資本結(jié)構(gòu)與股利政策流動(dòng)資產(chǎn)固定資產(chǎn)1有形固定資產(chǎn)2無(wú)形固定資產(chǎn)資產(chǎn)總價(jià)值股東權(quán)益流動(dòng)負(fù)債長(zhǎng)期負(fù)債公司投資者總價(jià)值公司資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表流動(dòng)資產(chǎn)固定資產(chǎn)1有形固定資產(chǎn)2無(wú)形固定資產(chǎn)股東權(quán)益流動(dòng)負(fù)債長(zhǎng)期負(fù)債公司應(yīng)投資于哪些長(zhǎng)期資產(chǎn)？TheCapitalBudgetingDecision（資本預(yù)算）公司資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表債務(wù)與股權(quán)TheCapital-StructureQuestionandThePieTheoryThevalueofafirmisdefinedtobethesumofthevalueofthefirm’sdebtandthefirm’sequity.V=

B+SValueoftheFirmSBIfthegoalofthemanagementofthefirmistomakethefirmasvaluableaspossible,thethefirmshouldpickthedebt-equityratiothatmakesthepieasbigaspossible.

Current Assets $8,000 Debt $0 Equity $8,000 Debt/Equityratio 0.00 Interestrate n/a Sharesoutstanding 400 Shareprice $20

Proposed $8,000 $4,000 $4,000 1/1 10% 200 $20FinancialLeverage,EPS,andROEConsideranall-equityfirmthatisconsideringgoingintodebt.(Maybesomeoftheoriginalshareholderswanttocashout.)EPSandROEUnderBothCapitalStructures Levered Recession Expected ExpansionEBIT $400 $1,200 $2,000Interest 400 400 400Netincome $0 $800 $1,600EPS $0 $4.00 $8.00ROA 5% 15% 25%ROE 0% 20% 40%ProposedSharesOutstanding=200shares All-Equity Recession Expected ExpansionEBIT $400 $1,200 $2,000Interest 0 0 0Netincome $400 $1,200 $2,000EPS $1.00 $3.00 $5.00ROA 5% 15% 25%ROE 5% 15% 25%CurrentSharesOutstanding=400sharesTheMMPropositionsI&II(NoTaxes)PropositionIFirmvalueisnotaffectedbyleverageVL=VUPropositionIILeverageincreasestheriskandreturntostockholdersrS=r0+(B/SL)(r0-rB)rBistheinterestrate(costofdebt)rSisthereturnon(levered)equity(costofequity)r0isthereturnonunleveredequity(costofcapital)BisthevalueofdebtSListhevalueofleveredequityTheMMPropositionI(NoTaxes)Suppose2firmswithsamelevelofbusinessriskUnleveredfirm:VULeveredfirm:VL=SL+BLSupposeaninvestorholdsaofthetotalsharesoftheleveredfirm,thenhisearningsYL:

YL=a×(EBIT﹣rB×BL)=a×EBIT﹣a×rB×BLSupposetheinvestorsellsallhissharesoftheleveredfirmsandborrowa×BL,andthenpurchasessharesoftheunleveredfirm.HisearningsYU:YU=TheCostofEquity,theCostofDebt,andtheWeightedAverageCostofCapital:MMPropositionIIwithNoCorporateTaxesDebt-to-equityRatioCostofcapital:r(%)r0rBrBMMPropositionsI&II(withCorporateTaxes)PropositionI(withCorporateTaxes)FirmvalueincreaseswithleverageVL=VU+tCDPropositionII(withCorporateTaxes)SomeoftheincreaseinequityriskandreturnisoffsetbyinteresttaxshieldrE=rA+(D/E)×(1-tC)×(rA-rD)

rDistheinterestrate(costofdebt)rEisthereturnonequity(costofequity)rAisthereturnonunleveredequity(costofcapital)DisthevalueofdebtEisthevalueofleveredequityMoregenerally,considerthefollowing:Twofirms,UandLwithidentical,pre-tax,perpetual,expectedannualcashflowofX.FirmUis100%equityfinancedandhasarequiredrateofreturnrA.FirmLmaintainsadebtlevelDandpaysperpetualexpectedinterestraterDonthedebt.ThecorporatetaxrateistC.Theexpectedafter-taxcashflowsofthetwofirmsareFirmU:CFU=(1–

tC)XFirmL:CFL=(1–

tC)(X–rDD)+rDD=(1–

tC)X+tC(rDD)Differencedueto‘taxshield’createdbytaxdeductibilityofinterestexpenseThevalueofeachofthesefirmsis:Note:TheriskofthefirstpartofthecashflowtoLissameasU,thususesamerAThediscountratefordebtisthesameastherequiredrateofreturnondebt,rDMMproposition1withcorporatetaxesThevalueoftwofirmsinthesameriskclasswilldifferbythepresentvalueoftheirtaxshield

