霉

SharedProsperityDigni?edLife

UNITEDNATIONS

ESCWA

ClimatefinanceflowstofoodsystemsintheArabregion

E/ESCWA/CL1.CCS/2025/Policybrief.1

Note:ThispolicybriefbenefitedfromthegeneroussupportoftheSwedishInternationalDevelopmentCooperationAgency(Sida)anditskeyanalyseswerepresentedatameetingofFoodSystemsNationalConvenorsfromArab

countries,16–17April2025.TheobjectivewastopreparefortheUnitedNationsFoodSystemsSummitStocktakingMoment(UNFSS+4),whichwillbeheldinJuly2025inAddisAbaba,Ethiopia.Formoreinformation,pleasevisit

/events/food-systems-transformation-arab-region

.

Keymessages

Foodsystemsarehighlyvulnerabletoclimate

change,withhighertemperatures,volatile

precipitationandextremeweatherevents

affectingagriculturalproduction,foodsecurity

andnutrition.Atthesametime,foodsystemsareamajorcontributortoclimatechange,accountingforapproximatelyone-thirdofglobalgreenhousegasemissions.

In2022,high-incomecountriesdeliveredontheircommitmentmadein2009toprovideatleast

$100billion/yearforclimatefinancetolower-

1

incomecountries;theyprovided$130.5billion,

ofwhich17percentwenttofoodsystemsectors.

IntheArabregion,Statesareextremely

vulnerabletoclimatechange,andtheirfood

systemsarefailingtoensureaccesstosafeandnutritiousfoodinasustainableandinclusive

manner.Arabregioncountriesneedtomobilizeclimatefinancetodrivethetransformationoffoodsystemswhileadvancingclimateaction.

Despiteitsextremevulnerability,theArabregiononlyreceived$10.2billionininternationalpublicclimatefinancein2022,ofwhich$2.1billionwasdirectedtowardfoodsystemsectors.Whenonlytakingintoaccountfinancialflowsthataddressclimatechangeastheprincipalobjective,theseamountsdropto$6.7billionforallsectors

and$1.4billionforfoodsystems.Whilethis

$1.4billionisthreetimesgreaterthanthe

previousyear’sallocation,itremainsinsufficienttoeffectivelyaddresstheurgentneedsoftheArabregion’sfoodsystems.

From2013to2022,theArabregionreceived$43billioninfinancingwithaprincipalclimateobjective,ofwhich$5.2billionsupportedfoodsystems.Around68percentwasusedfor

adaptationpurposes,15percentwasusedtoadvancemitigationgoals,andtheremaindersupportedprojectswithbothadaptationandmitigationobjectives.

Mostclimatefinancewasprovidedasdebt

(59percent),withgrantsconstitutingthe

remaining41percent(about$2.2billion)from2013to2022.Abouttwo-thirdsofthefinancingisprovidedbymultilateralorganizations,withtheremainingprovidedonabilateralbasis.

Ofthefinancingprovidedasgrantsfrom2013to2022,about$800million(38percent)wasdevotedtosupportingtheproductionand

consumptionoffoodwhiletheremainingwenttoothersub-sectorssuchastheenvironmentandforestry,watermanagementand

ruraldevelopment.

Thelargestshareintheregionwasreceived

byMorocco(38percent),followedbyTunisia

(18percent)whileothercountrieseach

receivedlessthan10percentoftheregional

total.LibyaandMauritaniareceivedthemost

fundsforfoodsystemasashareofthetotal

climatefinancereceived(over50percent),

followedbytheSyrianArabRepublic,theStateofPalestineandtheComoros(over30percent)andthentheSudan,Yemen,Tunisia,DjiboutiandAlgeria(over20percent).

