連鎖店的競爭企業(yè)差別定價和統(tǒng)一定價外文翻譯標題:Chain-StoreCompetition:Customizedvs.UniformPricing原文:1.IntroductionDifferentretaillocationshavedifferentcostsand,whatisourconcernhere,differentdegreesofcompetition.Forexample,wagelevelsmayvarybylocationandaparticularmarketplayermayfacefewercompetitorsinsomelocationsthanothers.Hence,wemightexpectpricestobecustomizedacrosslocations.Asanillustration,takethemilestoneantitrustinvestigationbytheUSFederalTradeCommissionoftheproposedStaples/OfficeDepotmergerHere,akeyelementtheFTCuncoveredwastheadoptionofmarkedlydifferingpricingpracticesacrosslocationsofdifferingcompetitiveintensity,withaclearlinkbetweenthenumberofcompetingstoresofsimilartypeandthelevelofpriceThisisthirddegreepricediscrimination,butinanoligopolycontext。Acommonlyheldviewisthatfirmsarebetteroffpracticingthisformofpricediscriminationbetweenlocationsofdifferingcompetitiveintensity.Againstthisview,Cortes1998andothersubsequentauthorshaveshownthatinsituationsof“bestresponseasymmetry”,whereoneplayer’sstrongmarketistheother’sweakmarket,firmscanbeworseoffpracticingpricediscrimination.AsCortesputsit,“…iffirmsdifferinwhichmarketstheytargetforthisaggressivepricingandcompetitivereactionsarestrong,pricesinallmarketsmayfall.”。Butinmostretailingsituations,suchasofficeequipmentsupplies,rivalfirmswillholdthesameopinionaboutwhichmarketisstrongandwhichisweakasaresultofdifferingdegreesofcompetition?asituationofbestresponsesymmetryratherthanasymmetryUnderthesecircumstances,aclearpuzzleiswhyinsomeprominentcasesofbestresponsesymmetry,indistinctiontoStaples/OfficeDepot,firmspracticeuniformpricingratherthanvaryingpricebylocation.Itisthispuzzlethatisthefocusofourpaper.Aswedocumentindetailbelow,thekeyplayersintheUnitedKingdom“UK”supermarketindustry,whichhasaturnoveroverfivetimesaslargeastheUSofficeequipmentmarket,havemaintainedorenhancedtheirpoliciesonuniformityofpricingacrosslocationwithinmainlandBritain.Noteitiscrucialtothesuccessofauniformpricingpolicythatthereispriorcommitmenttosuchapolicy,ratherthansimultaneouschoiceofpricingpolicyandpricesthemselves.WeshowthatUKsupermarketshavemadesuchcommitmentsGiventhisunderlyingcommitment,wedemonstrateataverygenerallevelthataprofitincentiveexistsinfavorofuniformpricing,insomebutnotallsituationsofbestresponsesymmetry.Theargumentisessentiallyasfollows:ItiswellknownthatinadifferentiatedproductmarketsettingwithBertrandpricecompetition,bothplayersinaduopolycanbenefitifonecancommittoahigherprice.AcommitmenttouniformpricingwillprovideacommitmenttoahigherpriceifdemandfacingthefirminamonopolymarketislesselasticthanintheduopolymarketThenifthegaininprofitsfromtheduopolymarketexceedsthelossfromthemonopolymarket,thestrategyisprofitable.Wegoontofurthercharacterizeanalyticallythetypeofmarketforwhichthisincentivewillexist.Akeyfeatureisthatlargermarketshaveconsumerswithawiderrangeoftastesthandosmallmarkets.Followingthisgeneralanalysis,wedemonstrateusingaparameterizedexamplethataverywiderangeofdegreesofcompetitiveintensityisconsistentwithprofitseitherbeingenhancedoratleastreducedonlyslightlybyapolicyofuniformpricing.Thus,smallpositivebenefitsarisingfromotherAspectsofuniformpricingincludingreductionsinpromotionalcostsandlesseningofantitrustattentionmaywellbesufficienttoensurethatuniformpricingdevelopsasaresilientpracticeacrosstheindustry.Weproceedasfollows.ThenextsectionsetsoutthenatureofpricingandpricingcommitmentintheUKsupermarketindustryasanillustrativecase.Followingthis,section3developsthegeneralAnalyticalframeworkjustoutlinedandcharacterizesthecircumstanceswheretherecanbeaunilateralprofitincentiveforuniformpricing.Section4utilizesaparameterizedexampletoillustratetherangeofmarketcircumstancesconducivetouniformpricingbeingmoreprofitablelocalpricing.Section5extendsthedomaintoincorporatejointincentivestoadoptuniformpricinginthepresenceofcompetingchain-storeretailers,alsopracticalconsiderationswherelocalpricingmaybemoreexpensivetooperatethannationalpricing.Section6containsourconcludingremarks.2.UniformPricinginUKGroceryRetailingInthissectionwechartsufficientmaterialrelatedtoUKgroceryretailingtoshowtheveryconsiderableextenttowhichthemajorchainspriceuniformlyacrossareasdespitefacingverydifferentcompetitiveenvironmentsandcostsacrossthoseareas.Wealsodocumentthecommitmentsfirmsuseinmaintainingtheiruniformpricingpolicies.GroceryretailingrepresentsthelargestretailsectorintheUK,wortharound$160bnin2005.Fourretailers?Tesco,Sainsbury,AdsaWal-MartsubsidiaryandMorrison/Safeway?dominatethenationalmarket,accountingfor75%ofsalesofgroceryitemsi.e.,foodanddrink,cleaningproducts,toiletriesandhouseholdgoods,andindeed30%ofallretailsalesintheUK.Thesefoursupermarketretailershaveprimarilypositionedthemselvesas“onestopshops”,operatingwithverywideproductrangesinlargeformatstores.Assuch,theyjointlyaccountfor95%ofgrocerysalesforstoresexceeding1,400sqmeterswhichhasbeenviewedbytheUKcompetitionauthoritiesasthecriticalsizedistinguishingone-stopgroceryshops,servingprimaryshoppingneeds,fromsmallerstorescateringfor“top-up”and“convenience”groceryshopping.WhilemostoftheretailgrocerychainsoperateonanationallevelintheUK,thereisconsiderablevariationinregionalandlocalmarketsharesandconcentrationlevels.Table1providessomesummaryevidence,basedonaverydetailedreportintothesectorundertakenbytheUK’sCompetitionCommission“CC”hereafterin2000.Inparticular,highlevelsoflocalconcentrationwerefoundinmoreruralareasnotablyinScotlandandWalesandcertainurbanareaswhereaproliferationofstoresfromthesamechainexisted.Inadditiontomarketstructuredifferences,consumerincomelevelsalsodifferfromregiontoregiontendingtobehigherinthesouthernpartoftheUKandfromdistricttodistricttendingtobehigherinurbanareasasopposedtoruralareas,suggestingthepresenceofvariationinlocalconsumerdemand,incomesandpossiblywillingnesstopay.Withdifferencesinbothlocalcompetitionandlocaldemandconditions,itmightbethoughtthatretailerswouldseektotakeadvantageofopportunitiestosetpricesdifferentlyfromstoretostore.Inparticular,retailersmightsethigherpricesinareaswherelocalcompetitionwaslimitedand/oraverageincomelevelswerehigh,whilesettinglowerpricesinareasofmoreintenselocalcompetitionand/orlowaverageincomes.However,forthesectorasawhole,theCC2000foundanalmostevensplitbetweenthosefirmsthatadjustedpricesonalocalbasisandthosethatadopteduniformpricesacrossalltheirstores.OfthefifteenmaingrocerychainsoperatingintheUK,sevenwerefoundtovarypricesfromstoretostorebasedonlocalcompetitionanddemandconditionswhileeightusednationalpricing,withnolocalvariationinprices.Table2showstheextentandcharacteroflocalpriceflexingidentifiedbytheCCamongstthebig5firmsin1999.TothiswehaveaddeddatafromalaterCCreportin2003.In1999,individualproductpriceswerefoundinsomeretailerstovaryconsiderablybyasmuchas100%,butaveragepricesdifferedacrosseachchainbylessthan3%.TheCCinvestigatedthebasisonwhichlocalpricingoperated,identifyingthecriticalfactorsinfluencingstore-levelpricing.Fortheretailgroupsthatdidvaryprices,bothdifferencesinlocaldemandinrespectofincomeorregionaleffectsandlocalcompetitioninrespectoflocalmarketpowerorfacingparticularprice-focusedcompetitorswerefoundtobeimportantindeterminingthepricebandappliedtoindividualstoresandthevariationinpricesacrossthestorechain.Costelementslikedifferencesinstoresizewerealsofoundtoplayarole,butnotsosignificantlyastoexplainthefullextentofstore-to-storepricevariationHowever,thepatternofpricingpracticesinthesectorchangedmarkedlyoverthefollowingfouryears.Whilepriceflexingcontinuedtobeusedbysomeofthesmallerchains,by2003,bothSainsburyandTescohadvoluntarilymovedawayfromstorepricingbasedonlocation.Furthermore,inMarch2004,MorrisonacquiredSafewayandsetaboutconvertingallthelatter’sstoresintotheMorrisonformat,intheprocessabandoningSafeway’sstore-by-storepromotionalpricingpolicyinfavorofitsnationalpricingpolicy.Remarkably,uniformpricinghasbecomethedominantformofpricinginthissector,andthemajorretailers,includingTesco,reportedlytheworld’sthirdlargestretailer,haveeschewedtheopportunitytocustomizepricesonastore-by-storebasisinfavorofnationalpricing.Ifnationalpricingistohaveanypossiblestrategicroleininfluencingthepricingdecisionsofrivalretailersi.e.beseenasbeyondmere“cheaptalk”,thenthechain-storeretailerwouldneedvisiblytopre-committouniformpricinginsuchafashionthattheotherretailerscouldbecertainthatthechainstore’shandsaretiedwhenitcomestoactualdeterminationofprices.BeyondUKsupermarkets,uniformpricingisalsowitnessedinotherretailsectorsaswell.AsDobsonandWatterson2005observe,thesefurtherexamplesillustratetherangeofpossiblecommitmentdevicesandpoliciesthatmaybeemployedtosupportthecredibilityofauniformpricingstrategy.Forinstance,aretailchainmayrelyonsomeexpensivecommitmentmechanismthatwouldrenderitspositionworsewereitnottoadoptuniformpricingthanifitdidso.Inthecaseofsomeretailersthiscomesaboutbypublishingallpricesinacataloguewhichthenappliesacrossthewholecountry,e.g.IKEAinfurnitureandfurnishingsorArgosintheUKforgeneralmerchandise,withnoscopeforlocalpricedeviations.Analternativecommitmentcanarisethroughnationaladvertisingtoinformconsumersaboutpricesorthroughuseofintegralpricetagsstandardacrossacountry,oreventhewholeEurozonee.g.topclothingretailerssuchasSweden’smultinationalH&MandUK’sMarks&Spencer.Afurtherpossibilityisforthechain-storeretailertoremovelocalmarketboundariestocreateessentiallyanationalmarketforitsowngoods.Forexample,thismightbepossibleifconsumerswereallowedfullaccesstothestorenetworkregardlessoftheirlocation,withorderstakenfromanypartofthecountrythenbackedwitheitherhomedeliveryordeliverytothenearestavailablestoreasofferedforexamplebyanumberofUKclothingretailersincludingMarks&SpencerandNext.AsimilareffectcouldarisethrougharetailerdevelopinganInternetoperationtorunalongsideitsstoreoperations,i.e.becomea“clicksandbricks”retailer,makingacommitmenttoofferingonlinepricesequaltotheloweststore-levelprices.Indeed,thisisamovethatTesco,AdsandSainsburyhaveadoptedindevelopingonlinegrocerysalesintheUKandisalsobeingrolledoutbyH&Mforclothing5.FurtherConsiderationsTheresultsintheprevioustwosections,anddiagrammaticallyillustratedinFigure1,pointtothescopeforuniformpricingofferingstrictlyhigherprofitsthanunderlocalpricingbeingquiterestricted.However,theremaybeotherpracticalconsiderations,aswealludedtointheIntroduction,whichmayextendthescopeforadoptinguniformpricing.Inthissectionwebuildonthelineardemandanalysisintheprevioussectiontoillustratetwopossibleconsiderations:first,whereother,rivalchain-storeretailersexistandtheycancoordinatetheirpricingpolicychoices;secondwherelocalpricingmayinvolvesomeadditionalcoststhatreducenetprofitsunderthispricingpolicychoice.6.ConclusionLargenationorregionalchain-storegroupsnowdominatemostsectorsofretailing.Theyhavethecostsavingsandmarketingcloutofalargepurchasercoupledwiththepotentialflexibilitytotailoroffersacrossthelocalmarketstheyserve.Thispotentialflexibilityhasbeenrealizedthroughdevelopmentsininformationgatheringandprocessing,allowingmarketerstocustomizemarketingmixvariablestothestore-levelMontgomery,1997Incontrast,ourfocushascenteredoncompetitiveaspects.Specifically,hicpricediscriminationmayimpactoncompetitionacrossthenetworkoflocalmarketsserved.Inthiscontextwehaveshownquitegenerallythatmarketconditionsexistwhereitwillbebothindividuallyandjointlyprofitableforretailerstoeschewcustomizingpricesandinsteadsetuniformpricesacrosstheirstores.Thismeanstheretailerforgoeshighpricesandhighprofitsinthelocalmarketswhereithasmonopolypowerandinsteadleveragesthismarketpoweracrossallitsmarketstoraisepricesinthosemarketswheretheintensityofcompetitionotherwisemakesthemlow.Itentailssacrificingsomelocalprofits,butwiththebenefitofsofteningcompetitionmorebroadlyandsufficientlytoraisefirmprofitsoverall.出處:PaulDobsonandMichaelWatterson.Chain-storecompetition:customizedvs.uniformpricing[J].MarketingSci.2008.4911,pp.29-40標題:連鎖店的競爭:企業(yè)差別定價和統(tǒng)一定價譯文:摘要:不同零售處有我們在這里所關注的不同的費用和不同程度的競爭。例如,工資水平可能會隨著地理位置的不同而不同,某一特定市場的人員在同一位置可能會面臨相對其他一些地方更少的競爭對手。因此,我們可以期望價格根據(jù)位置來定制。以具有里程碑意義的美國聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會提出的斯臺普斯辦公車廠合并反壟斷調(diào)查作為例子。在這里,一個關鍵的因素是,聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會發(fā)現(xiàn)根據(jù)不同的地點和競爭強度定價,跟有相似類型和價格水平的競爭商店的數(shù)量有明顯的聯(lián)系。這是三度差別定價,但是在寡頭壟斷的背景下產(chǎn)生的。一個普遍持有的看法是公司最好掌握這種針對不同的位置之間的競爭強度形式的歧視價格。對這種觀點,卡特1998和其他后來著作者的情況表明,在“最佳反應不對稱”的情況下,如果那里是玩家的強大的市場也是其他人的疲軟市場,公司運用價格歧視將會使情況更糟。作為個體所指出的那樣,“…如果公司有不同的目標市場,積極的定價和競爭力反應較強,在所有市場價格可能下降?！钡诙鄶?shù)零售的場合,例如辦公設備用品,競爭公司關于哪個市場力量強大,哪個力量弱作為不同程度競爭的結(jié)果會有同樣的看法-這是對稱最好的反應局面而不是不對稱。在這些情況下,一個清晰的困惑是為什么在一些突出的案例有明顯對稱性,最好的臺普斯辦公車廠是公司統(tǒng)一定價,而不是根據(jù)不同的位置定價。這個迷將是本文的重點。我們的文章詳細介紹在英國超市行業(yè)的關鍵參與者,營業(yè)額超過5倍美國辦公設備市場,他們在英國大陸內(nèi)保持或增強他們的不均勻性政策。注意這是成功的關鍵,統(tǒng)一價格政策應致力于這一政策,而不是同時選擇的定價政策和自己定價。我們展示的英國超市做了這樣的承諾?？紤]到這個潛在的承諾,我們證明了在一個很普遍的水平,利潤激勵存在贊成統(tǒng)一定價,只有部分好的反應的情況下最好是對稱。其中的論點本質(zhì)上如下:眾所周知,在分化的產(chǎn)品市場設置下,波特蘭德的價格競爭,在雙寡頭壟斷中如果一個人能確認了一種更高的價格它就將受益。承諾統(tǒng)一定價將提供一個承諾,以一種更高的價格如果需求面向公司壟斷市場比寡頭壟斷的市場缺少彈性。如果在寡頭壟斷的市場中獲得的利潤超過損失,他們的策略是有利可圖。我們繼續(xù)進一步描述的這個刺激會存在的類型的市場分析。一個主要特點是大的市場比小市場讓消費者到更廣泛的體會。綜合分析之后,我們證明了有非常廣泛的有競爭強度的參數(shù)化的例子利潤是一致的,采用統(tǒng)一定價利潤被增強,或至少輕微減少。于是,從其他統(tǒng)一定價方面產(chǎn)生的正面效益小包括減少促銷成本和減輕的反托拉斯的注意力可能會足夠保證統(tǒng)一定價發(fā)展為實踐整個行業(yè)的彈性實踐。我們按如下步驟。接下來的部分羅列出定價的性質(zhì)和價格承諾在英國超市的幾個行業(yè)情況作為例證。此后,第三節(jié)一般發(fā)展的解析框架,它只是概述了在利益單方面激勵統(tǒng)一定價的情況.第四部分采用參數(shù)化范圍的例子來說明市場狀況用統(tǒng)一的價格比地方定價更為有利可圖.第5部分延伸領域?qū)⒙?lián)合鼓勵采用統(tǒng)一的價格競爭的存在,實用的連鎖店的兩種零售商,也考慮當?shù)氐亩▋r可能會比國家定價變得更加的昂貴。第6部分包含我們的結(jié)束語。在這個部分中我們對英國食品零售業(yè)羅列足夠的材料,在非常大的范圍內(nèi)統(tǒng)一各個領域大型連鎖店價格,不畏懼在各個地方不同的競爭環(huán)境和成本。我們也證明公司使用并維護其均勻的定價政策。在英國,食品零售業(yè)代表最大的零售市場,2005年總價值約為1600億美元。四大零售商-特時刻、山柏力,愛仕達一沃爾瑪公司的子公司),莫里森-主宰國際市場,占75%的食品項目例如,食物和飲料、清潔用品、化妝品、家用物品的銷售額,事實上,30%的零售在英國。這四個超市零售商定位自己是“一站店”,在很大的格式化的商店范圍,操作廣泛的產(chǎn)品.這樣,95%的雜貨銷售額都在面積超過1400平方米的商店完成在英國競爭部門被視為一站式雜貨店,服務主要購物的需求,從那些小商店為“附加”和“便利”購物。雖然大部分的零售食品雜貨連鎖店在英國操作用一個國家標準,但市場占有率和地方的濃度有較大的不同。表1提供一些簡單的證據(jù),它是基于一個詳細的報告由進入這一行業(yè)英國競爭委員會以下簡稱“CC2000年提供。特別是,發(fā)現(xiàn)更多的在農(nóng)村地區(qū)特別是在蘇格蘭和威爾斯和一些城市的地區(qū)從商店擴散存在同一連鎖店高水平的局部濃度。除了市場結(jié)構(gòu)差異,消費者收入水平之間的差距也與地區(qū)與地區(qū)之間傾向較高位于該國南部的英國和區(qū)域與區(qū)域高傾向于在城市