ISSN1547-366X

WorkingPaperNo.1022

HastheTimeforaEuropeanJobGuaranteePolicyArrived?

by

RaniaAntonopoulos

LevyEconomicsInstitute

July2023

*AshorterversionofthisWPwaspreparedforETUI’spublicationTransformativeideas-ensuringajustshareofprogressforall,Brussels:2023

TheLevyEconomicsInstituteWorkingPaperCollectionpresentsresearchinprogressbyLevyInstitutescholarsandconferenceparticipants.Thepurposeoftheseriesistodisseminateideastoandelicitcommentsfromacademicsandprofessionals.

LevyEconomicsInstituteofBardCollege,foundedin1986,isanonprofit,nonpartisan,independentlyfundedresearchorganizationdevotedtopublicservice.Throughscholarshipandeconomicresearch,itgeneratesviable,effectivepublicpolicyresponsestoimportanteconomicproblemsthatprofoundlyaffectthequalityoflifeintheUnitedStatesandabroad.

LevyEconomicsInstitute

P.O.Box5000

Annandale-on-Hudson,NY12504-5000

Copyright?LevyEconomicsInstitute2023Allrightsreserved

1

ABSTRACT

AscountryaftercountryintheEuropeanUnioniscalledtorespondtothecurrentchallengeofourtime—highinflationanddecliningrealwages—governmentsmustengageinatransformativeagendaandgobeyondemergencyenergyvouchersandincomesupportcash-transfers.AndifthegoalistoleadthewaytoaresilientandsustainableEuropeanUnion,businessasusualwillnotdo.TheshareofwagestoGDPhasbeendecliningsincethelate1970s,deregulationoflabormarketshasincreasedinsecurityandprecariousness,and,amongordinaryworkingpeople,asenseofuncertainty,disenfranchisement,andmistrustingoverninginstitutionsisprevalent.Athoroughre-evaluationofpoliciesisneeded.Inresponsetothedeteriorationoflivingstandards,aguaranteeofminimumwagesadequatetosecureadecentlivingstandardshouldbeastartingpoint;apermanentpolicyofautomaticadjustmentofwagestoinflationratesinallmemberstatesshouldbepromoted;andstrengtheningcollectivebargainingagreementsoughttobere-invigoratedforafairsharingofproductivitybetweenwagesandprofits.AnEUJobGuaranteeshouldbeatthecenterofthispolicytransformation.Thisboldagenda,advocatedinthispaper,canmobilizepeopletoregaintrustthataSocialEuropeispossible.

KEYWORDS:Inflation,JobGuarantee,SocialEurope,IncomeDistribution

JELCODES:B5,D6,E24,E61,E62,H1,H3,H4,H5,J2,J3,J4,J16

2

INTRODUCTION:BUSINESSASUSUALWILLNOTDO

Inthelastfifteenyears,EuropeanUnionmemberstateshavefacedthreesevereeconomicshocks.Firstcamethe2008–9globalfinancialdebaclethatoriginatedintheUnitedStatesandreachedtheEUandtherestoftheworldbylate2009,resultinginasevereslowdownofoutputandincreaseofunemployment.Second,during2020–22,COVID-19hithard,leadingtoadeephealthcrisisandnecessaryperiodiccountry-widelockdowns,duringwhichproductionactivitycameclosetoastandstill.Third,theUkraine-RussianconflictthatbeganinFebruary2022deliveredanotherblow:energy-relatedpressurestogetherwithasupply-chaindisruptionculminatedinacceleratedinflation,leadingtothecurrentcost-of-livingcrisis.

