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PolicyResearchWorkingPaper11267

RiggingtheScores

CorruptionthroughScoringRuleManipulationinPublicProcurementAuctions

QianmiaoChen

WORLDBANKGROUP

DevelopmentEconomics

DevelopmentImpactGroupDecember2025

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ProducedbytheResearchSupportTeam

PolicyResearchWorkingPaper11267

Abstract

Publicprocurementishighlysusceptibletocorruption,especiallyindevelopingcountries.Althoughopenauc–tionsarewidelyadoptedtocurbit,thispaperfindsthatcorruptionremainsprevalentevenwithinthisprocurementformat.Procurementofficerscancollaboratewithfirmstomanipulatescoringrules,ensuringpredeterminedwinners,whilecorruptfirmssubmitnoncompetitivebidstomeetminimumbidderrequirements.UsingextensivedatafromChinesepublicprocurementauctions,thepaperintroducesmodel–drivenstatisticaltoolstodetectsuchcorruption,identifyingacorruptionrateof65percent.Aprocurementexpertauditsurveyconfirmsthetools’reliability,witha91

percentprobabilitythatexpertsrecognizesuspiciousscoringruleswhenflagged.Firm–levelanalysisrevealsthatlocal,state–owned,andlessproductivefirmsarefavoredincor–ruptauctions.Lastly,thepaperexplorespolicyimplications.Analysisofthenationalanti–corruptioncampaignsince2012suggeststhatgeneralinvestigationsmaybeinsuffi–cienttoaddressdeeplyingrainedcorruptpractices.Usingcounterfactualsbasedonanestimatedstructuralmodel,thepapershowsthatimplementinganonymouscall–for–ten–derevaluationscouldimprovesocialwelfareby10percentbyeliminatingsuspiciousrulesandencouragingbroaderparticipation.

ThispaperisaproductoftheDevelopmentImpactGroup,DevelopmentEconomics.ItispartofalargereffortbytheWorldBanktoprovideopenaccesstoitsresearchandmakeacontributiontodevelopmentpolicydiscussionsaroundtheworld.PolicyResearchWorkingPapersarealsopostedontheWebat

/prwp.Theauthor

maybecontactedatqianmiao@.Averifiedreproducibilitypackageforthispaperisavailableat

http://

,click

here

fordirectaccess.

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ThePolicyResearchWorkingPaperSeriesdisseminatesthefindingsofworkinprogresstoencouragetheexchangeofideasaboutdevelopmentissues.Anobjectiveoftheseriesistogetthefindingsoutquickly,evenifthepresentationsarelessthanfullypolished.Thepaperscarrythenamesoftheauthorsandshouldbecitedaccordingly.Thefindings,interpretations,andconclusionsexpressedinthispaperareentirelythoseoftheauthors.TheydonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment/WorldBankanditsaffiliatedorganizations,orthoseoftheExecutiveDirectorsoftheWorldBankorthegovernmentstheyrepresent.

RiggingtheScores:CorruptionthroughScoringRuleManipulationinPublicProcurementAuctions

QianmiaoChen(Michelle)*

AuthorizedfordistributionbyAriannaLegovini,Director,DevelopmentImpactGroup,DevelopmentEconomics,

WorldBankGroup

Keywords:PublicProcurement,OpenScoringAuction,Corruption JELclassification:H57,D73,D44,L44

*ResearchEconomist,WorldBankDECDI.Email:qianmiao@

tIwouldliketothankMarcoGonzalez-Navarro,SteveTadelis,KeiKawai,andFredFinanfortheiradvice,guidance,andsupport.IalsothankBettySadoulet,CailinSlattery,DanielRogger,EdwardMiguel,EthanLigon,FrancescoTrebbi,JedSilver,JoelFerguson,JuanOrtner,KarlSchurter,KirillBorusyak,ThiagoScot,andGuoXu,aswellasnumerousseminarparticipantsatNEUDC,DevPEC,IIOC,andConferenceonAuctionsandFirms.ZanSong,YuningXue,andTiffanyLiuprovidedexcellentresearchassistance.

