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GapsAnalysis9Quantuminfluence.Bothnationsareadvancingrareflectstarklycontrastingpriorities,governanceAdministration,thereportservesasastrategicgandstrategicinitiatives,thisdocumentsurveyspecosystem(Harnessingthefollowingsectionsdelveintoeachtechnbatteriesandfifth-generationwirelessnetworks(5Gsectorssuchasartificialintelligence(AIfoundationaltechnologies.at49(2022).SPECIALCOMPETITIVESTUDIESPROJECTexcelsincommercializationacrosssectorssuchasbiopharmaceuticalsoverglobalstandards(e.g.,6G,quantumtechnologies)andstrategicdependenciesinbiopharmaceuticals,highlightsvulnerabilitiesthatChinaAlNextGenerationNetworksAlNextGenerationNetworks→(Low-EarthOrbitSatellites)十一5GCommercialDronesBiopharmaceuticalsInternetPlatforms(SocialMedia/MobileOS)SemiconductorsSyntheticBiology→←FusionEnergyAdvancedManufacturingQuantumComputinggovernmentalactors.GovernmentListsListsNon-GovernmentListsListsAlAlBiotechnology/HealthAdvancedComputingEnergy9Biotechnology/HealthCybersecurity9Human-MachineInterfacesAdvancedComputing9Cybersecurity7AdvancedNetworks7AdvancedManufacturing5EnergyHuman-MachineInterfaces5MobilityAdvancedManufacturing5Autonomy/RoboticsSPECIALCOMPETITIVESTUDIESPROJECT RenewablesQuantumClimateWorkfoRoDoticSBatteriesMicroelectronicsldeaManufacturingMaterialsAlIiclMineasfoarmutavsBlockchainHypersonicsMetaverse5G/6G SatellitesSatellitesSocialPlatomsManufacturinganclioateAGIMaterialslTMostFrequenttechnologylists.Alandadvancedcomputingtechnologieshavelongbeenatopfocus,but,since2022,they'vegrowntorepresent24%ofalltechnologyprioritieslisted.MentionsofAlapplications-toincludeexplicitmentionsofAI,autonomy,or"smart"technologies-havealsogrownfrom12%in2022to22%in2024,inlinewithbroaderindustrygrowthingenerativeAlinnovations.frequentlymentionedadvancedcomputingtechnologypriotracked,since2022,thesetechnologieshavefallenfromrepresentingnearly34%ofcomputingprioritiesin2022to29%in2024.Acrossthesametimeperiod,cloudandedgeinthislatestsurveyofU.S.technologylists.Aldiagnostics,pandemictracking,andother27%in2024.Interestindata-informedhealthinnovationgovernmentlists.beenmentionedasapriorityon57%feweroccasionsacrossU.S.govergovernmentlists.Similarly,autonomy/roboticshasseenthesecond-largestdeclineinmentionsoutofanytechnology,mentioned40%fewertimes.SPECIALCOMPETITIVESTUDIESPROJECTenergytechnologies,nuclearenergyinnovation,includingfusionenergygovernmentorganizations.Particularly,ingovernmentlistssince2022,mentionsofSince2022,therehasbeenanoverallincreaseinU.S.priorityofcomputingtechnologies(i.e.Software,IT,Compute,EnterpriseSoftware,Cybersecurity,Al)andadecreasedprioritizationofhardinfrastructure(i.e.Advancedmanufacturing,Networks,Robotics).Chart:Author·Source:SpecialCompetitiveStudiesProject·CreatedwithDatawrapperTechnology%ofAllTechnologiesAIApplications%ofAIGenerativeAlResponsibleAl%ofBiotechnology/HealthHealthDataTreatments/Pharmaceuticals%ofEnergyBatteriesNuclearRenewables%ofMobilityUAVsEVs%ofAdvancedComputingCloud/EdgeComputingQuantumcomputingtechnologies-suproportionsthangovmoretraditional,hardinfrastructuretechnologiesprioritiesbycomparingthe%oftechnologiesmentionedsourcesacrossvariousinnovationsectors.AIAISoftwareAutonomy/RoboticsBiotechnology/HealthEnvironmentalCybersecurityAdvancedManufacturingSpaceAdvancedComputing+5.9%+2.8%+1.9%+1.1%-1.6%-1.7%-1.9%-2.1%-1.0%-1.0%-0.5%%DiffernceofTechListMentionstechnologieseachrepresentlessthan1%ofthetechnologiesmentioned.Infact,financialtechnologiesarenotmentionedoncewithingotechnologiesmentionedwereinbiotechnology/health,fintech,andAI.Asonewouldexpect,sinceChatGPT'slaunchinlate-2022,Al'sprominencehasgrown,with29%ofNetworks,largelyinlinewithBidenAdministrationprioritiesDirection:TrendConmanufacturingbaseandinfradistributionofcriticalm(2024).SPECIALCOMPETITIVESTUDIESPROJECT91%Source:GlobalCriticalMineralsOutlooremainsunmatchedglobally,producingastaggering1,705gigawatt-hours(GWh),dwarfingtheSPECIALCOMPETITIVESTUDIESPROJECTthesector,whereChinacommanded80%oftheworld'sshipmentsoflithium-iaccountingforover50%ofglobalmarketshare.9Notably,noU.S.