TheCentreforFuturesandForesightStudies

Authors:ErikSilfversten,ArturHonich,ZsofiaWolford,FookNederveen

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1

Introduction

AtRANDEurope,webelievethatrobustevidenceisessentialfordeliveringeffectivesolutions

topressingsocietalchallenges,ultimatelyhelpingcreatesafer,healthierandmoreprosperous

communitiesinthefuture.Emergingissuessuchasshiftsinthegeopoliticallandscape,escalatingclimaterisks,risinginequality,rapidtechnologicalchangeandevolvingworkplacedynamics

demandinnovativethinkingandresponses.Inaneraofincreasingpolarisation,itiscrucialtorenewpublictrustinexpertanalysisandempiricalresearch.Ratherthanturningawayfromevidence,wemustreaffirmitsimportanceanddemonstrateitsrelevancetodecisionmaking.

Amidthisrapidlyshiftingenvironment,futuresandforesighttechniquescanbeusedto

methodicallyexploreandmanagerisks.InRANDEurope’sfuturesresearch,weareguidedbyseveralprinciples:

?Thefutureisnotpredeterminedandcannotbepredictedwithcertainty;itmaydiffersignificantlyfromourpresentexperiences.

?Thechoicesmadetodayandinthecomingyearswillshapefutureoutcomestowardpreferredscenarios.

?Foresightresearchpromotesreflectionandinformeddiscussion,helpingindividualsandorganisationsconsiderfuturepossibilities.

DevelopedfortheRANDEuropeForesightForum,the2025‘TrendsinFocus’reporthighlightsthreekeygroupsofmajortrendsshapingtheUnitedKingdom(UK)and,morebroadly,Europe.

ThefindingsarebasedondeskresearchandacrowdsourcedprocessforidentifyingtrendsthatinvolvedovertwodozenseniorexpertsfromRANDEurope’sfourresearchgroups.Ourgoalis

toencouragereflectionontrendsthatcouldhaveasignificantimpactwithinthenextfiveyearsbutmightcurrentlybeoverlookedoutsidetheirrespectiveexpertcommunities.Assuch,thisdocumentdoesnotaimtoprovideacomprehensiveaccountofallglobalorsectoraltrends;

rather,itspotlightsninespecifictrendsorganisedintothreebroaderthemes:

BalancingsecurityandsocietyChallengesofadisconnectedyouth

Resilienceforachangingplanetandsociety

2TRENDSINFOCUS2025

3

Theglobalcontext

Weliveinaworldundergoingsignificantsystemic

disruption.Manyofthegeopoliticalandeconomic

assumptionsthatguideddecisionmakinginthepost-WorldWarIIeraareincreasinglybeingquestioned.

Internationallawandthemultilateralinstitutionsof

globalgovernanceriskbeingsidelinedinfavourofa

returntopowerpolitics.Simultaneously,changesin

technology,theenvironment,demographicsandhealthpresentchallengestodecisionmakersandsocietyatlarge.AscharacterisedbytheUKgovernmentinits

2025NationalSecurityStrategy,weareinan‘eraofradicaluncertainty.’1InherSeptember2025StateoftheUnionaddress,EuropeanCommissionPresidentUrsulavonderLeyenspokeofEuropeansfeelingthe'groundshiftbeneaththem.'2

Severalfar-reachingdynamicsshapingthisuncertaineraarelikelytoremaininfluentialinthecomingyears.Thefollowingsectionswillexplorethesedynamics,

providingtheglobalcontextforthethreethemesandtheassociatedninetrendsdiscussedlaterinthereport.

4TRENDSINFOCUS2025

Populationchangesandhealth:

respondingtoageing,migrationandurbanisation

Globalpopulationgrowthisslowingdown,withmanycountriesfacingageingand,insomecases,decliningpopulations.ThisdemographicshiftisparticularlynoticeableindevelopedregionssuchasWesternEuropeandEastAsia.Atthesametime,urbanisationisaccelerating,leadingtomorepeoplelivingindenselypopulatedcities.Urbanareaswillfacegrowingpressuretoadapt,astheymustsupportgrowingpopulationswithoutcompromisingthequalityoflife.3

