1、企業(yè)環(huán)境保護外文翻譯文獻（文檔含英文原文和中文翻譯）企業(yè)環(huán)境管理一基于市場獎勵的管理企業(yè)保護環(huán)境的辦法已經(jīng)從被規(guī)章條例驅動的被動模式演變?yōu)榉e極主動的方式，即通 過自愿管理做法，將環(huán)境問題與傳統(tǒng)的管理職能結合起來。作為公司決策的一種行為模式， 通過econometrically假設測試取得影響公司積極進行環(huán)境管理的因素。對這些假設進行 測試時，使用的樣本是標準普爾500指數(shù)公司的調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù)。分析結果表明，經(jīng)濟因素，如 環(huán)境負債的威脅和符合預期規(guī)定的高成本以及生產(chǎn)最終消費品和擁有大量資本產(chǎn)出率給 企業(yè)帶來的市場壓力，都在促使這些企業(yè)進行環(huán)境保護的過程中發(fā)揮了顯著作用。此外， 企業(yè)外部關于企業(yè)轉移有毒

2、物質(zhì)的報道和社會大眾對企業(yè)內(nèi)部有毒物質(zhì)單位排放量的壓 力都對企業(yè)通過創(chuàng)新實現(xiàn)環(huán)境管理的實踐有重大影響。導論傳統(tǒng)上，美國依賴強制性的指揮和環(huán)境控制的規(guī)章來保護環(huán)境質(zhì)量。這種做法雖然保 護了環(huán)境，但是也導致了政策框架的僵硬和高昂的成本，并且還會降低長遠上改進環(huán)境質(zhì) 量的效率。這種認識已經(jīng)導致越來越多基于市場的手段應用于為企業(yè)提供靈活選擇用最低 成本控制污染的環(huán)境保護方式，例如排污許可證制度、存款還款計劃和公眾的環(huán)境信息披 露自愿程序。在這些措施中，信息披露的自愿性程序通過非強制性的措施鼓勵企業(yè)控制污 染。監(jiān)管機構向社會提供的關于產(chǎn)品環(huán)境屬性和公司環(huán)境績效的信息能觸發(fā)產(chǎn)品和資本 市場的反應和社會的行

3、動，建立以市場為基礎的激勵機制，幫助企業(yè)改進其環(huán)境績效。美國環(huán)保局每年向社會公布的有毒物質(zhì)排放清單就是信息提供的一個例子。此外，爭 取讓企業(yè)在環(huán)境自我調(diào)節(jié)的自愿性項目已經(jīng)成為美國環(huán)保局的一個主要政策工具。1999 年，在聯(lián)邦級別上，這樣的項目已經(jīng)在短短的三年中由28項增長到54項。這兩種做法已 經(jīng)被很多政策分析家看成是對抗性超越“政府推動”的“下一代環(huán)境政策”，其依靠企業(yè) 自身在環(huán)境友好政策上的積極努力和社會公眾，例如公民和社區(qū)的積極參與，來達到保護 環(huán)境的目的。這種自律也體現(xiàn)在“企業(yè)主導”的倡議被越來越多的企業(yè)和行業(yè)協(xié)會接受和采納。一 些企業(yè)已經(jīng)起草了環(huán)保計劃，通過重新設計產(chǎn)品和工藝防止污染

4、；其他企業(yè)通過標準化的 環(huán)境管理和帶有生態(tài)環(huán)保標簽的產(chǎn)品從國際標準化組織申請了 ISO140001系列標準化證 書。調(diào)查顯示，很多企業(yè)都有針對性的通過自己混合管理的做法達到環(huán)境目標。這些做法 包括進行環(huán)境內(nèi)部審計，使企業(yè)員工補償金的一部分取決于他們在環(huán)境保護中的表現(xiàn)，把 環(huán)境影響的集中評價置于企業(yè)較高的等級以及為環(huán)境管理提供總體質(zhì)量管理的原則。這些 做法代表了企業(yè)內(nèi)部的組織變革，企業(yè)比以往任何時候都更大程度地把企業(yè)內(nèi)部自我激勵 機制引入到企業(yè)目標中。這種“企業(yè)主導”的環(huán)境管理模式作為一種創(chuàng)新且更有效保護環(huán)境的模式，已經(jīng)引發(fā) 了政策制定者廣泛的興趣?，F(xiàn)在，很多州的環(huán)保機構和美國環(huán)保局通過提供技術