PolicyresponsesoftheEUtothefirsttwocriseswereverydifferent.Toamelioratetheharshimpactonjobsandgrowth,theinitialreactionofseveralEUcountriestothefinancialcrisis,wasstronglycountercyclical.Memberstates,includingGermany,bypassedMaastrichtTreatyrulesandalloweddeficitsanddebt-to-GDPratiostoincrease.Unfortunately,thiswasshortlived.By2010,whiletheglobalfinancialcrisiseffectswerestillunfolding,publicspendingwascurtailedinthenameoffiscalresponsibility,andevenmoreimportantly,keyEUdecision-makingbodiesimposedsevereausteritymeasuresonseveralEUmemberstates.Thischangeofheartresultedinadropofoutputandarapidincreaseinunemployment,affectingasmanyas26.6millionpersons(Q1of2014),comparedto16.8millionatthebeginningstagesofthecrisis(Q1of2008)intheEU28.Insteadofhelping,austeritydeliveredthewrongmedicine,pushingPortugal,Greece,Ireland,andSpainintounprecedentedeconomiccontractionandmassiveunemploymentforanumberofyears.

Attheextremeopposite,inMarch2020,earlyonintheCOVID-19shock,theEUCommissiondecidedtoactivatethe“generalescapeclause”oftheStabilityandGrowthPact,enablingmemberstatestodepartfromtheMaastrichtTreaty’sstrictbudgetaryrules.Shortlyafter,timelyEUdecision-makingtosupportmemberstatesthoughtheSUREmechanismavertedlayoffs;thequickresponseofinfusionof€98.4billionundoubtablyallowedEUmemberstatestoengageinrobustjobretentionschemesandwagesubsidiesduringthepandemic-necessitatedlockdowns.Finally,afewmonthslater,theEUCouncilreachedagreementonNextGenerationEU,an

3

initiativethattargetedthemitigationoftheadversesocioeconomicimpactsofCOVID-19.TheaccompanyingcreationoftheRecoveryandResilienceFacilityof€800billionwasaclearsignofsolidarityamongEUmemberstates,providingcountrieswithampleaccesstograntsandloans,thusleadingthewaytoaswiftrecovery.

Thesetwodiametricallyopposedpolicyorientationsprovidevaluablelessons,oneofineffectiveness,theotherofsuccess.TheEUtodaycontinuestoconfrontthecurrentcost-of-livingcrisisandmustmakesomehardchoices.IfthegoalistoleadthewaytoaresilientandsustainableEuropeanUnion,businessasusualwillnotdo.Butforthat,wemustresistoldtruthsandallownewthinkingtoemerge.Ascountryaftercountryiscalledtorespondtothecurrentchallengeofourtime—highinflationanddecliningrealwages—governmentsmustengageinatransformativeagendaandgobeyondemergencyenergyvouchersandincomesupportcash-transfers.TheshareofwagestoGDPhasbeendecliningsincethelate’70s,deregulationoflabormarketshasincreasedinsecurityandprecariousness,and,amongordinaryworkingpeople,asenseofuncertainty,disenfranchisement,andmistrustingoverninginstitutionsisprevalent.

Athoroughre-evaluationofpoliciesisindeedneeded.Inresponsetotheaffrontonlivingstandards,aguaranteeofminimumwagesadequatetosecureadecentlivingstandardshouldbeastartingpoint;apermanentpolicyofautomaticadjustmentofwagestoinflationratesinallmemberstatesshouldbepromoted;andstrengtheningcollectivebargainingagreementsoughttobere-invigoratedforafairsharingofproductivitybetweenwagesandprofits.Redistributivemeasureshaveaplaceinoureconomy,ofcourse.Butafair,functionaldistributionofincome,theequitablesharingofthepiebetweenwagesandprofits,mustregainacentralroleinoursocieties.

Thisisaboldagenda.ItisalsoonethatcanmobilizepeopletoregaintrustthataSocialEuropeispossible.Re-examiningthepolicytoolboxisalsoneededinregardstounemployment.Andtothisweturnnext.

4

WHATISAJOBGUARANTEE?