Moreover,theurbanmiddleclassisexpectedtoexpand,especiallyinAsia,whichwillreshape

consumermarketsandinfluencesocialexpectations.Incontrast,regionslikeSub-SaharanAfricaarelikelytoexperiencesignificantmigrationflowsduetolimitedeconomicopportunitiesand

theeffectsofclimatechange.Muchofthismigrationwillbedirectedtowardsageing,developedcountries,resultinginwide-rangingimpactsondemographictrendsandlabourmarkets.4

Asglobalpopulationsage,ratesofchronicandnoncommunicablediseasessuchasdiabetes,cardiovascularconditionsandobesitywillcontinuetorise.Healthsystemsareincreasingly

strainedastheystrivetoaddressthecomplexneedsofolderadultswhilealsoaddressingbroaderpopulationhealthdeclines.5

5

Changingclimate,changinglives:

respondingtoenvironmentalthreats

Climatechangeandenvironmentaldeclinearefundamentallyalteringsocietiesworldwide.

Ongoinghumanactivitiesaredrivingglobal

warming,leadingtomorefrequentandsevereextremeweatherevents,risingsealevelsandthedepletionofvitalnaturalresources.Thesechangesthreatenfoodandwatersecurity,

endangercoastalandurbancommunitiesandacceleratethelossofbiodiversity.6

Despiteprogresstowarddecarbonisationand

moresustainablepractices,significantobstacles

Climatechangeis

contributingtogreater

migration,exposing

populationstonewhealththreatsandincreasing

theriskofemerging

infectiousdiseasesandfuturepandemics.

remain,includingcontinueddependenceonfossilfuelsandslowpolicyimplementation.Moreover,globaltensionsmakeitmorechallengingtocoordinateresponsestoclimatechallenges.Asaresult,climatechangeiscontributingtogreatermigration,exposingpopulationstonewhealththreatsandincreasingtheriskofemerginginfectiousdiseasesandfuturepandemics.7

Geopoliticalcompetition:adaptingtoshiftingglobalpowerdynamics

Geopoliticalcompetitionisintensifyingasestablishedpowerstructuresshiftandthemultilateralsystemfacesgrowingchallenges.Bothstatesandnon-stateactorsareincreasinglyforming

flexible,issue-drivencoalitions,makingglobalpartnershipsmorefluidandunpredictable.Atthesametime,technologicaladvancesarecreatingnewarenasofcompetitionforresourcesandinfluence,bothinspecificgeographicalregions(suchastheArctic)andinbroaderdomains(likespaceandcyberspace).8

China’srapideconomicgrowthischallengingtheUS-ledinternationalorderandprompting

astrategicpivottowardstheIndo-Pacific.Concurrently,countriessuchasRussia,Iranand

NorthKoreaarebecomingmoreassertiveinopposingWesternvaluesandinterests,whichis

contributingtoglobaltensions.Inresponse,Europeanstatesandlike-mindedpartners,such

asAustralia,JapanandSouthKorea,arestrengtheningcooperationandinvestinginshared

capabilities.However,multilateralorganisationsarestrugglingtokeeppacewiththediversityandcomplexityofemergingthreats.9

Additionalcomplicationsintheinternationallandscapeincludeclimatechange,technological

rivalryandideologicaldivisions,allofwhichenablemiddlepowerstoassertthemselves.Asa

result,achievingconsensuswithinmultilateralinstitutionsisbecomingincreasinglycomplex,anddemocraticsystemsfacemountingpressures.10

6TRENDSINFOCUS2025

Economicuncertainty:navigatingincreasingcompetition

Theglobaleconomyisfacinggrowinginstabilityduetogeopoliticalrivalries,climatechallengesanddemographicshifts.RecenteventssuchastheCOVID-19pandemic,regionalconflictsand

disruptionstosupplychainshaveexposedcriticalweaknessesininternationaleconomicsystemsandhighlightedtherisksassociatedwithglobalinterdependence.11

Demandforenergyandnaturalresourcesisrising,fuelledbypopulationgrowth,evolving

industrialactivityandtherequirementsofemergingtechnologies.Meetingthisdemandwillrequireafundamentaltransformationintheenergymix,necessitatingagreaterrelianceonrenewableresources,advancedenergystoragesolutionsandinnovativeenergymanagementstrategiestoensuresupplysecurityandenhanceclimateresilience.12

Lookingahead,competitionforstrategicresourcesandtechnologiesisexpectedtointensify.