5、援助、認 可以及其他福利來鼓勵企業(yè)建立環(huán)境管理體系。但是，監(jiān)管機構和社會因企業(yè)建立環(huán)境管 理體系而給企業(yè)的福利待遇還有待于調(diào)查和評價。對企業(yè)建立環(huán)境管理體系的興趣可以從 1999年由11國環(huán)保機構官員組成的多國工作組舉辦的關于環(huán)境管理體系的國家首腦會議 的廣泛參與中推斷出來。與會者來自不同的學術機構、環(huán)保局、布魯金斯學會、全國公共 管理學院以及國家政府委員會，他們強調(diào)需要對推動企業(yè)建立環(huán)境管理體系的影響因素和 依靠環(huán)境管理體系能在多大程度上改善環(huán)境質(zhì)量進行更多的研究。美國環(huán)保局還贊助建立 了環(huán)境管理的國家數(shù)據(jù)庫，其中包括在美國的100個志愿者機構實施環(huán)境管理體系的多方 面信息，以了解他們給企業(yè)

6、和社會帶來的成本和福利。正如下文所述，對推動企業(yè)建立環(huán)境管理體系的影響因素很少有系統(tǒng)的實證研究分 析。個案研究表明外部影響因素很重要，例如消費者對環(huán)境的而關注以及股東和社會公眾 在環(huán)境保護中起的重要作用。如果被視為對環(huán)境不“友好”，不良聲譽帶來的影響以及吸 引的金融投資者關注，對企業(yè)來說變得越來越重要。1989年的一份調(diào)查顯示，77%的美國 人說企業(yè)的環(huán)境信譽影響他們買什么。使用環(huán)保營銷的新產(chǎn)品從1989年僅有3%上升到 1991年的12%。銀行越來越多的意識到他們可能會因為借款企業(yè)的環(huán)境問題承擔法律責任。所以，銀行已經(jīng)把環(huán)境因素納入到貸款的決策中，并視環(huán)境績效差的企業(yè)有財務風險。本研究的目的

7、是對推動企業(yè)建立全面的環(huán)境管理體系的經(jīng)濟激勵措施進行一次系統(tǒng) 的分析，并解釋觀察到的企業(yè)建立環(huán)境管理體系水平上的多樣性。我們側重研究建立環(huán)境 管理體系的范圍，而不是決定的個人的做法，因為每個人的做法只不過是一種工具，如果 沒有環(huán)境管理體系，個人的做法起到的效果可能很小。例如，環(huán)境審計本身只不過是一種 審查業(yè)績的手段，如果不同時采取其他措施，如從企業(yè)管理層得到提供資源、獎勵員工防 止污染的承諾，環(huán)境審計在控制污染中可能是沒有效果的。本文為econometrically測試提供了關于經(jīng)濟獎勵推動企業(yè)建立一個全面的環(huán)境成本 管理體系的假設的行為框架，利用建立環(huán)境管理體系的調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù)以及可獲取的標準普爾

8、 500公司的特定特征的樣本，來對這些假設進行測試。更具體地說，本文試圖探討來自外 部的壓力在多大程度上推動企業(yè)更積極地保護環(huán)境，并認識到改進環(huán)境管理是企業(yè)經(jīng)濟上 成功的一個基本影響因素。這項分析的結果對政策制定者有重要的作用，幫助他們尋求促進企業(yè)領導層、政策分 析家和社會大眾確定社會政策以及利益相關者在根本上改變企業(yè)開展業(yè)務的方式，以及更 受這些因素影響的企業(yè)類型。此外，現(xiàn)有的或預期的強制性指揮和控制規(guī)章能夠為環(huán)保組 織提供激勵機制，在企業(yè)內(nèi)部實際實施。但是，人們對強制性條例的關注由于其不靈活和 高成本已經(jīng)大大減少。過去的文獻越來越多的理論文獻分析了企業(yè)主動進行環(huán)境保護相對于強制性條例的社會

