財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表舞弊的原因，后果和威脅財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表舞弊是一種由企業(yè)蓄意欺騙或通過(guò)編制和傳播重大誤報(bào)的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表來(lái)誤導(dǎo)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表使用者的行為，尤其是投資者和債權(quán)人，嚴(yán)重威脅市場(chǎng)參與者對(duì)已公布的經(jīng)審計(jì)的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表信心。由于大公司舞弊行為大量被報(bào)道，如朗訊、施樂(lè)、來(lái)德愛(ài)、勝騰、安然公司、環(huán)球電訊、世界通訊公司、阿德?tīng)柗苼喒竞吞┛?，?cái)務(wù)報(bào)表欺詐（FSF）引起了公眾、新聞媒體、投資者、金融界和監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的關(guān)注。過(guò)去幾年，財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表舞弊使投資者損失超過(guò)5000億美元。2002年10月，美國(guó)總審計(jì)局（GAO）發(fā)布了一份關(guān)于在過(guò)去數(shù)年由于會(huì)計(jì)違規(guī)行為引起重述的數(shù)量顯著增加的報(bào)告，總結(jié)了最近引人注目的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表樣本涉嫌欺詐案件，包括安然、世通和環(huán)球電訊公司。本文通過(guò)對(duì)5個(gè)互相影響的因素進(jìn)行解釋和說(shuō)明，分析進(jìn)行財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表舞弊行為的原因和財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表欺詐的后果，并提出防范的建議。而財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表舞弊是因?yàn)楣局卫聿簧坪捅O(jiān)管不嚴(yán)，會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則的不健全；動(dòng)機(jī)是為企業(yè)獲得更多資金。在“犯罪”單詞中的第一個(gè)字母是“C”，這是“捏造”的意思。2002年總審計(jì)局報(bào)告表明，從2001年1月至2002年2月，與會(huì)計(jì)相關(guān)的SEC案件共150件，其中將近75%的是針對(duì)上市公司或其董事、職員和雇員，以及25%涉及到會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所和注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師。第二個(gè)字母是“R”，代表著“方法”的意思。財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表舞弊有各種不同的方式，從最頻繁發(fā)生的，如收入詐騙，到最不經(jīng)常出現(xiàn)的，如應(yīng)付賬款詐騙。財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表欺詐的方法可以從夸大收入和資產(chǎn)到低估負(fù)債和費(fèi)用，通常開(kāi)始與謊報(bào)臨時(shí)的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表及持續(xù)到年度的報(bào)表。財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表欺詐的方法可能由下列幾種：（1）偽造、篡改或操縱財(cái)務(wù)記錄材料、證明文件或商業(yè)交易；（2）故意誤報(bào)、漏報(bào)材料、交易、賬戶或其他重要信息的真實(shí)情況（3）故意曲解會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則和政策，錯(cuò)誤的執(zhí)行方法來(lái)衡量，認(rèn)識(shí)和報(bào)告經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)和商業(yè)交易（4）積極通過(guò)管理會(huì)計(jì)方法的非法收益的使用；（5）會(huì)計(jì)實(shí)務(wù)操作，公司隱瞞其經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)質(zhì)表現(xiàn)?！胺缸铩眴卧~中的第三個(gè)字母是“I”，代表著“動(dòng)機(jī)”的意思，并解釋了公司及對(duì)其財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表粉飾的最常見(jiàn)的動(dòng)機(jī)。即使有其他類(lèi)型的動(dòng)機(jī)如精神上的、自我中心的或意識(shí)形態(tài)的動(dòng)機(jī)可以在財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表舞弊中發(fā)揮作用，但經(jīng)濟(jì)是財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表欺詐案件的共同動(dòng)機(jī)。為達(dá)到華爾街的經(jīng)濟(jì)預(yù)測(cè)的壓力和誘惑，是上市公司從事財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表舞弊行為的根本動(dòng)機(jī)。當(dāng)公司具有強(qiáng)烈的動(dòng)機(jī)和經(jīng)濟(jì)理由來(lái)報(bào)告那些更優(yōu)于被會(huì)計(jì)原則（GAAP）規(guī)定所接受的普通報(bào)告的財(cái)務(wù)業(yè)績(jī)時(shí)，財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表舞弊行為更有可能發(fā)生。第四個(gè)字母是“M”，是“監(jiān)測(cè)”的意思。上市公司財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的過(guò)程包括監(jiān)測(cè)機(jī)制。