?Thepreviousversionwascirculatedunderthetitle“CorruptioninPublicProcurementAuctions:Evi-dencefromCollusionbetweenOfficersandFirms”.

§Thefindings,interpretations,andconclusionsexpressedinthispaperareentirelythoseoftheauthors.TheydonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheWorldBankanditsaffiliatedorganizations,orthoseoftheExecutiveDirectorsoftheWorldBankorthegovernmentstheyrepresent.

1

1Introduction

Corruptionisapervasiveissuethatunderminesgovernmentsworldwide,distortingmarkets,stallingeconomicgrowth,anderodingpublictrust.Publicprocurementisespeciallyvulner-able,withbribesinthissectoraccountingforasignificantshareoftotalcorruption(

OECD

,

2016

).Corruptioninprocurementinvolvesillicitpracticestomanipulatecontractawardsforgoods,services,andworks,resultingininflatedcostsandplacingundueburdensontax-payersandbusinesses.Thischallengeisparticularlyacuteindevelopingcountries,whereweakinstitutionalframeworksandinadequateaccountabilityexacerbatetheproblem.

Inresponsetothesechallenges,manycountrieshaveadoptedopentenderingsystems,followingtheUNCITRALModelLawonPublicProcurement,

1

withopenscoringauctionsbeingoneofthemostprevalentmethods.Intheseauctions,firmssubmitconfidentialbidsassessedonqualityandprice,withcontractsawardedbasedonthehighestcombinedscores.

2

Topromotefaircompetition,aminimumnumberofbidders,oftenthree,istypicallyman-dated,asinChina.

3

However,despitethetransparencyandcompetitiveintentofopenscoringauctions,theireffectivenessincurbingcorruptioniscontested.PersonalinterviewswithChineseprocurementofficialsindicatethatcorruptionpersiststhroughthemanipula-tionofscoringrulestofavorpredeterminedsuppliers,oftenaccompaniedby“zombie”bidsthatcreateafacadeofcompetition.Existingauditingandcomplaintsystemsarefrequentlyineffectiveindetectingthesemanipulations.

4

Thispaperinvestigatestwokeyquestions:(1)Howprevalentisscoringrulemanipu-lationcorruptioninopenscoringauctionswithintheChinesepublicprocurementsystem?

(2)Whatpoliciescaneffectivelyreducecorruptionanditsassociateddistortions?Toex-plorethesequestions,IcompiledanovelandcomprehensivedatasetonpublicprocurementauctionsfromoneprovinceinChina,coveringallbiddingfirmprofilesandtheiroutcomes.Spanningtheperiodfrom2006to2021,thisdatasetincludesover300,000procurementprojectsandrepresentsthefirstcomprehensiveanalysisofdetailedpublicprocurementdatawithintheChinesecontext.Itisfurtherenrichedwithadministrativefirmdataandinfor-mationfromcorruptioninvestigations.

Toanswerthefirstquestion(1),Ibeginbydocumentingtwomotivatingstylizedfactsinscoringauctionpublicprocurementdata.First,inovertwo-thirdsofprocurementcases,thereareonlythreebidders—theminimumrequiredforanauctiontobedeemed

1UnitedNationsCommissiononInternationalTradeLaw(

UNCITRAL

,

2014

).

2Mostcountrieswithmodernpublicprocurementsystemsadoptopenscoringauctionsforopentendering.

3Indiarequiresthreebiddersforlimitedtenders,whileSerbiamandatesfive.

4Detectionischallengingbecauseeachprocurementstepadherestoformalregulations,suchasselectingopencompetitionandmeetingbidthresholds.Thelowcomplaintrateisalsoinfluencedbyfirms’reluctancetochallengecorruptionduetofearsofretaliationortheneedtomaintainpositiverelationswithlocalgovernments.