Low-incomeandleastdevelopedcountries

oftheregionreceivedaround$1.25billion

inclimatefinance,whileconflict-affected

countriesreceivedaround$0.9billion,despitetheirpressingneeds.1

Introduction

Climatechangeisaglobalchallengerequiringincreased

attentionasitleadstoshiftsintemperaturesandweatherpatternsthatmightresultindroughts,floods,wildfires,sealevelsriseandotherconsequenceswithsevereeconomicimpacts.Climatechangecannegativelyimpactfood

systemsthroughlowercropandlivestockproductivity,

landdegradationanddamagedinfrastructure,whichmightcausefoodpriceshocksthatinturncouldleadtosocial

unrest,conflictandpopulationdisplacement.

Climatechangeaffectsthefunctioningoffoodsystemsandtheiroutcomes,includingfoodsecurityandnutritionandrelatedeconomic,socialandenvironmental

impacts.Atthesametime,foodsystemscontributeheavilytoclimatechange.Theyaremajorcontributorstoglobalwarming,producinganestimatedonethirdofgreenhousegasemissionsfrominputproduction

anduse,soiltillingandharvesting,transport,storageandprocessing,andlivestockrearing(WorldFood

Programme(WFP),2022;CarbonBrief,2021).

Thereisanurgentneedtoreducethecontributionsof

foodsystemstoclimatechangewhilealsoenhancingtheirresiliencetoclimatevariations.Optionstocutemissions

infoodsystemsexistyetmultiplefactorshampertheir

adoptionandimplementation.Obstaclesincludeinadequatedecision-making,vestedinterests,powerimbalancesandalackofanencompassinglong-termvision.

Concertedeffortsandincentivesareneededtoshiftto

sustainableconsumptionandproductionpatternsand

lifestyles,andtocontinuetoenhancetheadoptionand

implementationofclimatechangemitigationandadaptionpoliciesandprogrammes.Atthesametime,aradical

2

transformationinthefunctioningoffoodsystemsgloballyisrequiredtoachievemeaningfulprogress,including

throughreducingemissionsbyafifthwhilecreatingtrillionsofdollarsofnewmarketopportunities.Suchtransformationrequiresatleastafifteenfoldincreaseininvestmentto

meettheyearlyexpectedrequirementof$300billionto$350billionoverthenextdecade(GlobalAlliancefortheFutureofFood,2022;FoodandLandUseCoalition,2019).

Foodsystemsencompassmultipleactorsthatproduce,

wholesale,process,distribute,retail,utilize,anddisposeoffoodproducts.Arangeofvalueaddingactivitiesinvolvescrops,livestock,forestry,fisheriesandaquacultureas

wellasupstreamanddownstreameconomic,socialand

environmentaleffortsthatfacilitatethefunctioningof

thesecomplexsystems(FoodandAgricultureOrganization(FAO),2018).Foodsystemscomprisethefoodsupplychain,thefoodenvironment,individualfiltersandconsumer

behaviour.Thesecomponentsareinterlinkedandinteractwithbiophysicalandsocioeconomiccomponentsto

determinefoodsystemoutcomes.

Thefoodsupplychaincomprisesalltheprocessesof

movingfoodfromproducerstoconsumers,andentails

functionssuchasfoodproduction,processing,packaging,transportation,distributionandretail.Thefoodenvironmentencompassesthephysical,economicandsocialfactorsthatdeterminefoodchoices,includingavailability,affordability,messagingandproductproperties.Individualfilters

involvefactorsbehindfoodacquisitionandconsumption

decisions,suchastastepreferences,healthconcerns,andculturalandreligiousbeliefs.Consumerbehaviourcoversallconsumeractions,includingfoodacquisition,preparation,mealpracticesandstorage.

