ChapterFourCorporateGovernanceAroundtheWorldCopyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.ChapterOutlineGovernanceandthePublicCorporation:KeyIssuesTheAgencyProblemRemediesfortheAgencyProblemLawandCorporateGovernanceConsequencesofLawCorporateGovernanceReformTheDodd-FrankActSummary4-2Copyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.GovernanceandthePublicCorporation:

KeyIssuesJointlyownedbyamultitudeofshareholdersprotectedbylimitedliabilityMajororganizationalinnovationofvasteconomicconsequencesEfficientrisksharingmechanismthatallowscorporationstoraiselargeamountsofcapitalatrelativelylowcostsPivotalroleinspreadingeconomicgrowthandcapitalismworldwideforlastfewcenturies4-3Copyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.KeyweaknessistheconflictofinterestbetweenmanagersandshareholdersInprinciple,shareholderselecttheboardofdirectors,whichinturnhiremanagerstorunthecompanyInreality,management-friendlyinsidersoftendominatetheboardofdirectors,withrelativelyfewoutsidedirectorswhocanindependentlymonitorthemanagement4-4GovernanceandthePublicCorporation:

KeyIssues(Continued)Copyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.InthecaseofEnronandotherdysfunctionalcorporations,theboardsofdirectorsgrosslyfailedtosafeguardshareholderinterestsFurthermore,withdiffusedownership,fewshareholdershavestrongenoughincentivetoincurthecostsofmonitoringmanagementthemselveswhenthebenefitsfromsuchmonitoringaccruetoallshareholdersalike“Free-rider”problem4-5GovernanceandthePublicCorporation:

KeyIssues(Concluded)Copyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.TheAgencyProblemShareholdersallocatedecision-makingauthoritytothemanagersResidualcontrolrightsrefertotherighttomakediscretionarydecisionsunderthosecontingenciesthatarenotspecificallycoveredbyacontractManagerscanexercisesubstantialdiscretionoverthedispositionandallocationofinvestors’capitalInvestorsarenolongerassuredofreceivingfairreturnsontheirfunds4-6Copyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.TheAgencyProblem(Continued)Withthecontrolrights,managersmayallowthemselvestoconsumerexorbitantperquisitesE.g.,privatejetsworthtensofmillionsofdollarsManagersmayalsostealinvestors’fundsE.g.,transferpricingschemeSelf-interestedmanagersmayalsowastefundsbyundertakingunprofitableprojectsthatbenefitthemselvesbutnotinvestorsManagersmayalsoadoptantitakeovermeasurestoensurepersonaljobsecurity4-7Copyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.RemediesfortheAgencyProblemSeveralgovernancemechanismsexisttoalleviateorremedytheagencyproblem:IndependentboardofdirectorsIncentivecontractsConcentratedownershipAccountingtransparencyDebtShareholderactivismOverseasstocklistingsMarketforcorporatecontrol4-8Copyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.BoardofDirectors(BOD)UnitedStatesShareholdershavetherighttoelecttheBOD,whichislegallychargedwithrepresentingtheinterestsofshareholdersGermanyCorporateboardisnotlegallychargedwithrepresentingtheinterestedoftheshareholders;Rather,itischargedwithlookingafterinterestsofstakeholders(e.g.,workers,creditors)ingeneralJapanMostcorporateboardsareinsider-dominated4-9Copyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.IncentiveContractsThoughmanagershavegreatdiscretionoverhowtorunthecompany,theyownrelativelylittleoftheequityinthecompanytheymanageTotheextentmanagersdonotownequityshares,theydonothavecashflowrightsIncentivecontracts,suchasstocksandstockoptions,existtobetteraligntheinterestsofmanagerswiththoseofinvestorsSeniorexecutivesmayabuseincentivecontractsbyartificiallymanipulatingaccountingnumbersorbyalteringinvestmentpoliciessotheycanreapenormouspersonalbenefits4-10Copyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.ConcentratedOwnershipAneffectwaytoalleviatetheagencyproblemisconcentratedownershipIfoneorafewlargeinvestorsownsignificantportionsofthecompany,theywillhaveastrongincentivetomonitormanagementConcentratedownershipofapubliccompanyisrareintheU.S.andtheU.K.,butnormalelsewhereintheworldResearchsuggestslargeshareholdersplayasignificantgovernancerole4-11Copyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.AccountingTransparencyStrengtheningaccountingstandardscanbeaneffectivewaytoalleviatetheagencyproblemManagersmaybelesstemptedto“cookthebooks”ifcompaniesarerequiredtoreleasemoreaccurateaccountinginformationinatimelyfashionToachieveagreatertransparency,however