2

valid—highlightingalackofrobustcompetition.Second,thereareunusuallylargescoregapsbetweenwinningandlosingbids,particularlyinauctionswithonlythreebidders.Inthesecases,winningbidsoftenstandalone,withnoclosecompetitivelosingbidstosuggestgenuinerivalry.

Buildingontheseobservations,Iproposetoolstoidentifycorruptionmorepreciselythroughscoringrulemanipulationinthestandardscoringauctionmodel.Buildingontheworkof

Che

(

1993

),

AskerandCantillon

(

2008

),and

Hanazanoetal.

(

2020

),Iconstructameasurecalled“pseudotype,”representingthehighestscoresbidderscanachievewhilemaintainingnonnegativeprofits.Ithendemonstratehowscoringrulecustomizationcancreatebiddingpatternsinconsistentwithcompetitivebehavior.Underthenullhypothesisofacompetitiveprocurementauction,thewinningscoreshouldcloselyalignwiththeexpectedpseudotypeofthestrongestrivals.Ifthewinningscoresignificantlyexceedstheexpectedstrongestrivals’pseudotypes,thewinnerhasleftasubstantialamountofpotentialprofituntouched.Attheauctiongrouplevel,Iuseanonparametricmaximumlikelihoodestimationtoestimatetheproportionofcorruptionbycomparingthemeanofthewinningscoreswiththemeanofthepseudotypeofthestrongestrivals.Attheindividualauctionlevel,Icomparethepseudotypesoflosingbidderswiththeexpectedrivals’pseudotypesgiventhewinningscores.Whenscoringrulemanipulationoccurs,amarkeddiscrepancyemerges,resultinginanunusuallylowaverageoflosers’pseudotypesandrejectionofthenullhypothesis.Resultsfromthetwodetectionmethodscloselyalign,particularlyincaseswiththreebidders,indicatingthatthenullhypothesisofnocorruptioninscoringrulemanipulationisrejectedinover65%ofauctions,revealingevidenceofscoringrulecustomization,favoritism,andcoordinatednon-competitivebids.

Tofurthervalidatemytest,Iconductedaprocurementexpertauditstudy.Publicpro-curementofficialsacknowledgedtheexistenceofsignificantopportunitiesformanipulationinthebiddingprocess(

GongandZhou

,

2015

).However,detectingirregularitiescanbechal-lengingforthepublicwithoutthenecessaryexpertisetoverifythecriteria.Toaddressthisissue,Iengagedfiveprocurementexpertsfromtheprovince’sbidevaluationexpertpool,selectedfortheiractiveinvolvementinbidevaluationmeetingsanddeepindustryandfirmknowledge.Theyevaluatedarandomsampleof500procurementprojectswithoutknowledgeofthebiddersoroutcomes,identifyingsignsofcriteriacustomizationandassessingthelevelofcompetition.Thesurveyresultswerecomparedtothepredictionsmadebymymodel,resultinginhighdegreesofcongruence.

5

Whenmymodelpredictedapotentiallycorruptauction,therewasa91%chancethatprocurementexpertshighlightedsignsofscoringrulecustomization,demonstratingthemodel’seffectivenessindetectingsuspiciouspatterns.

5Definedastheconcordancebetweencorruptiontestoutcomesandtheidentificationofsuspiciouscall-for-tenderfilesbyexperts,theaccuracyratemeasuresthepercentageofcasesforwhichbothexpertsandmodelpredictionscorrectlyclassifythemascorruptornotcorrupt.Thisaccuracyratestandsat81%.

