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TheJubileeReport
ABlueprintforTacklingtheDebtandDevelopmentCrisesand
CreatingtheFinancialFoundationsforaSustainable
People-CenteredGlobalEconomy
CommissionedbyPopeFrancis
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ThecontentofthisreportisidenticaltothecontentofthereportpublishedbythePontificalAcademyofSocialSciences(PASS).However,theformattinghasbeenadjusted,sopaginationmaydiffer.
I.Introduction
Thedevelopingworldisfacingdramaticdebtanddevelopmentcrises.Adebtcrisisshouldnotbenarrowlydefinedasamatterofcountriesdefaultingontheirobligationstocreditors.Formany
nations,therealdefaultisnotalegalorfinancialone,butasocialanddevelopmentone:Theyaredefaultingontheirpeople,theirenvironment,andtheirfuture.Thehistoriccommitmentsmade
in2015withtheSustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs),solemnlyresolvedbytheUNGeneralAssembly,arebeingvoided.Inthecurrentgeopoliticalcontext,theyarebeingrepudiatedbymanygovernmentsinpractice,andbysomeeveninprinciple.
Tomeetobligationstotheirexternalcreditors,debt-distressedcountriesaresacrificinginvest-
mentsineducation,healthcare,infrastructure,andclimateresilience.Coreaspectsofnational
sovereigntyareputintoquestionaseconomicpolicyservescreditorsratherthancitizens.Nationalpoliticsisdelegitimizediffiscalandfinancialpoliciesareintheserviceoffinanceratherthanintheserviceofdevelopment.
Unresolveddebtcriseshavebothshort-andlong-termadverseeffectsonhumandevelopment.Inthefaceofsustaineduncertainty,aggregatedemandandeconomicactivitytypicallydecline,lead-ingtorisingpoverty,malnutrition,andlabormarketexclusion.Vulnerablefamiliesaremorelikelytobreakdown,andtheerosionofhopespreadsacrosscommunities.Humanandphysicalcapitaldeteriorates,undermininglong-termdevelopmentprospectsanddeepeningsocialfractures.
Allsidesshareresponsibilityforthecurrentdebtsituation:Debtorgovernmentsthatborrowed
toomuch,oftenattoohighratesandtooshortmaturities,failedtoadoptcapitalaccountregula-tionstodeterdestabilizingspeculativeflows,prioritizedtheshortterm,andnowarenotdoingalltheycouldbetoresolvetheirdebtcrises—typicallyshyingawayfromtheinternational“fights”
thatmayberequiredtoprotecttheircitizensfromexcessivedemandsoftheircreditors;creditorsthatprovidedexcessivefinancing,seemingexpertsonriskthatknewtheywerelendingunder
conditionsthatimpliedthattherewasasignificantriskofdefault,butnow,whentheriskshave
materialized,arereluctanttoprovidethereliefneededtorestoredebtsustainability;andinterna-tionalfinancialinstitutions(IFIs)whoselendingpoliciesenablethesebehaviorsonbothsides—
policiesthatputoffdealingbothwithtoday’sdebtandwiththeunderlyingflawsinaglobalfinan-cialarchitecturethatrepeatedlygivesrisetosuchdevelopmentanddebtcriseswhileanentire
generationintheaffectedcountriesloseshopefordevelopment.
Thereisalsoabroaderreasonforthedebtsituation—theinternationalcommunityfailedto
addresstheflawsintheglobalfinancialarchitectureandtoenableandemboldentheIFIstotakestrongermeasurestopreventandresolvetheserecurrentdebtanddevelopmentcrises.
