中文 3265 字 本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯 外文題目： Understanding patterns of FDI: the case of Turkey and its auto industry 出 處： European Business Journal, 15 (2), 2003, pages 61-69 作 者： M. John Foster Ipek Alkan. Ipek 原 文： Patterns of FDI for Turkey: actuality and expectation The starting point arguably for any aspirant developing economy in its search for inward foreign investment FDI from the perspective of the investors is the general upswing in aggregate global FDI trends from source economies, which occurs for a variety of well-rehearsed reasons, see e.g. Porter (1990), Buckley (1992) and Dunning (1993). These reasons include: market extension (perhaps because the home market is near saturation); accessing scarce primary products (primarily oil and minerals); production efficiency strategies benefiting from location-specific cost advantages in sink economies; and more or less complex mixtures of these and other factors. For developing economies, the question they may reasonably ask is: Can we get a share of this inflow of capital? Table 1 summarises global patterns of FDI in recent years. It shows a 238% increase in aggregate FDI over the period 1994 to 1999. This comprised a 338% increase in FDI into developed countries and a 98% rise in the inflows to developing economies. In short, while there has been significant growth in developing economies, for the developed economies the growth has been much more dramatic. Even China, the much vaunted star of foreign investment, has only performed steadily when benchmarked against global aggregates. The table shows, using Vietnam as a benchmark, that Turkey has not done very well in aggregate terms when compared with newer emerging economies over the past decade. This simple aggregate pattern is further elaborated by considering the FDI per capita figures shown in Table 2. This clearly suggests that Turkey is missing out in that its per capita performance over the decade shown has been flat while the picture has been one of sharp growth within the other developing economies. The comparison with Vietnam is very stark; Vietnam is a country which had to re-launch its economy from a very low base after the US removed its block on US companies investment, instituted immediately after its withdrawal from the Vietnam War in 1975. Indeed the flat performance of the 1990s at a time of aggregate global increase is even more notable when compared with the 1980s. Data for that period show that the liberalisation-oriented change in regime of the period did indeed produce a positive increase albeit from a low base. Hence the fairly modest average performance around the change of decade (see Table 1) nevertheless marked a five-fold increase on the first couple of years. A corner was turned, so to speak, but was not followed by the expected acceleration. At an aggregate level, the ratio FDIt/GDPt,， where t is the year or period chosen, is sometimes used as an indicator of how well a country is doing in attracting FDI. Is a country getting its share? The unreliability of source data can be a problem but the ratio is likely to be fairly robust certainly to an order of magnitude. Based on data from the UN Statistical Yearbook (UN, 2001) and the data in Table 1, in 1999, Turkeys ratio was 0.4, compared with Thailand 5.5, Vietnam 5.8, China 3.8, UK 5.7, and US 3.1. These data suggest that Turkey failed to perform it clearly did not get a relative share, whether compared with developed or comparable developing countries. Until recently, manufacturing was very important within the pattern of FDI into Turkey, and the biggest subsector therein was the auto and transport parts industry. Hence the auto industry might be expected to be a particular target for FDI. But actual realised FDI in that sector has been muted in absolute if not internal, comparative terms, as we explain in more detail in the next section: why? We have already stated that Turkeys aggregate FDI performance has been weaker than might be expected based on simple benchmarking around the size of the