3

Tospeaktothesecondquestion(2),thecorruptiontestresultsobtainedfromthepreviousstepwerelinkedtofirmandanti-corruptioncampaigndata,enablingamorecom-prehensiveunderstandingofscoringrulemanipulationcorruptionanditspolicyimplications.First,Iexplorethedisparitiesbetweenwinnersincompetitiveandpotentiallycorruptsce-narios,revealingthatwinnersimplicatedinsuspectedcasesexhibitcharacteristicssuchaslowerproductivity,strongertiestostate-ownedentities,andcloserproximitytothelocalprocurementgovernment.Subsequently,Iutilizecorruptioninvestigationdatatoanalyzetheimpactofanti-corruptioncampaigninvestigationsonprocurementoutcomes.Ifindthatinvestigationspromptheightenedcompetitionandreducecorruptionintheshortterm,butfailtoyieldasustained,long-termreductionincorruptactivities.Notably,thisfindingispredominantlydrivenbyinvestigationsdirectedathigh-levelofficials.

Lastly,Ienhancethescoringauctionmodelbyincorporatingsemi-parametricestimatesoffirmcostfunctionstoconductcounterfactualpolicyanalyses.Iexaminetwodifferentcounterfactualscenariostostudytheimpactofvariouspolicychangesonprocurementout-comes.First,Iassesshowpre-determinedwinnerswouldbidifanonymouslyselectedexpertsweretaskedwithreviewingcall-for-tenderfilespriortoauctioncommencements.Iftheseexpertsidentifyanyunnecessaryrules,scoringruleswillberevisedaccordingly.Theelim-inationofsuchunnecessaryrulesleadstoan18%decreaseinthewinningpriceanda3%increaseinquality.Collectively,thistranslatestoan11%increaseinsocialwelfaremea-suredbyscorechange.Ofthesewelfaregains,70%arisefromcompetitivebiddingandtheremaining30%stemfromincreasedentries.Second,consideringthatcorruptofficialsoftenattempttoassignlowerweightstotransparentfactorslikepriceandhigherweightstoqualityinordertomanipulateoutcomes,Iinvestigatetheconsequencesofincreasingtheevaluationweightsonthepricecomponent.

Thispapercontributestoseveralstrandsofliterature.First,itcontributestothesmallbutgrowingbodyofresearchondetectingcorruptioninpublicprocurementbyintroducingnovelmethodsfordetectingcorruptioninscoringauctions,oneofthemostwidelyusedprocurementmethodsglobally.Bylinkingdetailedbiddingoutcomeswithrichfirmdata,itexplorespolicyimplications,offeringacomprehensiveapproachtounderstandingprocure-mentcorruption.Methodologically,thepaperemploysadvancedstatisticaltechniquesandintegratesaninnovativeexpertauditsurvey,providingrobustvalidationanddeeperinsights.Existingstudiesinthisfieldhavemeasuredcorruptioninprocurementauctionsthroughdirectindicatorssuchaspricesignaling(

Cai,Henderson,andZhang

,

2013

),bidleakage(

AndreyanovandKorovkin

,

2017

),andexaggeratedbids(

Huang

,

2019

).Otherresearchhastakenanindirectapproachbyexaminingprocurementthresholdsthatrequirepublicdisclo-sure(

CovielloandMariniello

,

2014

),theadoptionofopenauctions(

PalgutaandPertold

,

4

2017

;

Coviello,Guglielmo,andSpagnolo

,

2018

;

Baltrunaiteetal.

,

2021

;

Szucs

,

2024

),

6

andauditsthatrevealbunchingbehavioraimedatavoidingcompetition(

Gerardino,Litschig,

andPomeranz

,

2024

).Additionally,severalstudiesfocusonfavoritismtowardpoliticallyconnectedfirmsinprocurementawards(

Cao

,

2022

;

Baltrunaite

,

2020

;

Baltrunaiteetal.

,

2021

;

ColonnelliandPrem

,

2021

;

Brugu′es,Brugu′es,andGiambra

,

2024

).Thisstudydistin-guishesitselfbyfocusingoncorruptionmechanismswithinscoringrules,movingbeyondtheconventionalbinarydistinctionbetweenopenandnon-openauctionsanduncoveringsubtlerformsofmanipulationthatdonotnecessarilyinvolveovertpoliticalconnectionsoroutrightviolationsofpublicprocurementlaws.