這監(jiān)測(cè)機(jī)制又包括⑴對(duì)董事會(huì)、審計(jì)委員會(huì)、外部審計(jì)師和監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的直接監(jiān)督作用，⑵按照該公司的所有者或投資者，中介人如分析師、機(jī)構(gòu)投資者和投資銀行家進(jìn)行間接監(jiān)督。最后一個(gè)字母是“E”，是“最后結(jié)果”的意思。由于企業(yè)的成本是非常重要的，所以這必然是公司進(jìn)行財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表欺詐的罪行的一個(gè)強(qiáng)大動(dòng)機(jī)。1991年弗洛茲等研究了188家被SEC制裁的公司，發(fā)現(xiàn)對(duì)即使不成功的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告欺詐行為的罰則也是重要的。1994年，戴維森等人發(fā)現(xiàn)資本市場(chǎng)并不認(rèn)為所有公司的違法行為同樣嚴(yán)重，因此，市場(chǎng)對(duì)公司違規(guī)的嚴(yán)重程度有著不同的反應(yīng)。戴維森等人還發(fā)現(xiàn)沒(méi)有證據(jù)顯示股市對(duì)因逃稅、盜竊商業(yè)秘密、對(duì)客戶收取回扣被起訴的公司的市場(chǎng)效應(yīng)，同時(shí)，他們發(fā)現(xiàn)顯著的負(fù)股票的受賄指控，操縱價(jià)格，或起訴的公司的市場(chǎng)效應(yīng)欺詐性財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告。1996年德肖等人發(fā)現(xiàn)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表欺詐行為大大增加了企業(yè)的資本成本。由于與財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表舞弊甚至是失敗的欺詐活動(dòng)相關(guān)的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的成本高，使公司有正當(dāng)?shù)睦碛珊蛷?qiáng)烈的動(dòng)機(jī)來(lái)決定進(jìn)行這類(lèi)活動(dòng)，強(qiáng)迫企業(yè)進(jìn)行非法的行為。財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表舞弊行為嚴(yán)重威脅市場(chǎng)參與者對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)信息的信心；估計(jì)花費(fèi)公司重大資金；以及這一行為被認(rèn)為是不可接受的、非法的企業(yè)行為。進(jìn)行財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表舞弊行為的機(jī)會(huì)增加，使公司的控制結(jié)構(gòu)削弱，公司的治理變得不那么有效，也惡化了其審計(jì)職能的質(zhì)量。要防范財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表舞弊行為，就應(yīng)完善公司治理；加強(qiáng)公司的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告和提供可靠和有關(guān)資料，公司的條件和結(jié)果披露質(zhì)量；確保在提高審計(jì)人員的客觀，獨(dú)立的會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所更有效的監(jiān)督其審計(jì)質(zhì)量；避免審計(jì)人員從事的活動(dòng)可能造成潛在的利益沖突（如內(nèi)部審計(jì)，信息技術(shù)）和創(chuàng)建一個(gè)新的會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管體系、改善審計(jì)效果，此外，還要鼓勵(lì)上市公司參與建立防欺詐和檢測(cè)戰(zhàn)略，防止方面發(fā)揮積極作用并發(fā)現(xiàn)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表欺詐行為。這篇文章表明，財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表舞弊可以等同于犯罪一詞，其單詞中的“C”是代表偽造，“R”是代表方法，“I”是代表動(dòng)機(jī)，“M”是代表監(jiān)測(cè)或是缺乏監(jiān)測(cè)，以及“E”是代表最后結(jié)果。從文中也得出一個(gè)信息，財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表舞弊是一種嚴(yán)重威脅投資者對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)信息的信心的行為。財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表舞弊對(duì)經(jīng)審計(jì)的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的誠(chéng)信，質(zhì)量和可靠性產(chǎn)生不利的影響。無(wú)論是企業(yè)還是政府部門(mén)都需要調(diào)整。企業(yè)需要完善公司治理，加強(qiáng)公司的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告和提供可靠、有關(guān)資料。財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告程序的可靠性、透明度和一致性，使投資者作出明智的決定。對(duì)政府部門(mén)而言，完善會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則和其他相關(guān)制度，建立一個(gè)健全的會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管體系是防范財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表欺詐的重要措施。除此之外，政府部門(mén)還應(yīng)加強(qiáng)監(jiān)督。