環(huán)境保護(hù)部污染源監(jiān)控中心2013年第二季度湖北省國控重點(diǎn)污染源監(jiān)督性監(jiān)測(cè)結(jié)果紹興印染溫州電鍍兩個(gè)“污染大戶”轉(zhuǎn)型升級(jí)黑采砂船瘋狂吞噬錢塘江河床短短數(shù)小時(shí)吸金近萬

富陽造紙業(yè)壯士斷腕百余企業(yè)年底前關(guān)張

CHAPTER6

POLITICALECONOMYPoliticalEconomyPoliticaleconomy:Thefieldthatapplieseconomicprinciplestotheanalysisofpoliticaldecisionmaking.Selfishnessdoesnotnecessarilyleadtoinefficientoutcomes–undercertainconditions,themarketplaceharnessesself-interesttoserveasocialend.Whilethemaximizationassumptionmaynotbetotallyaccurate,itprovidesagoodstartingpointforanalysis.政府信任度中國以88%排全球第一巴西第二輿情監(jiān)測(cè)顯示民眾對(duì)政府專家及媒體信任度低美國貧富懸殊日甚對(duì)政府信任度低市場(chǎng)對(duì)于美國政府的信任還能維持多久

企業(yè)家和政治家公眾信任度低美國政府不受信任債務(wù)上限大限將至市場(chǎng)對(duì)于美國政府的信任還能維持多久

Sections:DirectDemocracyRepresentativeDemocracyExplainingGovernmentGrowthDirectDemocracy-UnanimityRulesrperyear00’Adam’sshare(SA)Eve’sshare(SE)DrATheLindahlModelDrEr*S*Lindahlprice:Thetaxshareanindividualmustpayperunitofpublicgood.FeasibilityofUnanimityRulesLindahlmodelshowsthetaxsharesandlevelofpublicgoodprovisiontowhicheveryoneagrees.Lindahlprices----taxshares(vs.marketprices)LindahlequilibriumallocationisParetoefficient.Lindahlmodelassumespeoplevotesincerelyanditsdecisioncostsarelow.Reachingequilibrium-auctioneerPracticalproblemsStrategicbehaviortimetoreachequilibrium《五月花號(hào)公約》（MayflowerCompact）