TheconsequencesareparticularlyacuteinAfrica,wheredebtdistressismostsevere.ItistheonlyregionwherepublicdebthasbeengrowingfasterthanGDPsince2013.Approximately57%of
thecontinent’spopulation—751millionpeople,includingnearly288millionlivinginextremepoverty—resideincountriesthatspendmoreonservicingexternaldebtthanoneducationorhealthcare.Giventhelegaciesofslavery,colonialism,andanti-Blackracism,theconcentrationofpovertyandunderdevelopmentinAfricacallsintoquestionthesincerityofourcollective
commitmenttouniversalnormsofhumanrightsandantiracism.Withitsrapiddemographicgrowth,Africaholdsuniquesignificanceforthecomingdecades,asitsshareoftheglobalyouth
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population(aged15to24)isprojectedtorisefrom23%in2023to35%by2050,accordingtotheUNWorldPopulationProspects.
Furthermore,climatechange—acrisisbornlargelyofhistoricalemissionsfromadvancedecono-mies—isimposinganadditional,crushingburdenondevelopingcountries.Theconsequencesofclimatechangeareespeciallydevastatingforsmallislandstatesandlow-incomenations,which
havecontributedtheleasttoitbutsufferthemostfromitseffects.Risingsealevels,extreme
weatherevents,andecologicaldegradationthreatennotonlytheireconomiesbutalsotheirveryexistence.Thisinjusticeiscompoundedbythestarkdisparityinconsumption:Itisthewealthiestindividualsandnations—thosewiththehighestcarbonfootprints—whohavecontributedmosttotheclimatecrisiswhilethepoorest,whoconsumeleast,endurethegravestconsequences.Itisaprofoundinjusticethatthoseleastresponsiblearenowpayingthehighestprice.
Inresponsetothisurgentrealityofdebt,development,andclimatecrises,agroupofleading
expertsindebt,development,andtheglobalfinancialsystemcametogetherattherequestofPopeFrancistoformaJubileeCommissionfortheyear2025.Aquartercenturyago,ontheoccasionofthelastJubilee,PopeJohnPaulIIadvocatedfordebtrelieffortheHighlyIndebtedPoorCoun-
tries(HIPC).Intheyearsthatfollowed,large-scaledebtreductionswereachievedthroughthe
HIPCInitiativeandtheMultilateralDebtReliefInitiative,bringingenormousbenefitstomanylow-incomecountries.Butnow,twenty-fiveyearslater,theworldconfrontsanotherdebtcrisis,
andtosolveitrequiresdeeperandlonger-lastingreformsoftheglobalfinancialarchitecture.
PopeFrancisagaincalledforsolutionsthatwillrequiredebtrelief,butaskedformore:forreformsoftheglobalfinancialsystem.
TheCommission’spurposeistwofold:first,toofferpracticalandprincipledrecommendations
toaddressthecurrentcrises;second,toadvanceavisionforareimaginedinternationalfinancialarchitecturethatiscapableofpreventingfuturecrisesandenablingsustainable,inclusivedevelop-ment.TheCommissionaffirmsthatdevelopmentinherentlyinvolvesrisk—whetherfromlong-
terminvestments,exposuretocommoditypricefluctuations,orvulnerabilitytoexternalshocks—andthatsustainabledevelopmentrequirestheseriskstobedistributedgloballyinanefficientandequitablemanner.Theburdenshouldbebornebythosemostcapableofabsorbingit,whichisnotwhatthecurrentsystemdelivers.
ThisreportmarksthefirststepinabroaderinitiativeconvenedbythePontificalAcademyof
SocialSciences(PASS)andColumbiaUniversity’sInitiativeforPolicyDialogue(IPD).Itseekstocontributetoacomprehensiverethinkingoftheglobalrulesgoverningfinance,taxation,trade,
andthesharingofknowledge.Atitsheartliesaclearandurgentgoal:tohelpbuildaglobalecon-omythatservespeople,especiallythemostvulnerable,andtrulyleavesnoonebehind.
“Thedevelopmentofaglobalcommunityoffraternitybasedonthepracticeofsocialfriendshiponthepartofpeoplesandnationscallsforabetterkindofpolitics,onetrulyattheserviceofthecommongood.”
