MigrationandDevelopmentBrief37November2022RemittancesBraveGlobalHeadwindsSpecialFocus:ClimateMigrationtancesTeamrotectionandJobsdBank FollowingaSurgeinRemittanceFlowsContinuedtoGrowin2022 8nedGrowthofRemittancesin RemittancesOutlookfor 17 fugeeMovements ecommendations onandRemittanceFlows iaandPacific a bbean hAfrica rica stInvestmentPortfolioFlowsandOfficialDevelopmentAssistanceFlowstoLow-andMiddle-IncomeCountries,1990–2023f 9PortfolioFlowsandOfficialDevelopmentAssistanceFlowstoLow-andMiddle-IncomeCountries,ExcludingChina,1990–2023f 9Figure1.2TopRecipientsofRemittancesamongLow-andMiddle-IncomeCountries,2022e 10FigureB.1AfterSurgingtoRecordHighs,CommodityPricesHaveEased 11FigureB1.2InflationRampsUpAcrossHigh-IncomeCountriesandEMDEs 12FigureB1.1.3USandEuroAreaWagesCompressedbyInflation 13Figure1.3RemittanceFlowsbyLMICRegion,2021–2023f 14Figure1.4AStrongerRubleagainsttheUSDollarhasIncreasedtheValueofRemittanceFlowsinManyCountriesofEuropeandCentralAsia 14Figure1.5HowMuchDoesItCosttoSend$200?RegionalRemittanceCosts,2021–22 19utHasMorethanRecoveredSince 20Figure2.2USSouthwestBorderApprehensions/Inadmissibles,FY16–FY21 21Figure2.3RefugeesandAsylumSeekersWorldwide,1991–2022 22Figure2.4First-TimeandPendingAsylumApplicationsintheEU-27,2014–22 23FigureA.1ResourceFlowstotheEastAsiaandPacificRegion,2000-2023f 30FigureA.2TopRemittanceRecipientsintheEastAsiaandPacificRegion,2022 31FigureA.3RemittanceFeestothePhilippinesareamongtheLowestinEastAsiaandPacific 32FigureA.4ResourceFlowstoEuropeandCentralAsia,ExcludingRussia,2000-2023f 34FigureA.5SomeCISCountriesareHighlyDependentonRemittancesfromRussia 35FigureA.6Top10RemittanceRecipientsin2022e 36FigureACostofSendingMoneyinEuropeandCentralAsiaRoseSlightlyintheSecondQuarterof2022 37FigureACostsofSendingMoneytoUkraineHaveFallenSharplyfollowingStartoftheWar 38FigureA.9Remittances,ForeignDirectInvestment,andOfficialDevelopmentAssistanceFlowstoLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean,2000–2023f 40FigureA.10TopRemittanceRecipientsinLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean,2022e 40FigureA.11RemittanceFlowstoLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanGrowingataSlowerPacein2022withtheExceptionofNicaragua 41FigureA.12EmploymentLevelsofHispanic,ForeignBorn,andNativeBornintheUnitedStates 41FigureA.13MedianWeeklyEarningsofHispanic-andNative-BornWorkersintheUnitedStates 42FigureA.14TheCostofSendingMoneytoLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanHasRemainedStable 43FigureA.15RemittancestoMENAofferSupportagainstHighVolatilityofOtherFlows,2000-2023f 46FigureA.16TopRemittanceRecipientsintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,2022e 47FigureA.17SendingMoneywithinMENAisLessExpensivethanSendingMoneyfromOutside 47FigureA.18RemittanceFlowstoMENARegiontoDeceleratein2022–23AmidSurgingPrices 49FigureA.19ResourceFlowstoSouthAsia,2000–2023f 50FigureA.20TopRemittanceRecipientsinSouthAsia,2022e 50FigureATheCostsofSendingRemittancestoSouthAsiaVaryacrossCorridors 53FigureA.22StockofInternationalEmigrantsVariesacrossSouthAsianCountries 54FigureA.23ResourceFlowstoSub-SaharanAfrica,1990–2023f 56FigureA.24TopRemittanceRecipientsintheSub-SaharanAfricaRegion,2022e 56FigureA.25CostsofSendingRemittancestoAfricanCountriesVariesWidelyacrossCorridors 57sTable1.1EstimatesandProjectionsofRemittanceFlowstoLow-andMiddle-IncomeRegions,2015–23f 