,thefollowingstepsareimportant:CountriesshouldreformtheaccountingrulesCompaniesshouldhaveanactiveandqualifiedauditcommittee4-12Copyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.DebtIfmanagersfailtopayinterestandprincipaltocreditors,thecompanycanbeforcedintobankruptcyanditsmanagersmaylosetheirjobsDebtcanserveasasubstitutefordividendsbyforcingmanagerstodisgorgefreecashflowtooutsideinvestorsratherthanwastingitExcessivedebt,however,createsitsownproblemsMayinducerisk-aversemanagerstoforgoprofitablebutriskyinvestmentprojects,causinganunderinvestmentproblem4-13Copyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.ShareholderActivism“Activistinvestors”havestartedtoplayanimportantroleinpromotingshareholders’interestsMaybeindividualinvestors,pensionfunds,ormutualfundsPursuesocialandpoliticalagendabypromotingchangesincompanies’environmental,social,andgovernancepracticesFocusoncorporatesocialresponsibilitiesandanincreasingingender/ethnicdiversityonboardofdirectors4-14Copyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.OverseasStockListingsCompaniesdomiciledincountrieswithweakinvestorprotectioncanbondthemselvescrediblytobetterinvestorprotectionbylistingtheirstocksincountrieswithstronginvestorprotection(i.e.,cross-listings)Studiesconfirmtheeffectsofcross-borderlistingsSpecifically,foreignfirmslistedintheU.S.arevaluedmorethanthosefromthesamecountriesthatarenotlistedintheU.S.4-15Copyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.MarketforCorporateControlMarketforcorporatecontrolcanhaveadisciplinaryeffectonmanagersandenhancecompanyefficiencyIfacompanycontinuallyperformspoorlyanditsinternalgovernancemechanismsfailtocorrecttheproblem,anoutsidermaybepromptedtomountatakeoverbidInahostiletakeoverattempt,thebiddertypicallymakesatenderoffertothetargetshareholdersatapricesubstantiallyexceedingtheprevailingshareprice4-16Copyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.LawandCorporateGovernanceCommerciallegalsystems(e.g.,company,security,bankruptcy,andcontractlaws)ofmostcountriesderivefromrelativelyfewlegalorigins:EnglishcommonlawFrenchcivillawGermancivillawScandinaviancivillawCopyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.4-17LawandCorporateGovernance(Continued)TwomostinfluentiallegalsystemsareEnglishcommonlawandFrenchcivillaw,withtheEnglishsystemofferingmoreprotectiontoinvestorsthantheFrenchsystemU.K.anditsformercolonies(includingtheU.S.,Canada,Australia,India,etc.)havetheEnglishcommonlawsystemFranceandthepartsofEuropeconqueredbyNapoleon(e.g.,Belgium,Italy,Spain,etc.),aswellasformeroverseascoloniesofFrance,theNetherlands,Portugal,andSpain,havetheFrenchcivillawtraditionCopyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.4-18ConsequencesofLawProtectionofinvestors’rightshasinterestinglegalorigins,butalsomajoreconomicconsequencestothefollowing:PatternofcorporateownershipandvaluationDevelopmentofcapitalmarketsEconomicgrowthProtectionofinvestorscanhavesignificanteconomicconsequencesE.g.,ItalyandtheU.K.4-19Copyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.DoesLawMatter?:ItalyversustheU.K.4-20Copyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.OwnershipandControlPatternCompaniesdomiciledincountrieswithweakinvestorprotectionmanyneedtohaveconcentratedownershipasasubstituteforlegalprotectionDominantinvestorsmayacquirecontrolthroughvariousschemes,suchas:ShareswithsuperiorvotingrightsPyramidalownershipstructureInterfirmcross-holdings4-21Copyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.OwnershipandControlPattern(Continued)Largeshareholders,whoareoftenfoundersandtheirfamilies,canuseapyramidalownershipstructureinwhichtheycontrolaholdingcompanythatownsacontrollingblockofanothercompany,whichinturnownscontrollinginterestsinyetanothercompany,andsoonEquitycross-holdingsamongagroupofcompanies,suchaskeiretsuandchaebols,canbeusedtoconcentrateandleveragevotingrightstoacquirecontrol4-22Copyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.PrivateBenefitsofControlOncelargeshareholdersacquirecontrolrightsexceedingcashflowrights,theymayextractprivatebenefitsofcontrolthatarenotsharedbyothershareholdersonapro-ratabasisStudiesdemonstratelargeshareholderstendtoextractsignificantprivatebenefitsofcontrolinthosecountrieswheretherightsofminorityshareholdersarenotwellprotected4-23Copyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.CapitalMarketsandValuationInvestorprotectionpromotesthedevelopmentofexternalcapitalmarketsWheninvestorsareassuredofreceivingfairreturnsontheirfunds,theywillbewillingtopaymoreforsecurities;Thus,stronginvestorprotectionwillbeconducivetolargecapitalmarketsWeakinvestorprotectioncanbeafactorinsharpmarketdeclinesduringafinancialcrisis4-24Copyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.CapitalMarketsandValuation(Continued)Existenceofwell-developedfinancialmarkets,promotedbystronginvestorprotection,maystimulateeconomicgrowthbymakingfundsreadilyavailableforinvestmentatlowcostPerBecketal.