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Page1of17

Forreleaseat2:00p.m.,EDT,March20,2024

SummaryofEconomicProjections

InconjunctionwiththeFederalOpenMarketCommittee(FOMC)meetingheldonMarch19–20,2024,meetingparticipantssubmittedtheirprojectionsofthemostlikelyoutcomesforrealgrossdomesticproduct(GDP)growth,theunemploymentrate,andin?ationforeachyearfrom2024to2026andoverthelongerrun.Eachparticipant’sprojectionswerebasedoninformationavailableatthetimeofthemeeting,togetherwithherorhisassessmentofappropriatemonetarypolicy—includingapathforthefederalfundsrateanditslonger-runvalue—andassumptionsaboutotherfactorslikelytoa?ecteconomicoutcomes.Thelonger-runprojectionsrepresenteachparticipant’sassessmentofthevaluetowhicheachvariablewouldbeexpectedtoconverge,overtime,underappropriatemonetarypolicyandintheabsenceoffurthershockstotheeconomy.“Appropriatemonetarypolicy”isde?nedasthefuturepathofpolicythateachparticipantdeemsmostlikelytofosteroutcomesforeconomicactivityandin?ationthatbestsatisfyhisorherindividualinterpretationofthestatutorymandatetopromotemaximumemploymentandpricestability.

Page2of17

Forreleaseat2:00p.m.,EDT,March20,2024

Table1.EconomicprojectionsofFederalReserveBoardmembersandFederalReserveBankpresidents,undertheirindividualassumptionsofprojectedappropriatemonetarypolicy,March2024