VL

=VU+PV(debttaxshield)Intuition:Ineffect,thegovernmentpaysafractiontcoftheinterestexpense.TotalCashFlowtoInvestorsUnder

EachCapitalStructurewithCorp.TaxesThesumofthedebtplustheequityoftheleveredfirmisgreaterthantheequityoftheunleveredfirm.Thisishowcuttingthepiedifferentlycanmakethepielarger:thegovernmenttakesasmallersliceofthepie!SGSGBAll-equityfirm LeveredfirmMMPropositionII(CorporateTaxes)StartwithM&MPropositionIwithtaxes:SinceThecashflowsfromeachsideofthebalancesheetmustequal:DividebothsidesbySWhichquicklyreducestoTheEffectofFinancialLeverageontheCostofDebt

andEquityCapitalwithCorporateTaxesDebt-equity

ratio(D/E)Costofcapital:r

(%)rArBExample:UK,2005UK

dividend1,050,000tax

credit

of

1/9

116,666__________taxable

dividend1,166,666upper

rate

tax

at

32.5%

379,166less

tax

credit

(116,666)__________further

tax

payable

262,500Taxes(Personal&Corp)Operatingincomebeforetax 1.00 1.00PaidasInterestDividendsless

tC=.34 0.00 0.34Incomebeforepersonaltaxes1.00 0.66lesstaxestpd=.28tpe=.21 0.28 0.139Aftertaxincome 0.72 0.521Advantagetodebt0.199Letcorporatetaxrate=tc;taxonequity=tpeandtaxondebt=tpdMMpropositionIwithalltaxesCashflowafteralltaxesisDiscountaftertaxcashflowsatappropriateratestofindvalueForallequityfirm,usethecorrespondingdiscountrateFordebt,shouldbe(1-

tpd)rDTaxes(Personal&Corporate)

RAF<1 VL>VUDebtRAF=1 VL=VUDebt=EquityRAF>1 VL<VUEquity

AdvantageRelativeTaxAdvantageOverDebt權(quán)衡理論（Trade-offTheory）FinancialDistressCostsFinancialdistressSignificantproblemsinmeetingdebtobligationsMostfirmsthatexperiencefinancialdistressdonotultimatelybankruptcyDirectcosts–BankruptcyCostLegalandadministrativecostsUltimatelycausebondholderstoincuradditionallossesDisincentiveto(limit)debtfinancingFinancialDistressCostsIndirectcostsLargerthandirectcosts,butmoredifficulttomeasureandestimateStockholderswanttoavoidaformalbankruptcyfilingBondholderswanttokeepexistingassetsintactsotheycanatleastreceivethatmoneyAssetslosevalueasmanagementspendstimeworryingaboutavoidingbankruptcyinsteadofrunningthebusinessThefirmmayalsolosesales,experienceinterruptedoperationsandlosevaluableemployeesFinancialDistressDebtMarketvalueofthefirmValueofunleveredfirmPVofinteresttaxshieldsCostsoffinancialdistressValueofleveredfirmOptimalamountofdebtMaximumvalueoffirmNewCapitalStructureTheoryAsymmetricInformationAssumptionManagementcontrolsmuchmoreinformationaboutthefirmthandoinvestors.SignalingModel----RossModel(byDebtRatio)----PeckingOrderTheory(negativeeffectofsignals)

RossModelDebtratioisatooltotransferinsideinformationAnincreaseddebtratioshowsthemanager’sgoodexpectationforthefirmHence,higherdebtratiobecomesagoodsignalforthefirm’soperatingqualityPeckingOrderTheoryInternalBankloansBondEquityGermany7912-10Japan702744UK93154-5US961115-8Commontypeoffinance(%)

investmentsfirstfinancedwithinternalfunds(financialslack)newdebtnewequitysafestsecurityfirstadverseselectioncost,egusedcarsifsecurityissensitivetonewinfo,thenrisky–debtbasedoncollateral,henceeasiertovaluenowelldefineddebt/equitymixPeckingOrderWhyisdebtpreferredtoequity?Managementoptimisticoncompanywillissuedebt -signalsequityundervalued Managementpessimisticoncompanywillissueequityasconsidersequityovervalued -signallingthatthestockisovervaluedTheissueofequitywilldrivedownstockprice -adverseselectionPeckingOrder–externalfinancing股利政策股利政策概述

一、股利的種類股利（dividend)可以有以下分類：1、按發(fā)放的內(nèi)容：現(xiàn)金股利(cashdividend)：公司向股東支付現(xiàn)金。

股票股利(stockdividend)：公司向股東支付股票紅利，發(fā)行在外的股票數(shù)量增加

財(cái)產(chǎn)股利（Propertydividends）證券股利實(shí)物股利（Propertydivide