AJobGuarantee(JG)isapolicyinterventionbythestatethatinterruptslongspellsofjoblessness.Simplyput,itoffersadirectjobandawagetothoseseekingbutunabletofindremunerativework.TheJobGuarantee—alsoknownasanemploymentguaranteepolicy,publicworksprograms,directjobcreation,oranemployeroflastresortprogram—isnotanewidea.TheoreticalantecedentsaretracedtoJ.M.KeynesandWilliamBeveridgeintheearlypartofthetwentiethcentury;HymanMinsky,AmartyaSen,andJeanDrèzeinthe1980s;andWilliamMitchell,RandyWray,MathewForstaterandD.Papadimitriouinthe1990s.

Atthepolicylevel,developedanddevelopingcountriesfacingmassiveunemploymentorstubbornprevalenceofjoblessnessamongspecificgroupshaveindeedperiodicallyintervenedthroughJGtypesofinitiatives.Ahostofcountries—rangingfromtheUSAintherecentglobalfinancialcrisis,andfamouslyintheNewDealprogramsoftheGreatDepression,toruralIndiaeachyearsince2005duringthelowagriculturalseason—haveimplementeddirectjobcreationprograms.Currently,politicalandgrassrootsmobilizationaroundaJGpolicyisgainingtractiononbothsidesoftheAtlanticandsmall-scaleimplementationisalreadyunderwayinFrance,Austria,Belgium,andGreece.

JGworkprojectsarehistoricallyselectedwithaviewtoyieldingapublicbenefittocommunities,fulfillingcurrentlyunmetneedstothegreatestextentpossible.Theirdesignandimplementationhasvariedintermsofscale:targetingspecificcommunitiesorhavingnation-widereach;durationofthejoboffer:shortorlongterm,seasonaloryear-roundoffer,parttimeorfulltimeengagement;payscale:aflatminimumwageormulti-tierwagestructureaccordingtoskilllevel;implementingandadministeringagencies:municipalandlocalgovernment,non-profits,and/orSocialEconomyentities;withorwithoutprovisioningofoptionaltrainingandupskilling;andchoiceofworkprojects:centrally-determinedorlocally-identified,withamandatetoreachdevelopmentalobjectivesorwithanopen-endedagenda,etc.

Asmentionedearlier,severalEUmemberstateshavealready,orarecurrently,designingandimplementingdirectpublicjobcreationprograms.France,Austria,Belgium,Luxembourg,

5

Ireland,andGreeceareamongthem.1MakinguseofempiricalresearchforthecaseofGreece,wewillalsoseethatjobcreationundertheJGprogramsisanexcellentcountercyclicalinstrumentthatservestheeconomywellduringrecessionarytimes:itacceleratesjobcreationinotherpartsoftheeconomy,contributestooveralleconomicgrowth,andleadstoexpansionoftaxrevenue.

WHYAJOBGUARANTEE?UNEMPLOYMENTISAPERMANENTFEATUREOFMARKETECONOMIES

Jobcreationisdependentonmanyfactors,includingfiscalandmonetarypolicy,theoverallstructureoftheeconomy,industrialanddevelopmentpolicy,technologicaladvancements,exogenousfactors,andshocks,includingtheeconomicstateoftradingpartners.Ultimately,jobsarecreatedanddestroyedbytheprivatesector,byhiringandfiringdecisionsguidedbymarketconditions,productionneeds,earningsprojectionsandprofits.Asthereisnointernalnecessityforjobopeningstomatchthenumbersofjobseekers,unemploymentandunderemploymentareapermanentfeatureofmarketeconomies.Andwhilejoblessnessfluctuatessignificantlyoverthebusinesscycle,itspresenceisfeltnotonlyduringperiodsofsevereshocksbutalsowhentheeconomyisonahealthygrowthpath.