—PopeFrancis,FratelliTutti,§154
II.TheCurrentDebtSituationinDevelopingCountries
Thefiscalnumbersforthedevelopingworldpaintastarkpicture:AccordingtotheUnited
NationsConferenceonTradeandDevelopment(UNCTAD),54developingcountriesnowspend10%ormoreoftheirtaxrevenuesjustoninterestpayments.Since2014,theaverageinterest
burdenfordevelopingcountries—measuredasashareoftaxrevenues—hasalmostdoubled.
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Today,3.3billionpeopleliveincountriesthatspendmoreoninterestpaymentsthanonhealth,
and2.1billionliveincountriesthatspendmoreoninterestpaymentsthanoneducation.Inter-
estpaymentsonpublicdebtarethereforecrowdingoutcriticalinvestmentsinhealth,education,infrastructure,andclimateresilience.Governments—fearfulofthepoliticalandeconomiccostsofinitiatingdebtrestructurings—prioritizetimelydebtpaymentsoveressentialdevelopmentspend-ing.Thisisnotapathtosustainabledevelopment.Rather,itisaroadblocktodevelopmentand
leadstoincreasinginequalityanddiscontent.
Thelonger-termeconomicconsequencesoftoday’sdebtanddevelopmentcrisesarebecom-
ingclear:Since2015,grosscapitalformationinlow-incomecountrieshasstalledatjust22%of
GDP—wellbelowthe33%averageformiddle-incomecountries.Toemergefromtheirpoverty
andtocatchupevenwithmiddle-incomecountriestheyshouldbeinvestingalarger,notasmaller,percentageofGDP.Externalborrowinginmanyofthesecountrieshasnotbeenaninstrumentforbuildingproductivecapacitiesordomesticvaluechains.Instead,undercurrentconditions,
financialflowsasawholehavediscouragedlong-terminvestmentwhileincreasingvulnerabilitytovolatilityandcapitalflight.
Thecurrentdebtanddevelopmentcrisisindevelopingcountriesisnotanisolatedfiscalmisfor-tune.Thefactthatexcessesofdebthaveafflictedsomanycountries,withdebtanddevelopmentcrisesoccurringsooftensuggeststhataresystemiccausesandconsequences.Accordingly,it
shouldcomeasnosurprisethatsoshortlyafterthepreviousinitiativesfordebtreliefforlow-in-comecountries,theworldisonceagainconfrontingdebtanddevelopmentcrises.
Onedefiningcharacteristicofthisdysfunctionalsystemisthat,fordevelopingcountries,capitalflowsareprocyclical:Duringglobalfinancingbooms,moneyfloodsin;inbusts,itflowsoutevenmorequickly.Successivephasesofpromisingdevelopmentcannotbecountedontocontinue.
Moreoftenthannot,apositivephaseisapreludetoapainfulcontraction,especiallywhenthey
arefinancedbydebt.Foradvancedeconomies,thereverseholdstrue.Intimesofcrisis,capital
flowstowardthem.Inastorm,safefinancial“havens”becomeallthemoreattractive.Thisasym-metryenrichestherich,impoverishesthepoor,andreinforcesitself,astheprocyclicalmovementsweakenthepoorandthecountercyclicalmovementsstrengthentherich,makingthemanever
moreattractivesafehaven.
Anotherdefiningcharacteristicofthisdysfunctionalsystemischronicunderinvestmentininno-vation,humancapital,andinfrastructure.Thepatternsofunderinvestmentindevelopingcoun-triesareexacerbatedbythefinancialconditionsimposedbyvolatileandprocyclicalcapitalflowsandbeenfurtherexacerbatedbythepolicyconstraintsassociatedwithhighdebtburdens.Theepisodiccrisesareregularlyaccompaniedbyepisodicboutsofausterity.