Percent

Variable

Median1

CentralTendency2

Range3

2024

2025

2026

Longer

run

2024

2025

2026

Longer

run

2024

2025

2026

Longer

run

ChangeinrealGDP

2.1

2.0

2.0

1.8

2.0–2.4

1.9–2.3

1.8–2.1

1.7–2.0

1.3–2.7

1.7–2.5

1.7–2.5

1.6–2.5

Decemberprojection

1.4

1.8

1.9

1.8

1.2–1.7

1.5–2.0

1.8–2.0

1.7–2.0

0.8–2.5

1.4–2.5

1.6–2.5

1.6–2.5

Unemploymentrate

4.0

4.1

4.0

4.1

3.9–4.1

3.9–4.2

3.9–4.3

3.8–4.3

3.8–4.5

3.7–4.3

3.7–4.3

3.5–4.3

Decemberprojection

4.1

4.1

4.1

4.1

4.0–4.2

4.0–4.2

3.9–4.3

3.8–4.3

3.9–4.5

3.8–4.7

3.8–4.7

3.5–4.3

PCEin?ation

2.4

2.2

2.0

2.0

2.3–2.7

2.1–2.2

2.0–2.1

2.0

2.2–2.9

2.0–2.5

2.0–2.3

2.0

Decemberprojection

2.4

2.1

2.0

2.0

2.2–2.5

2.0–2.2

2.0

2.0

2.1–2.7

2.0–2.5

2.0–2.3

2.0

CorePCEin?ation4

2.6

2.2

2.0

2.5–2.8

2.1–2.3

2.0–2.1

2.4–3.0

2.0–2.6

2.0–2.3

Decemberprojection

2.4

2.2

2.0

2.4–2.7

2.0–2.2

2.0–2.1

2.3–3.0

2.0–2.6

2.0–2.3

Memo:Projected

appropriatepolicypath

Federalfundsrate

4.6

3.9

3.1

2.6

4.6–5.1

3.4–4.1

2.6–3.4

2.5–3.1

4.4–5.4

2.6–5.4

2.4–4.9

2.4–3.8

Decemberprojection

4.6

3.6

2.9

2.5

4.4–4.9

3.1–3.9

2.5–3.1

2.5–3.0

3.9–5.4

2.4–5.4

2.4–4.9

2.4–3.8

Note:Projectionsofchangeinrealgrossdomesticproduct(GDP)andprojectionsforbothmeasuresofin?ationarepercentchangesfromthefourthquarterofthepreviousyeartothefourthquarteroftheyearindicated.PCEin?ationandcorePCEin?ationarethepercentageratesofchangein,respectively,thepriceindexforpersonalconsumptionexpenditures(PCE)andthepriceindexforPCEexcludingfoodandenergy.Projectionsfortheunemploymentratearefortheaveragecivilianunemploymentrateinthefourthquarteroftheyearindicated.Eachparticipant’sprojectionsarebasedonhisorherassessmentofappropriatemonetarypolicy.Longer-runprojectionsrepresenteachparticipant’sassessmentoftheratetowhicheachvariablewouldbeexpectedtoconvergeunderappropriatemonetarypolicyandintheabsenceoffurthershockstotheeconomy.Theprojectionsforthefederalfundsratearethevalueofthemidpointoftheprojectedappropriatetargetrangeforthefederalfundsrateortheprojectedappropriatetargetlevelforthefederalfundsrateattheendofthespeci?edcalendaryearoroverthelongerrun.TheDecemberprojectionsweremadeinconjunctionwiththemeetingoftheFederalOpenMarketCommitteeonDecember12–13,2023.Oneparticipantdidnotsubmitlonger-runprojectionsforthechangeinrealGDP,theunemploymentrate,orthefederalfundsrateinconjunctionwiththeDecember12–13,2023,meeting,andoneparticipantdidnotsubmitsuchprojectionsinconjunctionwiththeMarch19–20,2024,meeting.

1.Foreachperiod,themedianisthemiddleprojectionwhentheprojectionsarearrangedfromlowesttohighest.Whenthenumberofprojectionsiseven,themedianistheaverageofthetwomiddleprojections.

2.Thecentraltendencyexcludesthethreehighestandthreelowestprojectionsforeachvariableineachyear.

3.Therangeforavariableinagivenyearincludesallparticipants’projections,fromlowesttohighest,forthatvariableinthatyear.

4.Longer-runprojectionsforcorePCEin?ationarenotcollected.

Page3of17

Forreleaseat2:00p.m.,EDT,March20,2024

Figure1.Medians,centraltendencies,andrangesofeconomicprojections,2024–26andoverthelongerrun

Rangeofprojections

Percent

ChangeinrealGDP

6

Actual

5

4

3

2

Medianofprojections

Centraltendencyofprojections

1 0?1?2

?3

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

2026

Longerrun

Percent

Unemploymentrate

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

2026

Longer

run

Percent

PCEinflation

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

2026

Longer

run

Percent

CorePCEinflation

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

2026

Longerrun

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

Note:De?nitionsofvariablesandotherexplanationsareinthenotestotable1.Thedatafortheactualvalues

ofthevariablesareannual.

Page4of17

Forreleaseat2:00p.m.,EDT,March20,2024

Figure2.FOMCparticipants’assessmentsofappropriatemonetarypolicy:Midpointoftargetrangeortargetlevelforthefederalfundsrate

Percent

7.0

6.5

6.0

5.5

5.0

4.5

4.0

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

2024

2025

2026

Longerrun

Note:Eachshadedcircleindicatesthevalue(roundedtothenearest1/8percentagepoint)ofanindividualparticipant’sjudgmentofthemidpointoftheappropriatetargetrangeforthefederalfundsrateortheappropriatetargetlevelforthefederalfundsrateattheendofthespeci?edcalendaryearoroverthelongerrun.Oneparticipantdidnotsubmitlonger-runprojectionsforthefederalfundsrate.

Page5of17

0.6?0.7

0.8?0.9

1.0?1.1

1.2?1.3

1.4?1.6?

1.51.7

1.8?1.9

2.0?2.1

2.2?2.3

2.4?2.5

2.6?2.7

Percentrange

Forreleaseat2:00p.m.,EDT,March20,2024

Figure3.A.Distributionofparticipants’projectionsforthechangeinrealGDP,2024–26andoverthelongerrun

Numberofparticipants

2024

Marchprojections

Decemberprojections

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0.6?0.7

0.8?

0.9

1.0?

1.1

1.2?

1.3

1.4?1.6?

1.51.7

Percentrange

1.8?

1.9

2.0?

2.1

2.2?

2.3

2.4?

2.5

2.6?

2.7

Numberofparticipants

2025

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0.6?0.7

0.8?

0.9

1.0?

1.1

1.2?

1.3

1.4?1.6?

1.51.7

Percentrange

1.8?

1.9

2.0?

2.1

2.2?

2.3

2.4?

2.5

2.6?

2.7

Numberofparticipants

2026

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0.6?0.7

0.8?

0.9

1.0?

1.1

1.2?

1.3

1.4?1.6?

1.51.7

Percentrange

1.8?

1.9

2.0?

2.1

2.2?

2.3

2.4?

2.5

2.6?

2.7

Numberofparticipants

Longerrun

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

Note:De?nitionsofvariablesandotherexplanationsareinthenotestotable1.

Page6of17

3.2?3.3

3.4?3.5

3.6?3.7

3.8?3.9

4.0?4.1

4.2?4.3

4.4?4.5

4.6?4.7

Percentrange

Forreleaseat2:00p.m.,EDT,March20,2024

Figure3.B.Distributionofparticipants’projectionsfortheunemploymentrate,2024–26andoverthelongerrun

Numberofparticipants

2024

Marchprojections

Decemberprojections

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

3.2?

3.3

3.4?

3.5

3.6?

3.7

3.8?

3.9

4.0?

4.1

4.2?

4.3

4.4?

4.5

4.6?

4.7

Percentrange

Numberofparticipants

2025

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

3.2?

3.3

3.4?

3.5

3.6?

3.7

3.8?

3.9

4.0?

4.1

4.2?

4.3

4.4?

4.5

4.6?

4.7

Percentrange

Numberofparticipants

2026

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

3.2?

3.3

3.4?

3.5

3.6?

3.7

3.8?

3.9

4.0?

4.1

4.2?

4.3

4.4?

4.5

4.6?

4.7

Percentrange

Numberofparticipants

Longerrun

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

Note:De?nitionsofvariablesandotherexplanationsareinthenotestotable1.

Page7of17

1.7?1.8

1.9?2.0

2.1?2.2

2.3?

2.4

Percentrange

2.5?2.6

2.7?2.8

2.9?3.0

Forreleaseat2:00p.m.,EDT,March20,2024

Figure3.C.Distributionofparticipants’projectionsforPCEin?ation,2024–26andoverthelongerrun

Numberofparticipants

2024

Marchprojections

Decemberprojections

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

1.7?

1.8

1.9?

2.0

2.1?

2.2

2.3?

2.4

Percentrange

2.5?

2.6

2.7?

2.8

2.9?

3.0

Numberofparticipants

2025

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

1.7?

1.8

1.9?

2.0

2.1?

2.2

2.3?

2.4

Percentrange

2.5?

2.6

2.7?

2.8

2.9?

3.0

Numberofparticipants

2026

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

1.7?

1.8

1.9?

2.0

2.1?

2.2

2.3?

2.4

Percentrange

2.5?

2.6

2.7?

2.8

2.9?

3.0

Numberofparticipants

Longerrun

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

Note:De?nitionsofvariablesandotherexplanationsareinthenotestotable1.

Page8of17

Forreleaseat2:00p.m.,EDT,March20,2024

Figure3.D.Distributionofparticipants’projectionsforcorePCEin?ation,2024–26

Numberofparticipants

2024

Marchprojections

Decemberprojections

1.7?1.8

1.9?2.0

2.1?2.2

2.5?2.6

2.7?2.8

2.9?3.0

2.3?

2.4

Percentrange

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

Numberofparticipants

2025

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

1.7?

1.8

1.9?

2.0

2.1?

2.2

2.3?

2.4

Percentrange

2.5?

2.6

2.7?

2.8

2.9?

3.0

Numberofparticipants

2026

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

1.7?

1.8

1.9?

2.0

2.1?

2.2

2.3?

2.4

Percentrange

2.5?

