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2025

Energy

Perspectives

Globalmacroeconomicandenergymarketoutlook

2|EnergyPerspectives2025

3|EnergyPerspectives2025

WelcometoEquinor’sEnergyPerspectives2025

Long-termforecastsofthedevelopmentinglobal

energymarketsarenormallyverydifficult.Asthis

year’sEnergyPerspectivesreportispublished,the

taskisevenmorecomplex,asglobalmarketsand

geopoliticsareundergoingmassiveshiftswith

unpredictableconsequencesinboththeshorterandlongerterm.Politicalprioritiesaffectingglobalenergymarketsareshiftingfurtherawayfrom

decarbonisationtowardsenergyaffordabilityandsecurityofenergysupply.Ontopofthis,itisnearlyimpossibletogaugetheshort-termimpactoftradeconflictsandnewrulesinthegeopoliticsgame.

Aglobalenergytransitionroughlyinlinewiththe

ambitionsoftheParisAgreementhasbecome

severelydelayedandmorefragmented,andglobal

greenhouseemissionscontinuedtoincreaselastyear.Despitenumerouspositivedevelopments,the

macroeconomic,politicalandgeopoliticalrealitiesarecharacterisedbylackoftrust,cooperationand

burdensharing,thatareslowingdownthepaceof

changeforeseenintheParisAgreement.Areversalofthisdevelopmentwilltaketime,anditssuccessisbynomeansguaranteed.Withshort-termismandlocalandregionalprioritiesdominatingpolicy-making,

necessaryglobalchangesinthedirectionoftrulysustainabledevelopment,balancingthedifferentconcernsintheenergytrilemma,willbefurtherdelayed.

EnergyPerspectives2025presentsfourscenariosforthefutureworldeconomy,internationalenergy

marketsandenergy-relatedgreenhousegas

emissions.Thescenariosaredesignedtoillustrate

howdivergentdriversintheenergytrilemma(energysecurity,affordabilityanddecarbonisation)affect

long-termdevelopments.Thescenariosarenot

predictions,butpossiblecontrastingpathways,

providingaplatformfordebate,strategicplanninganddecisionmaking.

Thethreeforecastingscenarios,Walls,Plazasand

Silos,aimtohighlightthelargegapbetweenthe

relativelyslow,incrementalchangesthatcharacterisetheenergytransitiontoday,andtheradicalandrapidchangesneededtomovetheworldontoapath

alignedwiththe1.5°CambitionoftheParis

AgreementasinthenormativeBridgesbackcastscenario.

TheinsightsandanalysisprovidedbyEnergyPerspectiveshelpusnavigateshort-termuncertaintieswithoutlosingsightoflong-termtrends

AndersOpedal

PresidentandCEO

Thegeopoliticallandscapeandtradeconflictsclearlyillustratethatthe

globalcooperationneededforaParis-alignedenergytransitionisnotpresent

EirikW?rness

SeniorvicepresidentandChiefeconomist

4|EnergyPerspectives2025

KeyinsightsfromEnergyPerspectives2025

EnergyPerspectivespresentsfourscenariosforeconomicandenergymarketdevelopment

Wallsbuildsonhistoricalenergymarkettrendsandassumesclimateactionslowlyaccelerates.

Plazasexploresaworldwhereopentradeandcross-border

investmentenablehighereconomicgrowth,moreconsumption,andaffordableenergy.

Silosconsidersafragmentedworldwhererestrictedglobaltradeandalackofcollaborationhindergrowthandshapeconsumptionaroundenergysecurityconcerns.

BridgesEP23*isanormativebackcastscenariothatdemonstratestheimmensechangeneededtostaywithinthe1.5°Ccarbon

budget.

*TheBridgesscenarioasoutlinedinthe2023outlook.

Walls

Plazas

Bridges

Silos

ff。rdabiiity

Competingprioritiesareinfluencingpolicymakers’approachtoeconomic,climate

andenergypolicies

Geopoliticaltensions,warsandeconomicdevelopmentaredrawingfocusawayfromenergytransitiongoals.

