LaurelHillAdvisoryGroup

LetterfromthePresident

Ifwehadtodescribethe2025proxyseasoninoneword,“uncertainty”wouldberightatthetopofthelist.Frompoliticaltransitions(onbothsidesoftheborder)toglobaltariffs,toanti-DEIdevelopments,tomarketvolatility,thedesireforclaritywasaconstantfrom

bothissuersandinvestorsalike.LaurelHillworkedcloselywithourclientstohelpthemnavigatetheseuncertainwaters.Intheend,forthemostpart,thesedynamicsledtoa

relativelycautiousandquietproxyseason.Ofcourse,thisisnottosaythatallshareholdermeetingswereuneventful!

W

henweinitiallydeveloped

theTrendsinCorporate

GovernanceReport11years

ago,theintentwastoshareourexperiencesandinsightswithourclientstoassistthem

inpreparingfortheupcomingproxy

season.Thisresourcestartedasasixsummaryreportbuthasevolvedintotwoannualdocuments,theTrendsinCorporateGovernanceReportandtheTrendsin

ShareholderActivismReport.Bothreportsofferapproximately40pagesofin-depthdata,analysisandinsights.Butwhilethesepublicationshavegrownindepthand

scope,wecontinuetofocusonprovidingboardsandmanagementteamswith

practicalinsightsandtakeaways.

This11thannualTrendsinCorporate

GovernanceReportcoverspreviousand

developingtrendsandareasofissuerandinvestorinterest,includingcontinuedinvestor

scrutinyofdirectorelections,ongoing

concernswithlong-tenuredauditors,

improvedlevelsofsupportforsay-on-payandequitycompensationplans,greater

focusonracialdiversity,increasednumbersofshareholderproposalsbutreduced

averagesupport,andpushbackagainstvirtual-onlymeetings.

Lastyear,wenotedthetrendofrising

directorcompensation.Director

compensationhas,infact,increased

26%overthepastsixyearsand6%

from2024.Inthelargercontextof

executivecompensation,directorpay

hasnotbeencontentiousexceptfora

fewextremeoutliers.However,with

directorcompensationontheriseandtheproliferationofcustominvestorpolicies,wemayseeincreasedscrutinygoingforward.

ESG-focusedinvestingappearstohave

reachedamaturationpointinrecentyears.Atthesametime,USanti-DEIexecutive

orderssawmaiorproxyadvisoryfirmsandassetmanagersretreatfromwell-defineddiversityrequirements,thoughconfined

mainlytoUScompanies.SomeCanadianissuersdid,infact,pullbackfromDEI

commitmentsand/ordisclosures.Morebroadly,however,issuersmustcontinuetobeawareofandactivelymanageESGrisksandopportunities.Trendingtopics

in2025includeracialdiversity,boardoversightofclimaterisks,cybersecurity,artificialintelligence,andhumancapitalmanagement.

LaurelHillcontinuestobethefirmofchoiceforCanadianissuers.Weareatrusted

AGMandyear-roundgovernancepartnertoleadingcompanies.Weactonmore

friendlyandcontestedM&Atransactionsthananyotherprovider.Andweareahighlysought-afterstrategicadvisorinshareholderactivismsituations.

Wetakegreatprideinthedepth,diversity,andstabilityoftheLaurelHillteam.Aswe

continuetogrowourteamandmaintain

ourleadingpositioninCanada,weremainfocusedonourcorevaluesofintegrity,clientfocusandcollaboration,andonprovidingindustry-leadingadvice,insights,and

execution.Aswesay,“Whenyoudotherightthings,therightthingshappen.”

OnbehalfofLaurelHill,IappreciatethetrustourclientsandsupportersacrosscorporateCanadaputinusforeachcampaignand

thankyouforyourongoingsupport.

Wewelcomeyourfeedbackonourreportandlookforwardtoworkingwithyouasyoupreparefor2026.