Countriesareincreasinglydiversifyingtheirsupplychainsandforgingneweconomicpartnershipstosecureaccesstoessentialgoodsandcriticalminerals.13Asgeopoliticaltensionsescalate,

globalproductionnetworksarebecomingmorefragmented,raisingthepotentialforadditionaldisruptionsandmakingresilienceakeypriorityforpolicymakersandbusinesses.14

7

Theglobalimpactoftechnology:

navigatingopportunitiesandrisks

Whilethespreadoftechnologyisempoweringmorepeopleandorganisations,italsoraisesnewconcernsaboutunequalaccess,ethicaldilemmasandthepotentialformisuse.Thetechnologylandscapeisbecomingincreasinglyfragmented,whichdeepensregionaldifferencesin

standards,regulationsandinfrastructure.Policymakersandregulatorsfacemountingchallengesinkeepingupwiththerapidpaceoftechnologicalchangeacrossallsectors.Thisacceleration

widensgapsinoversightandgovernance,heighteningtherisksassociatedwithunevenadoptionandinconsistentimplementationofemergingtechnologies.15

Technologicalinnovationsandshiftingsocietalexpectationsare,forinstance,redefiningthe

workplace.Thegrowingadoptionofartificialintelligence(AI),includingincreasinglyautonomousoragenticAIsystems,offerssignificantopportunitiestoboostproductivity,createnewtypesofjobsandaddresslabourshortages.However,italsoposesrisksofjobdisplacement,widening

skillsgaps,andchallengesinensuringfairandethicaldeploymentacrosstheworkforce.Lifelonglearningandflexibleeducationpathwaysarebecomingincreasinglyessentialasdigitalplatformsexpandaccesstotrainingandknowledge.Thesechangesareinfluencingcareertrajectories,

workforcecompositionandrelationshipsbetweenemployersandemployees.16

Inotherareas,weareseeingmajorscienceandtechnologyadvancesthatcanhelpwiththeprevention,timelydiagnosisandbettertreatmentofbothchronicandinfectious

diseases.Developmentsincludenovellifescienceparadigms(e.g.genomicmedicineand

pharmacogenomics,syntheticbiology,regenerativemedicine)andinnovationinhealth

technologies(e.g.digitalinnovationsupportingremotemonitoringofpatients,digitaltherapeuticsformentalhealth,roboticsurgery).Innovationssuchasthesehavethepotentialtoprovidemorepersonalisedcare,keeppeopleoutofhospital,andtacklemajorpublichealthchallengeslike

cancer,obesityandmentalhealth.However,theyalsoraisequestionsabouthowhealthsystemscanaffordnoveldiagnosticsandtreatmentsthatinnovationismakingareality.17

ThedynamicsoutlinedabovepresentacomplexsetofchallengesforEuropeanpolicymakerstocontendwith,andmuchhasbeenwrittenabouteach.Inwhatfollowsweoutlineninefurther

trendswhicharemostdirectlypertinenttoEuropeinthecomingyear,andwhichriskbeingoverlookedasgovernmentsandpublicattentionpivotfromoneshort-termcrisistothenext.

8TRENDSINFOCUS2025

9

Balancingsecurityandsociety

Defencespendingwilllikelycontinueincreasing

significantlyamongEuropeancountriesinthecomingyears.Facedwithanincreasinglyhostileinternationalenvironment,NATOalliescommittedinJuly2025

toinvestingtheequivalentof5percentofGross

DomesticProduct(GDP)annuallyondefenceand

security-relatedspendingby2035.18Thiscommitmentrepresentsasignificantincreasefromcurrent

spendinglevelsformostEuropeanNATOmembers,comparedtothepreviousspendingtargetsetat2

percentofGDP.Decisionmakersfacetheenormouschallengeofdeliveringtheseincreaseswithout

exacerbatingothermajoreconomic,environmentalandsocialtrends.