2.6

2.7?

2.8

2.9?

3.0

Note:De?nitionsofvariablesandotherexplanationsareinthenotestotable1.

Page9of17

Forreleaseat2:00p.m.,EDT,March20,2024

Figure3.E.Distributionofparticipants’judgmentsofthemidpointoftheappropriatetargetrangeforthefederalfundsrateortheappropriatetargetlevelforthefederalfundsrate,2024–26andoverthelongerrun

Numberofparticipants

2024

Marchprojections

Decemberprojections

2.13?2.37

2.38?2.62

2.63?2.87

3.13?3.37

3.38?3.62

3.63?3.87

3.88?4.12

2.88?3.12

4.13?4.37

4.38?4.62

4.63?4.87

5.13?5.37

5.38?5.62

4.88?5.12

Percentrange

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

Numberofparticipants

2025

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

2.13?2.37

2.38?

2.62

2.63?

2.87

2.88?

3.12

3.13?

3.37

3.38?

3.62

3.63?

3.87

3.88?

4.12

4.13?

4.37

4.38?

4.62

4.63?

4.87

4.88?

5.12

5.13?

5.37

5.38?

5.62

Percentrange

Numberofparticipants

2026

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

2.13?2.37

2.38?2.62

2.63?2.87

2.88?3.12

3.13?3.37

3.38?3.62

3.63?3.87

3.88?4.12

4.13?4.37

4.38?4.62

4.63?4.87

4.88?5.12

5.13?5.37

5.38?5.62

5.63?5.87

5.88?6.12

6.13?

6.37

Percentrange

Numberofparticipants

Longerrun

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

2.13?2.37

2.38?

2.62

2.63?

2.87

2.88?

3.12

3.13?

3.37

3.38?

3.62

3.63?

3.87

3.88?

4.12

4.13?

4.37

4.38?

4.62

4.63?

4.87

4.88?

5.12

5.13?

5.37

5.38?

5.62

Percentrange

Note:De?nitionsofvariablesandotherexplanationsareinthenotestotable1.

Page10of17

Numberofparticipants

RiskstoGDPgrowth

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

Marchprojections

Decemberprojections

Weightedtodownside

Broadlybalanced

Weightedto

upside

Forreleaseat2:00p.m.,EDT,March20,2024

Figure4.A.UncertaintyandrisksinprojectionsofGDPgrowth

Medianprojectionandcon?denceintervalbasedonhistoricalforecasterrors

Percent

ChangeinrealGDP

Medianofprojections

70%confidenceinterval

Actual

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

?1

?2

?3

20192020202120222023202420252026

FOMCparticipants’assessmentsofuncertaintyandrisksaroundtheireconomicprojections

Numberofparticipants

UncertaintyaboutGDPgrowth

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

Marchprojections

Decemberprojections

Lower

Broadly

similar

Higher

Note:Theblueandredlinesinthetoppanelshowactualvaluesandmedianprojectedvalues,respectively,ofthepercentchangeinrealgrossdomesticproduct(GDP)fromthefourthquarterofthepreviousyeartothefourthquarteroftheyearindicated.Thecon?denceintervalaroundthemedianprojectedvaluesisassumedtobesymmetricandisbasedonrootmeansquarederrorsofvariousprivateandgovernmentforecastsmadeovertheprevious20years;moreinformationaboutthesedataisavailableintable2.Becausecurrentconditionsmaydi?erfromthosethatprevailed,onaverage,overtheprevious20years,thewidthandshapeofthecon?denceintervalestimatedonthebasisofthehistoricalforecasterrorsmaynotre?ectFOMCparticipants’currentassessmentsoftheuncertaintyandrisksaroundtheirprojections;thesecurrentassessmentsaresummarizedinthelowerpanels.Generallyspeaking,participantswhojudgetheuncertaintyabouttheirprojectionsas“broadlysimilar”totheaveragelevelsofthepast20yearswouldviewthewidthofthecon?denceintervalshowninthehistoricalfanchartaslargelyconsistentwiththeirassessmentsoftheuncertaintyabouttheirprojections.Likewise,participantswhojudgetheriskstotheirprojectionsas“broadlybalanced”wouldviewthecon?denceintervalaroundtheirprojectionsasapproximatelysymmetric.Forde?nitionsofuncertaintyandrisksineconomicprojections,seethebox“ForecastUncertainty.”