Decarbonisationfacesincreasingscrutinyasapolicyconsiderationifviewedasachallengeforenergysecurityoraffordability.

sustainableandjustenergytransition

Thebalanceofprioritieswithintheenergy

trilemmawillinfluenceglobalGDP,energy

demand,energymixandultimately,emissions

Totalprimaryenergydemand

Netemissions

InWalls,theworldlookstobalanceenergysecurityandaffordabilitywithoutdisregarding

decarbonisation.

InPlazas,economicgrowthissupportedby

unrestrictedglobaltrade,investmentand

GDPCAGR

collaboration,whichincreaseconsumptionattheexpenseofdecarbonisation.

InSilos,energysecuritydominatespolicymakingas

globaltradeandcollaborationfragmentintoregionalalliances.

Scenariooutcomesin2050comparedto2022levels

Walls

Plazas

Silos

+5%

+19%

-5%

-35%

-16%

-34%

2.1%

2.3%

1.7%

Source:Equinor

5|EnergyPerspectives2025

Totalprimaryenergydemandisimpactedbybotheconomicgrowthandachangingenergymix

InWalls,despiteagrowingglobalpopulationand

economy,primaryenergydemandplateausinthelate2030saselectrificationandashiftawayfromfossilfuelsincreaseend-to-endenergyefficiency.

By2050,theincreasedconsumptionandslowertransitioninPlazasdriveprimaryenergydemandhigherthanin

Walls.InSilos,lowergrowthandrestrictedconsumptionreduceenergydemandin2050comparedto2022levels.

Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)

Totalprimaryenergydemand

(Gtoe)

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

202220302050

WallsWallsPlazasSilosBridges

EP23

FossilfuelsOtherNewrenewables

Peakdemandforfossilfuelsarrivestowardstheendofthe2020sinWallsandSilos,butcomeslaterinPlazas

InWalls,totalfossilfueldemandstartstoleveloffinthemid-2020s,followedbyaslightdownwardtrajectory.

InPlazas,increasedeconomicactivitydrivesprolonged

fossilfueldemand,whichpeaksin2033beforeaveryslowdecline.

InSilos,demandisimpactedbylowgrowthbutsupportedbyreducedglobaltradeincleantechnology.

InBridgesEP23,allfossilfuelsseerapiddecline.Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)

Globalfossilfueldemand

(Gtoe)

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

2010

2020

WallsSilos

History

2050

20302040

Plazas

BridgesEP23

Sectoraldemandchangesreflecttheinterplaybetweengrowthandefficiencyimprovements

InWalls,demandinmostsectorsincreasesinlinewiththegrowingpopulationandeconomy,butefficiencygains

achievedthroughelectricvehicle(EV)uptakereduceroadtransportenergydemand.

InPlazas,theefficiencygainsfromEVuptakekeeproad

transportdemandin2050at2022levels.Inothersectors,efficiencyimprovementsarenotsufficienttooffset

growingdemandduetostrongeconomicgrowth.

InSilos,cost-focusedbehaviouralchangesand

efficienciesleadtoareductioninbuildingsandroadtransportdemandoutto2050.

Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)

Energydemandbysector:changein2050

vs.2022levels(Gtoe)

4

3

2

1

0

-1

-2

-3

-4

WallsPlazasSilosBridges

EP23

Industryandnon-energyBuildings

RoadtransportNon-roadtransport

Netchange

6|EnergyPerspectives2025

LiquidsdemandisweakenedbyEVsbutsupportedbypetrochemicalandnon-roadtransportsectors

InWalls,EVsincreasinglyreplaceinternalcombustion

vehicles,causingdemandtosoften.However,

petrochemicalsandnon-roadtransportseeincreasingdemand,drivenbyalackofalternatives.Asaresult,totalliquidsdemandpeaksat105mbdin2028before

softening.

InPlazas,higherdemandfortravelandconsumer

productsincreasesliquidsdemandandpushesthepeakover108mbdin2035,

SilosfollowsasimilartrajectorytoWalls,peakingat105mbdin2028,astheeffectsofaslowertransitiontoEVsareoffsetbyloweroveralldemand.

Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

Globalliquidsdemand

(mbd)

20102020203020402050

WallsPlazas

SilosBridgesEP23

History

Globalgasdemandishighlysensitivetotraderestrictionsandenergyinterdependence

Wallsseespeakgasdemandin2038aselectrificationandrenewablesmoderatetheworld’srelianceongas.