Relationshipsunderlyingthesecomponentsarepartoffoodsystems.Forexample,thepurchaseofaspecific

foodproduct(consumerbehaviour)isdeterminedby

itsavailabilityandaffordability(foodenvironment)andaffectedbyupstreamproductiondecisions(foodsupplychains).Atthesametime,biophysical,economic,politicalandsocioculturalfactors(externaldrivers)affectthe

availability,characteristicsandparticularsofthatfoodproduct.Externaldriversincludetheenvironmentandclimatechange,globalizationandtrade,incomegrowthanddistribution,urbanization,populationgrowthandmigration,politicsandleadership,andthesocioculturalcontext.Thecombinationofallinterlinkedcomponentsanddriversofthefoodsystemleadstospecificfood

securityandnutrition,health,economic,socialandenvironmentaloutcomes.

Thevulnerabilityoffoodsystemstoclimatechange

requiresmeasurestoenhanceresiliencethrough

appropriateinvestment.Thiscouldbedirectedtowards

manyareas,includingimprovingfoodsysteminputs

andservicestomakethemmoredrought-tolerant,

encouragingtheadoptionofclimate-smartsystems,

adoptinglow-carbonmachinery,oraccountingformoreclimate-relatedrisks.Economic,socialandenvironmentalimplicationsneedtobeconsideredindesigningor

adoptingclimateadaptationandmitigationinterventionsinfoodsystems.Measurescouldencompassenhancing

publicperceptionsofclimatechangerisk;implementingnationalandglobalplans,includingfortheSustainable

DevelopmentGoals(SDGs);improvingcapabilitiesfor

climatechangemitigationandadaptation;andbetter

managingnaturalresources(e.g.,land,soil,waterand

geneticdiversity)andothernaturalprocesses(FAO,2018).

Figure1.Thefoodsystemsframework

Externaldrivers

Incomegrowthanddistribution

Populationgrowthandmigration

Politicsandleadership

Social-cultural

context

Environment

Globalization

andtrade

Urbanization

andclimate

change

Outcomesoftheoperation

ConsumerbehaviourFoodacquisition,

preparation,meal

practices,andstorage

FoodenvironmentsFoodavailabilityandaffordability,productsproperties,vendor

properties,foodmessaging.

Individual-level?ltersEconomic,cognitive,

aspirational?lters.

Foodsecurityandnutritionoutcome(FSN)

Economicoutcomes

Socialoutcomes

Foodsupplychains

Foodproductionsystemsandinputsupply,storage

anddistirbution,processingandpackaging,retailand

marketing.

ConstraintsDiets

Environmentaloutcomes

Source:AdaptedfromFanzoandothers,2020.

3

StatusoffoodsystemsintheArabregion

FoodsystemsintheArabregionfaceunprecedented

andoftenworseningchallenges.Theconsequences

arereflectedinthealarmingriseinthetripleburden

ofmalnutritionduetoundernutrition,highratesof

peoplebeingoverweightandlivingwithobesity,and

micronutrientdeficiencies.In2022,about13.5percent

ofthepopulationoftheArabregionwasaffectedby

undernourishment,about37percentexperiencedfood

insecurity,and19percentofchildrenunder5yearsofagewerestunted.About32percentoftheadultpopulationwasconsideredobese.Mostoftheseindicatorshavebeentrendingupwardsoverthelastdecadeandcurrentlyareaboveworldaverages.Otherconcerningissuesinclude

thefactthatabout38percentofthepopulationcould

notaffordahealthydietin2021asfoodcostshavebeenrisingsince2017,reachingabout$3.47perpersonperday(FAO,2022).

Recentworldandregionaleventshavefurther

exacerbatedthesituationduetodisruptionsinfood

supplychains.Thesehaveledtocripplingfoodproduct

shortagesandpriceshikesforkeycommodities,includinggrainsandvegetableoil,aswellasessentialagriculturalinputssuchasfertilizers.TheCOVID-19pandemic,thewarinUkraineandprotractedconflictsintheArabregionhaveallhadharmfuleffects.Prevailingstructuralweaknesses

leadingtoeconomicdownturns,highdebtburdens,andrisingpovertyandinequalityimplythatmanycountries

cannotinvestadequatelyinfoodsecurityandimprovednutrition.Overall,theregionremainsfarofftrackintermsofachievingtheSDGsby2030,particularlythosethat

relatetofoodsystemsandclimatechange.