Second,thisstudycontributestotheliteratureontheeffectsofanti-corruptioninvestiga-tionsandauditsinreducingcorruptionbylinkingcorruptiondetectionwithanti-corruptioncampaignsandhighlightingtheineffectivenessofthesecampaigns.Existingresearchsug-geststhatanti-corruptioninvestigationsandauditscandecreasecorruption(

Avis,Ferraz,

andFinan

,

2018

),increasegovernmentrevenue(

ChenandKung

,

2019

),reduceexpenditure(

Olken

,

2007

;

Lichand,Lopes,andMedeiros

,

2016

;

ZamboniandLitschig

,

2018

),improvefirmperformance(

ColonnelliandPrem

,

2021

),andenhanceelectoralaccountability(

Fer-

razandFinan

,

2011

).However,somestudiesfindthatauditsarenotalwayseffectiveinreducingcorruptionandmayevenhaveadverseeffectsduetopoortargeting(

Dufloetal.

,

2018

),inadequatedesign(

Gerardino,Litschig,andPomeranz

,

2024

),ordistortedincentives(

Khan,Khwaja,andOlken

,

2016

;

LichandandFernandes

,

2019

).Thispaperdemonstratesthat,withoutchangestoprocurementpolicies,investigationsfailtoproducelastingeffects.Additionally,Idesignatargetedauditstudytoshowhowimprovedauditdesignscanhelpreducecorruptionandenhanceprocurementoutcomes.

Third,thisresearchcontributestotheexistingliteratureonscoringauctionsbyinte-gratingcorruptpracticesintotheauctionmodel,leveragingrichandnovelpublicprocure-mentdata,andproposingempiricalmethodstodetectcorruptionusingreal-worlddata.Foundationalworkby

Che

(

1993

)analyzedvarioustypesofscoringauctionsandidentifiedoptimalscoringrules,whilesubsequentstudieslike

AskerandCantillon

(

2008

)and

Chen-

Ritzoetal.

(

2005

)showedthatscoringauctionscanyieldhigherpayoffsforbuyerscomparedtominimum-qualityorprice-onlyauctions.Morerecentresearchby

Hanazonoetal.

(

2013

),

Takahashi

(

2018

),

Andreyanov

(

2018

),and

Hanazanoetal.

(

2020

)hasfurtherexaminedequilibriumandmechanismdesigninscoringauctions,enhancingtheunderstandingofthisauctionformat.Additionally,studiessuchas

Bajari,Houghton,andTadelis

(

2014

),

Ryan

(

2020

),and

Kong,Perrigne,andVuong

(

2022

)haveextendedthescoringauctionmodeltoincludecontractdesigninpublicprocurement.Buildingonthisbodyofwork,myre-

6Alackoftransparencyinprocurementprocessesoftensignalspotentialcorruption,whereasopenandtransparentprocessesarepresumedtomitigatecorruptpractices.Studieshaveshownthatcorruptionisfrequentlyassociatedwithnon-openprocurementprocesses.

5

searchlinkstheoreticalinsightswithempiricalevidence,uncoveringpatternsofcorruptionwithinscoringauctionsandofferingpolicyimplicationsforreducingcorruptioninpublicprocurement.

Lastly,thisstudycontributestotheliteratureoncollusiondetectioninauctionsandmarkets,specificallythedetectionofnon-competitiveagreementsamongtwoormorebid-ders.

7

However,corruptionoriginatingfromtheauctioneeroragencysidehasreceivedcomparativelylessattention,despitebeingasignificantissueinmanydevelopingcountrieswherepublicprocurementlawsarepoorlyenforced.Mystudytakesanovelapproachbyallowingforbothcorruptionandcollusionandinvestigatingtheirrelationshipwithinthecontextofpublicprocurementinadevelopingcountry.Asaresult,thisresearchnotonlyintroducesadata-drivenmethodfordetectingcorruptionbutalsoexaminesthedistortionsandpolicyimplicationsarisingfromsuchpractices.