InPlazas,unrestrictedgassupplyanddilutedclimatetargetspushpeakgasdemandbeyond2050.

InSilos,globalgasdemandpeaksin2029asgas

importersreducetheirdependenceonotherregionsandgrowthstalls.

Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)

Globalgasdemand(bcm)

20102020203020402050

WallsPlazas

SilosBridgesEP23

History

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0

Whilegasandliquidsarebothtradedglobally,gasdemandismoresensitiveasitisimpactedbyelectricitydemandandcanbemoreeasily

substitutedwithotherenergysources

LiquidsdemandinSilosissimilartoWallsdespitelowereconomicgrowth,assloweruptakeofEVsandcleantransportfuelssupportliquidsdemand.

Incontrast,gasdemandis17%lowerinSilosthanWallsby2050duetoreducedtotalenergyuse,lowerelectricity

demand,andincreasefuelswitchingtoviablealternatives.

Source:Equinor

Totalprimaryenergydemand2050

(Gtoe)

LiquidsGas

5

-1%

-17%

4

3

2

1

0

PlazasWallsSilosPlazasWallsSilos

7|EnergyPerspectives2025

Electricitywillmeetahighershareoffinalenergydemand

InWalls,electrificationseessteadyaccelerationtowards2050,increasingitssharebyhalf.

Plazasfollowsasimilartrend,withincreasedeconomicactivitydrivingdemandforbothelectricityandotherenergycarriers.

InSilos,restrictionsonthetradeofEVsand

renewabletechnologiesslowtheincreasein

electricitydemandandtheavailabilityofcheapelectricity,leadingtoaslowerrateof

electrification.

Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)

Electricityshareoffinalenergydemand

(%)

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

20102020203020402050

WallsPlazas

SilosBridgesEP23

History

Electricitygeneration:changein2050vs.

2022levels(ThousandTWh)

60

40

20

0

Thekeyenableroftheenergytransitionisgrowthindecarbonisedelectricity,stronglylinkedtoinvestmentandpolicy

Low-carbonelectricityproductionwillincreaseinallscenarios,buttovaryingdegree.

Solarandwindcanprovidecheapelectricity,buttheircostsandshareofgenerationwilldependontrade

restrictions,climatepolicy,andthewiderinvestmentenvironment.

-20

WallsPlazasSilosBridges

EP23

Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)

Coal

Wind

Gas

SolarPV

NuclearHydrogen

Other

Netchange

Electricvehiclesbecomeincreasinglyaffordableandavailable

InWalls,policiesincludingsubsidiesandemission

standardsencouragetheadoptionofEVs,especiallyamongstlightdutyvehicles(LDVs).

InPlazas,policyincentivesarediluted,buthigher

consumerspendingandunrestrictedtradesupportEVuptake.

InSilos,EVuptakeisdelayedduetolowerconsumerspending,limitedpolicysupport,andrestrictedtrade.

Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)

EVshareofglobalLDVfleet

(%)

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

20102020203020402050

WallsPlazas

SilosBridgesEP23

History

8|EnergyPerspectives2025

InPlazasandSilos,theenergytransition

progresseswhereitalignswithaffordabilityorenergysecuritypriorities

InPlazasandSilos,incidentaldecarbonisationoccurs,asusingrenewableenergytodriveincreased

electrificationcanprovidebothvalueformoneyandenergyindependenceforsomeenduses.

Climatepolicycanincreasethespeedoftransitionandencouragedecarbonisationacrossallsectors.

Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6

Energydemandbyenergycarrier:changein

2050vs.2022levels(Gtoe)

WallsPlazasSilosBridges

EP23

Oil

Other

Coal

Hydrogen

GasElectricity

Netchange

Energy-relatednetemissionsarereducedinallscenariosby2050comparedto2022

Regardlessofclimatepolicyambitions,demandforcoalis

projectedtofallineveryscenario,drivenbytheaffordabilityofrenewableenergysources,whichcanprovideadditionaladvantagesovercoalsuchasdecreasedimportreliance

andimprovedairquality.

Thecost-driventransitiontoEVsreducesemissionsfromoilinallscenarios.Plazashashigheroildemandoverall,butagreatersharecomesfromthepetrochemicalsector,whichhasaloweremissionsintensitythantheroadsector.