Page11of17

Numberofparticipants

Riskstotheunemploymentrate

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

Marchprojections

Decemberprojections

Weightedtodownside

Broadlybalanced

Weightedto

upside

Forreleaseat2:00p.m.,EDT,March20,2024

Figure4.B.Uncertaintyandrisksinprojectionsoftheunemploymentrate

Medianprojectionandcon?denceintervalbasedonhistoricalforecasterrors

Percent

Unemploymentrate

Medianofprojections

70%confidenceinterval

7

6

Actual

5

4

3

2

20192020202120222023202420252026

1

FOMCparticipants’assessmentsofuncertaintyandrisksaroundtheireconomicprojections

Numberofparticipants

Uncertaintyabouttheunemploymentrate

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

Marchprojections

Decemberprojections

Lower

Broadly

similar

Higher

Note:Theblueandredlinesinthetoppanelshowactualvaluesandmedianprojectedvalues,respectively,oftheaveragecivilianunemploymentrateinthefourthquarteroftheyearindicated.Thecon?denceintervalaroundthemedianprojectedvaluesisassumedtobesymmetricandisbasedonrootmeansquarederrorsofvariousprivateandgovernmentforecastsmadeovertheprevious20years;moreinformationaboutthesedataisavailableintable2.Becausecurrentconditionsmaydi?erfromthosethatprevailed,onaverage,overtheprevious20years,thewidthandshapeofthecon?denceintervalestimatedonthebasisofthehistoricalforecasterrorsmaynotre?ectFOMCparticipants’currentassessmentsoftheuncertaintyandrisksaroundtheirprojections;thesecurrentassessmentsaresummarizedinthelowerpanels.Generallyspeaking,participantswhojudgetheuncertaintyabouttheirprojectionsas“broadlysimilar”totheaveragelevelsofthepast20yearswouldviewthewidthofthecon?denceintervalshowninthehistoricalfanchartaslargelyconsistentwiththeirassessmentsoftheuncertaintyabouttheirprojections.Likewise,participantswhojudgetheriskstotheirprojectionsas“broadlybalanced”wouldviewthecon?denceintervalaroundtheirprojectionsasapproximatelysymmetric.Forde?nitionsofuncertaintyandrisksineconomicprojections,seethebox“ForecastUncertainty.”