Sincerely,

DavidSalmonPresident

October2025

2LaurelHillAdvisoryGroup

TableofContents

4

5

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8

12

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15

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24

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26

33

35

Canada's#1

ProviderOverall

GovernanceTrendsataGlance

TheVotingLandscape

ElectionofDirectorsatUncontestedMeetings

AppointmentofAuditors

Non-EmployeeDirector(NED)Compensation

ExecutiveCompensationand

ManagementSay-on-PayResolutions

EquityCompensationPlans

ShareholderProposals

Say-on-Climate

VirtualMeetings

2025TrendsinESG

ProxyAdvisorVotingPolicyUpdates

NotesonDataandMethodology

TrendsinCorporateGovernance20253

4LaurellHillAdvisoryGrrooup

Canada’s#1ProviderOverall:

LaurelHillconsistentlyleadsthefieldinthenumberofpubliclydisclosed

shareholdercommunicationsadvisory,proxysolicitation,andinformation

agentservicesmandates,includingactingonmanyofCanada’slargestandmostcomplexannualmeetings,M&Atransactions,andactivismfiles.In2024,weactedon38%ofallpubliclydisclosedmandates.

#1

PROXYSOLICITORINCANADAOVERALL

2024BYBLOOMBERGGLOBALACTIVISM

LEAGUETABLES

250+

YEARSOFCOMBINED

INDUSTRYEXPERIENCEWITHUNMATCHEDTEAMDEPTH,

EXPERIENCE,ANDSTABILITY

ACTEDON46%FRIENDLY&CONTESTEDTRANSACTIONMANDATESINCANADA

46%

AGM,GOVERNANCE&

COMPENSATIONPARTNERTOCANADA’SLEADING

71%

COMPANIES

ACTEDON71%HOSTILEBIDSANDMINI-TENDEROFFERSSINCE2016

TrendsinCorporateGovernance20255

GovernanceTrendsataGlancefor

S&P/TSXCompositeIndexCompanies

VOTEPARTICIPATIONRATE

Auditors’Resolution

Directors’Resolution

FEMALEREPRESENTATIONONBOARDS

%ofBoardswith30%ormorewomen%ofFemaleDirectors

AVERAGENON-EMPLOYEE

DIRECTORTOTALCOMPENSATION

Avg.NEDTotalComp.

AVERAGESUPPORTFORTHEELECTIONOFDIRECTORS

VotesFOR

VISIBLEMINORITYOR

INDIGENOUSDIRECTORS

%ofCompaniesMeetingISS'RacialDiversityPolicy

%ofVisibleMinorityandIndigenousDirectors

FAILEDSAY-ON-PAYRESOLUTIONS

FailedSay-on-PayResolutions

AVERAGESUPPORTFORAUDITORS

AverageSupportforAuditors

TERMLIMITAND

RETIREMENTPOLICIES

TermLimit(%)

MandatoryRetirementAge(%)

AVERAGESUPPORTFORSAY-ON-PAY

AverageSupportforSay-on-Pay

6LaurelHillAdvisoryGroup

TheVotingLandscape

Successfulshareholdermeetingsaremarked,amongotherthings,bytheidentificationandmanagementofrisks,includinghowtheyrelatetoshareholdercomposition,mechanics,andthenarrative.

Theprimaryshareholdercompositionfactorsthatshouldbeconsideredare:

?Whatpercentageofvotesareheldby:

-institutionalinvestors

-insiders

-retailshareholders

?Whatpercentageofshareseligibletovoteareexpectedtovote?

?WhatistheexpectedinfluenceofISSandGlassLewis(when

referredtotogether,the“proxyadvisors”)onthesharesexpectedtovote?

?Willtherebeanynegativerecommendationsfromtheproxyadvisors?

?Howmuchoppositioncouldtherebebecauseofinstitutionalinvestorcustomvotingpolicies?

Historicalvoteparticipationtendstoprovideastrongstartingpointforvotinginsightsandanalysis.Thehigherthehistoricalparticipation,thelesssensitivetheoverallsupportforanyresolutionwouldbetoadissentingvoiceoranegativerecommendationfromoneoftheleadingproxyadvisors.Forinstance,with80%voteparticipation,noactivesolicitationstrategy,andanegativerecommendationfromGlassLewis,where20%oftheissuedandoutstandingsharesfollowtheirresearch,theexpectedvotesfortheresolutionwouldbeabout75%(i.e.,20%ofthe80%wouldbeexpectedtovoteagainst).Ontheotherhand,ifhistoricalvoteparticipationisonlyabout50%,that20%blockofGlassLewissubscribersrepresentsabout2in5votescast,whichisgoingtoputthatresolutioninthedangerzone.