Theremainderofthepaperisorganizedasfollows.InSection2,Iofferbackgroundin-formationonthescoringauctionprocedureandChina’spublicprocurementsystem.Section3describesthedatasetusedfortheanalysis.Movingforward,Section4presentskeystyl-izedfactsthatmotivatetheinvestigation.InSection5,atheoreticalmodelisconstructed,layingthefoundationfortheempiricaltestconductedinSection6.Tofurthervalidatetheproposedapproach,Section7presentsthedesignandresultsoftheexpertsurvey.Section8delvesintoadiscussionoftheimplicationsofcorruptioninpublicprocurementbyexploringtheimpactofanti-corruptioninvestigationpolicies,andconductingcounterfactualanaly-sesthroughthestructuralmodeltoevaluatedifferentpolicyscenarios.Finally,Section9providesconcludingremarks,summarizingthefindingsandtheirimplications.

2Background

2.1PublicProcurementinChina

PublicprocurementprojectsinChinaaredefinedbasedontheuseofpublicfundsandtheiralignmentwithlegalrequirements.AccordingtoArticle2oftheGovernmentProcurementLawofthePeople’sRepublicofChina,governmentprocurementinvolvestheacquisitionofgoods,services,andprojectsbystateagencies,publicinstitutions,andorga-nizationsusingfiscalfunds.Theseprocurementsmustadheretocentralizedprocurementcatalogsorexceedspecifiedfinancialthresholds.Onlyprojectsmeetingthesecriteriaaresubjecttogovernmentprocurementregulations,whichmayincludelistingontheChina

7See

Porter

(

2005

)foraliteraturereviewoncollusioninauctions.Morerecentpapersinclude

Conley

andDecarolis

(

2016

);

Schurter

(

2017

);

Chassangetal.

(

2022

);

KawaiandNakabayashi

(

2022

);

Kawaietal.

(

2023

);

Kawai,Nakabayashi,andShimamoto

(

2022

).

6

GovernmentProcurementCatalog.

8

Incontrast,non-governmentprocurementprojectsrefertothosethatdonotusefis-calfunds,fallbelowthefinancialthresholds,orareoutsidethecentralizedprocurementcatalogs,thusexemptfromgovernmentprocurementrules.Consequently,mostlarge-scaleinfrastructureprojects,suchashigh-speedrailwayconstruction,arenotincludedinpub-licprocurement.Theseprojectsareoftenledbystate-ownedenterprisesliketheNationalRailwayandHighwayGroupsandarefundedthroughacombinationoflocalfinancingornon-publicfunds.

9

Thisdistinctionunderscorestheseparationbetweenpublic-fundedpro-curementandalternativefinancingmechanismsforinfrastructuredevelopment.

Figure1:PublicProcurementProcedure

Notes:ThestandardsforprocurementchoicesareguidedbytheRegulationsfortheImplementationof

theGovernmentProcurementLawofthePeople’sRepublicofChina.

Therearenon-openauctionmethods,suchasnegotiations,first-pricebiddingononlineplatforms,andpricesolicitations.

PublicprocurementinChinatypicallyprogressesthroughthreedistinctphases:pre-procurement,procurement,andpost-procurement.Inthepre-procurementphase,theprocur-ingentity,oftenagovernmentdepartmentorstate-ownedenterprise,identifiesitsneedsanddraftsadetailedprocurementplan.Thisstageinvolvesassessingprojectfeasibilityanddefiningtherequiredgoods,services,orconstruction.

Oncetherequirementsareestablished,theprocuringentityfinalizesaprocurementplanthatoutlineskeydetailssuchasprojectscope,selectedprocurementmethod,budget

8ProcurementbytheDepartmentofDefenseisnotincludedinthepublicprocurementsysteminChina,asithasanindependentprocurementsystemandregulations.