PoliciestosupporttheunemployedinEuropearedeliveredtraditionallythroughthreeinterventions.First,throughunemploymentbenefitsintendedtoaverttheriskofasudden,ifnotcatastrophic,declineinincomeduringthejobsearchperiod.Second,throughActiveLaborMarketPolicies(ALMPs)tofacilitatere-entry:jobsearchassistancetomatchtheunemployedtoemployers;trainingandupskillingtostrengthenjobseekers’qualifications;andwagesubsidiesforemployershiringjobseekerswhoarehardertoplace.Third,toavertmassivelay-offs,jobretentionschemesand/orwagesubsidiesareofferedforshort-timework(STW),thatis,the

1ForFrance,seehttps://www.tzcld.fr/decouvrir-le-projet/les-territoires/

ForIreland,see.ie/en/service/412714-community-employment-programme/ForLuxembourg,seehttps://adem.public.lu/en/employeurs/demander-aides-financieres/embaucher_cld.htmlForAustria,seehttps://maxkasy.github.io/home/files/papers/Jobguarantee_marienthal.pdf

6

partialcompensationofdirectandindirectlaborcostsofferedtoprivatecompaniestomaximizejobretention.ThislastmeasurewaswidelyandeffectivelyusedbyEUmemberstatesduringtheCOVID-19lockdownsbutalsoduringthe2008–10financialcrisis.

Thesetraditionalinterventionsaredesignedtofendoffrisksthelaborforcemayfacefromtimetotime.Yet,theireffectivenesspresupposesthateithertheavailabilityofjobsisplentifulandthereforejobscanbematchedtothenewlyreskilledpersons,orthatlacklusterdemandforlaboristemporaryandnormalcywillsoonberestored.Iftheseconditionsdonothold,traditionalinterventionsdonotworkwellandshort-termjoblessnessturnsintolong-termunemployment(LTU).Thisisthecasefor4.5millionlongtermunemployedtodayintheEU,whosenumbershadreachedroughly14millionatthepeakofthefinancialcrisis.Whyarepeopleunabletofindjobs,oftenafteryearsofsearching,despiteextensiveeffortsandpolicyinterventions?Wemustdistinguishbetweentwofundamentalreasons.

Ontheonehand,itconcernspeoplewhoseemploymentprofilesplacethemfurthestawayfromthelabormarket,achallengethatmaybeextremelydifficultorimpossibletoovercome.Examplesincludebeinglaidoffatanolderageornearretirement,whichbecomesevenworsewhencombinedwithskillsnolongerindemand;seekingfulltimeworkinmidlifewithnopriorworkexperience;facingcomplexhealthissuesordisabilities;beingamemberofamarginalizedgroupfacingprejudicialbias;orhavingrecentlyservedtimeinprison.Despiteincentives,theprivatesectorisreluctanttohirethoseitdeemslessdesirable.Thisisthesupplysideoflaborchallengeoflong-termunemployment.

Ontheotherhand,thereisthechallengingdemandsideforlabor.Theprivatesectormaysimplybeunabletogeneratejobsforallthoseseekingthem.Unlessthefiscalandmonetarypolicytargetfullemployment,industrialpolicycoordinationisatfullspeed,tradingpartners’economiesareboomingetc.,thereisnoreasontoexpectthelevelofeconomicactivitytoensurethefullemploymentoflabor.Theprocessbecomeseventougherwithprotractedperiodsofrecessions;recoveriesthatareUorWshaped;joblessrecoveryphases;periodsofstructuralchangewhichrequireprolongedadjustmentperiods;andseverefinancialcriseswithglobal

7

repercussions.Inallsuchcases,theexistingtoolboxisinsufficienttodealwithlong-termunemployment,withsevererepercussionsforthepeopleaffected.

Thus,wemustturntoapolicysuchastheJG,whichisapolicyof“employmentoflastresort.”WhentheprivatesectorcannotprovidejobsandALMPsorjobretentionschemesdonotdelivertheoptimaloutcomes,wehaveacollectiveresponsibilitytoseethatthosewhowanttoworkhaveanoptioninsteadofbeingforcedtoremaininastateofsocialexclusionandinactivity.

