositivefeedbackloopsalsoembedfirst-moveradvantagesintothesystem,creatingpath-dependentgainsthatgrowhardertodislodgeastechnologiesinterconnectandco-evolve.17SatelliteCommunications=AI二<>ProcessorIntelligenceProcessorTelephoneGyroscopeTelephoneAccelerometerTechnologicalconvergencecomplicateseffortstogovernorforecasttheimpactofcriticalandemergingtechnologies.Italsomeansthatcountriesseekinggreatpowerstatusmustmaintainanedgeacrossaconstellationofcriticalandemergingtechnologies.18Thisdoesnotmeanthatsmallerstatesareoutofthegame.Thecountriesthatbuildontheirstrengthsandcoordinatewithpartnersabroadcansecurelastingeconomicprosperityandsecuritywithintheirregionsorgeopoliticalblocs.Forexample,policymakersinOttawahavehelpedCanadabecomeaquantumpowerhouse:althoughitrepresentsjust0.5%oftheworld’spopulation,thecountryishometofivepercentofglobalquantumtalent,hasauthoredover1,000ofthe75,000quantumresearchpaperspublishedonarXivin2023,andhascommitted$360millionCanadiandollarsthroughits2023NationalQuantumStrategytosupporttalentdevelopmentandinternationalcollab-orationinquantumsensing,computing,andcommunications.19Still,managedoremergentinterdependencecomeswithexternalrisks.Exogenousshocks—suchasglobalpandemicsorinterstatewars—canabruptlysevercross-bordersupplychains,leavingcountriesthatspecializetoonarrowlyunabletosecurecriticalinputsorexportgoodsandservices.Tomitigatethese12CriticalandEmergingTechnologiesIndexrisks,manygovernmentsarereshoringspecificindustries,friendshoringtoalliesandpartners,andtight-eningexportcontrolsoncriticalanddual-usetechnologies.Thesechangesareunfoldinginbothglobalandregionalcontexts;afterall,mosttradeandinvestmentisheavilyregional,andso-called‘global’supplychainsrarelystretchendtoend.20Theseareoftenusedwithinbroadernationalstrategiestobalancecostefficiencyandresilience.Still,thechallengesofenforcement,tensionsbetweencompetitionandinno-vation,andthecomplexityofglobaltradenetworksmeanthatnosinglepolicycanaddresseveryrisk;tradeoffsareunavoidable.21Governmentsmuststriketherightbalanceinhowtheyusethesetools.WhilethisIndexandReportmapthegloballandscapeofcriticalandemergingtechnologies,theydonotaccountforshorter-termdevelopments.Astechnologyevolves,thewaythatsectorsandcross-cuttingpillarsareassessedshouldevolvewithit.ReadersshouldusetheflexiblemodelingfeatureoftheIndexDashboardtoadjustweights,challengeunderlyingassumptions,andtestdifferentanalyticinputs.13