countrys population and GDP. An examination of some of the key elements of the countrys business environment would tend to suggest that the expectation might well be for a stronger performance than that found. First of all there is its favourable geographical position. Turkey sits at the northeast corner of the Mediterranean. As such, it: abuts the EU via its current most easterly element, Greece (and has its customs union with the EU), has borders with oil rich Iran and Iraq and moregenerally can be seen as well placed to serve the growing Middle East market, and has immediate access to a number of ex-Comecon economies either via direct land borders or by sea via Black Sea ports it controls the Bosphorus, which is the gateway to the Black Sea. Three more positive factors can be readily identified, all of which might be thought to be sources of comparative advantage: 1. competitive labour rates, certainly compared with EU rates, if not with those of other developing economies in other regions (e.g. the benchmark used before, Vietnam); 2. a well-developed infrastructure, in the west of the country at least, which is also the industrialized area; and 3. a large privatisation programme, over the past decade. We conclude this section by noting the major sources of FDI into Turkey. Recently the main sources have been: France, Germany, US, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK, Italy and Japan, see e.g. Loewendahl and Ertugal-Loewendahl (2000, Table 1). In other words the EU and the US lead such inward investment as is occurring, not for example its oil-rich Arab neighbours. The auto sector within the Turkish economy At the time of the research in 2001, there were 15 auto-makers in Turkey (TAMs), of which 10 have at least some element of FDI. The pattern of production and imports is shown in Table 3. It shows a growing share of the Turkish market for auto units being taken by imports even as the market itself grew. The industry is the third largest industrial segment in the economy and employs 500 000 people. Vehicle ownership rates currently are around 62 per thousand persons, compared with a global average of 82 per thousand, indicating high potential demand if the economy can grow generally. However, there are major perceived impediments to auto sales, as we discuss in the next section. These include low income per capita and high levels of final sales tax. The 15 producer companies have a capacity to build 667 000 passenger cars per annum (in five companies) and a further 223 000 vehicles of other types, making 890 000 in total. Table 4 shows the recent export performance of the TAMs. While they show an upward trend they are still not sufficient to enable the TAMs to achieve acceptable levels of plant utilisation, no more than the order of 50% over a number of years. Survey of foreign-invested TAMs Given the twin facts of Turkeys general underperformance in the FDI stakes, including the auto sector, and, apparently, the potentially favourable conditions for FDI in Turkey, the question of its relatively poor level of FDI remained. In order to explore this issue, a survey was conducted of the 10 auto-makers in Turkey which have at least some element of foreign investment (the FITAMs see Appendix 1 for a list). Five of the ten responded and supplied some considerable detail, including answers to follow-up queries by telephone, where answers to questions were not wholly clear. The questionnaire was structured in the form of a combination of closed (fact gathering) and open (opinion offering) questions. Perceived barriers to FDI in the auto industry It was found that the main factors believed to impede the development of the auto industry and hence act as barriers to further FDI into it were as follows: political instability, including corruption; recurring economic crises, with attendant high inflation, interest rates and stagnation; low income levels these are believed to be holding back latent domestic demand; heavy reliance on imported components (inputs) this can also be seen as the industry