In2050,gasdemandanditscorrespondingemissionsarehigherinPlazasandlowerinSilosversusWalls,inlinewiththelevelofdemandandtradeopenness.

*Excludingcarbonremovalfromnature-basedsolutions,directaircapture,andbioenergywithcarboncaptureandstorage.

Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)

Energy-relatednetemissions:changein

2050vs.2022levels(GtCO?eq.)

WallsPlazasSilosBridges

EP23*

CoalOilGasNetchange

5

0

-5

-10

-15

-20

-25

-30

-35

Carboncaptureandstorage(CCS)deploymentstagnatesinPlazasandSilos

CCSenablesdecarbonisationbutincreasescosts,onlyprovidingacompetitiveadvantagewhenemission

reductionsareinherentlyvalued.

Accordingly,CCSisnotprioritisedinPlazasandSilos,wheredecarbonisationisnotamainpolicyfocus.InWalls,CCSaccountsfor644milliontonnesofCO2in2050,comparedto1,965milliontonnesinBridges

EP23*.

*Excludingnature-basedsolutions,directaircaptureandbioenergywithCCS.TotalcarboncaptureandremovalinBridgesEP23is6,264milliontonnes.

Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)

2000

1500

1000

500

0

Annualcarboncaptureandstorageofenergy-relatedemissions(MtCO?)

202220302050

WallsWallsWallsPlazasSilosBridges

EP23

9|EnergyPerspectives2025

EnergydemandinemergingregionsexcludingChinaovertakesusein

industrialisedregionsinthisdecade

EmergingregionsexcludingChinawillbethebiggestcontributorstoglobalenergydemandoutto2050,overtakingthecombineddemandofindustrialisedregions.

Thischangeisdrivenbyincreasingpopulationandhigheconomicgrowthinemergingregions,whileindustrialisedregionswillexperienceapopulationplateau,continueddeindustrialisation,andafastertransitiontomoreefficientenergytechnology.

Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

EnergydemandinWalls(Gtoe)

19902000201020202030

2040

2050

Emergingexcl.ChinaChina

IndustrialisedHistory

Energydemandpercapitainemerging

regionsexcludingChinaremainsmuchlowerthaninindustrialisedregions

Theincreasedenergyuseinemergingregions

excludingChinaisspreadoveranincreasing

population,whichlimitsenergypercapitagrowtheventhoughthetotalfinaldemandexceedstheusein

industrialisedregions.Thisreflectsthecontinued

disparityinlivingstandardsbetweenindustrialisedandemergingeconomies.

AsChina’spopulationstartstodecreaseoutto2050,itsenergyusepercapitastartstoapproachthatofindustrialisedregions.

Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections),UN(population)

4

3

2

1

0

EnergydemandpercapitainWalls

(toepercapita)

19902000201020202030

2040

2050

Emergingexcl.ChinaChina

IndustrialisedHistory

Chinaisexpectedtoleadtheworldinelectrification.Fossilfueldemandremainssignificantacrossregions

China’sdominanceinproducingcost-effectivecleanenergytechnologyallowsittoproducecheapelectricity,reduce

dependenceonfossilfuelimports,andconsequentlydecarboniseitsenergysupply.

InWalls,industrialisedregionsmaintainclimateambitions,experienceastrongercoalphase-downandahighershareofelectricityandcleantransportfuelsthanemerging

regionsexcludingChina.

EmergingregionsexcludingChinaprioritisegrowthanddevelopment,andremainwithalowershareof

electrificationbeyond2050.

Source:Equinor

Energydemandin2050inWalls(%)

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

IndustrialisedChinaEmergingexcl.

