多元化折價(jià)與控股股東多元化動(dòng)機(jī)——一個(gè)代理理論視角的拓展類別：行業(yè)公司類課題研究人：辛?xí)走x送單位：興業(yè)基金管理有限公司

多元化折價(jià)與控股股東多元化動(dòng)機(jī)——一個(gè)代理理論視角的拓展內(nèi)容提要企業(yè)多元化與以托賓 q度量的企業(yè)績效（企業(yè)價(jià)值）之間的負(fù)向關(guān)系被稱為多元化折價(jià)。這是一個(gè)非常重要的發(fā)現(xiàn)，自WernerfeltandMontgomery（1988）、LangandStulz（1994）和BergerandOfek（1995）的研究后，許多學(xué)者對多元化折價(jià)進(jìn)行了理論和實(shí)證解釋。對于多元化折價(jià)的理論解釋大致可以劃分為三種：代理理論、無效率內(nèi)部資本市場理論和最優(yōu)多元化理論。其中，代理理論用管理者和股東之間的代理沖突很好地解釋了管理者的多元化動(dòng)機(jī)損害企業(yè)價(jià)值，從而產(chǎn)生多元化折價(jià)；內(nèi)部資本市場理論認(rèn)為代理沖突和信息不對稱可能導(dǎo)致多元化企業(yè)內(nèi)部資本市場無效率配置，不過另一方面，內(nèi)部資本市場也可能會(huì)有效率的配置資源，這一理論很好的解釋了為什么有些多元化企業(yè)存在折價(jià)，而有些則不是。最優(yōu)多元化理論則認(rèn)為盡管存在多元化折價(jià)，但多元化并不導(dǎo)致多元化折價(jià)，多元化是企業(yè)的最優(yōu)化選擇行為。除此之外，一些研究認(rèn)為是由于實(shí)證分析中樣本選擇和度量偏差問題，從而導(dǎo)致了多元化折價(jià)結(jié)果的出現(xiàn)，控制住這些因素后，多元化折價(jià)現(xiàn)象會(huì)減弱或消失，甚至還出現(xiàn)了多元化溢價(jià)?；谥袊默F(xiàn)實(shí)，本文在代理理論視角下對企業(yè)多元化理論進(jìn)行了拓展，引入控股股東和中小股東的代理關(guān)系分析控股股東的多元化動(dòng)機(jī)。在這個(gè)拓展模型框架下，假設(shè)多元化程度作為控股股東的掠奪利益的一種表現(xiàn)形式，因此可以預(yù)期，當(dāng)控股股東控制權(quán)越大時(shí)，股東之間的股權(quán)制衡程度也較低，其對中小股東的掠奪越大，就越不情愿通過多元化的形式來進(jìn)行掠奪；相反，當(dāng)控股股東控制權(quán)較小時(shí)，由于股東之間的股權(quán)制衡程度較大，因此，對于中小股東的掠奪就越不容易，此時(shí)，通過多元化形式的利益掠奪動(dòng)機(jī)就會(huì)增強(qiáng)?？梢灶A(yù)期多元化程度與控股股東的控制權(quán)呈負(fù)向關(guān)系，而同股權(quán)制衡呈正向關(guān)系。接著我分別引入超額價(jià)值法和Herfindahl指數(shù)來度量多元化程度，以國內(nèi)企業(yè)多元化的相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行了相關(guān)的實(shí)證分析，在面板數(shù)據(jù)中，我提供了非常全面地反映企業(yè)多元化經(jīng)營的樣本，盡管采用單位計(jì)數(shù)法度量多元化程度，但這也是基于我的大量手工整理工作之上的，實(shí)證結(jié)果檢驗(yàn)了控股股東多元化動(dòng)機(jī)模型等理論假說。最后，根據(jù)本文的實(shí)證研究，提出了如下政策建議：進(jìn)一步加大國內(nèi)市場投資者保護(hù)力度、進(jìn)一步完善上市公司信息披露和行為約束制度、優(yōu)化上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和治理結(jié)構(gòu)等。

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