10TRENDSINFOCUS2025

TREND1:

Defencespending

exacerbatespressures

onpublicfinancesanddebt

However,therecentlyannouncedlong-termdefencespendingrequiresaccompanyingeconomicreforms.Allocatingalargerproportionofpublicfundstodefencewillnecessitatesignificantcutsinotherareasofpublicspending,highertaxesorrisingpublicdebt.SuchcutbackscomeatatimewhenseveralEuropeancountriesarealreadygrapplingwithhighdeficitsanddebtlevels,althoughthesituationvariesacrossEurope.Asofearly2025,theaveragedebt-to-GDPratiowasaround88percent,withFrancereaching114percent.19

Moreover,publicfinancesarealreadyunderpressurefromthecostsassociatedwithpensionsandhealthcare,aswellasthetransitiontoagreenereconomyandincreasedgovernment

borrowingexpenses,whicharefurtherstrainedinsomeareasbyCOVID-19recoveryefforts.20Thesecompetingdemandsforpublicresourcesmayputvariouspublicservicesatrisk(e.g.

healthcare,socialservices,education),makingitchallengingtomeetallsocial,environmentalandsecurityobjectives.

FIGURE1.AVERAGEGOVERNMENTDEBTAS%OFGDP,EUROAREA20(SINCE1JANUARY2000)

100

95

90

Percentage

85

80

75

70

65

2000200220042006200820102012201420162018202020222024

Governmentdebt(consolidated)(as%ofGDP),Euroarea20,Annual

Source:EuropeanCentralBank(ECB).ECBDataPortal,28August2025,09:17CET.

11

TREND2:

Defencespendingcouldfueldiscontentandpolarisation

ThereisnocleareconomicconsensusontheimpactofincreaseddefencespendingonGDP.

Whilesomestudieshavearguedthatdefencespendingstimulatesaggregatedemandby

drivingjobs,investmentandthereforegrowth,othershaveemphasisedthatdefenceinvestmentrepresentsanopportunitycost,comingattheexpenseofhigherproductivity-generating

investmentelsewhereintheeconomythatisnotreliantongovernmentstimulus.21Defence

spendingmayalsogeneratesubstantialenvironmentalconcerns,which,togetherwithpotentiallymodest22economicgrowthimpacts,itwillseriouslytestthepossibilityofmaintainingabroad

consensusaboutdefencespending.23

Theopportunitycostsassociatedwithincreaseddefencespendingmayalsoincrease

downstreamsecurityrisks.OneexampleistheUK’sdecisiontofundincreaseddefencespendingbycuttingitsoverseasaidbudget,whichcouldimpactbroadersecurity.Additionally,challengesacrossthedefenceacquisitionsystemcurrentlychallengeitscapacitytotranslatefundingintoaclearoperationaladvantage.24

Asaresult,defencespendingmaybecomeacontroversialanddestabilisingsocietalissueinthecomingyears,particularlyifitscurrentsupportdiminishes,leadingtoconflictsofinterestamongvotersandprovidingfertilegroundforpartisanpolitics.

12TRENDSINFOCUS2025

TREND3:

Militarybuild-upintensifiesinfluenceoperations

Thecaseforincreasingpublicspendingondefencecanbedifficulttomake,asitsvaluecanfeelmoreabstractthanthatofotherinvestmentssuchasinfrastructureprojects.25Severalfactors

influencehowdifferentcommunitiesinvariouscountriesperceivethedirectandindirectvalue

ofdefence,includingtheirperceptionofthethreatlevel.26Forexample,defencespendingin

PolandandtheBalticstatesissignificantlyhigherthanelsewhereinEuropeduetotheimmediateperceivedthreatfromRussia.Atthesametime,conceptslikethevalueofdeterrencearealmostimpossibletocalculate.27

Continuedpublicsupportfordefencespendingisthereforeparticularlyvulnerabletodisinformation.Ifnoteffectivelycountered,AI-superchargeddisinformationmayhaveadestabilisingeffecton

nationalsecurity.28Adversariesmayincreasinglyusemessagesandnarrativesthatdividesocietiesbyexploitingexistingtensions.29Adversariescouldplausiblyusethisasadeliberatetacticto

underminethecaseforEuropeanmilitarycapabilitydevelopmentatsource.

13

Whataretheimplications?

Governmentsmustclearlyarticulateandadvocatefortheholisticvalueofdeterrenceand

defence.Effectivepublicengagementbygovernmentandarmedforcesthroughregular,

impactfulcommunicationcampaignsiscrucialforachievinghighlevelsofmassparticipation

andstrengtheningsocietalresilience.30Ifthepublicisunclearaboutwhatistrulyworthdefendingorfightingfor,adversariesmayassumethatademocraticstatewillconsiderallpolicyoptions

exceptresistancetoarmedaggression.Thismisperceptioncouldweakendeterrenceefforts.31Therefore,messagingstrategiesmustbecoherentandcoordinatedwithallieswhilealso

addressingthespecificneedsandprioritiesofindividualcommunities.32

Whydoesthismatter?