Page12of17

Forreleaseat2:00p.m.,EDT,March20,2024

Figure4.C.UncertaintyandrisksinprojectionsofPCEin?ation

Medianprojectionandcon?denceintervalbasedonhistoricalforecasterrors

Percent

PCEinflation

7

Medianofprojections

70%confidenceinterval

6

5

4

3

2

1

Actual

0

20192020202120222023202420252026

FOMCparticipants’assessmentsofuncertaintyandrisksaroundtheireconomicprojections

Numberofparticipants

Numberofparticipants

RiskstoPCEinflation

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

UncertaintyaboutPCEinflation

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

Marchprojections

Decemberprojections

Marchprojections

Decemberprojections

Lower

Broadly

similar

Higher

Weightedtodownside

Broadlybalanced

Weightedto

upside

Numberofparticipants

Numberofparticipants

UncertaintyaboutcorePCEinflation

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

RiskstocorePCEinflation

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

Marchprojections

Decemberprojections

Marchprojections

Decemberprojections

Lower

Broadly

similar

Higher

Weightedtodownside

Broadlybalanced

Weightedto

upside

Note:Theblueandredlinesinthetoppanelshowactualvaluesandmedianprojectedvalues,respectively,ofthepercentchangeinthepriceindexforpersonalconsumptionexpenditures(PCE)fromthefourthquarterofthepreviousyeartothefourthquarteroftheyearindicated.Thecon?denceintervalaroundthemedianprojectedvaluesisassumedtobesymmetricandisbasedonrootmeansquarederrorsofvariousprivateandgovernment forecastsmadeovertheprevious20years;moreinformationaboutthesedataisavailableintable2.Becausecurrentconditionsmaydi?erfromthosethatprevailed,onaverage,overtheprevious20years,thewidthandshapeofthecon?denceintervalestimatedonthebasisofthehistoricalforecasterrorsmaynotre?ectFOMCparticipants’currentassessmentsoftheuncertaintyandrisksaroundtheirprojections;thesecurrentassessmentsaresummarizedinthe lowerpanels.Generallyspeaking,participantswhojudgetheuncertaintyabouttheirprojectionsas“broadlysimilar”totheaveragelevelsofthepast20yearswouldviewthewidthofthecon?denceintervalshowninthehistoricalfanchartaslargelyconsistentwiththeirassessmentsoftheuncertaintyabouttheirprojections.Likewise,participantswhojudgetheriskstotheirprojectionsas“broadlybalanced”wouldviewthecon?denceintervalaroundtheirprojectionsasapproximatelysymmetric.Forde?nitionsofuncertaintyandrisksineconomicprojections,seethebox“ForecastUncertainty.”

Page13of17

200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021202220232024

Forreleaseat2:00p.m.,EDT,March20,2024

Figure4.D.Di?usionindexesofparticipants’uncertaintyassessments

Diffusionindex

ChangeinrealGDP

1.00

0.75

0.50

0.25

0.00

?0.25

?0.50

?0.75

200720082009201020112012201320142015

201620172018201920202021202220232024

?1.00

Unemploymentrate

Diffusionindex

1.00

0.75

0.50

0.25

0.00

?0.25

?0.50

?0.75

200720082009201020112012201320142015

201620172018201920202021202220232024

?1.00

PCEinflation

Diffusionindex

1.00

0.75

0.50

0.25

0.00

?0.25

?0.50

?0.75

200720082009201020112012201320142015

201620172018201920202021202220232024

?1.00

CorePCEinflation

Diffusionindex

1.00

0.75

0.50

0.25

0.00

?0.25

?0.50

?0.75

?1.00

Note:ForeachSEP,participantsprovidedresponsestothequestion“Pleaseindicateyourjudgmentoftheuncertaintyattachedtoyourprojectionsrelativetothelevelsofuncertaintyoverthepast20years.”Eachpointinthedi?usionindexesrepresentsthenumberofparticipantswhoresponded“Higher”minusthenumberwhoresponded“Lower,”dividedbythetotalnumberofparticipants.FigureexcludesMarch2020whennoprojectionsweresubmitted.

Page14of17

Forreleaseat2:00p.m.,EDT,March20,2024

Figure4.E.Di?usionindexesofparticipants’riskweightings

Diffusionindex

ChangeinrealGDP

1.00

0.75

0.50

0.25

0.00

?0.25

?0.50

?0.75

?1.00

200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021202220232024

Diffusionindex

Unemploymentrate

200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021202220232024

1.00

0.75

0.50

0.25

0.00

?0.25

?0.50

?0.75

?1.00

Diffusionindex

PCEinflation

200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021202220232024

1.00

0.75

0.50

0.25

0.00

?0.25

?0.50

?0.75

?1.00

Diffusionindex

CorePCEinflation

200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021202220232024

1.00

0.75

0.50

0.25

0.00

?0.25

?0.50

?0.75

?1.00

Note:ForeachSEP,participantsprovidedresponsestothequestion“Pleaseindicateyourjudgmentoftheriskweightingaroundyourprojections.”Eachpointinthedi?usionindexesrepresentsthenumberofparticipantswhoresponded“WeightedtotheUpside”minusthenumberwhoresponded“WeightedtotheDownside,”dividedbythetotalnumberofparticipants.FigureexcludesMarch2020whennoprojectionsweresubmitted.