9Forinstance,theNoticeonStrictlyProhibitingIllegalFinancingbyLocalGovernmentsintheNameofGovernmentServiceProcurement(MinistryofFinance[2017]No.87)explicitlyexcludesinfrastructureprojectsinsectorssuchasrailways,highways,airports,telecommunications,utilities(water,electricity,andgas),education,science,healthcare,culture,sports,landdevelopment,andagriculturalwaterconservancyfrombeingcategorizedasgovernmentserviceprocurement.

7

allocation,timeline,andcriteriaforsupplierselection.Thisplanisthensubmittedforreviewandapprovalbyrelevantoversightagencies,suchastheAuditBureauandtheBureauofFinance,ensuringcompliancewithregulatorystandardsandproperuseoffiscalfunds.

Specificcriteriaguidethechoiceofaprocurementmethod,asshowninFigure

1

.Whendealingwithuniquelyqualifiedsuppliersorunforeseenemergencies,single-sourceprocure-ment,alsoknownasdirectcontracting,becomesaviableoption.Thismethodisalsousedwhenitiscrucialtomaintainprojectconsistencyoralignwithexistingservices.Inothercases,thechoiceofprocurementmethoddependsontheprocurementbudget.Toensuretransparency,projectsexceedingacertainthresholdarerequiredtousethestandardopen-scoringauctionmethod.

10

Projectsbelowthisthresholdhaveseveraloptions,includinginvited-onlyauctions,onlinefirst-priceauctions,anddirectpriceinquiries.However,evenforsmaller-scaleprocurement,thereisapreferenceforopen-scoringauctionsduetothein-creasedscrutinyandauditassociatedwithnon-openmethods.Variousstudies(

Calvo,Cui,

andSerpa

,

2019

;

Decarolisetal.

,

2020

)havefoundthatpublicprocurementusingnon-openmethodsoftenleadstohighercostsandgreatersusceptibilitytocorruption.Inthispaper,Ispecificallyfocusontheopen-scoringauctionmethodhighlightedinFigure

1

.

Uponapprovaloftheplan,theprocuringentitymustpublicizeprocurementinformationonnationalandlocalprocurementwebsites.Thisinformationincludesprojectdetails,thechosenprocurementmethod,budgetallocation,timeline,andscoringcriteria.Accordingtoregulations,anopenauctionrequiresatleastthreequalifiedbidderstobeconsideredvalid.Ifanopenauctionendswithonlytwoqualifiedbidders,expertsmustdecidewhethertoadjustthecall-for-tenderdocumentsandrestarttheauctionorswitchtonon-openmethods.Ifonlyonebidderparticipatesintheopenauction,theprocuringentitymayoptforsingle-sourceprocurement,providedthatexpertsconfirmthecall-for-tenderdocumentsarefairandcompliantwithcompetitionregulations.

Becauseofthecomplexityofpublicprocurement,corruptionwithintherealmofpublicprocurementhasremainedalongstandingconcern.Inthecontextofopen-scoringauctions,acomplexnetworkofactorsisinvolved,asshowninFigure

A1

.Thisnetworkinvolvesvariousroles,suchascityorcountyleaders,directors,andtheirsubordinateswithingovernmentdepartmentsresponsibleforprocurementrequests(e.g.,education,transportation,health),theprocurementagenciesoverseeingbidconferences,andthepublicprocurementexpertstaskedwithbidevaluation.

10ThethresholdsforopenscoringauctionsinpublicprocurementvaryacrossdifferentprovincesinChina.Intheprovinceunderstudy,asignificantchangeoccurredin2020,settingthebenchmarkforpublicbiddingongovernmentprocurementofgoodsorservicesat4millionyuanacrosstheprovince.Similarly,thethresholdforpublicbiddinginconstructionprojectsadherestobothnationalandprovincialregulations.Thesethresholdshavebeenrevisedseveraltimessince2007.

8

2.2ScoringAuctionProcedureandCorruption

Inadditiontothegeneralpublicprocurementprocedures,adetailedoutlineoftheopen-scoringauctionprocessispresentedinFigure

2

.Oncetheprocurementrequ