Boardsshouldalsobeclearaboutwhatlevelofsupportthey

findacceptable.Theboardmightconsideravotefallingshortof

unanimoussupportaproxyforboardfailureandpulloutallthestopstoavoidtheresolutiongettinglessthan80%,oreven90%.

Alargebaseofengagedshareholdersputsissuersinthebest

positionpossible.ThefollowingsectionshowsthetrendinoverallvoteparticipationandhowhistoricalvoteparticipationisdistributedacrosstheCompositeIndex.

VoteParticipationintheCompositeIndex

Thetwomeasuresofvoteparticipationatannualmeetingsare:

?“total”participation,asmeasuredbytheappointmentofauditors’resolution;and

?“actual”participation,whichcanbemeasuredbyanynon-routineresolution,usuallytheelectionofdirectors’resolution.

TheprimarydifferencebetweenthesevoteparticipationmeasuresisthatcertainUSbrokershavethediscretiontocast“brokernon-votes”

onbehalfofthebeneficialownersfornon-routineresolutions,such

astheappointmentofauditors’resolutions.Brokernon-votesare

intendedtoassistissuersinmeetingquorumrequirements.ThehighertheretailownershipbyUScustodialhouses,thewiderthegaptendstobebetweenvotescastontheauditors’resolutionandthedirectors’resolution.Intermsofthinkingabouttheriskofaresolutionfailing,

itismorehelpfultosolelyfocusontheactualvoteparticipationasmeasuredbyvotescastonthedirectors’resolution,asthisistherealindicatorofactiveshareholderparticipation.

AVERAGEVOTEPARTICIPATION

AveragevoteparticipationacrosstheS&P/TSXCompositeIndex(theCompositeIndex)isupaboutapercentagepointin2025,bothfordiscretionarybrokernon-votesandnon-discretionaryvoting,buthasgenerallystayedsteadyoverrecentyears.

aaAuditors’ResolutionmmDirectors’Resolution

DISTRIBUTIONOFVOTEPARTICIPATIONINTHECOMPOSITEINDEX

Asshownabove,onaverage,companiesgetabout70%ofeligiblevotescastattheirmeeting.However,thechartbelowshowsthevotedistributionacrossCompositeIndexcompanies.

<40%(Low)40-60%(Medium)60-80%(High)>80%(VeryHigh)

About5%ofCompositeIndexcompanieshavevoteparticipationlowerthan40%.Thisgroupofcompaniescarriesthehighestriskoffailedvotesanddissidentactions.Forwould-bedissidents,thebarisrelativelylowtoundertakeanactivistcampaignsuccessfully.This

TrendsinCorporateGovernance20257

proportionofcompaniesisdownconsiderablyfromlastyear,whenabout9%ofcompanieswereinthisgroup.

Aboutaquarterofcompaniesareinthemid-range,with40%

to60%voteparticipation,andabout70%ofcompanieshave

greaterthan60%voteparticipation.Companieswithgreaterthan

80%voteparticipationoftenhavedual-classsharestructures,are

highlyinstitutionalorhaveasingledominantholder,essentially

guaranteeingthevoteoutcome,exceptincaseswhereamajorityoftheminorityvoteisrequired,suchasafundamentalM&Atransaction.Examplesinclude:

?HydroOne,Ontario’sregulatedelectricitytransmissionand

distributioncompany,wheretheProvinceofOntarioownsabout47%oftheshares.

?RogersCommunications,wheretheRogersfamilycontrolsabout97%ofthevotingpowerthroughthedual-classsharestructure.

?ToycompanySpinMaster,wherethefoundershaveover95%votingpowerthroughadual-classsharestructure.

Issuerswithstrongvoteparticipationcanmoreeasilyabsorb

adversevotesthanissuerswithlowparticipation.Issuerswithlowparticipationarealsohighlyvulnerabletooppositionand,insomecasesmayevenbetargetedbyactivistshareholders.