9、效率。本 文表明，企業(yè)可能通過獎勵自愿改善環(huán)境的行為，因為他們能導致直接和間接形式的私人 利益回報。這些利益可能產(chǎn)生于企業(yè)針對強制性標準先發(fā)制人的行動以及針對排污稅進行 的自愿減排。盧茨、里昂和麥克斯韋分析了未來章程對企業(yè)自愿生產(chǎn)環(huán)保產(chǎn)品提供獎勵的 可能性，麥克斯韋、里昂和哈克特研究了企業(yè)自我約束的獎勵和福利，所羅拉和 gangopadhya證明了消費者愿意為環(huán)保產(chǎn)品支付保險費的意愿導致企業(yè)更加遵守環(huán)保制 度。一些研究試圖研究企業(yè)參加由環(huán)保局設立的志愿者項目的動機，如美國的33/50號項 目和美國的氣候挑戰(zhàn)項目。這些研究表明，參加通過美國環(huán)保局新聞稿、簡報被社會認可 的以及受美國環(huán)保局資助和技

10、術援助的項目對預防污染有十分重要的作用。Khanna、Quimio和Bojilova向我們說明，企業(yè)收到的消極的股市回報是社會對企業(yè)不良環(huán)保表現(xiàn) 的回應，這導致企業(yè)自愿減少現(xiàn)場排放污染物。一些研究特別分析了企業(yè)內(nèi)部組織變化的動機，如采取環(huán)境友好做法的決定。 Henriques和Sadorsky研究企業(yè)采取這樣的做法或環(huán)保計劃的影響因素。King和Lenox 分析了美國化學工業(yè)企業(yè)參加化學制造商協(xié)會的責任關懷計劃并接納其行為準則。 Henriques和Sudorsky使用強烈感知到來自于消費者、政府和社區(qū)的壓力的企業(yè)排名作為 解釋性變量。King和Lenox研究是否環(huán)保表現(xiàn)差并被社會更加關注的企

11、業(yè)更有可能加入責 任關懷計劃。關于影響企業(yè)建立環(huán)境成本管理體系影響因素的分析很少，尤其是在美國。 Dasgapta、Hettige和Wheeler分析了墨西哥企業(yè)采用ISO14001環(huán)境管理做法的程度。他 們表明，環(huán)境成本管理體系的建立受企業(yè)規(guī)模、員工素質(zhì)以及管理水平的顯著影響，而企 業(yè)落伍的技術和社會間接的壓力的作用并不重要。下一部分為本文提供了實證分析的基礎概念框架。此框架以建立了高質(zhì)量環(huán)境管理體 系企業(yè)的獎勵情況作為資源，建立一套廣泛的解釋性變量。這些變量包括負債、遵循強制 性條例的威脅以及獲取建立在環(huán)境屬性基礎上的產(chǎn)品差異的競爭優(yōu)勢。第三部分和第四部 分分別介紹了基于這些假設的實證方法

12、和數(shù)據(jù)描述。第五部分介紹了實證的結果，隨后介 紹了本文的結論。概念框架我們把企業(yè)產(chǎn)生的污染物質(zhì)(如化學品)用x表示，把投入的資本性設備用k表示， 把產(chǎn)出用y表示。再生產(chǎn)過程中用到的污染物質(zhì)x的有效性用表示。企業(yè)產(chǎn)生的產(chǎn)出y 是企業(yè)大量的投入在生產(chǎn)(x)中的有效利用和存量資本k的函數(shù)： TOC o 1-5 h z y=f(x, k); fx 0, fk 0, fxx 0, fkk0, 0, 0, 0。但是，Pq的規(guī)模在企業(yè)之間可能不同。生產(chǎn)最終消費品并且直 接面對消費者的企業(yè)更能從“綠色消費”中獲益。這里討論的主要問題是，企業(yè)認識到這種情況并努力尋求環(huán)境友好的聲譽，而不是消 費者是否確實能夠區(qū)分