Page15of17

Forreleaseat2:00p.m.,EDT,March20,2024

Figure5.Uncertaintyandrisksinprojectionsofthefederalfundsrate

Percent

Federalfundsrate

Midpointoftargetrange

Medianofprojections

70%confidenceinterval*

Actual

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

20192020202120222023202420252026

Note:Theblueandredlinesarebasedonactualvaluesandmedianprojectedvalues,respectively,oftheCommittee’stargetforthefederalfundsrateattheendoftheyearindicated.Theactualvaluesarethemidpointofthetargetrange;themedianprojectedvaluesarebasedoneitherthemidpointofthetargetrangeorthetargetlevel.Thecon?denceintervalaroundthemedianprojectedvaluesisbasedonrootmeansquarederrorsofvariousprivateandgovernmentforecastsmadeovertheprevious20years.Thecon?denceintervalisnotstrictlyconsistentwiththeprojectionsforthefederalfundsrate,primarilybecausetheseprojectionsarenotforecastsofthelikeliestoutcomesforthefederalfundsrate,butratherprojectionsofparticipants’individualassessmentsofappropriatemonetarypolicy.Still,historicalforecasterrorsprovideabroadsenseoftheuncertaintyaroundthefuturepathofthefederalfundsrategeneratedbytheuncertaintyaboutthemacroeconomicvariablesaswellasadditionaladjustmentstomonetarypolicythatmaybeappropriatetoo?setthee?ectsofshockstotheeconomy.

Thecon?denceintervalisassumedtobesymmetricexceptwhenitistruncatedatzero-thebottomofthelowesttargetrangeforthefederalfundsratethathasbeenadoptedinthepastbytheCommittee.Thistruncationwouldnotbeintendedtoindicatethelikelihoodoftheuseofnegativeinterestratestoprovideadditionalmonetarypolicyaccommodationifdoingsowasjudgedappropriate.Insuchsituations,theCommitteecouldalsoemployothertools,includingforwardguidanceandlarge-scaleassetpurchases,toprovideadditionalaccommodation.Becausecurrentconditionsmaydi?erfromthosethatprevailed,onaverage,overtheprevious20years,thewidthandshapeofthecon?denceintervalestimatedonthebasisofthehistoricalforecasterrorsmaynotre?ectFOMCparticipants’currentassessmentsoftheuncertaintyandrisksaroundtheirprojections.

*Thecon?denceintervalisderivedfromforecastsoftheaveragelevelofshort-terminterestratesinthefourthquarteroftheyearindicated;moreinformationaboutthesedataisavailableintable2.Theshadedareaencompasseslessthana70percentcon?denceintervalifthecon?denceintervalhasbeentruncatedatzero.

Page16of17

Forreleaseat2:00p.m.,EDT,March20,2024

Table2.AverageHistoricalProjectionErrorRanges(Percentagepoints)

Variable

2024

2025

2026

ChangeinrealGDP1..............

±1.6

±2.0

±2.2

Unemploymentrate1..............

±0.8

±1.4

±1.9

Totalconsumerprices2............

±1.4

±1.8

±1.8

Short-terminterestrates3.........

±0.9

±2.0

±2.5

Note:Errorrangesshownaremeasuredasplusorminustherootmeansquarederrorofprojectionsfor2004through2023thatwerereleasedinthespringbyvariousprivateandgovernmentforecasters.Asdescribedinthebox“ForecastUncertainty,”undercertainassumptions,thereisabouta70percentprobabilitythatactualoutcomesforrealGDP,unemployment,consumerprices,andthefederal fundsratewillbeinrangesimpliedbytheaveragesizeofprojectionerrorsmade inthepast.Formoreinformation,seeDavidReifschneiderandPeterTulip(2017),“GaugingtheUncertaintyoftheEconomicOutlookUsingHistoricalForecastingErrors:TheFederalReserve’sApproach,”FinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeries2017-020(Washington:BoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem,February),

/10.17016/FEDS.2017.020.

1.De?nitionsofvariablesareinthegeneralnotetotable1.

2.Measureistheoverallconsumerpriceindex,thepricemeasurethathasbeenmostwidelyusedingovernmentandprivateecon

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