Asthegeopoliticallandscapeevolves,governmentsmustincreasinglyprioritisedefencespendingwhilerecognisingthechallengingeconomicdecisionsthiswillentail.Complicatingthissituationistherapidtransformationinmilitarytechnologies,alongsidepersistentstructuralissuesacrossthedefence-industrialbaseandtheacquisitionsystem.Together,thesefactorscreateacomplexscenariothatcouldhinderrearmamenteffortsandexacerbatesocietaldividesregardingdefence.AsignificantpartofthesolutionliesinEuropeanalliescollaboratingmoreeffectively,leveragingtheirrespectiveindustrialstrengthsandenhancingcross-bordercooperation.Thisapproachmayinvolvenewmultilateralfinancingmodels33andtargetedinnovationfundingtogainadvantagesandachievescalability.Inaddition,activecivicengagementandaheightenedfocusonsocietalresiliencewillbecrucial.Governmentsshouldavoidthetemptationtoviewdefencespending

asa‘silverbullet’forprosperity,andconcentrateinsteadontheprosperitythatemergesfrommaintainingasecureinternationalenvironment.

‘Ashiftinggeopoliticalenvironmentincreasinglyrequiresustoappreciatethecomplextrade-offsassociatedwithincreaseddefencespending,whilstsafeguardingtheprosperitythatasecureinternationalenvironmentunderpins.’

StuartDee

ResearchLeader,DefenceEconomics&Acquisition

14TRENDSINFOCUS2025

15

Challengesofa

disconnectedyouth

Youngergenerationsfaceastarksetofchallenges,includinglimitedsocialmobility,34risingrelative

childpoverty35andanincreasingrelianceonsocialanddigitalmedia.Theeffectsmanifestinvarious

ways,includinggrowinglevelsofeconomicinactivityamongthoseaged18–24,ariseinviolenceamongyoungpeople36anddecliningmentalhealthamongadolescents.

Earlylifeexperienceshaveaprofoundimpactona

person’slong-termqualityoflife.However,fundingforyouthsupportservicesisdeclining,exacerbatingtheexistingchallenges.Forexample,spendingonyouthserviceshasdroppedby50percentfrom2013/14

to2023/24,andaccesstomentalhealthservices

remainslow,withonlyhalfofchildrenreferredtotheseservicesintheUKactuallyreceivingtreatment.Atthesametime,thenumberofreferralsincreasedby105percentfrom2013/14to2023/24intheUK.37SimilarchallengesintheEUexist,withmentalhealthservicesremaininginsufficienttoaddressthegrowingdemandforsuchservicesforchildren.38

16TRENDSINFOCUS2025

TREND1:

Deterioratingmentalhealthamidincreasedrelianceonsocialmedia

Thereisalongstandingconnectionbetweentheincreasinguseofsocialanddigitalmediaandthedeclineinmentalhealthamongadolescentsandyoungadults.39Astaggering97percent

ofyoungpeopleintheEUusetheinternetdaily,primarilytomaintainsocialrelations,regulatetheiremotionsandmakelifedecisions.40IntheUK,childrenaged5to15nowspendmorethan5hoursonsocialmediaonadailybasis.41Consequently,theeffectsofdigitaltechnologiesaremostpronouncedamongthisagegroup.Recentstudieshaveshownthatrisingsocialmedia

usageislinkedtogreatersocialpolarisationaswellashigherratesofdepression,anxiety,self-harmandsuicideamongadolescentsandyoungadults.42Onereviewstudyfoundthatadirectcorrelationbetweenheavysocialmediauseandanincreasednumberofsuicideattempts,whileminimalornouseofsocialmediawasassociatedwithfewersuicideattempts.43

Digitaltechnologiescanalsohavesignificantphysicalconsequences.Arecentstudyshowsthatdigitaltechnologiescancontributetoviolence,particularlyviolenceagainstwomenandgirls

(VAWG),byfacilitatingthespreadofmisogynisticcontent.44Between2018and2023,crimesrelatedtoVAWGincreasedby37percentintheUK.45

AlthoughtechnologyisconstantlyevolvingandnewtoolssuchasAIandLLMsarebecoming

available,welackaclearunderstandingofhowincreasedrelianceondigitaltechnologiesaffectsyoungpeopleandinfluencestheirlong-termdevelopment.Thisuncertaintyincludesareassuchascognition,learning,socialrelations,mentalhealthandresilience,amongothers.Therefore,

moreresearchisneededtofullyunderstandhowdigitalmediaandnewtechnologiesimpactnotonlychildrenandadolescentsinthelongterm,butalsohowtheyshapeoursociety’sfuture.