TheacutevulnerabilityoffoodsystemsintheArabregiontoclimatechangestemsfrommultiplesources.Averageannualtemperatureisprojectedtoincreasebyasmuchas5oCbytheendofthecentury,whileprecipitationlevelsareprojectedtobothdecreaseandbecomemorevolatile,leadingtomorefrequentdroughtsinsomeareasand

morefloodinginothers(UnitedNationsEconomicand

SocialCommissionforWesternAsia(ESCWA),2022).Thiswillfurtheraffectwateravailability.Already19ofthe

22countriesintheregionarebelowthewaterscarcitythresholdof1,000cubicmetrespercapitaperyear;13arebelowtheabsolutescarcitythresholdof500cubicmetres.Thisworseningsituationwillgreatlyimpactfoodsystems,leadingtoloweragriculturalproductivityandworseninghealthandsanitation,withmanyecosystemsunabletofunctionproperly(ESCWA,2023).TheArab

region,whichcurrentlydoesnotproducesufficientfoodtomeetitsneeds,willcontinuetorelyheavilyonfoodimports,especiallyforkeycommodities.

Trackingclimatefinanceforfoodsystems

Thenegativeimpactsofclimatechangeonregional

foodsystemscouldbelessenedthroughappropriate

investmenttoenhanceadaptativecapacityandthe

resilienceoftheagriculturalsector.Unfortunately,the

averageAgriculturalOrientationIndexforgovernment

expenditurefortheArabregionstandsatonly0.2

comparedtoaworldaverageof0.45.ThisindicatesthatcountriesintheArabregionarenotdevotingsufficient

publicinvestmenttoimprovetheiragriculturalsectors.

Mostmiddle-andlow-incomecountriesarefinancially

constrainedandmustraisefundingfromglobalsourcestomitigateandadapttoclimatechange.Sourcesincludedonorcountries,multilateralorganizationsandtheprivatesector.Thefollowinganalysisconsidersoveralltrends

inclimatefinanceintheregionwithanemphasisonfoodsystems.

TheOrganisationforEconomicCo-operationand

Development(OECD)hasbeentrackingpublicinternationalclimatefinanceflowstodevelopingcountriesforover

adecade.Itsmandatederivesfromarequestfrom

membersofitsDevelopmentAssistanceCommitteeto

trackprogresstowardsmeetingtheclimatefinancegoalsetin2009atUnitedNationsFrameworkConvention

onClimateChange(UNFCCC)COP15tomobilizeatleast

$100billioninclimatefinanceannuallyby2020(OECD,

2024).Whilethegoalwasnotmetontime,totalpublic

internationalclimate-relateddevelopmentfinancelevelsreached$130.5billionin2022.2UNFCCCPartiesfurther

agreedatCOP29inNovember2024toatleasttriple

climatefinancelevelstoayearlyamountof$300billionbytheyear2035(UNFCCC,2024).

TheOECDClimate-relatedDevelopmentFinancedatasetstrackoverseasdevelopmentassistancethatisreporteduponasclimatefinancebydonorsandrecipientcountries.Thedatasetsextendfromtheyear2000to2022,with

figuresprovidedin2022constantdollars.3Theanalysesinthisbriefwillbelimitedtothe10-yearperiod2013–2022.

4

Box1.Foodsystemsectors

ThefollowingsectorsfromtheOECDClimate-relatedDevelopmentFinancedatasetswereusedtorepresentclimatefinanceflowstofoodsystems.Theyinclude:

?Agriculture,forestryandfishing.

?Ruraldevelopment(othermultisector).

?Foodsecuritypolicy,householdfoodsecurity,foodsafetyandquality(othermultisector).

?Basicnutrition(health).