LONG-TERMUNEMPLOYMENTANDEUPOLICY:THENEEDFORA“BACKTOWORKNOW”APPROACH

Inthepastdecade,Eurostatdata(LFSonlinedatacodeLFSQ_UGATES)revealsthatthenumberofunemployedpersonsinEU27hasrangedroughlyfromahighof24.4million(2014Q1)toalowof13.8million(2019Q2)and,morerecently,hasfluctuatedbetween14.4million(2020Q4)andarecordlowof12.9millionforbothmenandwomenasofOctober2022(Eurostat,onlinedatacodeUNE_RT_M).Overthesameperiod,theEUannualaverageofthelong-termunemploymentshare,aconceptthatcountshowmanyindividualsamongtheunemployedhavebeenlookingforworkformorethan12months,hashoveredintherangeof40–55percentoftotalunemployment.Aquickobservationofthedatashowsmanycountriestobearoundorabove40percent:Italy(51.5percentin2020);Belgium(45.3percentin2019);Germany(40.9in2018);Portugal(49.9in2017);Ireland(50.5in2016);TheNetherlands(42.5in2015);Greece(73.0in2014);andSlovakia(70.2percentin2013).

ThepictureofLTUisconsistentlygrimmeramongthosebetweentheagesof50and64years.Forexample,in2012forthoseinthe50to64agerange,theLTUsharewas57.7percentcomparedto45.3fortheentirepopulationoftheLTU;in201461.9percentcomparedto50.0percentforallpersonsinLTU;and50.0percentin2020comparedto35.2percentofthetotal

LTU.

8

Amoredetailedexaminationofthesamedatarevealsevenlargersegmentsinlong-termunemploymentstatusbeingrecordedincountriesthatexperiencedextraordinaryeconomicrecessions,reachinganastoundinghighof75.0percent(Spain,Greece,Ireland,andPortugal),aswellasthosethatnavigatedmilderwaves(Germany,France,Italy,Belgium,andLuxembourg,tonameafew).InEUcountriesoverthepastdecade,withtheNordiccountriesandIcelandbeingnotableexceptions,roughly6outof10unemployedpersonsamongtheolder-agedsearchingforajobcouldnotfindonewithinareasonableamountoftime.Fortheentireunemployedpopulation,onaverage,4–5outof10personsremainedjoblessformorethanayear(Eurostat,LFSannualdata).Employerscustomarilyaremuchmorereluctanttohirethosewhohavenotheldajobforalongperiodoftime;thosewhoarelaidoffintheirlate50sorolderhavethehardesttimereenteringthelabormarket.

TheEuropeanUnionhasindeedrecognizedtheprevalenceofLTUasachallenge.Accordingly,theCouncilRecommendationof15February2016,ontheintegrationofthelong-termunemployedintothelabourmarket(2016/C67/01),putsforwardavarietyofactionstobetakenandcoordinatedservicesthatoughttobemadeavailable.Thefirstthreeparagraphsofthedocumentreadasfollows:

(1)TheunemploymentrateintheUnionincreasedtoahistoricallyhighlevelfollowingthe2008-2009financialandeconomiccrisis.Itiscurrentlydecreasing,butlong-termunemploymentremainsveryhigh.Long-termunemploymentaffectseachMemberStatetoadifferentextent,particularlyastheimpactofthecrisishasbeenunevenandthemacroeconomicsituation,economicstructureandfunctioningofthelabourmarketvaryfromoneMemberStatetoanother.

(2)Afteryearsofsubduedgrowthandlowjob-creation,in2014long-termunemployment,definedbyEurostatasthenumberofpeoplewhoareoutofworkandhavebeenactivelyseekingemploymentforatleastayear,affectedmorethan12millionworkers[…]62%ofwhomhadbeenjoblessforatleasttwoconsecutiveyears.

9

(3)Long-termunemploymentisaffectingthepersonsconcerned,loweringthepotentialgrowthoftheUnioneconomies,increasingtheriskofsocialexclusion,povertyandinequality,andaddingtothecostsofsocialservicesandpublicfinances.Long-termunemploymentleadstoalossofincome,anerosionofskills,ahigherincidenceofhealthproblemsandincreasedhouseholdpoverty.