(2000),financialdevelopmentcancontributetoeconomicgrowthinthreeways:EnhancessavingsChannelssavingstowardrealinvestmentsinproductivecapacities,therebyfosteringcapitalaccumulationEnhancesefficiencyofinvestmentallocationthroughmonitoringandsignalingfunctionsofcapitalmarkets4-25Copyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.CorporateGovernanceReformScandal-wearyinvestorsaroundtheworldaredemandingcorporategovernancereformMorethanthesecompanies’internalgovernancemechanismsfailed;auditors,regulators,banks,andinstitutionalinvestorsalsofailedintheirrolesFailuretoreformcorporategovernancewilldamageinvestorconfidence,stuntthedevelopmentofcapitalmarkets,raisethecostofcapital,distortcapitalallocation,andevenshakeconfidenceincapitalismitself4-26Copyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.ObjectivesofReformGrowingconsensusisthatcorporategovernancereformshouldbeamatterofglobalconcernKeyobjectiveshouldbetostrengthentheprotectionofoutsideinvestorsfromexpropriationbymanagersandcontrollinginsidersReformrequiresthefollowing:StrengtheningtheindependenceofBODswithmoreoutsidersEnhancingthetransparencyanddisclosurestandardoffinancialstatementsEnergizingtheregulatoryandmonitoringfunctionsoftheSEC(intheU.S.)andstockexchanges4-27Copyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.PoliticalDynamicsReformiseasiersaidthandoneItisnoteasytochangehistoricallegacies,whichproducedtheexistinggovernancesystemsManypartieshavevestedinterestsinthecurrentsystem,andtheywillresistanyattempttochangethestatusquoReformersshouldunderstandthepoliticaldynamicssurroundinggovernanceissuesandseekhelpfromthemedia,publicopinion,andnongovernmentalorganizations(NGOs)4-28Copyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.TheSarbanes-OxleyActU.S.CongresspassedtheSarbanes-OxleyActinJuly2002tostrengthencorporategovernanceKeyobjectiveistoprotectinvestorsbyimprovingtheaccuracyandreliabilityofcorporatedisclosure,therebyrestoringthepublic’sconfidenceintheintegrityofcorporatefinancialreportingMajorcomponentsofSOXarethefollowing:AccountingregulationAuditcommitteeInternalcontrolassessmentExecutiveresponsibilityCopyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.4-29TheSarbanes-OxleyAct(Continued)ManycompaniesfindcompliancewithSection404onerous,costingmillionsofdollarsSection404requirespubliccompaniesandtheirauditorstoassesstheeffectivenessofinternalcontroloffinancialrecordkeepingandfraudpreventionandfilereportswiththeSECCostofcompliancedisproportionatelyaffectssmallercompaniesManyU.S.-listedforeignfirmsthathavedifferentgovernancestructuresathomealsofinditcostlytocomplywiththeSarbanes-OxleyActSomefirmshavechosentolistshareselsewheretoavoidthecostlycomplianceCopyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.4-30TheCadburyCodeofBestPracticeBritishgovernmentappointedtheCadburyCommitteein1991withthebroadmandateofaddressingcorporategovernanceproblemsintheU.K.CommitteeissueditsreportinDecember1992,includingtheCodeofBestPractice(i.e.,CadburyCode)incorporategovernance,recommending:BODsofpubliccompaniesincludeatleastthreeoutside(nonexecutive)directorsPositionsofCEOandCOBbeheldbytwodifferentindividuals4-31Copyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.CadburyCode“Theboardshouldmeetregularly,retainfullandeffectivecontroloverthecompanyandmonitortheexecutivemanagement.Thereshouldbeaclearlyaccepteddivisionofresponsibilitiesattheheadofacompany,whichwillensureabalanceofpowerandauthority,suchthatnooneindividualhasunfetteredpowerofdecisions.Wherethechairmanisalsothechiefexecutive,itisessentialthatthereshouldbeastrongandindependentelementontheboard,witharecognizedseniormember.Theboardshouldincludenon-executivedirectorsofsignificantcalibreandnumberfortheirviewstocarrysignificantweightintheboard’sdecisions.”4-32Copyright?2021bytheMcGraw-HillComp