ThePass-ThroughVotingRedHerring

TheBigThreeindexfundmanagers(BlackRockInc.,Vanguard

Associates,andStateStreetGlobalAdvisors)havealwayscastalongshadowwiththeirproxyvotingpower.Followingincreasedpoliticalpressureonthatconcentrationofinfluence,theBig

Threehaverespondedwithsimilarofferingstounwindvoting

decisionsfromtheirinternalstewardshipgroupstotheunderlyingshareholders.Despitetheuncertaintyandconcernabouttheimpactthiswouldhaveontheproxyvotinglandscape,itseffectsareyettobefeltinCanada.

TheBigThreehavetakenslightlydifferentapproachestothesame

concept;eachhaveprovidedamenuofdifferentproxyvoting

policiesthatcanbeappliedfortheirproportionalholding,includingbenchmarkandsubsetvotingpoliciesfromISS,GlassLewis,and

Egan-Jones,theirinternalstewardshipgroup’srecommendation,inadditiontoblanketpolicieslike“board-aligned”thatwillsimplyvotewithmanagement’srecommendation,or“mirror”policiesthatvoteinproportiontotheothersharessubmittedbytheassetmanager.

Vanguardevenbrieflyoffereda“donotvote”policy.

ImpactinCanadahasbeenmutedforafewreasons.First,therolloutoftheseprogramshasgenerallybeenlimitedtopooledinstitutionalfundswithinspecificfunds.ForVanguardFunds,usingtherollout,Canadianexposureisbelow0.1%onanasset-weightedbasis.StateStreet’s

versionhasbeenlimitedtoUSregisteredfunds(ofwhichthereisnoCanadianfocusedfund)andunregisteredUKandLuxembourgfunds,withonlysmallCanadianweightingsinsomeglobalindexfunds.

Second,amongthefundswheretheoptionhasbeenrolledout,thereisn’tstrongevidencethatshareholdersarelookingfora

greatdeparturefromthestatusquo.AccordingtodatareleasedfromVanguard,onanasset-weightedbasis,63.4%ofVanguard

shareholderselectedeitherthedefaultVanguardstewardship

teamvotepolicyorboard-supportpolicies.Thesetwopolicies

representadistinctionwithoutameaningfuldifference;onroutineitemslikeelectionsofdirectorsorsay-on-pay,Vanguardhasvotedinfavourofmanagement94.6%and98.7%ofthetimein2024,respectively,accordingtodatafromDiligent.Theremainderwereatthemoreextremepoles,with20.7%selectingtheanti-ESG

Egan-JonesWealth-Focusedpolicy,and15.9%choosingtheGlassLewisESGpolicywhichmayrepresentsomewhatofanideologicalcounterbalance.

DataatthefundlevelislessavailablefromBlackRock;however,

oftheirindexequityundermanagement,lessthanhalfiseligible

forpass-throughvoting,andjust11%haveoptedin.Withsimilar

optionsasVanguard,amongthat11%thathaveoptedin,it’snot

unreasonabletopresumeasimilarproportionhavemaintainedthestatusquoorsubstantiallysimilaroptions,whichwouldsuggestlessthan5%oftheindexequitychoosingdifferentvotingpolicies,beforediscountingtheCanadianweightings.

Clearly,theimpactontheCanadianmarketisnegligibletoday,andwhileit’sentirelypossiblethatpass-throughvotingwillcontinuetoproliferatetoincludemorefundswithgreaterCanadianexposure,thecurrentdatashowsmassadoptionanddesireforradically

differentvotingoptionsremainunderwhelming.

WHATYOUNEEDTOKNOW

?Voteparticipationisiustunder70%acrosstheCompositeIndex.

?Pass-throughvotingincreases

uncertaintyabouthowproxyadvisor

recommendationswillinfluencevotes

heldbylargeassetmanagerssince

theunderlyingholdersmightvotein

alignmentwithadifferentvotingpolicy,however,theimpactdoesnotseemtobeoverlysignificant.

8LaurelHillAdvisoryGroup

ElectionofDirectorsatUncontestedMeetings

OverallVoteSupportforDirectors

AveragesupportfordirectorsofCompositeIndexcompanies

remainsveryhigh,justbelowthe97%mark.Thedropin2023

wasdrivenbyfourdirectorsreceivinglessthan55%support,thehighestnumberofsuchcasesacrossthesix-yearperiod.Supportreboundedin2024and2025asfewerdirectorsfacedsuchlowlevelsofbackingandnegativeproxyadvisorrecommendationsdeclined,suggestingthatreducedoppositionfromISSandGlassLewishelpedbolstervoteoutcomes.