-basedcompaniesareamongLeadingCountriesbyBattTobolsterdomesticadvancedbatterundertakensignificantbipartisanlegislationliketheBipart(IRA).TheBILallocatedovproduction.10Furthermore,theIRAincludedmeasuresdesignedtoincentivizeconsumerstotobuildnewbatteryfacilities.Grants,U.S.DepartmentofEnergy(2024).hybridvehiclessignificantovercapacitGroup(2024).State(2024);Indo-PacificEconomicF(2024).WhattoWatchGenomeInitiativeareunlockingthenextgenerationoflong-dursynthesizingAl-designInternationalEnergyAgency(2024).ChinaStudies(2023).Low-IncomeCountries&LowerMiddle-Imanufacturingtechnologies:accordingtoPRCstate-affiliatedsources,as29JacobAchenbach,etal.,HarnessingGenerativeAliMaturityIndexReport(智能制造成熟度指數(shù)報(bào)告),(2023).SPECIALCOMPETITIVEsignificantventuresignificantlyimpactU.Foundation(2024).andInternationalStudies(20includingEVs,energystorage,andsemiconductors.1Tidentifiedadvancedmanufacturing40JacquelineDu,etal.,HumanoidRobot:Energy,Semiconductor,andOtherAd43ArthurR.Kroeber,UnleSource:ArtificialIntelligenceI(2024).NationalBureauofAsianReMoonshotAlandZhiphuAI.53ModelsproducedbytheseNote:Someleading-edgemodelslackpubliclyavailabledataonFLOPandarethereforemissingfromthegraph.Source:NotableA/N53ChinaMaySoonBetheTopAlInnovatorintheWorld,NewReportFinds,InformationTFoundation(2024).54NathanBenaich,StateOfAIReport2024,Stateof.ai(2024).55SamEifling,China'sBiggestAIModelis56KyleWiggers,DeepSeek'sNewAIModelAppearstoBeOneoftheBest'(2024).WhattoWatchBureauofAsianResearch(202CNBC(2024).accessed2024).andCanada20.7%ProductsAdministration(2021).Discovery&Development(2024).SPECIALCOMPETITIVESTUDIESPROJECTTheNumberofNewChineseBiopharmaCompaniesHasRisenQuicklySource:JohnWong,etal.,CompetinginChina'sBiopharmaMarket:KeySuccessFactorsforAcriticalindicatorofinnovationleadershipistheabilitytobringnoveldrugstomarket.Betweentheperiodsof2000-2008and2009-2017,U.S.FoodandDrugAdministration(FDA)approvalsroseby44.5%.80By2023,theFDAapproved55newdrugs,81includingthreefromPRCdevelopers.82Inparallel,China'sNationalMedicalProductsAdministration(NMPA)approved87noveldrugsin2023,includingfivefirst-in-classdrugsfromdomesticfirms.83TheseoutcomeshighlighthowChina'sregulatoryreforms?havereducedapprovalbacklogsandincreasedbothimportedanddomesticallydevelopedmedicinessince2011,85underscoringitsgrowingabilitytotransformdiscoveriesintomarketableproducts.LibraryofMedicine82LangZheng,etal.,TargetedDrugApprovalsin2023:BreakthroughsbytheFDAandNMPA,SignalTransductionandTargetedTherapy(2024).andTargetedTherapy(2024).SPECIALCOMPETITIVESTUDIESPROJECTNumberofDomesticandImportedDrugApprovalsbyNMPAinChina,2011-2021Source:HowInnovative/sChinainBiotechnology?,Informati(2024).WheretheUnitedStatesstrugglestocompetewithChinainbiopharmaceuticalsis,likeinmanyothersectors,onthecommercializationandproductionsideofthevaluechain.Supplychain,regulatory,andproductioncapacityfactorshaveimprovedChina'srelativeposition.WhiletheUnitedStatesstillledin2020with28.4%ofglobalpharmaceuticalproduction(upfrom26.2%in1995),China'sshareclimbedto17.4%duringthesameperiod,adramaticincreaseof14.4%.86Thisshiftisevidentintradepatterns:in2022,U.S.biopharmaceuticalimportsfromChinatotaled$10.2billion,outpacingexportsof$9.3billion.87Moreover,PRCfirmsnowsupplyabout17%ofU.S.ActivePharmaceuticalIngredients(APls),88atatimewhenonly28%