13、企業(yè)是否遵循環(huán)境友好的做法。企業(yè)在投入市場上被假設成是價格接收者。投入變量的單位成本是w。年均成本被假 設成是企業(yè)環(huán)境管理質(zhì)量下降的函數(shù)，用r(q)表示。一些研究表明，投資者對信息披露中 環(huán)保表現(xiàn)差的企業(yè)有消極的反應，這很可能導致企業(yè)股票市場上的負面影響，使其在資本 市場上的成本上升。這個消極反應很可能是因為投資者對企業(yè)不良的環(huán)保表現(xiàn)，由于執(zhí)法 行動導致更大的風險和來自美國環(huán)保局執(zhí)行減少污染的戰(zhàn)略形成的壓力，以及更大的環(huán)境 負債和環(huán)境訴訟風險。這些企業(yè)在資本市場在資本市場上可能有更高的成本。所以，我們 認為環(huán)境管理不善的企業(yè)為籌借資金要付出更多的成本，因此，rq0, fk 0, fxx 0,

14、f kk0, 0, 0, 0. The magnitude of P q , however, could vary across firms. Firmsthat are producing final goods and dealing directly with consumers may perceive larger benefits from green consumerism!+ than those producing intermediate goods. The relevant issue here is not whether consumers are indeed

15、able to differentiate products based on the environmental practices followed by firms but whether firms perceive that to be the case and therefore seek to build an environmentally friendly reputation.The firm is assumed to be a price-taker in the input market. The per unit cost of the variable input

16、 is w. The annualized cost of capital is r(q) and is assumed to be a decreasing function of a firms quality of environmental management. A number of studies have shown thatinvestors react negatively to disclosures about poor environmental performance by firms and that this leads to a significant neg

17、ative impact on the stock market returns of the firms which is likely to raise their cost of raising capital in the market (Hamilton, 1995; Konar and Cohen, 1997; Khanna, Quimio and Bojilova, 1998). This observed negative reaction is possibly because investors view firms that are not environmentally

18、 friendly as being more risky since they are more likely to face penalties due to enforcement actions and greater pressure from the USEPA to implement strategies for reducing their waste generation in the future and a greater risk of environmental liabilities and lawsuits (GAO, 1994). Such firms are

19、 likely to have a higher cost of raising capital in the market. We therefore assume that firms with poor environmental management practices have to pay a higher price for borrowing capital, therefore rq 0.DESCRIPTION OF DATAPrimary data on management practices used in this study are obtained from th

20、e Corporate Environmental Profile Directories 1994 and 1995, compiled from a survey of S&P 500 firms conducted by the Investor Research Responsibility Center (IRRC). Information from the surveys includes whether or not the company had employed specific environmental management practices, number of e

21、nvironmental staff, environmental auditing and reporting procedures.Environmental performance data are primarily obtained from the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) database that contains facility-level information on on-site releases and off-site transfers of chemical-specific toxic pollutants. The TR

22、I, first released in 1989, is mandated by the Emergency Planning and Community-Right-to-know Act of 1986 and requires production facilities to report annual quantities of on-site toxic emissions to air, water and land and underground injection and the quantities of off-site transfers on a chemical-s

23、pecific basis. The TRI is made available to the public with a lag of two years. Financial information about firms is obtained from the publicly available Standard & Poor (S&P) 500 and Super Compustat databases which provide company specific information on all publicly traded firms that file 10-K for

24、ms with the Securities and Exchange Commission.Of the 500 firms included in the IRRC survey, only firms that completed the survey in 1994 and 1995 and reported to the Toxics Release Inventory and for which financial in a sample of 176 firms performance data are available are included in this study.