LTUisthenclearlyacknowledgedasaconsequenceofthedeclineineconomicactivityitself,butitisalsorecognizedthatitstillremainsaconcernforseveralyearsaftereconomicrecovery.ThispolicyawarenessandtheactionsendorsedbytheCouncilRecommendationofFebruary15,2016,provideanopportunityforsupplementingthetraditionalmenuofALMPswithspacecreatedfortheseriousconsiderationofaEuropeanJobGuarantee.

Thequestionsthatconfrontusarestraightforward.Underthebestofcircumstances,willtherebesufficientjobvacanciestoabsorbthemajorityofthe4.5millionpersonscurrentlyintheLTUcategory?Doshort-termtrainingcoursesprovideequalfootingfortheolder-agedjoblesstothatofthegeneralpopulationofjobseekers?DowagesupportmeasuresabsorbtheLTU?TheanswersareidentifiableinthestatisticalrecordofthenumbersofLTU.WhynotthenconsiderforthemillionsofLTUsmeaningfuljoboffersattheircurrentskilllevelsinprojectsthatcanbenefittheircommunities?AJGthatisstructuredaroundtheconceptof“backtoworknow,”coupledwithupskillingthroughlifelonglearningseminarscangoalongway.Environmentalinterventions,plentifulcareeconomygaps,andthedigitaltransitionofferampleprospectformeaningfulJGopportunities.

Principle4oftheEuropeanPillarofSocialRights(2017)2echoestheCouncil’sRecommendation.Itreinstatescitizens’righttoactivesupportinfindingemploymentbyreceivingjobsearchsupport,training,andrequalification(emphasisadded).Thetroubleisthat,inmanyinstances,althoughthesemeasuresabsorbsubstantialamountsofEuropeanSocialFund(ESF),theEU’smainfinancialinstrumentfortacklinglong-termunemployment(European

2TheEuropeanPillarofSocialRightscontains20principlesandrights,allofwhichpromote(a)equalopportunitiesandaccesstothelabourmarket;(b)fairworkingconditions;and(c)socialprotectionandinclusion.Afterextensiveconsultationsin2016,itwaslaunchedinMarch2017andendorsedbytheEuropeanCommission,theEuropeanParliamentandtheCounciloftheEUattheSocialSummitofGothenburginNovember2017.

10

Commission2019),thelong-termunemployedstillremainjobless.Anintegrated,comprehensivestrategyfortheactiveinclusionoftheLTUoughttoconsideraJG“backtoworknow”intervention.

THECASEOFGREECE

Greece’seconomyhadenteredturbulentconditionsbeginningin2008,andby2010,thecountrywasshutoutoffinancialmarkets.Toavoidbankruptcy,thegovernmentsoughtsupportinservicingitssovereigndebtthroughaloanagreementprovidedjointlybytheEuropeanCommission,theEuropeanCentralBank(ECB),andtheInternationalMonetaryFund.Tobringthedeficitanddebt-to-GDPratiosundercontrol,sothatGreececouldregainaccesstofinancialmarkets,theprescriptionincludedharshausteritymeasures,taxincreases,andinternaldevaluation,withthelegalminimumwagefallingfrom€751to€586permonth.

ThisentireperiodproveddisastrousfortheGreekeconomy.ThousandsofbusinessbankruptciesandacontractionofitsGDPbyover25percentwereaccompaniedbymassiveunemploymentataraterisingfrom7.7percentin2008toover27.8percent.Comparedto2008,asofOctober2013roughlyamillionmorepeoplehadjoinedtheranksoftheunemployed,withmanufacturing,construction,andretailtradesufferingthemostjoblosses.Bythistime,anastounding71percentofthe1.3millionunemployedwereintheLTUcategory,andoverthecourseof2013,thepopulationwhohadbeenunemployedforlongerthanfouryearshadreached224,000individuals.

