》OECD

OECDCompendiumofProductivity

Indicators2025

OECDCompendium

ofProductivityIndicators

2025

》OECD

BETTERPOLlcIESFORBETTERLIVES

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OECDCOMPENDIUMOFPRODUCTIVITYINDICATORS2025?OECD2025

Foreword

Productivitygrowthshapeseconomicdevelopmentandunderpinsimprovementsinlivingstandards.Thepaceandpatternofchangesinproductivitydifferwidelyacrosscountriesandovertime,reflectingtheinterplayofawiderangeoffactors-structuralandcyclical,internationalanddomestic.Internationallycomparableindicatorsofproductivityarecentralforassessingcross-countryvariationinproductivitytrendsandgaugingeconomicperformance.

Sinceitsfirsteditionin2006,theOECDCompendiumofProductivityIndicatorshascompiledacomprehensivesetofcross-countrystatisticsonlabourproductivity,multifactorproductivity,andrelatedindicators.Itoffersanin-depthoverviewofshort-andlong-termtrendsinproductivityacrossOECDcountriesand,wherepossible,accessioncountries,whilealsoexaminingkeycomponentssuchascapitalandlabourinputs.Inaddition,theCompendiumpresentsmoregranularinsightsintoproductivityperformance,highlightingdifferencesacrossindustriesandbetweensmallandmedium-sizedenterprisesandlargefirms.Thiseditionalsoincludesanexaminationofproductivitygrowthadjustedforcyclicaleconomicfluctuations.

ThereportwascoordinatedbyNhungLuuandcompletedunderthesupervisionofJarmilaBotevandAnnabelleMourougane,withcontributionsfromAlexanderJaax.ChapterswerepreparedbyNhungLuu(Chapters1,3,5,6and7),HectorMoreno(Chapters2and4),TomArend(Chapter8),YannDorville(Chapter9).JuliaHufandGueramSargsyanprovidedexcellentstatisticalcontributions.

ThereportwasformattedbyVirginieElgrably.

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OECDCOMPENDIUMOFPRODUCTIVITYINDICATORS2025?OECD2025

Tableofcontents

Foreword3

Executivesummary7

1.Productivityinashiftinggeopoliticalandeconomiclandscape8

Weakoverallproductivitygrowthin2023and20248

Productivitygrowthdifferedacrosscountries9

SlowMFPgrowthexplainedmostoftheweaklabourproductivityperformancein2023,with

capitaldeepeningplayingonlyminorrole.11

Labourproductivitygrowthcontinuestobeshapedbywithin-industrydevelopmentsandlarge

firms’productivitygrowth12

Cross-countryvariationinproductivitygrowthprimarilyreflectedstructuralfactorsin202313

Challengesandopportunitiesforfutureproductivitytrends14

Datasources16

References16

2.Productivityandeconomicgrowth18

Contextandoverview18

GDPgrowth:Contributionsfromlabour,capitalandmultifactorproductivity19

Labourproductivitygrowth:Contributionsfromcapitalandmultifactorproductivity21

GDPgrowth:Contributionsfromemployment,hoursworkedperworker,andlabourproductivity23