?Foodassistance(developmentfoodassistance).

?Emergencyfoodassistance(emergencyresponse).

?Basicdrinkingwaterandsanitation.

?Riverbasindevelopment(watersupplyandsanitation).

?Agro-industries(industry,mining,construction).

?Transportandstorage.

?Environment,biodiversity,biosphereprotectionandsiteprotection(generalenvironmentalprotection).

Source:ClassificationmadebyauthorsbasedontheOECDdataset.

Thedatasetsidentifytheprovidersofthefunds,whichcouldbeDevelopmentAssistanceCommitteemember

countries,othernon-DevelopmentAssistanceCommitteedonorcountries,multilateraldevelopmentbanks,othermultilateralorganizations,andprivatedonors.

Thedatasetsdifferentiatebetweenflowsthatmeet“principal”and“significant”climateobjectivesbasedontheRiomarkers,whichoriginatefromDevelopmentAssistanceCommitteemembercountries,andthosewitha“climatecomponent”,whichareprovidedby

multilateralorganizations.4Projectswithaprincipalclimateobjectivemakeclimateorenvironmental

considerationstheprimarydriverandmotivation.

Projectswithasignificantclimateobjectivealsohave

otherobjectivesbutareadjustedtohelpmeetrelevantclimategoals.Projectswithaclimatecomponenthaveclimateasaprimaryobjective.Inaddition,thedatasetsdistinguishvariousfinancialinstruments.Thefundscanbedisbursedasdebt,equityorasgrants.Theycouldalsobeprovidedonconcessionalornon-concessionaltermsorasexportcredits.

Thedatasetsidentifyawiderangeofeconomicsectors.

TheanalysisofclimatefinanceflowstowardsfoodsystemsprovidedinthisreportisbasedontheOECDclassificationofprojectsbysector.Box1detailsthesectorsandactivitiesthatareincludedasrelatedtofoodsystems.However,thisdoesnotaccountforallcomponentsandexternaldriversoffoodsystems.

Climate-relatedfinanceflows

Globalandregionaltrendsforallclimateobjectives

TheOECDdatasetshowsthatdevelopedcountries

providedatotalofabout$130billioninclimatefinancefordevelopingcountriesin2022,whichwasthefirst

timethegoalofmobilizing$100billionannuallywas

achieved.5Regardingthetwoclimateobjectives,

mitigationandadaptation,thedistributionofthefundsfavouredmitigationpurposes(about50percent)overadaptationobjectives(about33percent)withthe

remainder(about17percent)allocatedtocross-cuttingprojectsthataddressbothadaptationandmitigation

purposes.Mitigationfocusesonreducingemissionsthatcontributetoclimatechange,whileadaptationaimstostrengthenclimateresilienceandreducevulnerabilitytoclimatechangeimpacts(box2).

From2013to2022,theOECDClimate-related

DevelopmentFinancedatasetsshowthattheArabregion6receivedatotalofaround$59billionin

climatefinance(figure2)ofwhich$10.2billionwere

5

providedin2022.However,whenonlyconsideringprojectswithaprincipalclimateobjectiveasdefinedbytheRiomarkersfordonorcountriesandthose

withaclimatecomponentasreportedbymultilateral

institutions,thefundscommittedfrom2013–2022were27.5percentloweratabout$43billion.Duringthesameperiod,thefoodsystemsoftheArabregionreceiveda

totalofabout$8.8billionregardlessofclimateobjective.Theamountdecreasesby41percenttoabout$5.2billionwhenconsideringthosewithaprincipalclimateobjective

oraclimatecomponent,areflectionofthefactthatfoodsystemsreceivelessclimatefinancethanothereconomicsectors(figure2).ThesubsequentanalysesarelimitedtoclimatefinanceforfoodsystemprojectswithaprincipalclimateobjectiveaspertheRiomarkersforDevelopmentAssistanceCommitteecountriesoraclimatecomponentformultilateralinstitutionsfrom2013to2022.