Thereisoftenaviciouscircleatplay.Inmanycases,thesedynamicshaveerodedstatecapacityandweakenedtheabilityofpolicymakerstoevenconceiveofdevelopmentstrategiesthatcouldenablestructuraltransformationandsustainedeconomicself-determination.
Thesestructuralvulnerabilitiesarecompoundedbytheactionsofbothcreditorsandborrowers.Sovereignborrowersmaytakeonexcessivedebtundertermsincompatiblewithdevelopment
financing—sometimesdrivenbyshort-termpoliticalincentivesormisalignedvestedinterests,andoftenwithouttheinstitutionalcapacitytochannelborrowedfundsintoproductivetransformation.Ontheotherside,privatecreditorsfrequentlyengageinexcessiveandexpensivelendingduringboomperiods,motivatedsometimesbyexpectationsofpreferentialtreatmentinrestructuring
vis-à-visofficialcreditors.Sometimestheylendbecause,intheeventofashortageofforeign
exchangerequiredtoservicethedebt,theIFIswillprovidetherequisitefunds,adefactobailout.
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Thisdynamichasoftenresultedinexcessivedebt,metwithlimitedaccountability.
Afterthe2008financialcrisis,the2009worldrecession,andthebailoutofWesternbanking
systems,privatecapitalpouredintolow-andlower-middle-incomecountries,wherereturnswerehighandcapitalaccountregulationswereweakornonexistent.Thiswaveofcapitalinflowsfueledoptimisticnarrativesofdevelopment,epitomizedbythe“billionstotrillions”slogan.Butwhile
theinflowsappearedpromising,theywerefundamentallymisalignedwithlong-termdevelopmentgoals.Governmentsborrowedunderunfavorableterms:shortmaturitiesandnoassurancesof
continuedaccesstofundswhenthedebtneededtoberolledover,andratesthatweresignificantlyabovethoseofloansprovidedbyinternationalfinancialinstitutions.Thesearenottheconditionsunderwhichinvestmentsineducation,infrastructure,andindustrialcapacity—whichtakedecadestomature—canbesustainablyfinanced.
EvenbeforetheCOVID-19pandemicandthewarinUkraine,manycountrieshadalreadyaccu-
mulatedunsustainabledebts.Thepandemicnecessitatedunprecedentedpublicspendingtoprotectlivesandlivelihoods.Thewarthentriggeredspikesinfoodandenergyprices,exacerbatingexter-nalimbalances.Whenadvancedeconomiesrespondedbysharplyraisinginterestrates,financingconditionsforotherstighteneddramatically.In2023alone,thenetfinancialtransferfromlow-
andlower-middleincomecountriestoprivatecreditorsinadvancedeconomiesreached$30billion.
Ironically,itwastheIFIs—whosemandateistosupportdevelopment,reducepoverty,andstabi-lizeeconomies—thatsteppedintofinancetheseoutflows.Ratherthanprovidingcountercycli-caldevelopmentfinance,theyunderwrotecapitalflight.Indoingso,theyshiftedthecostof
private-sectorbailoutsontocitizensinthedevelopingworld—manyofwhomnowfacenotonlyhigherdebtstocks,butalsorisinginterestpaymentsonofficialloans.
Beneaththiscrisisliesadeeperstructuralfailure,whichisthechronicweaknessofpublicfinancesandthepersistentunderinvestmentineconomictransformation.Theabilityofstatestomobilizedomesticresourceshasbeenunderminedbyinternationaltaxavoidance,illicitfinancialflows,
theunder-taxationofcorporateprofits—especiallyinvolvingmultinationalfirms—theunfair
exploitationofextractiveresources,andtheheavyrepatriationofdividends.Yetresponsibility
cannotliesolelywithexternalactors.Inmanycases,domesticpoliticalandeconomiceliteshavealsoplayedarole—byfailingtostrengthenpublicinstitutions,bytoleratingorenablingrent-seek-ingbehavior,andbyavoidingreformsthatcouldhavebuiltgreaterresilienceandaccountability.