Datasources25

References25

3.Investment26

Contextandkeyfindings26

Datasources31

References31

4.Cross-countrycomparisonsoflabourproductivitylevels32

Context32

Sizeofoutput32

Hoursworkedandemployment35

Labourproductivity39

Datasources42

References42

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OECDCOMPENDIUMOFPRODUCTIVITYINDICATORS2025?OECD2025

5.Industrycontributionstoaggregatelabourproductivitygrowth43

Contextandkeyfindings43

Datasources50

References50

6.Industry-levelmultifactorproductivitygrowth51

Contextandkeyfindings51

Datasources58

References58

7.ProductivityinSMEsandlargefirms60

Contextandkeyfindings60

Datasources64

References64

8.Cyclicaladjustmentofmultifactorproductivity66

Contextandkeyfindings66

Cyclically-adjustedMFPgrowthinthemanufacturingindustry67

Whatdoescyclicaladjustmentrevealaboutlong-termtrendsinMFPgrowth?69

References71

Annex8.A.Methodology72

Howtoreadtheindicators72

Performanceacrossmodelsisrobust73

9.Insightsonproductivitydevelopmentsin202474

Contextandkeyfindings74

Whathappenedin2024?75

Theunderlyingforcesdrivingthepredictions78

Datasources80

References80

Annex9.A.Methodology81

Tables

Table3.1.BreakdownoffixedcapitalassetsaccordingtotheSystemofNationalAccounts200831

AnnexTable8.A.1.Bestcyclical-adjustmentapproachbycountry73

Figures

Figure1.1.Labourproductivitygrowthsince19959

Figure1.2.Labourproductivitygrowthacrosscountriesin202310

Figure1.3.Multifactorproductivitygrowthin202311

Figure1.4.Contributionstolabourproductivitygrowth13

Figure1.5.AI’spredictedannuallabourproductivitygainsoverthenexttenyearsacrossstudies15

Figure2.1.Labour,capital,andmultifactorproductivitycontributionstoGDPgrowth19

Figure2.2.Contributionstoannuallabourproductivitygrowth:Capitalstocktooutputratio,capitalqualityand

multifactorproductivity22

Figure2.3.ContributionstoannualGDPgrowthfromchangesinlabourproductivity,hoursworked,and

employmentin202324

Figure3.1.Annualchangeininvestmentrate27

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OECDCOMPENDIUMOFPRODUCTIVITYINDICATORS2025?OECD2025

Figure3.2.Decompositionofinvestmentbyassets28

Figure3.3.Annualchangeininvestmentratebyassettype29

Figure3.4.Differenceininvestmentratebyassettype30

Figure4.1.RelativesizeofOECDeconomiesbasedonGDPcurrentPPPs33

Figure4.2.RelativesizeofOECDeconomiesbasedonGDPcurrentexchangerates34

Figure4.3.RelativesizeoftheworkforceinOECDeconomies,basedonhoursworked,202336

Figure4.4.RelativesizeoftheworkforceinOECDeconomies,basedonemployment,202337

Figure4.5.Averagehoursworkedperworkeracrosscountries,202337

Figure4.6.Labourproductivityin202340

Figure4.7.LabourproductivitygaprelativetotheOECDaverage40

Figure4.8.Labourproductivitylevelsbasedin2023.41

Figure5.1.Decompositionoflabourproductivitygrowth44

Figure5.2.Industrycontributionstocross-industryreallocationeffect46

Figure5.3.Industrycontributionstowithin-industryeffect,202348

Figure6.1.MFPgrowthforthetotaleconomy53

Figure6.2.MFPgrowthacrossindustriescomparedtothetotaleconomy54

Figure6.3.MFPgrowthinselectedindustriesacrossG7countries55

Figure6.4.MFPcontributiontolabourproductivityinselectedindustries:G7average57

Figure7.1.LabourproductivityinSMEsandlargefirms,businesseconomy62

Figure7.2.LabourproductivityinSMEsandlargefirms,manufacturing62

Figure7.3.LabourproductivityinSMEsandlargefirms,businessservices63

Figure8.1.Comparisonofcyclically-adjustedMFPgrowth68

Figure8.2.ComparisonofcyclicallyadjustedMFPgrowthforFrance69

Figure8.3.AdjustedMFPtimeseriesforselectedOECDcountries,1995-202270

Figure9.1.Labourproductivitygrowthnowcastfor202476

Figure9.2.Labourproductivitygrowthbyregion,nowcastfor202477

Figure9.3.Country-levellabourproductivitygrowth,nowcastfor202478

Figure9.4.Featureimportancebydomains79

Figure9.5.Featureimportancebyvariablescope79

AnnexFigure8.A.1.Mainstepsforthecyclicaladjustmenttechnique72

AnnexFigure9.A.1.Mainstepsoftheempiricalstrategy81

Boxes

Box1.1.AIemergenceanditsimplicationsforproductivity14

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OECDCOMPENDIUMOFPRODUCTIVITYINDICATORS2025?OECD2025

Executivesummary

Productivitygrowthremainedsubduedin2023and2024amidashiftinggeopoliticalandeconomiclandscape