TheshareoftheclimatefinancegoingtowardsfoodsystemsintheArabregionamountedtoaround

Box2.Financeforadaptationandmitigation

Adaptationfinanceaimstosupportadjustmentstothecurrentandfutureeffectsofclimatechange.Itsupportscommunitiesinreducingeconomicorsocialvulnerabilitiesandenhancingtheirresiliencebasedonanidentifiedclimaterisk.AsnotedbytheWorldResourcesInstitute(2022),buildingaroadenhancestheresilienceofa

communityasitimprovesaccesstosocialandeconomicservices.Itbecomesaformofclimateadaptationifitisbuiltwithafocusonalleviatinganidentifiedclimateimpact,suchasbyimprovingaccessduringstormsorflooding.Ifthisconditionisnotmet,thenthefundingfortheroadisdevelopmentfinanceratherthanclimateadaptationfinance.

Mitigationfinanceaimstoreduceorpreventthereleaseofgreenhousegasesandlessentheeffectsofclimatechange.Thiscanbeachievedbycuttingemissionsfromtransport,powerplantsorfarms,orbyremoving

greenhousegasesfromtheatmospherethroughcarbonsinks,amongothermeasures.

Source:Larsen,BrandonandCarter,2022;EuropeanEnvironmentAgency,2024.

Figure2.ClimatefinancefortheArabregion,byclimateobjectives,2013–2022

70

2022constantbilliondollars

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

59.0

42.8

8.8

5.2

Allsectors

Allclimate?nance

Foodsystems

Principalandclimatecomponents

Source:CompiledbyESCWAfromOECDdatabaseClimate-RelatedDevelopmentFinanceDatasets–RecipientPerspective,2013–2022.Itincludescommitmentswithclimatemarkedasaprincipalobjective(Riotag)aswellasclimatecomponentsreportedbymultilateraldevelopmentbanks.Flowswithclimatemarkedasasignificantobjectivearenotincluded.

6

12percentofclimatefinancereceivedforallsectors.Theshareallocatedforfoodsystemsatthegloballevelwasabout18.5percentofglobalclimatefinanceforallsectorsduringthesameperiod.

Ofthe$43billionreceivedbytheArabregionfrom

2013to2022,$6.7billionwereprovidedin2022

(figure3),whichwas37percenthigherthanthe

previousyearandquadruplethefundsreceived

in2013($1.9billion)ascountriesandmultilateral

financialinstitutionsralliedtomeetthecommitment

of$100billionannuallyinclimatefinancemobilizedfordevelopingcountries.About66percentoftheclimatefinancefortheArabregionfrom2013to2022was

earmarkedformitigationpurposes,while28percentwasforadaptationpurposesandtheremaining

6percentwasforcross-cuttingprojectsforboth

adaptationandmitigation.Climatefinanceforbothmitigationandadaptationnearlytripledwithaslightedgeforadaptationpurposes,asignthatcountriesintheArabregionareincreasinglyfocusingonbuildingtheirresiliencetowardsclimatechange.

Figure3.ClimatefinancefortheArabregionforallsectors,bypurpose

8

2022constantbilliondollars

6

4

2

0

3.6

3.1

0.3

1.4

2.6

2.2

0.3

1.8

3.5

0.1

0.8

3.6

0.3

2.8

0.1

0.8

2.5

0.1

0.8

2.8

0.2

0.7

0.40.4

1.4

0..

2.61.9

2013201420152016201720182019202020212022

1.0

AdaptationCross-cuttingMitigation

Source:CompiledbyESCWAfromOECDdatabaseClimate-RelatedDevelopmentFinanceDatasets–RecipientPerspective,2013–2022.Itincludescommitmentswithclimatemarkedasaprincipalobjective(Riotag)aswellasclimatecomponentsreportedbymultilateraldevelopmentbanks.Flowswithclimatemarkedasasignificantobjectivearenotincluded.