not achieving sufficient mass to allow local vertical integration; and high taxes on final vehicle sales, from 37 to 64%. One consequence of these factors, in combination, was low utilisation rates within Turkish auto plants (of the order of 50%, as already noted). A consequence of this in turn is that unit costs are higher than would be the case were something close to full capacity use to be achieved. This in turn has made Turkish exports less competitive, in the EU for example, than might have been expected. In the case of the EU market this lack of competitiveness occurs in spite of markedly higher EU labour rates. This highlights an important point, made elsewhere in a Southeast Asian context, see Foster (1997), that simply having low wage rates available is an inadequate basis for an FDI decision. The point seems obvious once made but is often glossed over because the low wage rationale for FDI is the one most frequently discussed. The sense of Turkey being in an apparently strong competitive position vis-vis inward FDI but failing to realise its potential because of concerns regarding political and economic stability is supported by the conclusions of a recent paper by Loewandahl and Ertugal-Loewendahl (2000). Prognosis for the future of FITAMs The responding auto companies were also asked for their prognosis for the future. Those foreign manufacturers already committed to Turkey, as were our respondents, are cautiously bullish. Conclusions, in brief, were: none of the responding FITAMs had plans to withdraw nor expected competitors to do so; indeed three of the five respondents had further immediate investment plans in hand and a fourth had recently completed a significant investment; the consensus was nevertheless that moves into Turkey by Volkswagen and Nissan were not expected; political stability was seen as the key to significant expansion of the FITAMs; Turkey is perceived to possess country-specific advantages (CSAs): these CSAs could underpin future FDI if the question of political stability could be resolved. CSAs commonly included: quality of labour; managerial ability; an industrial mentality a mindset able to cope with an industrial environment; an already well-constructed industry base in autos. The issue of managerial ability is of particular interest for Turkeys future. In a study of UK firms engaged in FDI, it was notable that companies were more worried by lack of competent local management than lack of trained shop-floor labour (Foster, 2002). As for the threat of other emerging economies being alternative destinations for auto inward FDI, the responses showed that Turkeys own CSAs would enable it to compete. In addition, the EU customs union agreement gives Turkey a direct advantage, even if all other factors are equal. However, perhaps the major competitor destination in simple aggregate investment terms is China and its auto industry is currently inwardly focused, i.e. seeking to develop and meet growing domestic demand as its economy continues to grow quickly (of the order of 7 to 8% until 2002). The major change in Turkish life in late 2002 was the election in November of a new government. The two important factors concerning the new government are its Islamic roots and the fact that it has an overall majority in the parliament. The latter certainly offers the potential to deliver stable government and initiate necessary economic reforms which may have been infeasible for preceding coalitions because of the inherent fragility of those coalitions. The fact that the party has, as stated, Islamic roots raises different questions in a country whose government was secularised by Ataturk some eighty years ago. So far the new government has shown no extreme tendencies which might worry would-be investors and rather has presided over the agreement with the EU of a timetable for Turkeys potential accession. A complementary assessment approach Having looked at the actual situation and the industrys own perceptions of future prospects, we apply an evaluative framework for FDIs (Foster, 