Followinga0.2%dropin2022comparedto2021,labourproductivityacrossallOECDcountriesreboundedmodestlyto0.6%in2023.Intheeuroarea,labourproductivityfellsharplyby0.9%in2023,markingthesteepestdeclinesincethe2008financialcrisis.Experimentalestimatessuggestthatlabourproductivitygrowthislikelytohavegrownmodestlyataround0.4%in2024onaverageacrossOECDcountries,excludingTürkiye.WhileArtificialIntelligence(AI),particularlyGenerativeAI,isexpectedtopositivelyshapefutureproductivitytrendsiftherightpoliciesareinplace,itsimpactisnotyetevidentintheproductivitystatistics.

Evidencefor2023showsthatMultifactorProductivity(MFP)growth,whichcapturesthejointefficiencyoflabourandcapitalinputs,eitherstagnatedordeclinedinmostcountries,explainingmostoftheweaklabourproductivityperformance.Bycontrast,thecontributionofcapitaldeepening,whilestillnegative,showedaslightimprovementin2023.

InvestmentratesvariedacrossOECDcountriesin2023.AroundhalfofOECDcountriesexperiencedanincreaseininvestment,whiletheotherhalfsawstagnationorevenadecline.Thisvariationlikelyreflectsdifferencesinhowfirmsandhouseholdsrespondedtoheighteneduncertainty,risingcosts,andtightercreditconditions.

Productivityperformancevariedacrosscountries,industriesandfirms

Aggregatefiguresmaskconsiderablevariationacrosscountries.AroundhalfofOECDcountriessawproductivitygainsin2023,whereastheotherhalfexperienceddeclinesofvaryingmagnitude.Robustlabourproductivitygrowthinseveralnon-EUcountrieshelpedsupportthemodestincreaseintheOECDaverage.

Evidencesuggeststhatcross-countryvariationinproductivityperformancewasprimarilyshapedbystructuralfactors,includingdifferencesinthebusinessenvironmentandregulatoryframeworks,ratherthancyclicalfactorssuchaslabourhoarding.

Labourproductivitygrowthin2023wasmostlydrivenbywithin-industrydevelopmentsratherthanshiftsacrossindustries.Inabouthalfofthecountrieswithdataavailable,thewithin-industrycontributionwasnegativeornearzero,pullingdownoverallproductivity.Labourproductivitygrowthinmanufacturingwasthekeycontributortoeconomy-wideproductivitygainsinseveralcountries,includingSlovakRepublicandDenmark.Energy-relatedactivities,onthecontrary,exertedasignificantdragonproductivitygrowthincountrieslikeGreeceandCroatia.Technology-intensiveactivitiessawaslowdowninproductivitygrowthinmanyOECDcountries.

Largefirmsalsoplayedanimportantroleinshapingproductivitydevelopments.Onaverage,theytendtoachievehigherlabourproductivitylevelsthantheirsmallercounterpartsacrossOECDcountries,althoughthispatternvariesbyindustry.Thegapwasmorepronouncedinmanufacturingthaninbusinessservices,reflectingeconomiesofscaleandthecapital-intensivenatureofproduction.