China

CoalOilGasElectricityHydrogenOther

10|EnergyPerspectives2025

11|EnergyPerspectives2025

TableofContents

WelcometoEquinor’sEnergyPerspectives2025

3

KeyinsightsfromEnergyPerspectives2025

4

SHORT-TERMOUTLOOK

12

Geopoliticsisshapingtradeandenergymarkets

13

Theglobaleconomy

14

Highercostoffinancingchallengestheenergytransition

15

Commodities

17

THESCENARIOS

18

Thescenarios

19

Walls

21

Bridges

21

Plazas

22

Silos

23

LONG-TERMOUTLOOK

24

Theenergyworldin2030and2050

25

Globaleconomy:Declininglong-termgrowthprospects

27

Thegloballiquidsmarket

28

Theglobalgasmarket

30

Gasa

remainstransitionfuelinEurope

32

Theglobalelectricitymarket

34

Datacentres:Localeffects,globalconsequences

36

Theglobalhydrogenmarket

37

Keyfigures

38

Units

40

Definitions

40

References

40

Photocredits

40

Acknowledgementsanddisclaimer

41

SHORT-TERMOUTLOOK

12|EnergyPerspectives2025

13|EnergyPerspectives2025

Geopoliticsisshapingtradeandenergymarkets

In2025,energymarketswillbeimpactedbyintensegeopoliticalcompetitionandshiftsinglobalpowerdynamics.Theerosionofeconomiccollaborationwillfurtheraddtomarketvolatility.Also,thepoliciesofthenewUSadministrationwillplayasignificantroleinfuellingtheuncertaintythesemarketswillexperience.

Geopoliticalriskswilldominatetheshort-term

outlook,reinforcingasensethattheglobalorderisexperiencingafragileanduncertaintransition.

PresidentTrump’sdisruptiveinstinctsandwillingnesstochallengelong-standingUSforeignpolicynormswillfeedthisuncertainty,furtherincreasingtherangeofpossibleoutcomes.Inthiscontext,protectionism

andnationalsecuritywilldominatepolicymakers'

priorities,alongsideurgentincreasesindefence

spendinginthisneweraofhardpower.Thisfocuswillfurtherlimitthespaceforglobalcooperation.

TheEUwillprioritiseimprovingitseconomic

competitivenessanddefenceintegration.While

climatetargetswillremain,therewillbelessemphasisondecarbonisation,particularlywherestatesubsidiesareneededtoprogressenergytransitionprojects.EUmanufacturingisalreadyunderseverepressurefromhighenergyprices,exacerbatedbytheongoing

conflictinUkraineandrisingglobaltradebarriers.

Thebloc’scompetitivenesswilllikelybefurther

underminedbythenewUSadministration’stradeandsecuritypoliciesandpotentialreactionsfromChina.

FacedwithUStariffs,theEUwillinitiallyseekto

negotiatewiththeUSbutisalsopreparedtoretaliateiftalksfail.Asglobaltariffsescalate,theEUwillaimtodiversifyitsgeopoliticalpartnershipsthrough

strengthenedrelationswithmulti-alignedpowerslikeIndia.AnyweakeningoftheUS’securitycommitmenttoEuropewillpushEuropeancountriestoincreasedefencespending,likelyattheexpenseof

decarbonisationinvestmentandwelfare.ThereisariskthatEuropeanpopulistparties,whicharehostiletomoredefencespending,willgainpopularityif

policymakersfailtostriketherightbalance.TheEU’sgrowingcompetitivenessconcernswillpushthe

EuropeanCommissiontoembarkonaderegulatoryagenda,includingonsomeclimateregulations.

TheUS“energydominance”strategymarksa

significantshiftawayfromdecarbonisationefforts,

impactingenergymarketsandgeopoliticsin2025.

GiventhegrowthpotentialofglobalLNGmarkets,USexports,alreadyapowerhouse,aresettoplaya

greaterroleasabargainingchipduringtrade

negotiations.USalliesarefacinggrowingpressuretoincreaseUSLNGimportstooffsetthreatsoftariffs.

TheUSdiplomaticbehaviour–outreachtoRussia

andclosertiestoSaudiArabia–underscoresashifttoamoreresource-drivenmindsetwhereenergy

marketprimacyandbilateralnegotiationsare

leveragedtoovercomeperceivedconstraintsofamultilateralorder.

CompetitionbetweentheUSandChinawillremainanenduringgeopoliticaldynamic,andariskfactorfor

businesses.Intheimmediateterm,tradeissueswill

dominaterelations,butfundamentaldifferences

entailthattherelationshipwillfacelonger-term

instability.BothChinaandtheUSwillusetheir

economicpolicytofurthertheirstrategicinterests.

Thistrendwillbeechoedinpoliciesworldwide,riskingdeepertradefragmentationandgreatersupply

chaincomplexityanddisruptions.