Average%VotesFOR

NoCompositeIndexdirectorreceivedlessthan50%ofvotescastinfavouratuncontestedmeetingsinthefirsthalfof2025.However,thereweresomefailuresontheTSX,outsideoftheCompositeIndex.

ISSANDGLASSLEWISWITHHOLD/AGAINSTRECOMMENDATIONRATES

ISSAGA/WHRate%GLAGA/WHRate%

DIRECTORRESIGNATIONSINADVANCEOFBEINGDEFEATEDATTHEMEETING

Inthelasttwoyears,sevendirectorswithdrewtheirnominationsafterthecircularwaspublished,butbeforethemeeting.Fivewithdrawalswereforhealthreasonsorotherpersonalcircumstances.However,twoelectionwithdrawalscoincidedwithalackofsupportfortheirrespectivesay-on-payresolutions.

FirstMaiesticSilverCorp.,2024:FirstMajestichadbeenstrugglingtogetshareholdersupportforsay-on-paysinceits2022meeting.

Theproxyadvisorshavevotingpolicieswhichtargetcontinuing

compensationcommitteememberswithnegativerecommendationsifacompanyisassignedanagainstrecommendationfortwoormoreconsecutiveyears.Inthiscase,GlassLewishadtargetedcontinuingcompensationcommitteememberswithnegativerecommendationssince2023.GlassLewis'negativerecommendationsforthe

compensationcommitteeculminatedinthechairofthecompensationcommitteewithdrawinghisnominationimmediatelypriortothe

2024AGM,presumablytoavoidfailingatthemeeting.Theothercompensationcommitteememberwaselectedin2024,butwithonly57.4%ofvotescastinfavour.

OpenTextCorporation,2024:SimilartoFirstMajestic,OpenTexthadstruggledtogainsupportforitssay-on-payresolutionsince2022.Theresolutionfailedin2022,2023,andagainin2024,largelyduetoagainstrecommendationsfromtheproxyadvisors.In2024,both

theresolutionandthecontinuingcompensationcommitteemembersreceivedagainstrecommendations.Thechairofthecompensationcommitteeresignedinadvanceofthe2024meeting,andthe

remainingcommitteememberreceived86%support.

FAILEDDIRECTORS’ELECTIONSUNDERTHECBCA

Therewasacaseinthe2025proxyseasonwherethreedirectorsataCBCAissuerreceivedmorevotescast“against”than“for.”ThiscasedemonstrateswhatcanhappenunderthenewCBCAstatutoryvotingrequirementforuncontesteddirectorelections.

AmendmentstotheCanadaBusinessCorporationsAct(CBCA)thatimposedamajorityvotingrequirementwentliveonAugust31,2022.ReportingissuersformedundertheCBCAnowrequireshareholderstovote“for”or“against”individualdirectornomineesratherthan

“for”or“withhold”undertheTSXmajorityvotinganddirectorresignationpolicy.

The2022CBCArequirementcontainssomewhatsimilarprovisions

astheTSXmajorityvotingrulestoallowdirectorstoremaininofficeforalimitedtimeinexceptionalcircumstances.UndertheCBCA,ifanincumbentdirectorisnotelectedbyamajorityof“for”votesatthemeeting,theywillstillbepermittedtocontinueinofficeuntiltheearlierofi)the90thdayafterthedateoftheelection;orii)thedayonwhichtheirsuccessorisappointedorelected.

Inlimitedcircumstances,theelecteddirectorsmayalsoreappointtheincumbentdirectoreventhoughtheydidnotreceivemajoritysupport,namelyi)whereitisrequiredtosatisfytheCBCA’sCanadianresidencyrequirement;orii)whereitisrequiredtosatisfytheCBCA’srequirementthatatleasttwodirectorsofadistributingcorporationnotalsobe

officersoremployeesofthecorporationoritsaffiliates.