Causes,consequencesanddeterenceoffinancialstatementfraudZabihollahRezaee(2005)CriticalPerspectivesonAccounting277-298Financialstatementfraudisadeliberateattemptbycorporationstodeceiveormisleadinvestorsandcreditorsofpublishedfinancialstatements,especiallyinvestorsandcreditors,bypreparinganddisseminatingmateriallymisstatedfinancialstatements,anditisaseriousthreattomarketparticipants7confidenceinpublishedauditedfinancialstatements.Financialstatementfraud(FSF)hasreceivedconsiderableattentionfromthepublic,press,investors,thefinancialcommunity,andregulatorsbecauseofhighprofilereportedfraudatlargecompaniessuchasLucent,Xerox,RiteAid,Cendant,EnronCorporation,GlobalCrossing,WorldCom,Adelphia,andTyco.Financialstatementfraudhascostinvestorsmorethan$500billionduringthepastseveralyears.TheUSGeneralAccountingOffice(GAO)releasedareportinOctober2002,whichindicatesthatthenumberofrestatementsduetoaccountingirregularitieshasgrownsignificantlyduringthepastseveralyears,anditsummarizesasampleofthemostrecenthighprofileallegedfinancialstatementfraudcases,includingEnron,WorldCom,andGlobalCrossing.Thispaperanalysisthecausesandconsequencesoffinancialstatementfraudbyexplainingandjustifyingthefiveinteractivefactors,andbringsuptherecommendationsfortheprevention.Themotivationsoffinancialstatementfraudareirresponsibleandineffectivemonitoringbycorporategovernance,imperfectaccountingstandards,companiestoobtainmorefundsandsoon.Thefirstletterintheword“CRIME"is"C”，whichstandsfor“COOKS”.TheGAOreport(2002)indicatesthatalmost75%ofthetotal150accounting-relatedSECcasesbroughtfromJanuary2001toFebruary2002wereagainstpubliccompaniesortheirdirectors,officers,andemployeeswhereastheother25%involvedaccountingfirmsandCPAs.Thesecondletterintheword"CRIME"is"R”,whichstandsfor"RECIPES".Financialstatementfraudcanbecommittedinavarietyofways,rangingfrommostfrequentlyoccurringsuchasrevenuefraudstoleastcommonlyoccurringsuchasaccountspayablefrauds.Recipesoffinancialstatementfraudcanrangefromoverstatingrevenuesandassetstounderstatingliabilitiesandexpenses,whichtypicallybeganwithmisstatementofinterimfinancialstatementsandcontinueintoannualfinancialstatements.Financialstatementfraudmayinvolvethefollowingschemes(1)falsification,alteration,ormanipulationofmaterialfinancialrecords,supportingdocuments,orbusinesstransactions;(2)materialintentionalmisstatements,omissions,ormisrepresentationsofevents,transactions,accountsorothersignificantinformationfromwhichfinancialstatementsareprepared;(3)deliberatemisapplication,intentionalmisinterpretation,andwrongfulexecutionofaccountingstandards,principles,policiesandmethodsusedtomeasure,recognize,andreporteconomiceventsandbusinesstransactions;(4)theuseofaggressiveaccountingtechniquesthroughillegitimateearningsmanagement;and(5)manipulationofaccountingpracticesundertheexistingrules-basedaccountingstandardswhichhavebecometoodetailedandtooeasytocircumventandcontainloopholesthatallowcompaniestohidetheeconomicsubstanceoftheirperformance.Thethirdletterintheword“CRIME”is"I”，whichstandsfor“INCENTIVES”，andex-plainsthemostcommonmotivationsforcompaniesandtheircookstoperpetratefinancialstatementfraud.Economicincentivesarecommoninfinancialstatementfraudcases,eventhoughothertypesofmotivessuchaspsychotic,egocentric,orideologicalmotivescanplayaroleinfinancialstatementfraud.EconomicpressureandincentivestomeetWallStreetforecastsarethefundamentalmotivesforpubliclytradedcompaniestoengageinfinancialstatementfraud.Financialstatementfraudismorelikelytooccurwhenacompanyhasastrongmotiveandeconomicreasontoreportmorefavorablefinancialperformancethanotherwisewouldbereportedbycomplyingwithgenerallyacceptedaccountingprinciples(GAAP)requirements.Thefourthletterintheword“CRIME"is"M”，whichstandsfor“MONITORING”.Thefinancialreportingprocessofpubliclytradedcompaniesincludesamonitoringmechanism.Themonitoringmechanismconsistsof(1)adirectoversightfunctionoftheboardofdirectors,theauditcommittee,externalauditors,andregulatoryagenciesand(2)anindirectoverseeingfunctionbythosewhofollowthecompanyintheroleofowner/investorasanintermediarysuchasanalysts,institutionalinvestors,andinvestmentbankers.Thelastletterintheword“CRIME”is“E”，whichstandsfor“ENDRESULTS”.Theremustbeastrongmotivationforcorporationstoengageinfinancialstatementfraudbecausethecostsofcorporateoffensescanbeverysignificant.Davidsonetal,(1994)findthatthecapitalmarketsdidnotviewallcorporateoffensesasequallysevereandthus,themarketreacteddifferentlytotheseriousnessofviolationsbycorporations.Ferozetal.(1991)studied188firmsthatweresanctionedbytheSECandfindthatpenaltiesforevenunsuccessfulfinancialstatementfraudaresignificant.Davidsonetal.(1994)detectnoevidenceofastockmarketeffectforfirmsindictedfortaxevasion,theftoftradesecrets,kickbacks,andoverchargingcustomerswhiletheydetectedsignificantnegativestockmarketeffectsforfirmsindictedonchargesofbribery,price-fixing,orfraudulentfinancialreporting.Dechowetal.(1996)findthatthecostofcapitalforfirmsconvictedoffinancialstatementfraudsignificantlyincreased.Giventhehighcostassociatedwithfinancialstatementfraudandevenunsuccessfulfraudulentfinancialreportingactivities,thedecisionbycorporationstoengageinsuchactivitiesmustbejustifiedbystrongmotivesthatcompelfirmstobehaveillegally.Financialstatementfraudisaseriousthreattomarketparticipants7confidenceinfinancialinformation;estimatedtocostcorporationssubstantialmoney;andviewedasunacceptable,illegalcorporateconduct.Theopportunitytoengageinfinancialstatementfraudincreasesasthefirm’scontrolstructureweakens,itscorporategovernancebecomeslesseffective,andthequalityofitsauditfunctionsdeteriorates.Topreventfraudthefinancialstatements,itshouldbeimprovecorporategovernance;enhancethequalityofcorporatefinancialreportinganddisclosuresinprovidingreliableandrelevantinformationregardingcompanies7conditionsandresults;ensureamoreeffectiveoversightofpublicaccountingfirmsinenhancingauditors7objectivity,independence,andqualityoftheiraudits;refrainauditorstoengageinactivitiesthatmaycreatepotentialconflictsofinterest(ernalauditoutsourcing,informationtechnology);andcreateanewaccountingregulatorysystem,improveefficacyofaudits,whafsmore,thecommissionoffinancialstatementfraudbyhighprofilecorporationsencouragespubliclytradedcompaniestotakeproactiverolesbyestablishingfraudpreventionanddetectionstrategiestopreventanddetectfinancialstatementfraud