In2025,globalmarketsremainfragileamidstgeopoliticalandtradeconflicts.TheIFIsnowproj-ectlowerglobalgrowthforthecomingyears,particularlyfordevelopingcountries.Thisfurtherunderminesdebtsustainability,asacountry’sdebtisobviouslymoresustainablewhenthecountrygrowsmorerapidlyand,specificallyforexternaldebt,whenthereismoreavailabilityofforeignexchange.Refinancingprospectsfordistressedeconomiesareincreasinglyuncertain,whilethe
debtoverhangcontinuestodepressinvestment,growth,andhumanwell-being.
Inthiscontext,solutionsmustgobeyondtemporaryrelieformodestreductionsindebtservice.Whatisneededisaneweconomicmodelcenteredonstrengtheninglong-terminvestment.Publicinvestmentandfinancialstrategiesshouldnotbetreatedjustasshort-termcountercyclicaltoolsbutasinstrumentsforpromotingsustainabledevelopment.Usingcreditsimplytocreatefiscal
spaceisnotenough.Theprioritymustbetousethatspacetofinancecoherent,long-termsustain-abledevelopmentstrategiesthatalignfiscal,financial,andproductivedevelopmentpolicy,undertheguidanceofcapablepublicinstitutions.Thisrequiresanchoringinvestmentplansaround
developmentmissions.Thegoalisnotmerestabilization.Itisstructuraltransformation.
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Muchofthedebtsustainabilityrisksindevelopingcountriesarerelatedtoexternalfactorsoverwhichtheyhavenocontrol.Theserisksarecompoundedbytheweaknessesofthemultilateral
financialsystemtoprovidesufficientflowsatcompetitivetermsthataccuratelyreflectactuarialriskandwhichmovecountercyclicallyandnotprocyclically,andwhichwhenadebtcrisisarises,resolvesitswiftly,fairly,andefficiently.Aglobalfinancialsystemthatenablesvastresourcetrans-fersfromthedevelopingcountriestothecreditors,whiledenyingsustainableinvestmentina
country’sfuture,isnotonlyinefficient,butalsounjustandextractive.
Sharedresponsibility.Ouranalysisoftheoriginsofthisandotherdebtcrisesandwhattodo
aboutthemsuggestsasharedresponsibility.Theinternationalcommunitywritlarge,themultilat-eralinstitutions,andthedevelopingcountrieshavenotdonewhattheyshould.And,unfortunately,itistrueevenofthosewiththebestofintentionswhosoughttoenhancestabilityandpoverty
reduction.Worse,therearethosewhohavenothadthebestofintentionsbutrathersoughtgainwithouttakingintoaccountthecostsimposedonsomeofthepoorestpeopleintheworld.Ourpurposehere,however,isnottoassessblamebuttoproposeaplanofactionthatdetailswhat
canandshouldbedonebymultilateralinstitutions,financialinstitutions,andgovernmentsatthenationallevelandintheparticularjurisdictionswheredebtcontractsarewritten.Wewantto
alleviatethecurrentdebtanddevelopmentcrisisandmakeitlesslikelythattherewillbefurthercrises,sothatcountrieswillfinallybeabletofinancesustainabledevelopment.
AsPopeFrancishasremindedus,“Inequalityistherootofsocialills”(EvangeliiGaudium,§202).Ifwearetomeaningfullyaddressthedevelopmentandenvironmentalcrises,wemustbeginbyconfrontingthisinjustice—understandinghowtheglobalfinancialarchitecturecontributestothesecrises,acknowledgingsharedresponsibility,andadvancingsolutionsthatshiftthesystemtowardgreaterequity,efficiency,andsharedprosperity.