17

TREND2:

Economicinactivityand

decreasingschoolattendance

Decliningschoolattendanceandincreasingeconomicinactivity–wherepeopleareneither

workingnoractivelyseekingemployment–amongyoungpeopleintheUKandotherdevelopedcountriesarealsoconcerningtrends.46InEngland,schoolabsencelevelshavemorethandoubledsincebeforethepandemic.Moreover,exclusionshaverisenby21percent,andhomeschoolinghasincreasedby20percentoverthepastyear.47Whiledecreasingfundingineducationin

Englandsince2010couldbeoneofthedrivers,thereislimitedevidenceavailableaboutthe

underlyingcausesofthesetrends.48Nevertheless,theyimpactarangeofchildren’soutcomes,includingtheirlong-termeconomicprospects.Thiscould,inturn,hinderthecountry’slong-termeconomicgrowth.49

Forinstance,youngpeoplewhoarefrequentlyabsentfromschoolarethreetimesmorelikely

tobecomeinvolvedincrimebytheageof17thanthosewhoattendschoolfull-time.50Reducedschoolattendancealsolimitschildren’seducationalattainmentprospectsandnegativelyaffectstheirjobprospects.51Furthermore,individualswithlowereducationalattainmentarelesslikelytobeineducation,employmentortrainingasadolescentsandyoungadults.52

Accordingtoa2025report,one-quarterofeconomicallyinactivepeopleintheUKwhoarenotworkingduetohealthreasonsareunder35.53WhilethenumberofyoungpeopleintheUKwhoareNotInEducation,EmploymentorTraining(NEET)increasedto13.4percentin2024amongthoseaged16–24,54thisfigurehasdecreasedinEuropesince2014(11percentofthoseaged15–29in2024),despiteatemporaryincreaseoverthepandemic.55

FIGURE2.PERSISTENTABSENCEOVERTIME

2,000,000

Numberofpersistentlyabsentpupils

1,500,000

1,000,000

500,000

0

2014/152015/162016/172017/182018/192019/202020/212021/222022/232023/24Source:CentreforSocialJustice

18TRENDSINFOCUS2025

TREND3:

Children’sinvolvementinviolence

Thepastdecadehasseenaworryingincreaseinchildren’sinvolvementinviolenceinEurope,

particularlyintheUKandNordiccountries.56Severalcomplexfactorsunderliethistrend,includingsocialinequalities,increasingchildpoverty,limitedaccesstoyouthandcommunityservices,

andincreaseduseofdigitalmediaforrecruitmentbyorganisedcrimegroups,amongothers.57IntheUK,forexample,thenumberofchildrenaged10–14suspectedofbeinginvolvedinviolentcrimeincreasedby38percentbetween2020and2023,althoughthisfigureremainslowerthanitwasin2019.IntheUS,thenumberofhomicidesperpetratedbyjuvenilessurgedby65per

centbetween2016and2022.58InEnglandandWales,thetotalnumberofhomicidesamong

thoseaged13–19was64percenthigherin2023/24thanin2013/14.59Furthermore,halfofthechildrenservingcustodialsentencesintheUKarealsoabsentfromschool,whichnegatively

impactstheireducationalattainmentandeconomicprospects–therebyincreasingtheirriskoffutureinvolvementincrime.60

However,mostsectorsthataimtoprotectchildren,suchasyouthservices,arefacingsignificantbudgetarypressuresintheUK,whileaccesstosuchservicesisincreasingintheEU.61

Additionally,thecriminaljusticesystemevidencessignificantracialdisproportionality.62Thereisariskthatthesetrendswillcontinuetoworseninthecomingyearsanddecades,drivenbyrisingschoolabsenteeism,increasingchildp