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OECDCOMPENDIUMOFPRODUCTIVITYINDICATORS2025?OECD2025

1.Productivityinashiftinggeopoliticalandeconomiclandscape

Sinceitsfirsteditionin2006,theOECDCompendiumofProductivityIndicatorshasshedlightonshort-andlong-termtrendsinlabourandmultifactorproductivityacrossOECDcountriesandwherepossibleaccessioncountriesovertheperiod1995-2023.Ithasalsoexaminedtrendsinkeycomponentsofproductivity,namelycapitalandlabourinputs.Beyondeconomy-widedevelopments,thepublicationalsooffersgranularinsightsatindustryandfirmlevel.Inaddition,itprovidesinsightsintoproductivitydevelopmentsin2024andpresentstwonewanalysesonmulti-factorproductivitybyindustryandoncyclicaladjustmentofmulti-factorproductivityinmanufacturing.

Weakoverallproductivitygrowthin2023and2024

In2023,labourproductivity–measuredasGDPperhourworked–forthetotaleconomyaveragedacrossallOECDcountriessawamodestincreaseof0.6%.However,itfellby0.9%intheeuroarea–thelargestdropsince2009–continuingadownwardtrajectoryobservedsince2021.Incontrast,labourproductivityincreasedby1.6%intheUnitedStates,closetothepaceseenin2019

(Figure1.

1).

Thesubduedlabourproductivitygrowthin2023unfoldedagainstthebackdropofachallengingmacroeconomicenvironment.Theglobaleconomyslowedmarkedlyto1.7%in2023from3%in2022amidheadwinds,suchastighterfinancialconditionsandheightenedgeopoliticaltensions.Despitemodesteconomicgrowth,labourmarketsremainedresilient.Hoursworkedgrewby1.1%onaverageacrossOECDcountries,mostlythroughanincreaseinemployment.

Atthesametime,globalisationappearedtohavelostmomentum,withglobaltradegrowthweakeningnotably(OECD,2024[1]).Sincetradeandforeigndirectinvestmentsplayavitalroleinfacilitatingknowledgediffusionanddrivinginnovation,aweakeningofglobaleconomicintegrationislikelytoweighonfutureproductivityperformance(Aiyaretal.,2023[2]).

Inaddition,realinterestratesremainedelevatedin2023inmostcountries(OECD,2024[1]).Restrictivefinancialconditionsinmostmajoreconomies,withhighlendingratesandtightcreditstandards,continuedtodampenfirms’investmentandeconomicactivity.Elevatedborrowingcoststendtoraiseoperationalexpensesandcreateuncertaintyaroundtheinterestrateoutlook,makingitharderforfirmstocommittolong-terminvestments(Duquerroy,IstrefiandMouabbi,2024[3]).This,inturn,canslowinnovationandimpedeproductivitygrowth,asconstrainedaccesstocreditlimitsfirms’capacitytoadoptnewtechnologiesandinvestinefficiency-enhancingmeasures.

Labourproductivitygrowthisestimatedtohavestagnatedataround0.4%in2024onaverageacrossOECDcountriesexcludingTürkiye(Chapter9).However,theseestimatesaresubjecttosignificantuncertainty.LabourproductivitygrowthisexpectedtohaveimprovedmodestlyinOECDAsiancountries,averaging1.8%in2024.Incontrast,productivitygrowthwouldhaveremainedstagnantinOECDSouth

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OECDCOMPENDIUMOFPRODUCTIVITYINDICATORS2025?OECD2025

AmericancountriesandseveralEuropeaneconomiesoutsidetheeuroarea.Meanwhile,labourproductivitygrowthisexpectedtohavedeclinedslightlyinboththeeuroareaandNorthAmerica.

Figure1.1.Labourproductivitygrowthsince1995

GDPperhourworked,Percent

5

4

3

2

1

0

-1

-2

EuroAreaOECDUnitedStates

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

Note:OfficialdataonlabourproductivitydataacrossOECDcountriesareonlyavailablefrom2011onwardsduetotheunavailabilityofdataonhoursworkedforKoreapriortothatyear,followingamethodologyrevisionbyStatisticsKoreain2017.Dataofthisseriesforyear