Figure4.ClimatefinanceforArabfoodsystems,bypurpose

1.5

2022constantbilliondollars

1.0

0.5

0.0

0.16

0.37

0.12

0.030.110.030.05..0.070.17

0.07..0.090.040.020.91

0.240.290.330.27

..0.000.30..0.420.52

2013201420152016201720182019202020212022AdaptationCross-cuttingMitigation

Source:CompiledbyESCWAfromOECDdatabaseClimate-RelatedDevelopmentFinanceDatasets–RecipientPerspective,2013–2022.Itincludescommitmentswithclimatemarkedasaprincipalobjective(Riotag)aswellasclimatecomponentsreportedbymultilateraldevelopmentbanks.Flowswithclimatemarkedasasignificantobjectivearenotincluded.

7

Withregardstoclimatefinanceforfoodsystemsinthe

Arabregion,mostofthefinancewasusedforadaptationprojects(68percent)whilemitigationprojectsonly

receivedabout15percent,withtheremaining17percentgoingtocross-cuttingprojectsthatsupportboth

adaptationandmitigation(figure4).Moreclimatefinanceforfoodsystemsgoestowardsadaptationasmitigationishardertoachieveinfoodsystems.Foodsystems

areheavilyimpactedbyclimatechangethrough,for

example,floods,droughts,risingtemperaturesorshiftsinthetimingofgrowingseasons,whichaffectsoverallperformanceandthelivelihoodsofthosedependent

onthesector.Fortheyear2022,theclimatefinancecommittedtowardsArabregionfoodsystemswas

$1.4billion,whichwastripletheamountcommitted

thepreviousyear,whichpartlyreflectedtheadded

commitmentoftheglobalcommunityfollowingtheFoodSystemsSummitin2021.TheSummithighlightedthe

importanceoffoodsystemsforensuringfoodsecurity

andnutritionandachievingotherdevelopmentand

climategoalsandemphasizedtheurgentneedtoincreaseinvestmenttotransformfoodsystems,includingto

enhancetheirresiliencetoclimate-shocks(InternationalInstituteforSustainableDevelopment,2023).

Sub-trendsattheregional

levelforprincipalandclimatecomponentobjectives

Providers:MostclimatefinancetowardsArabfoodsystemsisfrommultilateralbanks(48percent),followedbyDevelopmentAssistanceCommittee

membersordonors(38percent)andthenother

multilateralorganizations(14percent).In2022,

sizableincreasesinfinancingfromDevelopment

AssistanceCommitteemembersandmultilateralbanksexceededthecombinedfinancingprovidedinpreviousyears(figure5).

Financialinstruments:Climatefinanceforfoodsystemshasreliedforemostondebt,bothconcessionaland

non-concessional,followedbygrants(figure6).Non-

concessionaldebtaccountedfor39percentofthetotalfrom2013to2022whilegrantsaccountedfor41percentandconcessionaldebtamountedto18percent,withtheremainderbeingunspecifieddebt.Thehigheremphasisonnon-concessionalfinancingiscontrarytotheprincipleofCommonbutDifferentiatedResponsibilities,whichcallsforsharedresponsibilitiesinprotectingtheglobalclimate.Non-concessionalfinanceisprovidedontermscloseto

marketvalueswhileconcessionalfinanceisbelowmarketconditionstosupportprojectswitharelativelyelevateddevelopmentimpact.Thisdiffersfromgrants,whichareprovidedlargelyonahumanitarianordevelopmental

supportbasis.Adeeperdiveintothegrantsshowsthat

themajority(morethan90percent)wereprovidedby

DevelopmentAssistanceCommitteemembers(ona

bilateralbasis)andotherdonorsusingtheRiomarkers,

whilemultilateralbanksprovidedlessthan9percent.

About40percentofthegrantswent