AttheArizonaMetalsCorp.AGMheldinJune2025,bothISSandGlassLewisrecommendedshareholdersvote“for”eachdirector.

However,threedirectorsreceivedmorevotescast“against”than“for”theirelection.

TrendsinCorporateGovernance20259

Accordingtothecompany’sSeptember15,2025newsreIease,1theaffecteddirectorstenderedtheirresignationseffectiveSeptember17,2025,butremainedontheboardtemporariIyaftertheAGMtoensureanorderIytransitionwhiIerepIacementswereidentified.AnewdirectorhassincebeenappointedtofiIIoneofthevacancies.

ThiscaseconfirmsthatundertheCBCA’s“for”and“against”votingframework,directorsnotre-eIectedmayremaininpIacebrieflytofaciIitatecontinuitybutmustuItimateIystepdownorberepIaced.

ExecutiveChairs

ThegeneraIIyacceptedideaIboardstructureisforthechairto

beentireIyindependentofthecompany.However,itmightmake

sensetohaveanexecutivechairincertaincircumstances.CommonexampIesincIudei)afounderwhoaIsoservesastheCEOand

whoisbestpositionedtoIeadthecompanyfromtheboardIeveI

inadditiontoIeadingfromtheexecutiveIeveI;orii)aformerCEO

whocontinuesasanexecutivechairtoprovideIeadershipduringatransitionperiodwiththenewCEO.TheIistgoesonwithaIternativestructuresandrationaIesamongissuersforhowtheroIesofchairandCEOcanbedividedorcombined.

Onethingisconsistentacrosstheproxyadvisorsandmany

institutionaIsharehoIders—theywiIIsupporttheseparationofthechairandCEOroIe.Theproxyadvisorsmay,andoftendo,supportacombinedchairandCEOroIewithcompeIIingrationaIeprovidedbytheissuer,butdonotrequireanysupportingexpIanationfortheseparationofthetworoIes.

The2025votingdatashowsthatsupportfornon-independentIeadershiproIes,suchasexecutivechair,generaIIyreceivesfewervotescastinfavourthanaIIotherdirectors.

BoardRole

AverageSupportin2025

AllDirectors

96.9%

Non-ExecutiveChair

95.0%

ExecutiveChair

93.5%

CEO&Director

98.2%

WhiIesupportisstiIIgeneraIIyhigh,thereisaminorityof

sharehoIderswhotargetthesedirectorsbecauseofconcernsoverindependentIeadership.

GenderDiversity

Forthefirsttimesincethediversityissuecametotheforefrontaboutadecadeago,therepresentationofwomenonboards,andthenumberofboardswithatIeast30%women,hassteadiIyincreasedeveryyear,untiI2025,whenitIeveIIedoff.

%ofFemaIeDirectors%ofBoardswith30%ormorewomen

ThepercentageofcompanieswithatIeast30%womenontheboardissteadyatiustbeIow92%andthenumberofaIIboardseatsheIdbywomenissteadyat38%.

WhiIethechartaboveshowsthatabout8%ofCompositeIndexcompaniesshouIdhavetriggerednegativerecommendations

fromtheproxyadvisorsforhavingIessthan30%ofboard

seatsoccupiedbywomen,manyissuersavaiIedthemseIvesof

exceptionsavaiIabIeineachvotingpoIicy.In2025,abouta

quarterofcompaniesnotmeetingthe30%requirementincIudedadditionaIdiscIosureintheircircuIartosatisfytheproxyadvisorsbystatingthatthecompanyhadtemporariIyfaIIenbeIowthe30%requirementandiscommittedtoachievingatIeast30%femaIe

representationbythenextannuaImeeting.

USVOTINGPOLICIESREMOVEDDIVERSITY

WhereasthegrowthintherepresentationofwomenonCanadianboardsappearstohaveIeveIIedoff,southoftheborder,diversitytooka180-degreeturnthisyear.

AftertakingofficeasUSPresidentonJanuary20,2025,DonaIdTrumpsignedseveraI“anti-DEI”executiveorders.

FoIIowingtheenactmentoftheseorders,ISSannouncedon

February11,2025,thatitwiIIindefiniteIyhaItconsiderationof

certaindiversityfactorsinmakingvoterecommendationsatissuerscoveredunderitsUSvotingpoIicyforaIImeetingsheIdonorafterFebruary25,2025.