TheUSadministration’sstaunchlyunilateralist

approachtoforeignpolicyislikelytodrivefurther

multilateralengagementamongemergingeconomies.Whilemultilateralforums,suchasBRICS+1,havebeensteadilyexpanding,starklydivergentgoalsamong

memberswillcontinuetolimitcohesionandeffectivedecisionmaking.Nevertheless,thenumberofmulti-alignedpowersadeptatleveragingstrategic

resourcesisgrowing.

CountriesacrossLatinAmerica,AfricaandSoutheastAsiahaveprovedabletonavigatebetweengreat

powers,therebysecuringadiverserangeof

investmentsources.EffortsbytheEUandothersto

de-risksupplychainsanddiversifyimportandexportmarketswillofferemergingeconomiesfurther

opportunitiesforcase-by-caseinternational

alignment.Yet,theUS’“AmericaFirst”agendawill

placesomeofthesemulti-alignedstrategiesunder

closerscrutiny,potentiallyexposingthemtoeconomicbacklash.

Greatpowercompetitionalsocreatesopportunitiesforrisingmiddlepowerstoadoptamoreassertive,andattimes,moredestabilisingforeignandsecuritypolicy.InAfrica,thisdynamicmaterialisesinfierce

competitionforcontrolovervitalcommoditiesandkeyinfrastructure.Inaddition,non-stateactorsmaycapitaliseontheresultinginstabilitytostrengthen

theirterritorialcontrolandchallengefailedorfailingstates.

1AnexpandingintergovernmentalorganisationincludingBrazil,Russia,India,China,SouthAfricaandothers.

14|EnergyPerspectives2025

Theglobaleconomy

Globalgrowthisexpectedtocontinuetostabilise,althoughatasubduedlevel,withdivergentpathsandnear-termrisksbiasedtothedownsideduetopolicy

uncertainty2.

Afterasequenceofshocks,theglobaleconomy

stabilisedin2024andclockedaGDPgrowthof2.7%y/y.Aroundtwo-thirdsofthegrowthcontribution

camefromemergingmarkets.TheUSgrewbrisklyat2.8%y/ywhileEuropedeliveredsubparexpansionat0.8%.Followingthesharpincreaseinfoodandenergypricesobservedin2022,globalinflationhasgraduallyfallentowards4%in2024,andmovedcloserto

centralbanks’targetsinthedevelopedworld.Inresponse,severalkeycentralbankshaveloweredtheirpolicyinterestrates.Unemploymenthas

remainedlowinmosteconomies,weatheringthequickestratehikecycleindecades.

Whileglobaleconomicmomentumpersistedatthe

beginningof2025,theriseinprotectionistmeasures—triggeredbytheTrumpadministration'sshiftintradepolicy—hasthepotentialtosignificantlyaffect

economicgrowth.Theeffectsarelikelytodiffer

acrosscountries,dependingontradeandfinanciallinkages,aswellaspolicyresponsestotrade

measures.OpeneconomiesliketheEUcountriesandNorwayarevulnerabletotariffsandothertrade

restrictions.Protectionistpolicieshavebeen

implementeddespiteagreementonthepartofmostmainstreameconomiststhattheworldeconomy

benefitsfromfreetrade.Itisoftenarguedthatfreetrademaximisestradingpartners’comparative

advantage,increaseseconomicefficiency,andreducesconsumerprices.

IntheUS,economicgrowthisforecasttomoderatetoanaverageof2.0%overthenextfouryearsas

consumptioneases.Solidlabourproductivity

isexpected,onthebackofbusinessinvestmentwithinsoftwareandcomputerservices.TheEUlookstobeagrowthlaggardat1.4%annuallyfor2025-2028.

Europeansgrapplewithfinancialconstraintsdueto

debtandcompetingspendingneeds,althoughthereisroomforsomeadditionalpublicspendingin

selectedareas.Inaddition,theyfaceproblems

includingstagnatingproductivity,insufficient

innovation,highenergycosts,andpoor

demographics.Privateconsumptionshouldbea

driverforeconomicactivityduetoincreased

purchasingpower.Theongoingslowdownofthe

Chineseeconomyislikelytocontinueandleadtoanestimated

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