WHYGREECENEEDEDAJOBGUARANTEE

Projectionsbythelendersandthegovernmentin2013reportedthatGreecewouldenterpositivegrowthterritoryin2014,but,fromthestandpointofjobcreation,puttinganendtoausteritywouldnotsufficetoturntheunemploymenttide.EvenifGreecehadmanagedtoreturnfromnegativeratesofeconomicgrowthtothoseithadenjoyedpriortothecrisis(averagingaround4percentperyear)—itwouldhavetakenmorethan14yearstoreachpre-crisisemploymentlevels,giventhetendencyoflabormarketrecoverytolagbehindGDPgrowthrecovery

11

(Dedousopouloset.al.2013).3Ifthiswasthe“best-casescenario”forapost-austerityGreece,furtherpolicyactionswereurgentlyneeded.

Threeyearsintothecrisis,withunemploymentandLTUskyrocketing,EUSocialFundallocationstoALMPsinGreececontinuedtobedirectedatimprovingemployability.Butwiththousandsofbusinessesinbankruptcy,firmsweresimplynothiring.Alarge-scaleintervention,beyondthescopeofthecurrentALMPs,wasurgentlyneeded.

THEJOBGUARANTEEOFGREECE:BACKGROUNDANDRATIONALE

ThepolicyproposalforaJGforGreece,whosefindingsonjobcreationandgrowthpotentialwepresentbelow(Antonopouloset.al.2014),wasundertakenbycolleaguesandmyselfattheLevyEconomicsInstitutein2013,inclosecoordinationandpartnershipwiththeGeneralConfederationofTradeUnionsofGreece(GSEE).ThecollaborationwithGSEEonaJGhadbegunseveralyearsearlier(Antonopoulos,Papadimitriou,andToay2011)and,asaresult,in2012asmallprogramwasrolledout.Subsequently,wewereinvitedbyGSEEtoprovidecommentsonthis2012directjobinitiativeandwejointlydecidedthatamuchmorecarefullydesigned,largerscaleprogramwasnecessary.Tothatend,weengagedinfurtherresearchin2013.TheJGproject’sresearchfindingswerepresentedinaconferenceinMarch2014organizedbyGSEEandattendedbytradeunionists,academics,membersofparliament,andrepresentativesofpoliticalparties.Duringthepre-electioncampaignlaterthatyear,aJGfor300,000long-termunemployedwasannouncedasapartoftherecoverypolicymixbytheleft-leaningoppositionparty,Syriza.WhenSyrizawaselectedintopower,the2015JG—knownasthe“publicservicework”or“kinofelisergasia”—wasrolledoutinsuccessivewavesoverathree-yearperiodandreachedroughly200,000persons.Despiteitsrelativelysmallsizetotackletheproblemathand—manifestedbythemultifoldapplicantsincomparisontotheavailablejobs

3Thepredictionsofarhasbeenaccurate,astheunemploymentrateinGreece—asofOctober2022—remainedat11.6percent.Iftheestimationisaccurate,itwilltakeanother4yearstoreachpre-crisislevels.Basedonemploymentlevelsover1998Q1–2007Q4,Dedoussopoulosetal.,inareportissuedbytheILOin2013,estimatedajobcreationrateof60,000perannum.Projectingintothefuture,theyfoundthatiftheGreekeconomy,beginningin2012Q4,returnedtoitspre-crisis(1998Q1–2007Q4)rateofadding60,000jobsannually,itwouldregainits2009Q1(pre-crisis)employmentlevelin2027Q2—thatis,inroughly14.5years

12

advertisedundertheprogram(foreveryjobadvertised,5–8applicationsweresubmitted)—thelogic,structure,andnecessityofa“PublicBenefit”JGprogramgainedsupportfromtheparticipantsandthegeneralpublic.Whenelectedintogovernmentin201