2002) to the Turkish auto industry context. The results were found to be highly compatible with those from the questionnaire data. This is both further evidence for the validity of the framework and interesting in that its outcomes are consonant with the preceding discussion. The Foster FDI-Evaluation framework (2002) comprises six factors which are seen to be important, contextual aspects of the overall FDI decision as a complement to the usual financial appraisals. Each factor has an attached (subjective), Likertbased scoring scale. Four of the six factors have positive or affirmative scales, while the other two, F4 and F6, have negatively inclined scales (i.e. a high score denotes potential hazard). For this application we have adopted two conventions. First, we have used a seven-point scale for each factor. Secondly, we have presented the complements of the two negatively oriented factors, i.e. if the score for factor F4 were 5, then the score of the complement F4c would be (7 5) = 2. By doing this we generate a picture that is visually easy to interpret. A pattern to the right will be favourable and to the left will be unfavourable. Finally, note that here we apply the framework to the Turkish auto industry (TAI) as an entity rather than using it as a complement to the financial assessment of an individual investment proposal. The factors and their scores or the scores of the complements are shown in Figure 1. (Brief details of the nature of the factors in the Foster model can be found in Appendix 2.) 譯 文： 外商直接投資模式的解釋：基于土耳其汽車產(chǎn)業(yè)的分析 土耳其的 FDI模式：現(xiàn)狀和展望 從投資者的角度研究對內(nèi)外商投資時，可以認為 FDI 是個正普遍上升的經(jīng)濟來源。 FDI的產(chǎn)生原因包括很多，如波特（ 1990）、巴克利（ 1992）、鄧寧（ 1993）的研究理論。這些原因包括：市場擴展（可能國內(nèi)市場幾近飽和）；獲得稀缺的初級產(chǎn)品（主要為石油和煤礦）；在下沉經(jīng)濟過程中從某個特定的成本優(yōu)勢中獲得生產(chǎn)效率戰(zhàn)略；其他原因或者以上原因的組合。處于發(fā)展中的經(jīng)濟體理所當然會疑問：“我們能從這種資金的流動中受益嗎？” 表 1概況了近幾年 FDI在全球的分布規(guī)模。該表顯示從 1994-1999年總 FDI流量增長了 238%。發(fā)達國家相應的增長了 338%，而發(fā)展中國家增長了 98%。簡單的說，當發(fā)展中國家經(jīng)濟發(fā)生了較大的增長，發(fā)達國家的經(jīng)濟增長就要巨大的多。即使對外商投資的贊美很多，但跟全球的總量比，中國只是表現(xiàn)的很穩(wěn)定。圖表顯示，拿越南作為參照，過去 10 年與一些新興經(jīng)濟體比，土耳其在總體上看表現(xiàn)的并不好。 在考慮了人均 FDI 后，簡單的綜合模式在表 2 中體現(xiàn)。從表中可以明顯看出，土耳其在過去的 10年里，其人均 FDI落后而其他發(fā)展中經(jīng)濟體是 快速增長的，表現(xiàn)為土耳其的曲線平緩。土耳其與越南的之間比較是非常明顯的；自從美國取消了他對美國公司投資的股份后，越南在經(jīng)濟基礎極低的情況下開始重新開發(fā)經(jīng)濟，即從 1975年越南戰(zhàn)爭的撤退后直接開始建立。 確實， 19 世紀 90 年代在與 80 年代的全球總增長表現(xiàn)比較中，其平坦表現(xiàn)更為顯著。那段時間的數(shù)據(jù)顯示即使基數(shù)小，但政權(quán)自由化的改變確實產(chǎn)生了積極的增長。因此， 10年來這種相當平均的表現(xiàn)仍然在最初幾年有了 5倍的增長?？梢哉f原先的表現(xiàn)不好的觀點被否定了，只是這還不及預期。 在總和的水平上，選定的單位年或特定期間的 FDI/GDP 比例，有時可以很好地表示一個國家在吸引 FDI上做的有多少出色。一個國家能“得到份額”嗎？數(shù)據(jù)資料或許存在不可靠的問題，但對于一個數(shù)量集，比率是相當合理的?；诼?lián)合國統(tǒng)計數(shù)據(jù)（ 2001）和表 1的數(shù)據(jù)，土耳其的比率為 0.4，臺灣為 5.5，中國3.8，英國 5.7，美國 3.1。這些數(shù)據(jù)顯示無論是與發(fā)達國家還是發(fā)展中國家比較，土耳其未能得到相應的市場份額。 到現(xiàn)在為止，制造業(yè)是非常重要的 FDI 進入土耳其的模式，其中占絕大部分的是汽車和運輸零部件產(chǎn)業(yè)。因此，汽車產(chǎn)業(yè)可能是研究 FDI最理想的對象。但是我們觀察到 FDI 對汽車產(chǎn)業(yè)并非如此，我們將在下一部分詳細解釋：為什么？ 以國家的人口和 GDP為尺標，我們已經(jīng)證明土耳其的 FDI總額比預期的要差很多。一個針對該國商業(yè)環(huán)境中的關(guān)鍵因素開展的檢驗，將提出預期的表現(xiàn)可能要比以發(fā)現(xiàn)的要更好。 首先，是它有利的地理位置。土耳其坐落在地中海的東北角。照這樣說來： 土耳其緊靠著歐盟，經(jīng)過他最東邊的鄰國 -希臘（并與歐盟建立了海關(guān)聯(lián)盟）； 與石油國家伊朗、伊拉克和被普遍看好且日益增長的中東市場有市場交涉； 土耳其通過直接的土地邊界和黑海的港口與許多的經(jīng)濟互助經(jīng)濟體取得聯(lián)系，他控制了 博斯 普魯斯海峽 ，即黑海的入口。 三個積極因素應該確定，這三個都可能成為競爭優(yōu)勢： 1有競爭力的勞動價格，這自然是指與歐盟的價格對比，而不是與其他地區(qū)的發(fā)展中經(jīng)濟體（如之前用過的越南的標準）； 2良好的基礎設施，起碼在該國的西部 -同樣也是個工業(yè)區(qū)擁有這優(yōu)勢； 3過去幾十年以來的巨大的私有化體系。 我們以對土耳其的 FDI 來源的關(guān)注來結(jié)束該節(jié)。近年來主要的來源有：法國、美國、荷蘭、瑞士、英國、意大利和日本，如見 Loewendahl和 Ertugal-Loewendahl（ 2000，表 1）。換句話說，當下發(fā)生的外來投資都是受制于 歐盟和美國 ， 而不是如它的石油儲量豐富的阿拉伯鄰國 。 外商投資土耳其汽車制造商的研究 土耳其在 FDI 股份中表現(xiàn)不佳的兩個原因之一是在于汽車產(chǎn)業(yè)部分。汽車產(chǎn)業(yè)作為土耳其有潛力吸引 FDI的有利條件，存在著 FDI水平相對較低的問題。為了開展本項研究，我們對 10 家具有外商投資因素的土耳其汽車制造商開展了調(diào)查（即 FITAMs，外商投資的土耳其汽車制造商，見附錄 1）， 10 家中的 5 家已經(jīng)給予了回復并提供了足夠的信息，包括通過后續(xù)的電話回訪答的不是很清楚的問題。問題的 設置為結(jié)合封閉式和開放式的問題。 FDI在汽車產(chǎn)業(yè)中的壁壘的假設 被認為阻礙了汽車產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展而因此成為后續(xù)的 FDI 進入該產(chǎn)業(yè)的主要因素包括以下幾點： 政局不穩(wěn)定，包括腐??； 經(jīng)常性的經(jīng)濟危機，伴隨高通脹，高利率和經(jīng)濟停