1620年11月11日，經(jīng)過在海上66天的漂泊之后，一艘名為“五月花”的大帆船向美洲陸地靠近。船上有102名乘客。他們的目的地本是哈德遜河口地區(qū)，但由于海上風(fēng)浪險(xiǎn)惡，他們錯(cuò)過了目標(biāo)，于是就在現(xiàn)在的科德角外普羅溫斯頓港拋錨。為了建立一個(gè)大家都能受到約束的自治基礎(chǔ)，他們?cè)谏习吨昂炗喠艘环莨s。41名男乘客在船上簽了這份公約。在這份后來被稱為《“五月花號(hào)”公約》的文件里，簽署人立誓創(chuàng)立一個(gè)自治團(tuán)體，這個(gè)團(tuán)體是基于被管理者的同意而成立的，而且將依法而治。這是美國歷史上第一份重要的政治文獻(xiàn)?！段逶禄ㄌ?hào)公約》以上帝的名義，阿門。我們，下面的簽名人，作為偉大的詹姆斯一世的忠順臣民，為了給上帝增光，發(fā)揚(yáng)基督教的信仰和我們祖國和君主的榮譽(yù)，特著手在弗吉尼亞北部這片新開拓的海岸建立第一個(gè)殖民地。我們?cè)谏系鄣拿媲埃舜艘郧f嚴(yán)的面貌出現(xiàn)，現(xiàn)約定將我們?nèi)w組成政治社會(huì)，以使我們能更好地生存下來并在我們之間創(chuàng)造良好的秩序。為了殖民地的公眾利益，我們將根據(jù)這項(xiàng)契約頒布我們應(yīng)當(dāng)忠實(shí)遵守的公正平等的法律、法令和命令，并視需要而任命我們應(yīng)當(dāng)服從的行政官員。THEMAYFLOWERCOMPACTInthenameofGod,Amen.Wewhosenamesareunderwritten,theloyalsubjectsofourdreadsovereignLord,KingJames,bythegraceofGod,ofGreatBritain,FranceandIrelandking,defenderofthefaith,etc.,havingundertaken,forthegloryofGod,andadvancementoftheChristianfaith,andhonorofourkingandcountry,avoyagetoplantthefirstcolonyintheNorthernpartsofVirginia,dobythesepresentssolemnlyandmutuallyinthepresenceofGod,andoneofanother,covenantandcombineourselvestogetherintoacivilbodypolitic,forourbetterorderingandpreservationandfurtheranceoftheendsaforesaid;andbyvirtuehereoftoenact,constitute,andframesuchjustandequallaws,ordinances,acts,constitutions,andoffices,fromtimetotime,asshallbethoughtmostmeetandconvenientforthegeneralgoodofthecolony,untowhichwepromiseallduesubmissionandobedience.DirectDemocracy-MajorityVotingRulesMajorityvotingrule–onemorethanhalfofthevotersmustfavorameasureforittobeapprovedvoterChoiceBradJenAngelinaFirstACBSecondBBCThirdCAAVoterChoiceBradJenAngelinaFirstACBSecondBACThirdCBADirectDemocracy-MajorityVotingRulesVotingParadox–communitypreferencescanbeinconsistenteventhoughindividual’spreferencesareconsistent.AgendaManipulation–processoforganizingorderofvotestoensureafavorableoutcome.Cycling–whenpairedvotingonmorethantwopossibilitiesgoesonindefinitelywithoutaconclusioneverbeingreached.Ifallvoters’preferencesaresinglepeaked,novotingparadoxoccurs.ConsistentPreferencesCompleteTransitiveP(A)>P(B)>P(C)P(A)>P(C)MonotonicityP(A)>P(B)A>BConvexP((1-a)A+aB)>(1-a)P(A)+aP(B)GraphingPreferencesMissilesUtilityABCBradJenAngelinaSingle-peakedpreferencesDouble-peakedpreferencesPracticalImportanceofDouble-peakedPreferencesAvailabilityofprivatesubstitutesIssuesrankedalongsingledimensionDirectDemocracy-TheMedianVoterTheoremVoterExpenditureDonald$5Daisy100Huey150Dewey160Louie700TheMedianVoterTheoremMedianvoteristhevoterwhosepreferenceslieinthemiddleofthesetofallvoters’preferences;halfthevoterswantmoreofthegoodthanthemedianvoter,andhalfwantless.Themedianvotertheorem:Ifindividualpreferencesaresinglepeakedandcanberepresentedalongasingledimension,theoutcomeofmajorityvotingreflectsthepreferencesofthemedianvoter.假設(shè)海濱浴場(chǎng)長200米，兩端各設(shè)一小賣部，品種價(jià)格一樣。如允許小賣部移動(dòng)，會(huì)發(fā)生什么情況？為什么？SummarizeWhenallpreferencesaresinglepeaked,majorityvotingyieldsastableoutcome,andthechoiceselectedreflectsthepreferencesofmedianvoter.Whensomevoters’preferencesaremultipeaked,avotingparadoxcanemerge,butnotnecessarily.Becausemultipeakedpreferencesmaybeimportantinmanyrealisticsituations,majorityvotingcannotbedependedontoyieldconsistentpublicchoices.年份財(cái)政預(yù)算內(nèi)收入（萬億）土地收入（萬億）比重19980.990.05075.12%2001-20035.70.9115.96%2004*2.640.589422.33%20053.160.550517.42%20063.880.718.04%20075.121.325.39%20086.130.9615.66%20096.851.5923.21%20108.312.934.90%*《關(guān)于繼續(xù)開展經(jīng)營性土地使用權(quán)招標(biāo)拍賣掛牌出讓情況執(zhí)法監(jiān)察工作的通知》DirectDemocracy-LogrollingLogrollingsystemsallowpeopletotradevotesandhenceregisterhowstronglytheyfeelaboutvariousissues.Thecompromisesimplicitinvotetradingarenecessaryforademocraticsystemtofunction.Logrolling/votingtradingcaneitherimproveorlowerwelfare.Evenwhenmajorityvotingleadstoconsistentdecisions,itmaynotbeefficientinthesensethatoverallbenefitsexceedcost.Amajorityofvoterscanformacoalitiontovoteforprojectsthatservetheirinterests,butwhosecostsarebornemainlybytheminority.DirectDemocracy-LogrollingIVoterProjectMelanieRhettScarletTotalNetBenefitsHospital200-50-5595Library-40150-3080Pool-120-60400220DirectDemocracy-LogrollingIIVoterProjectMelanieRhettScarletTotalNetBenefitsHospital200-110-105-15Library-40150-120-10Pool-270-140400-10DirectDemocracy-Arrow’sImpossibilityTheorem“Reasonable”collectivedecision-makingcriteriaItcanproduceadecisionwhatevertheconfigurationofvoters'preferencesItmustbeabletorankgallpossibleoutcomesItmustberesponsivetoindividuals’preferencesItmustbeconsistentIndependenceofirrelevantalternativesDictatorshipruledoutArrow’sImpossibilityTheoremAllconceivablevotingschemeshavesomepotentialforbeingunfairorproducingaparadoxicalresultMeaningoftheoremconsistentrulenotnecessarilyimpossibletofind,butcannotbeguaranteedBuchanan’scritiqueUseofsocialwelfarefunctions證明參見