III.TheSystemicFlawsintheGlobalFinancialArchitectureUnderminingDevelopment
Theinternationalfinancialsystemisnotwelldesignedtoservetheneedsofdevelopingcountries.Instead,itreflectsandreinforcesdeepstructuralasymmetriesbetweendevelopingandadvancedeconomiesthatinturnshapetheconditionsunderwhichcountriesborrow,thecoststheyfacewhentheydo,andtheconsequencesofthatborrowing.Theseasymmetriesarenotjusteconomic;theyarehistoricalandpolitical,preservedbyaninternationalordershapedbythemostpowerfulandstructuredinwaysthatfavorthem.
Manydevelopingeconomiesfaceenormousinvestmentneeds,limitedfinancingopportunities,andheightenedvulnerabilitytoexternalshocks.Thispredicamentisgivencontemporaryurgencybyrapiddemographicgrowthinmanyofthepoorestcountries,butitisrootedinhistoricalpatterns.Thecolonialeraleftbehindeconomicstructuresgearedtowardtheextractionandexportof
rawmaterials,withlowlevelsofproductivediversificationandheavydependenceonimportedconsumergoods.Thisdependencyhasprovendifficulttoovercomeformanysocieties.Inmanycases,theglobaltradearchitecturehasbeenoneoftheimpediments.
Globalfinancialmarketspenalizetheseinheritedweaknesses.Countriesthatdependheavilyon
theexportofprimarycommoditiesare,andareperceivedas,riskierborrowers.Asaresult,theyarechargedhigherinterestratesininternationalcreditmarkets,whichaccordingtotheempiricalevidencearehigherthancanbejustifiedbythehigherriskofdefault.Thisfurtherincreasestheirriskofdefaultandconstrainstheircapacitytoinvestintheeconomictransformationtheyneed—reinforcingaself-perpetuatingcycleofunderdevelopmentandinequality.
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Onemighthavethoughtthatrichcountries,beinginabetterpositiontoabsorbrisk,wouldtransferriskawayfromdevelopingcountries.Externalcapitalflowswouldpresumablyhelpde-riskdevelop-mentandserveasabuffer.Thisiswhatstandardeconomictheoriesofefficientmarketswouldhavepredicted.Buttheoppositehasoccurred.Ratherthanbeingasourceofsustainablegrowth,globalcapitalmarketshaveoftenprovenprocyclicalanddestabilizing.Suddenstopsandsurginginterestrateshaverepeatedlyinterruptedinvestmentneededtodiversifyeconomiesandbuildresilience.Ingoodglobaltimes,capitalflowstodevelopingcountries;whenturbulencehits,itfleesbacktoadvancedeconomiesperceivedassafer.Asdiscussedearlier,thisisthekeyasymmetryintheglobalfinancialsystem.CapitalmobilityactsasastabilizerfortheGlobalNorthandadestabilizerformuchoftheGlobalSouthandthedevelopingworld.Wearewitnessingtheseeffectstoday.Globalfinancialandcapitalregulations—orthelackthereof—havecontributedtothisproblem.Thus,eventhosegovernmentsindevelopingcountriesthatborrowtoinvest,butatrelativelyshortmaturities,andgrowsufficientlynottoseetheirdebtratiosrise,arestillunabletorefinancethosedebtswhenglobaluncertaintiesriseandinternationalcapitalmarketstightenforthedevelopingcountries.
Thisdysfunctionalbehaviorreflectsdeeperflawsinthearchitectureofglobalfinance.Misalignedincentives—or“agencyproblems”—affectbothborrowersandlenders.Manydebtorspursueshort-termgains,includingtheimmediatepoliticaladvantagesthataccesstofundsnowmightprovide,evenwhencertaindebtpoliciesimposelargelong-termcosts.Privatecreditors,oftenlargecorpo-rations,borrowwithoutfullyaccountingforthebroadermacroeconomicconsequences.Likewise,individualcreditorsdisregardhowtheirlendingmightaffectexchangeratesorfinancialstability;andthemanagersoffinancialinstitutionsmaygetrewardedmoreonthebasisoftheamountlentthantheaccurateassessmentoftheriskoftheborroweranditscapacitytorepay.