25、This resultsfor 1995 and 159 firms for 1994. All time dependent explanatory variables are measured with a five-year lag. This is done to avoid endogenous regressors since adoption of some practices, may have occurred between 1991-95. Based on the theoretical framework, we consider the following dete

26、rminants of the quality of the environmental management system.Variable ConstructionThe dependent variable in this study is the adoption of an EMS, defined as a system of 13 practices that indicate multifaceted efforts, that are proactive and anticipative in orientation, targeted towards improving e

27、nvironmental performance. The practices considered here include having an environmental policy, training and rewarding workers to find opportunities to prevent pollution, setting corporation-wide internal standards that are maintained even by facilities in other countries with lower environmental st

28、andards, undertaking internal environmental audits to identify opportunities for preventing pollution and ensuring that manufacturing operations are in compliance with regulatory requirements. Some firms also adopted the philosophy of TQM, that seeks to minimize quality defects while making continuo

29、us efforts at improving performance across the firms activities, to improving environmental management. Firms may also choose toset aside funds to reduce their risks of future environmental liability costs and buy insurance to cover liability or remediation costs of environmental incidents. These pr

30、actices are listed in Table 1 and the adoption decision of each practice is represented by a dummy variable.As shown in Table 1, 92% of the firms have a formal environmental policy while 70% apply TQM principles to environmental management. Other practices, however, are adopted less frequently, with

31、 less than 40% of firms having a uniform corporate environmental policy and regularly releasing environmental reports to the public. Of the firms included in the two-year sample, 156 firms had observations for both years. Over the two-year period, 62 of these firms increased the number of practices

32、they adopted, while 12 firms decreased the number of practices adopted. Of the 335 observations over the two-year period, 17% indicated an adoption of less than 3 practices, while 38% indicated adoption of 4 to 7 practices. The mode of the distribution is 9 practices and less than 2% of firms adopte

33、d all 13 practices.We find that the adoption decisions for these practices were positively correlated with each other indicating that these practices are complementary to each other rather than substitutes for each other. For example, firms adopting TQM were more likely to have an environmental poli

34、cy, corporate standards, provide environmental performance related compensation to employees and conduct environmental audits. We, therefore, use a summated scale, by summing the dummy variables indicating adoption of the various practices to obtain a total score for each firm, which is used as an i

35、ndicator of the quality or comprehensiveness of a firms environmentalmanagement system. The explanatory variables are categorized into those proxying regulatory pressures, market based pressures and firm-specific characteristics. These variables are described below and their descriptive statistics a

36、re provided in Table 2.Regulatory PressuresWe proxy the impact of existing and anticipated mandatory environmental regulations using several explanatory variables. The accumulated NUMBER OF SUPERFUND SITES for which a firm is named as a potentially responsible party under the provisions of the Compr

37、ehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act are used as a proxy for the potential threat of liability a firm faces if it continues to generate pollution at the same levels in the past. These data are obtained from the Site Enforcement Tracking System (USEPA, 1996). Facility-speci

38、fic data are aggregated to the parent company level by obtaining the list of subsidiaries and divisions of each parent company from various Corporate Directories.Additionally, several major environmental statutes, such as the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and RCRA have provisions for severe pe

39、nalties in cases of violations of regulations, releases of hazardous pollutants and record keeping violations. Firms are also subject to periodic inspections to enforce compliance with mandatory regulations. Firms that have received civil penalties for not complying with mandatory regulations are pr

40、esumably the ones that have high costs of compliance; hence they prefer to be penalized rather than be in compliance with regulations. Such firms may also consider themselves as having a higher likelihood of receiving penalties in the future if they do not make efforts to improve their environmental

41、 performance. Data on the civil penalties received by a firm under 10 different environmental statutes were obtained from the IRRC directory. The variable CIVIL PENALTY is a dummy variable equal to 1, if the firm received at least one civil penalty for violation with any of the environmental statute

42、s. Information on the number of times a facility was inspected is obtained from USEPA 4 publicly available database IDEA, Integrated Data for Enforcement Analysis. The IDEA is a comprehensive single-source of environmental performance on regulated facilities within USEPA. It includes inspections mad