《高級(jí)微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)理論》

杰弗瑞.A.杰里菲利普.J.瑞尼著王根蓓譯上海財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)出版社2003.3RepresentativeDemocracy-ElectedPoliticiansGoverningisdonebypeople----politicians,judges,bureaucrats,andothers.Realisticpoliticaleconomymodelsmuststudythegoalsandbehaviorofthepeoplewhogovern.Themediavotertheoremholdswhenelectedrepresentativesmakedecisionsonthebehalfofcitizensundercertainconditions.Avote-maximizingpoliticianadoptsthepreferredprogramofthemedianvoter.Two-partysystemtendtobestableinthesensethatbothpartiesstakeoutpositionsnearthe“center”.RepresentativeDemocracy-ElectedPoliticiansNumberofVotersLiberalConservative0ImplicationsoftheMedianVoterModelTwo-partysystemstendtobestableReplacementofdirectreferendabyrepresentativesystemhasnoeffectonoutcomesOtherFactorsInfluencingVotingSingle-dimensionalrankingsIdeologyPersonalityLeadershipDecisiontovote英首相夫婦外出度假真低調(diào)坐廉價(jià)航班最后登機(jī)

RepresentativeDemocracy-PublicEmployeesFunctionofbureaucratsThelegislationenactedbyelectedpoliticiansisvague,andtheprecisewayaprogramisrunisinthehandsofpublicemployees.Amoderngovernmentcannotfunctionwithoutbureaucracy.GoalsofbureaucratsBureaucratstendstofocusonsuchitemsasperquisitesofoffice,publicreputation,power,andpatronage.Power,statusandsoonarepositivecorrelatedwiththesizeofthebureaucrat’sbudget.美國大選特刊：奧巴馬，總統(tǒng)難做

美國大選2012美國總統(tǒng)競(jìng)選第二場(chǎng)電視辯論奧巴馬連任演講希拉里首次表示有意參加2016年美國總統(tǒng)大選波多黎各，美國第51顆星？(組圖)美國選舉制度美國總統(tǒng)選舉制度兩岸統(tǒng)一方案曝光

中國代表的產(chǎn)生Niskanen’sModelofBureaucracyQperyear$0VCQ*Efficient

outputQbcActual

outputRepresentativeDemocracy–SpecialInterestsWhatare“SpecialInterests”EstablishmentofSpecialInterestGroupsSourceofIncome:CapitalorLaborSizeofIncomeSourceofIncome:IndustryofEmploymentRegionDemographicandPersonalCharacteristicsRepresentativeDemocracy–Rent-Seekingtonsofpeanutsperyear$S=MCDMRRentsRepresentativeDemocracy–OtherActorsJudiciaryJournalistsExpertsExplainingGovernmentGrowthCitizenPreferencesG=f(P,I)MarxistViewChanceEventsChangesinSocialAttitudesIncome