Meanwhile,centralbanksinadvancedeconomies—theprimaryenginesofgloballiquidity—follow-ingtheirmandatesrespondalmostexclusivelytodomesticconcerns,disregardingtheglobalrippleeffectsoftheirpolicies.Inperiodsoflowglobalinterestrates,suchasafterthe2008internationalfinancialcrisis,theresultingsearchforyieldledtoexcessivelendingtodevelopingcountriesandemergingmarkets.
Theexcessesofderegulation—especiallycapitalaccountliberalization—removedkeytoolsthatdevelopingcountriesonceusedtomanagevolatilefinancialflows.Fromthe1980sonward,market-drivenideologyencouragedgovernmentstoopentheireconomiesandborrowabroadinhopesofestablishingcredibility,gainingmarketaccess,andboostinginvestment.Evenshort-termflowswerewelcomed,underthebeliefthatsuchflowswouldleadtohigherrealinvestment.Inreality,thevolatilityofshort-termcapitaloftenprovedcounterproductive.
Asnotedearlier,IFIs—createdafterWorldWarIIbytheinternationalcommunitytostabilizetheglobaleconomyandpromotedevelopment—haveattimesexacerbatedtheproblem.Thoughtheirmissionistopreventcollapseandsupportgrowth,theyhaverepeatedlybailedoutprivatecreditorsandimposedausterityondebtorcountriestoensurerepaymenttocreditorsfromadvancedecon-omies.Inpractice,theyhavetoooftenprioritizedfinancialinterestsoversustainabledevelopment.
Moreover,asignificantportionofmultilaterallendingcarriesprocyclicalfeatures.Loaninterestratesarecloselytiedtopolicyratessetbythecentralbanksofeconomicallyadvancedcountries.Thisexplainswhythecostofborrowingfrommultilateralinstitutionshasrisensharplyoverthepastthreeyears,drivenbymonetarytighteningintheeconomicallyadvancedcountriesinresponsetoinflationfollowingthewarinUkraine.
Certainbankingregulations,includingthoseintendedtoensurethesafetyandsoundnessofbanksbutwhichtreatsovereigndebtfromdevelopingcountriesandemergingmarketsasriskyassets,also
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contributetotheprocyclicalnatureofcapitalflowstodevelopingcountries.
ThereisasecondaspectofIFIs’lendingthatmaybecounterproductive.Wenoteinthisreportthattheyhavesystematicallyprovidedadefactobailoutforprivatecreditorsandaredoingsonow.Suchbailoutsencourageexcessivelendingand/orlendingofthewrongkind,contributingtotheepisodicdebtanddevelopmentcrisesfacingdevelopingcountries.
Insum,theglobalfinancialsystemfailstoofferthekindoflong-term,stable,countercyclicalfinanc-ingthatdevelopingcountriesneed.Nordoesitprovideadequateprotectionfromexternalshocks—whethertriggeredbyglobalinterestratehikes,commoditypricespikes,orclimate-relateddisasters.
WithallthereservationsnotedconcerningtheIFIs,creditfromMultilateralDevelopmentBanks(MDBs)remainsamongthemosthelpfulformsoffinancingfordevelopingcountries,givenitstermsandthatitattemptstolinkfinancewithdevelopment.Moreover,theInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)providesfinancingwhenprivatecreditorsdonot,whichprovidesthemainrationaleforitspreferredcreditorstatus.
Somearguethattoolittlemoneyflowstodevelopingcountriesthroughdebtchannels,giventheirvastinvestmentneeds.Butamoreaccurateassessmentisthatthereistoomuchofthewrongkindofdebt,andtoolittleofthekindthatsupportssustainabledevelopment—toomuchfocusonshort-termcapital,andtoolittleonlong-terminvestment.Moreove
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