43、e on firm compliance with various environmental statutes such as the Clean Water Act, Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, Emergency Response Notification System and the Toxic Substances Control Act. The variable INSPECTIONS is a dummy variable equal to 1, if the firm was subject to a

44、t least one inspection in the course of a year.To capture the stringency of the existing regulatory environment for a firm the ratio of Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures for the industry to total industry shipments (PACE/INDUSTRY SALES) at the two-digit SIC level is constructed. Pollution c

45、apital expenditures include expenses associated with the purchase and expansion of plant and equipment used to control air and water pollutants and solid waste. Abatement costs consist of all costs and expenses necessary to operate and maintain pollution abatement equipment. The value of total indus

46、try shipments is defined as the receipts for all primary and secondary products manufactured and shipped, services rendered and resale of products bought and resold without further processing. Firms that belong to industries that are heavily regulated as indicated theirPACE to industry output ratio

47、are likely to have high costs of compliance and greater incentives to improve their environmental management. These data are obtained from the Annual Survey of Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures compiled by the Bureau of Census.In order to proxy the incentives to seek strategic advantages ov

48、er competitors by reducing emissions of hazardous air pollutants ahead of time through improved environmental management, we use the ratio of hazardous air pollutants to the toll on-site toxic releases (HAP/ON-SITE RELEASES). Title III of the 1990 CAA Amendments has listed 189 toxic chemicals that w

49、ill be regulated under the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP). Firms have been aware since 1990 that air emissions of these chemicals will be subject to Maximum Available Control Technology (MACT) standards that would be based on emissions levels already achieved by th

50、e best-performing similar facilities (USEPA, 2000). Reducing these pollutants ahead of time using flexible methods is expected to lower the future costs of compliance and may also give the firm a strategic advantage relative to its competitors if its performance influences the standards that are set

51、 for other firms. We would therefore expect that firms with a larger ratio of HAP to on-site toxic discharges are more likely to adopt a comprehensive EMS. The data on HAP emissions by firms were obtained from the TRI after aggregating across all chemicals categorized as HAP and across all facilitie

52、s belonging to a parent company.Market PressuresMarket pressures emanate from consumers, investors and competing firms. Firms that produce final goods and are in closer contact with consumers are likely to feel greater pressure or benefit more from improving their environmental friendliness. Thus, s

53、trategic considerations to improve market share or charge premium prices from green consumers may motivate corporate environmental management among some firms. We use the 4-digit secondary SIC code of the sample firms to classify them into final goods and intermediate goods. Firms are represented by

54、 a dummy variable FINAL GOOD equal to 1, if that firm is primarily selling final products such as pharmaceutical preparations, cosmetics, and food products consumed directly by consumers. It also include retail stores, restaurants and banks that provide direct services to consumers.Firms with a high

55、er capital stock per unit output are more likely to be concerned about negative investor reactions about their environmental practices and performance. We proxy this impact by the SALES-ASSET ratio for the firm and expect that firms with a higher value of this ratio will have lower incentives to ado

56、pt a more comprehensive environmental management system. The impact of market structure of the industry on incentives for environmental management is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), which equals the sum of the squared percentages of market shares of each firm in the industry. A hig

57、h value of HHI implies that the industry is more concentrated and less competitive than one with low HHI. The impact of exposure to global competition and a wider pressure to differentiate its products on a firms incentives for adopting an EMS is captured by the ratio of its facilities that ( countr

58、ies to its total facilities (MULTINATIONAL STATUS). A count of the number of U.S. and non-U.S. facilities for each parent company is obtained from various Corporate Directories.Firm-specific CharacteristicsAs suggested by the theoretical analysis, firm-specific characteristics, such as its pollution

59、-output ratio, technical knowledge and the cost of improving environmental management are also expected to influence the quality of environmental management.Data on all the various types of pollution generated by firms were not publicly available. The only information available at a facility and che

60、mical-specific level is on the volume of toxic releases emitted and reported to the TRI. Each facility is identified by its name, its primary SIC code, its parent company name and a Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) number assigned to each parent company. We used this information to group facilities by their