8BoxB.1.1.2RemittanceFlowstoFCSCountries 16Box1.1GlobalEconomicDevelopmentsandFactorsAffectingRemittancesin2022 11BoxRemittanceFlowstoCountriesinFragileandConflictAffectedSituationsBounceBackin6Box3.1CountryClimateDiagnosticReportsandMigration 28BoxA.1India’sRemittanceReceiptsareonTracktoReach$100Billionin2022 51SummaryThisMigrationandDevelopmentBrief(number37intheseries)describeskeydevelopmentsinmigrationandremittanceflowsandrelatedpolicyandregulatorychangesthathaveoccurredsincethepreviousbrief,publishedinMay2022.TheeffectsonmigrationandremittancesoftheRussia-UkrainewartheCOVID-19pandemic,inflation,andotherchangesintheglobaleconomicenvironmentareexamined.RemittancestolowandmiddleincomecountriesLMICsincreasedbyanestimated5percentin2022,to$626billion.However,downsiderisksremain.Migrationflowsarereboundingfromthepandemic-shavealsoincreasedespeciallyduetotheRussiaUkrainewarInaspecialfeature,theBriefnotesthatclimatechangewillincreasemigration,mostlywithincountriesThepoorestarelikelytobemostaffected.Nationalandregionaldevelopmentstrategiesneedtobeviewedthroughaclimatemigrationlens.Consideringtheglobalnatureandexpectedtrajectoryofmigration,thecaseforcreatingaglobalconcessionalfinancingfacilityformigrationremainsstrong.RemittancesThegrowthofglobalremittanceflowsisexpectedtobe4.9percentin2022.RemittancewereshapedbyseveralfactorsinBesidesthedeterminationofmigrantstohelptheirfamiliesbackhome,agradualreopeningofvarioussectorsinhostcountries’economiesexpandedmanymigrants’incomeandemploymentsituation.Ontheotherhand,risingpricesadverselyaffectedmigrants’realincomesandtheirremittances.InRussia,risingoilpricesandcontinueddemandformigrantworkersincreasedtheflowofremittancestoCentralAsiancountries.TheappreciationoftherubleagainsttheUSdollartranslatedintohighervalue,inUSdollarterms,ofoutwardremittancesfromRussiatoCentralAsia.InEurope,aweakereurohadtheoppositeeffect,reducingtheUSdollarvaluationofremittanceflowstoNorthAfricaandelsewhere.RemittancesreceivedbymigrantsintransitcontributedtostrongflowsinMexicoandCentralAmerica.Finally,inmanycountriesthatexperiencedscarcityofforeignexchangeandmultipleexchangerates,officiallyrecordedremittanceflowsdeclinedasflowsshiftedtoalternativechannelsofferingbetterexchangerates.Growthinremittancesisexpectedtomoderateto2percentin2023,asGDPgrowthinhigh-incomecountriescontinuestoslow.Downsiderisksremainsubstantial,includingafurtherdeteriorationofthewarinUkraine,volatileoilpricesandcurrencyexchangerates,andadeeper-than-expecteddownturninmajorhigh-incomecountries.RemittancecostsUNSustainableDevelopmentGoalindicatorc1).AccordingtotheWorldBank’sRemittancePricesWorldwideDatabase,theglobalaveragecostofsending$200toLMICswas6percentinthesecondquarterof2022,notverydifferentfromayearago,andtwiceashighastheSDGtarget.Amongdevelopingcountryregions,thecostwaslowestinSouthAsia,atabout4.1percent,whileSub-SaharanAfricacontinuedtohavethehighestaveragecost,about7.8percent.Theburdenofcompliancewithregulationsgoverninganti-moneylaunderingandcombatingthefinancingofterrorism(AML/CFT)continuestorestrictaccessofnewserviceproviderstocorrespondentbanks.Theseregulationsalsoaffectmigrants’accesstodigitalremittanceservices.MigrationPreliminarydataindicatethatofficialmigrationflowsarereboundingfromthepandemic-yinmigrationseemsverystrongintheUnitedStatesintheEuroAreamigrationflowshavenotreturnedtopre-COVIDlevels.However,undocumentedmigrationtotheEuropeanUnionandtheUnitedStatesappearstoberising.Refugeeflowsalsoareincreasing:7.8millionUkrainianshavecrossedintotheEUsincethestartoftheRussia-Ukrainewar.gasapotentdriverofmobilityStrongerstormsincreasedfloodingintensifyingheatanddrought,andrisingsealevelsarealreadyforcingpeopletoleavetheirhomesandsometimestheircountries.SuchextremeeventsareexpectedtoincreaseintheyearsaheadTheWorldBanksGroundswellreportestimatedthatinternalclimatemigrationmayreachupto216millionpeopleby2050duetoslow-onsetclimateimpacts.Whilemostclimaterelatedmobilityhasbeenandisexpectedtobeinternal,itcouldspilloverintoneighboringcountries,especiallyamongsmallislandnationsfacingriskstotheirhabitability.Mostvulnerabletothenegativeimpactsofclimatechangearethosewhoareimmobileinthreatenedareas.Hazardsmaytrapthemostaffectedasmovingrequiresresources,andvulnerabilityisinverselycorrelatedwithmobilityThepoorestarelikelytobemostaffectedastheyoftenlacktheresourcesnecessarytoadaptormove.Safeandregularmigrationneedstobeconsideredasapartofadaptationstrategiesthatincludelabormobilityanddecentwork,humanitarianadmissionandstay,familyreunification,visawaivers,andlegalpathwaysPolicysolutionsmustbeconsideredforpeoplewhowanttomove,peoplewhoarealreadyonthemoveandpeoplewhowouldstayinplace.Effortsarerequiredacrossseveralaspectsofmigrationpoliciesatthelocalcountry,andinternationallevel,including:(1)preparednessandanticipatoryaction2)plannedrelocationprograms,(3)policycoherenceandstrategies,and(4)legalnormsandtheinternationalinstitutionalframework.Allsolutionsmustincludedisasterriskreductionsandclimatechangeadaptation.parednessandanticipatoryactionwillberequiredtomanagedisplacementinaffectedregionsaswellastheinfluxofpeopleintoreceivingcommunities.Policymakersneedtoplanforsafeareaswheremigrantscanbeaccommodated,andarrangeadequatefinancing.Investmentsintheadaptationofout-migrationhotspotstoenablepotentialmigrantstostayinplace,arealsoimportant.Remittancesalsohavearoleinhelpingrecipienthouseholdsindevelopingcountriestobuildresilience,forexamplethroughstrongerhousing,andtocopewiththelossesintheaftermathofdisasters.Plannedrelocationsaredifficulttoexecuteinawaythatenhanceswell-being,butifappropriatelyimplementedcanbeameasureoflastresortforpeoplewhowouldotherwisebetrapped.Morebroadly,systematicplanningatthenexusofclimate,development,andmigrationcanhelpbroadentheopportunitiesforpeopletoadaptwheretheylive,orelseenablethemtomove.TheGlobalCompactonMigration(GCM)mentionstheimportanceofincreasinglegalpathsforthoseaffectedbydisasters,climatechange,andenvironmentaldisasterscausedbyhumanactivity.Ontheoccasionofthe27thConferenceoftheParties(COP27),theUnitedNationsNetworkonMigrationcalledonMemberStatestostrengthensupporttoaffectedcountriesandpeople,includingmigrants,byeffectivelymobilizingadequatefinance;enhancingclimate-sensitivepathwaysforregularmigration;andfurtheringinternationalactionandcooperationtoaddressclimate-relatedmigrationatlocal,national,regionalandgloballevels.Changesintheinternationallegalnormsandinstitutionalframeworkformigrationwillberequiredtocopewiththechallengeofincreasedmigrationduetonaturalhazardsandclimatechangeevents.Theseshouldinclude(1)humanitarianadmissionsprograms;and(2)protectionagainstnonreturn(similartothatprovidedtorefugees)forpersonswho,duetoenvironmentalfactors,wouldfacesevereconsequencesifreturnedhome.Hostcommunitiesexperiencingrapid,unexpectedinfluxesofmigrantsrequiresupportforthefinancialcostsofservicesprovidedtothenewcomers.AcknowledgmentsThisbriefwaspreparedbyDilipRatha,VandanaChandra,EungJuKim,BaranPradhan,ElliotRiordan,andMajaVezmaroftheMigrationandRemittancesUnitoftheGlobalUnitEngagementintheSocialProtectionandJobsGlobalPractice,andSoniaPlazaoftheFinance,Competitiveness,andInnovationGlobalPracticeAlexAleinikoff,JonasBergmann,andSusanMartinoftheKNOMADThematicWorkingGrouponEnvironmentalChangeandMigrationcontributedtothesectiononclimatemigration.ThankstothepeerreviewersHarishNatarajan,OyaPinar,andVivianeWeiChenClementforhelpfulcomments,andtoMichalRutkowski,LoliArribas-Banos,andIanWalkerforsupportandguidance.CommentsfromadditionalreviewersColinAndrews,LouisBenveniste,LouiseCord,MatthewDornan,MariaEugeniaGenoni,SonaKalantaryan,DavidStephenKnight,LuisFelipeLopez-Calva,MoritzMeyer,andKantaRigaudaremuchappreciated.ThanksforvaluableinputfromNianSadiqandAndriyPoddyeroginNationalBankofUkraine).AndthecontributionsofRebeccaOngforcommunicationssupport,WilliamShawforcontentediting,andFayreMakeigforcopyeditingareespeciallyrecognized.1TrendsinRemittanceFlowsFollowingaSurgeinRemittanceFlowsContinuedtoGrowin2022RemittanceflowstolowandmiddleincomecountriesLMICsareestimatedtohaveincreasedby4.9percenttoreach$626billionin2022(table1.1).Thestronggrowthrateisnoteworthy,comingasitdoesafterasurgeof10.2percentin2021(accordingtorevisedofficialdata).Fortheworld,remittanceflowsareexpectedtoreach$794billionin2022.1RemittancescametorepresentanevenlargersourceofexternalfinanceforLMICsduring022,relativetoforeigndirectinvestment(FDI),officialdevelopmentassistance(ODA),andportfolioinvestmentflowsfigure1.1a).ExcludingChina,remittancesstandasthepremiersourceofexternalfinanceforLMICssince2015,exceedingFDIflowsandODA(figure1.1b).Table1.1EstimatesandProjectionsofRemittanceFlowstoLow-andMiddle-IncomeRegions,2015–($billion)20152016201720182019202020212022e2023fLow-andmiddle-incomecountries*447440477524546542597626639EastAsiaandPacificexcludingChina470697808384EuropeandCentralAsia42432926525LatinAmericaandCaribbean83818996MiddleEastandNorthAfrica48480146235SouthAsiaSub-SaharanAfrica42942494743035World602596638694722711781794815(%growthrate)Low-andmiddle-incomecountries*0.5-4.3-0.8EastAsiaandPacific3.7-3.2-7.5-2.60.7-1.0excludingChina8.04.7-0.8EuropeandCentralAsia-12.94.7-8.915.710.34.2LatinAmericaandCaribbeanMiddleEastandNorthAfrica-6.6-4.54.0SouthAsia1.6-5.96.0Sub-SaharanAfrica6.4-8.69.616.9-5.1-8.5World-1.4-0.97.08.83.9-2.7Memoitem:RemittancestoLMICsaccordingtothe2021countryclassificationusedinMDBrief36($billion)(%growth)4530.5447-1.24848.35319.75554.5550-0.960710.36385.26512.1Sources:KNOMAD/WorldBankstaff;IMFBalanceofPaymentsStatistics.SeeappendixinMigrationandDevelopmentBrief32forforecastingmethods(WorldBank/KNOMAD2020).Noteeestimatefforecast.IntheWorldBank’s2022countryclassificationusedinthisreport,PanamaandRomaniamovedtothehigh-incomegroupfromtheuppermiddleincomegroup.WhilePalaumovedtotheupper-middleincomegroupfromthehigh-incomegroup,Venezuelahasbeenunclassifiedduetotheunavailabilityofdata.FigureaRemittancesForeignDirectInvestmentPortfolioFlowsandOfficialDevelopmentAssistanceFlowstoLow-andMiddle-IncomeCountries,1990–2023f($billion)900($billion)700500R500300ODA100ODA-100-100andequityflowsFigurebRemittancesForeignDirectInvestmentPortfolioFlowsandOfficialDevelopmentAssistanceFlowstoLow-andMiddle-IncomeCountries,ExcludingChina,1990–2023f($billion)700($billion)600Re600500400300200ODA1000PortfoliodebtandPortfoliodebtandequityflowsSourcesKNOMAD/WorldBankstaff;WorldDevelopmentIndicators;IMFBalanceofPaymentsStatistics.AlsoseeWorldBankKNOMAD)forsources,methods,andchallengesofcollectingremittancedata.NoteFDIforeigndirectinvestment;ODA=officialdevelopmentassistance;e=estimate;f=forecast.Thetopfiverecipientcountriesforremittancesin2022areexpectedtobeIndia,establishingabenchmarkof$100billionintheyear,followedbyMexicowithatallyof$60billion(whichreplacedChinainsecondpositionduring2021),andChina,thePhilippines,andtheArabRepublicofEgypt(figureceinflowsrepresentverylargesharesofGDPhighlightingthendsTongapercentofGDPandSamoapercentstandinthetopten,giventheirexposuretothevagariesoftourismandvulnerabilitytodisasters(figure1.2b).FigureTopRecipientsofRemittancesamongLowandMiddle-IncomeCountries,2022ea.ByTotalAmountllione2121b.AsaShareofGDPofGDPe*343231Source:KNOMAD/WorldBankstaff.Note:GDP=grossdomesticproduct;e=estimate.SouthSudanisexcludedduetodatavalidity.ReasonsforSustainedGrowthofRemittancesin2RemittanceflowstodevelopingregionswereshapedbyseveralfactorsinFirstandforemost,arobustpaceofgrowthinremittancesisevidenceofmigrants’determinationtohelptheirfamiliesbackhome.Second,agradualreopeningofvarioussectorsinhost-countryeconomies(followingpandemic-inducedclosuresandtraveldisruptions)improvedmigrantworkers’incomesandemploymentsituationsandtherebytheirabilitytosendmoneyhome.Third,risingpricesingeneraladverselyaffectedmigrantsrealincomesandtheirremittances.Fourth,currencyexchangeratesaffectedremittanceflowsinthecaseofRussia,anunexpectedandstrongappreciationoftherubletranslatedintohighervalue,inUSdollarterms,ofoutwardremittancestoCentralAsiaandtheSouthernCaucasuscountries.2InthecaseofEurope,aweakereurohadtheoppositeeffectofreducingtheUSdollarvaluationofremittanceflowstoNorthAfricaandelsewhere.Fifth,inmanycountriesthatexperiencedscarcityofforeignexchangeandmultipleexchangerates,officiallyrecordedremittanceflowsdeclinedasflowsshiftedtoalternativechannelsofferingbetterexchangerates.Twootherregion-specificfactorsareofnote.Transitmigrationand,therefore,remittancesreceivedbymigrantsintransitcontinuedtobestronginMexicoandCentralAmerica.InEuropeandCentralAsia,risingoilprices,inconjunctionwiththepost-pandemicreboundinRussia’sdemandformigrantworkersandpaymentstoRussianindividualsandcompaniesthatrelocatedabroadfollowingtheonsetofthewar,increasedtheflowofremittancestoCentralAsianandSouthernCaucasuscountries.The10.2percentgrowthofremittanceflowsin2021,thehighestsince2010,occurredagainstthebackdropoftheglobalpandemic,althoughtheimpactofCOVID-19easedacrosstheworldduringtheyearStimulusmeasuresenactedtounderpinfalteringhigh-incomeeconomies,notablyintheUnitedStatesandEuropehelpedtosupportemploymentlevelsandmaintainorincreaseincomesofmigrantsendremittancesthesetrendswereapparentthroughthefirsthalfof021.iteemergingadversedevelopmentsintheglobalenvironmentremittancescontinuedtoberobustUncertaintiesconcerningglobalconditionsemergedmoreforcefullyduringthesecondhalfof2021.DirecteffectsofstimulusmeasuresamongmembercountriesoftheOrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopmentOECDwerebeginningtowane;difficultiesinsupplychainsandlogisticscontinuedtohamperproductionandtoboostcoststoproducersandconsumers,andinflationwasamplifiedbysubstantialincreasesinoilandfoodprices.Inthecaseofoil,risingdemandandconstrainedoutputstoodoutaskeyfactors.3Thegrowthofremittanceflowstodevelopingcountriesisanticipatedtonarrowtosingle-digitgainsover23.Theconcernsofinternationalmarketparticipantshaveincreasedsubstantially:thatinflationwillbecomeimbeddedinconsumerandcorporateexpectations;thatmonetaryauthoritieswillberequiredtotightenpolicytodampensuchexpectations;andthatuncertaintyinfinancialmarketswilladverselyaffectfinancingflowsfordevelopingcountries,alargenumberofwhicharepressingthelimitsofdebtsustainabilityBox1highlightsthat,inlargepart,developmentsin2022validatetheseconcerns,compoundedbytheunanticipatedinvasionofUkrainebytheRussianFederationinFebruary.BoxGlobalEconomicDevelopmentsandFactorsAffectingRemittancesin022Globaleconomicconditionsdeterioratedmarkedlyduring2022,asdirecteffectsoffiscalstimulusinthehigh-incomeeconomiestosupportactivitythroughthepandemicbegantofade.TheRussianinvasionofUkraineonFebruary24augmentedtrendsalreadyunderway:worldenergyandfoodpricesratchetedtonewhighs—withBrentcrudeoilupmorethan50percentto$130/barrelandwheatrising60percentto$12.94/bushelfromFebruary24throughmid-June2022(figureB1.1).ThoughpricessoftenedfromlateJunethroughSeptember,withoilpricesfallingbelowpre-warlevels,riskstotheupsidemustbetakenintoconsideration,particularlygiventhecutinoilproductionannouncedbyOPEC+.Hikesofthisscaleforstrategicenergycommoditiesandforagriculturalproducts(notablywheat)criticaltosustaininghouseholdconsumptioninlow-andmiddle-incomecountries(LMICs),posestarkrisksforglobalinflation.FigureB1.1.1AfterSurgingtoRecordHighs,CommodityPricesHaveEased2222-202222-2022-20220222222-202222-2022-202202222-202222-202222CrudeOilandWheatPriceIndices--February24,2022=100BrentCrude60tIndexSources:BusinessInsider,Macrotrends.Therehasbeenasofteningofeconomicactivityinbothhigh-incomeanddevelopingeconomies.Worldgrowthhasbeenmarkeddownbyafull1.7percentagepoints(to2.5percent),andby2.3and2.4percentagepointsrespectivelyforkeyremittancesourcecountries—theUnitedStates(to1.6percent)andintheEuroArea(to1.7percent).AconcurrentgrowthslowdownamongOECDmembercountriesandotherhigh-income(hostcountry)economieswillservetorestrainemploymentopportunitiesandwageincreasesforthemigrantlaborforce,limitingfundsavailabletoberemittedtohomecountries.Inflationrampeduptomorethan8percentintheUnitedStatesand10percentintheEuroAreathroughOctober(yearoveryear)(figureB1.1.2),affectingrealwagesandthusmigrants’abilitytosendmoneyhome(figureB1.1.3).4Thistrendisdriveninpartbyhigherenergyandfoodprices,butso-calledcoreinflationhasalsorisen,propelledbycostsofpersistentroadblockstosupply.MedianinflationinLMICshasnowsurpassedthatofthehigh-incomeeconomies,throughdepreciationoflocalcurrencies,aswellasabuildupinfinancialpressures(wideningfiscalandexternaldeficits);thismayexactafurthertollonexchangerates.FigureB1.1.2InflationRampsUpAcrossHigh-IncomeCountriesandEMDEs108640.0-3.0-4.0108640.0-3.0-4.01220Sources:USBureauofLaborStatistics,Eurostat,andWorldBankGEMDatabase.Note:CPI=ConsumerPriceIndex;EMDE=emergingmarketsanddevelopingeconomies.FigureB1.1.3USandEuroAreaWagesCompressedbyInflationRealwagesAHEquarterlychangeyearoveryearQ2-2021