OnMarch4,2025,GIassLewisnotifieditssubscribersthatwhiIetherewerenochangestoitsUSvotingpoIicy,anynegative

recommendationsmadebasedonaDEIissuewiIIbeflagged“ForYourAttention.”ThisflagwiIIaIIowcertainsubscribers,whoaresoincIined,toadiusttheirvotingdecisionsaccordingIy.

CANADIANISSUERVOTINGANDDISCLOSUREIMPACTS

IssuerscoveredbytheCanadianproxyadvisorvotingpoIicieswereIargeIyunaffectedinthe2025proxyseason.TheproxyadvisorscontinuedtoappIythediversityvotingpoIiciesasinpreviousyears,

1ArizonaMetaIs,“ArizonaMetaIsAnnouncesAppointmentofPameIaSaxtontoBoardofDirectors,”September15,2025,

https://www.arizonametaI/_resources/

news/nr-20250915.pdf

10LaurelHillAdvisoryGroup

andUS-basedassetmanagersappearedtocontinuevotingin

alignmentwiththelocalCanadianvotingpolicy.Issuersdual-listedinCanadaandtheUSfoundthemselvesinasituationwheretheyhadtocomplywithtwosomewhatconflictingsetsofdisclosureregimes.Generally,circularspublishedin2025dialedbacktheDEIdisclosuresectionstoavoidbeingmisalignedwiththeUSexecutiveorders,

whileatthesametimecontinuedtoreportaggregatestatisticsabouttherepresentationofwomenandotherdesignatedgroupstoadheretodisclosurerequirementsinCanada.

CHANGESTOINSTITUTIONALINVESTOR

VOTINGPOLICIES

WhilethereweresignificantchangestotheUSDEIvotingpoliciesforbothproxyadvisorsandinstitutionalinvestors,CanadianinstitutionalinvestorDEIvotingpoliciesaregenerallylessspecificthantheproxyadvisorvotingpolicies.Asaresult,wedidnotwitnessanymaior

changestoproxyadvisorpoliciesexcepttoframethediversityvotingpoliciesabout“identifyingoutliers”and“votinginalignmentwith

marketnorms.”Again,thisisanotherbalancingacttocontinuetocastvotesbasedondiversityintheCanadianmarketwithoutbeingoff-sideofUSrules.

RacialDiversity

TherewerenochangestotheproxyadvisorCanadianvotingpoliciesregardingracialdiversityin2025.SinceFebruary1,2024,ISShaslookedforatleastoneraciallydiverseorIndigenouspersonontheboardofCompositeIndexissuers,whileGlassLewiscontinuestonotmakevotingrecommendationsonthisbasis.Ofcourse,therewere

changesintheUSbecausethismatteristiedtotheanti-DEIexecutiveorders,butsofar,thereisnoindicationthatISSisgoingtoamenditsapproachintheCanadianmarket.Thechartbelowshowshowthe

proportionofCompositeIndexcompanieswithatleastoneraciallydiversedirectorcontinuestoincrease,andtheproportionofraciallydiverseorIndigenousdirectorscontinuestorise.

%ofVisibleMinorityandIndigenousDirectors

%ofCompaniesMeetingISS’RacialDiversityPolicy

BoardRenewal

(TermLimitsandMandatoryRetirementAgePolicies)

Generally,acompany’sapproachtoboardrenewalrarelygarnersnegativerecommendationsfromtheproxyadvisors;however,a

smallbutcommittedminorityofinstitutionalinvestorscontinuestocastnegativevotesforlong-tenureddirectors.Evenwiththelimitedattentionthatthisissuecommands,theaveragetermofCompositeIndexdirectorshasdecreasedsteadilyinthelastfewyears.This

indicatesacontinuedfocusonboardrenewalbygovernanceandnominatingcommitteesacrossthemarket.

AverageTerm<10years10-20years>20years

Theaveragetermin2025was6.8yearsacrossalldirectors,downfrom2020,whentheaveragetermwas7.5years.

Directorswiththelongestterm(greaterthan20yearsinthechartabove)continuetogetnoticeablylowervotesupporttha