ofAPImanufacturersarebasedintheUnitedStates.89Reflectingthesedependencies,theU.S.biopharmaceuticaltradedeficitwithChinagrewfrom$959millionin2010to$4.07billionby2022.90SPECIALCOMPETITIVESTUDIESPR○JECTU.S.GlobalTradeBalanceinPharmaceuticalManufacturing,2010-2022Source:NotAgain:WhyInresponse,U.S.policymakershavedesignatedpharmaceuticalsasacriticalsupplychainpriority,committing$40milliontodomesticbiomanufacturing?andanadditional$35millionundertheDefenseProductionActforesaleaderininnovation,China'sroleasacriticalsurelianceonPRC-originAPlsandwideningtradedeficits-showsthatcompetitionhasevolvedbeyondinnovationtoencompasstheentirepharmaceuticalvaluechain.workingwithcertainPRCbiotechnologyfirms.93Thoughsuchlimitationscouldinitiallyincreasecostsanddisruptproduction,itcouldstrengthenU.S.supplychainsecurityoverthelongerterm.94With79%ofU.S.biotechnologyfirmsholdingcontractswithPRCpartners,5thereisaclearneedfordiversification.IndiastandsoutasastrongalternativegivenitsAPlproductionandcontractmanufacturingexpertise,6whileJapan?7andSouth9FactSheet:TheUnitedStatesAnnouncesNewInvestmentsandResour2FactSheet:PresidentBidenAnnouncesNewActionstoStrengthenAmerica'sSupplyChains,LowerCostsforFamilies,andSecureKeySectors,TheWhiteHouse(2023).93H.R.8333,BIOSECUREAct(2024)passedbytheU.S.HouseinSeptember2024.The97Takeda'sPlasma-derivedTherapiesManufacturingFacility,Japan,PharmaceuticalTechnology(2023).astheBIOSECUREAcWhattoWatchAdvancedmanufacturingtechnologieslikemanufacturingplatforms1?dependencyonlarge,centralizedfacilities,pTechnology&InnovationFoundation(2024).(2024).09MarqueritaAlgorri,etal.,ConsiReview(2024).SPECIALCOMPETITIVESTUDIESgovernmentsupport,14whichhasstrengthenedChina'sdroneindustryandenabledPRCfirmstoconsistentlyoutperformU.S.competitors.ThePRC'sstrongholdonthecommercialdronesectorhasraisedsecurityconcernsintheUnitedStates,particularlyasPRCdroneshavedemonstratedmilitaryapplicationsinrecentconflicts.1DespitevariousU.S.initiativestoreducedependency,Americandronesoftenremainmoreexpensive,glitch-prone,andchallengingtorepairthantheirPRC-madealternatives."Asaresult,DJIproductscontinuetoaccountfor70to90%ofdronesusedacrossU.S.commercial,government,andconsumerapplications,"7leavingChina'sdominanceinthecommercialdronesupplychainlargelyunchallenged.China'sDominanceintheGlobalDroneMarketEQ\*jc3\*hps85\o\al(\s\up1(14Wh),2024)Journal(2024).JournalJournal(2024).Journal(2024).Somerville,WhyFirstRespondersDoSPECIALCOMPETITIVESTUDIESPROJECT20232022CompanyGrowthSource:EdAlvarado,RankingtheLeadingDroneManufacturers,DroneIndusiagencieswerePRC-made,underscoringhowentrenchedthisdependencyhasbecomeatall118LarsSch?nander,SecuringtheSkies:ChineseDronesandInnovation(2023).America'Drones,GovernmParty(2023).SPECIALCOMPETITIVESTUDIESPROJECTlikelycontinuetodominateotherma2020DJIisaddedtotheU.S.DepartmentofCommerce'sEntityList.DJIisformallylabeledasa“Chinesemilitarycompany"bytheDepartmentofDefense.2024ImplementationoftheprohibitionsoutlinedintheAmericanSecurityDroneActbegins.2019CongressbanstheDepartmentofDefensefrompurchasingChinesedronetechnology.2021ExecutiveOrder13981warnsaboutdatasecurityrisksrelatedtoforeign-madeUnmannedAircraftSystems(UAS).2023Arkansas,Florida,Mississippi,andTennesseebanChinesedrones.TheAmericanSecurityDroneActispassedasapartoftheFY2024NationalDefenseAuthorizationAct.Source:TimelineofU.S.FederalGovernmentActivityIdentifyingandAddressingUnsecuresUAS,chaindependenciesasleverageamidescalatingUnon-PRCsourcingofdronecomponents.AlthoughtechnicalsophisticationandpricecompetitivenessofPRWhattoWatchandAl-enabledcapabilities,off123AgenceFrancePresse,U.S.DroneMakerSaysChinaSancttransmissionwillbecomeessentialdifferentiators.U.applications.Chinahasaggressivelyalreadyinprogress,30whileWarInstitute(2024).(2024).wirelessspectrum,whichiscriticalforexpan(2023).maturedeployment.51Source:5GintheU.S.—AdditionalMid-BandformanceOokla(202WildcardsnetworkswithtrustedalternloTapplications.56IntheFY25NationalDefenseAuthorizationAct,Congressprovidedperformance,securityProgram,SecurityWeek(2024).(2020).Questions,CongressionalResearchSerNetworks,U.S.HouseCommitcapabilities,andaddressingsecurityconsiderationsl?3toproWhattoWatchJournal(2024).(2024).Direction:TrendConhailedas“oneofthemostsiLaboratory(2022).SPECIALCOMPETITIVESTUDIESPROJECTGovernmentFundingPrivateFundingU.S.governmentfundingforfusiondoesnotincludethefundingdesignatedforfusionactivitiesundertheNationalNuclearSecurityAdministration(NNSA).beelusive.1?7Additionally,whilethesefundingcomparisonsappearstraightforward,thenationalpriorities,andreceivesignificantstatefunding.ChinaisfocusedoncobydirectingmostofitsfundingtowaCNN(2024).EnergySciences(2023).Journal(2024).SPECIALCOMPETITIVESTUDIESPROJECTthancutting-edgedevelopment?9andnearlyone-thirdoftheannualFESbudget20goestothedelayedInternationalThermonuclearExperimentalReactor(ITER)projectinFrance.201Chinaisalreadytranslatingitsfundingandcommercializationfocusintoaction,constructinginfrastructurethatspanseverystageoffusiondevelopment.202TheExperimentalAdvancedSuperconductingTokamak(EAST)supportsadvancedresearch,whiletheComprehensiveResearchFacilityforFusionTechnology(CRAFT)2?3andtheBurningExperimentalSuperconductingTokamak(BEST)2??drivedevelopmentefforts.TheChinaFusionEngineeringTestReactor(CFETR)2?5servesasademonstrationplatform,allleadingtowardafutureprivatecompaniesfordevelopmentanddemonstration,withnonationaldeploymentfacilityplanned.China'sintegratedapproachm1GWPowerPlantValidationBEAFT2030'CFESource:JeanPaulAllain,BuildingBridges:ABoldVisionfortheDOEFusionEneraySciences,U.S.DepartmentofEnergy(2023).(2024).fusionworkforceoperateswithrebridgingtechnologicalgapsforapilotdevelopments—theDOE’s2025commerciaJournal(2024).Journal(2024).Association(2024).2020s20excelsinsometechnologies(lasers,superconductors,softwarvulnerabilitiesforAmericanfisolarpanelsandelectricWhattoWatchbeyondconventionaltrial-astrategicadvantage.22DeepMind(2022).Engineering(2024).Scientists(2024).StreetJournal(2024).U.S.partnershipswiththeUnitedKiChina'stightlyintegrateddomesticecosystem.positionnarrows.WithoutEnergy(2024).thebeginningofalargertrend.Capcut,avideoeditingtool,alsoaproductofBytedance,bRankCountryofOriginMobileAppParentCompany1Meta23FacebookMeta4WhatsAppMeta6TelegramTelegram7Snapchat9WhatsAppBusinessMetaWildcardsUnitedStates.243However,recentsignalsfWhattoWatchCNBC(2024). SPECIALCOMPETITIVESTUDIESPROJECTInthethirdquarterof2024,Andriodhad80%oftheworld'sglobalsmartphoneshare,iOShad16%andHarmonyOShad4%Thenewoperatingsystemisreportedlybuiltwithcompletelyindigenouscode,independentfromopen-sourceAndroid.Huawei'sexistingmobileoperatingsystem,HarmonyOS,recentlyovertookApple'siOSasbeingthesecondmostusedmobileoperatingsysteminChina,afterAndroid.27Currently,about700milliondevicesrunonHarmonyOSand2.2millionthird-partydevelopersarecreatingappsfortheplatform,248withHuaweiaimingtobuildover100,000applicationsfortheoperatingsystemwithinthenextyear.249Notably,theHuaweiappstorefrontonthesedeviceshasanemulatorthatallowsthemtorunAndroid-basedapps,afeaturethatmaybeparticularlytailoredforChinesecitizensworkingabroad.250However,HarmonyOSNEXThasalongroadaheadbeforeitmayposeasaseriouscompetitortoAppleandGoogle,butitsdevelopmentwillbeanoteworthymilestoneinaddressingoneofChina'slong-perceivedgapsinmobileoperatingsystems,akeyvulnerabilityidentifiedbyapro

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