法學外文翻譯溫州姜BasicConceptsofCriminalLaw,page117-120NewYorkOxfordOXFORDUNIVERSITYPRESS1998IntentionversusNegligenceName：GeorgeP.FleteherTEXT:Therearesomesituationsinlifeinwhichpeoplesetouttoaccomplishcertaingoalsandtheyrealizetheiraimsexactlyasplanned.Theysetouttogotothelibraryandtheyarriveatthelibrary.Theysetouttogotostealabookandtheystealabook.Obviously,theaimsaresometimesgood,sometimesbad.Butveryoftenpeoplegetwheretheywanttogo.Thesearecaseofintentionalconduct,ofsettingonessightsonrealizingaparticulartarget,whetherthegoalbesociallydesirable(goingtothelibrary)orcriminal(stealingabook).Inmanysituations,however,weaccomplishbothgoodandbadnotastheobjectofourintentionsbutastheunwittingsideeffectsofourconduct.Imaginethatsomeonedropsawalletfullofcash,astarvingmotherthenfindsitandusesthefundstosavethelivesofherthreechildren.Losingthewalletwasanaccident,andgoodcameofit.Orsupposethatapharmacistmislabelsabottleofpoisonasanutritionalfoodsupplementandthencasuallyleavesapackageofthebottlesinthebackofhisstore.Astreetpersonfindsthebottlesofpoisonandafterreadingthelabels,drinksthepoisonanddies.Mislabelingthebottlewasanaccident,moreorless,butgreatharmcameofit.Thepersonwhodroppedhiswalletmightfeelgoodthathismoneywasappliedtoagoodpurpose,butitwouldbeoddforhimtoclaimcredittoexpectpraiseandappreciationfromothersforsavingthelivesofthethreechildren.Butthepharmacistwhomislabeledthepoisonmightberesponsible,bothmorallyandlegally,forthedeathofthepersonwhoconsumedthepoison.Thisdifferenceshouldpuzzleus.Praiseforgooddeedsseemstopresupposeanintentiontodogood,butblameforharmfuldeedsneednotbeattendedbyanintentiontoharm.Grantingcreditandgivingpraiserequire,itseems,achoosingtodogood,aninvestingofoneselfinphilanthropy.Wrongdoingdiffers.Ifthepharmacistcouldavoidendangeringthepublicbytakingappropriatemeasures,heisrequiredtodoso.Ofcourse,thereismuchworktobedoneinfiguringoutwhattheseappropriatemeasuresare.Butifhepaystoolittleattentiontothemeasuresnecessarytoprotectthepublicfromthepoisonsinhisshop,hiscausingharmwillbelabelednegligent.Andnegligentlycausingharmcanprovideabasisforcriminalliabilityaswellasmoralcensure.SinceRomanlawyerscarvedoutapplicationsforthetermsdolus(intention)andculpa(fault,negligence),lawyersintheWesternlegaltraditionhaverelieduponthispairofwordstoassaybothcriminalandcivilresponsibility.Receivingpraisefordoinggoodrequiresagoodintention.Butitseemsthatwecanbeblamedfortheharmwebringabouteitherbyintentionornegligence.AlllegalculturesintheWestrecognizethedistinctionbetweenintentionalandnegligentwrongdoing,butthereisgreatdisagreementaboutthecontoursandtheimplicationsofthesewaysofbeingheldresponsible.Negligence:ObjectiveandSubjectiveWhyisnegligencesotroublingasagroundofliability?Therearesome,assuggestedabove,whodonotregardnegligencetobeaformofmensreaorapropergroundforblamingeithercausingharmofmakingmistakes.Thereareotherswhoinsistthatnegligenceisanobjectivestandardandthat,therefore,negligenceinvariablyentailsadepersonalizedandunjustjudgmentofresponsibilityandblame.Thenegligentarenotjudgedonthebasisofwhattheyhaveactuallydonebutontheextentoftheirdeviationfromthemythicalstandardofthereasonableperson.Thiscritiqueofnegligencehasbecomeacute.Inrecentyearsasmanyfeministscholarshavearguedthatthestandardofthereasonablepersonhasamalebiasbuiltintoitandthat,therefore,theproperstandardforjudgingfemalesuspectsshouldbea“reasonablewoman”standard.Theterms“objective”and“subjective”getinthewayofclarifyingthisdisputeandtryingtoresolveit.Theproblemisthatthetermsmeandifferentthingstodifferentpeople.Sometimes“subjective”istakentomean:asthesuspectpersonallybelieves.Forexample,inafamousnineteenth-centurycase,Commonwealthv.Pierce,thealternativetoanexternalorobjectivestandardofnegligencewasthoughttobeoneinwhichthedefendantsgoodfaithwascontrolling.InPierce,thedefendant,practicingpubliclyasaphysician,causedthedeathofapatientbyapplyingkerosene-soakedflannelstoherskin.Concludingthatthestandardofliabilitywas“external,”JusticeOliverWendellHolmes,Jr.wrotethatthequestionwaswhetherthetreatmentwouldhavebeen“recklessinamanofreasonableprudence.”Thepointofsayingthatthestandardwas“external”wastostressthatgoodfaithwasnotadefenseandthatthedefendantmightbeguilty,eventhoughhethoughthewasdoingtheprudentthing.Inonesense,then,theconflictbetweenobjectiveand“internal”standardsofgoodfaith.InamodernreplayoftheprobleminPierce,BernhardGoetzargued,afterhehadshotfouryoungmenwhosurroundedhiminthesubway,thattheNewYorkstatutorystandardof“reasonablyperceiving”athreatofrobberyshouldbejudgedbythesubjectivestandardofgoodfaith.Remarkably,theappellatecourtsandevenalawprofessoragreedwithhim.WhenthecasefinallyreachedtheNewYorkCourtofAppeals(thehighestcourtinthestate),thejudgesunanimouslyandthatthestatuteimpliedthestandardofthereasonablepersonandthatthereforeGoetzsperceptionbothofdangerandofthenecessityofshootingshouldbejudgedaccordingtoanexternalcommunitystandardofreasonablebehavior.ThebeautyoftheMPCprovisiononnegligenceisthatitdistinguishesclearlybetweentheexternalorobjectivestandardofanunreasonableriskandtheactor-specificissueofpersonalresponsibilityrunningtherisk.Inthisrespect,thestructureoftheMPCprovisiontracesthedistinctionwedevelopedinchapter5betweenwrongdoingandpersonalresponsibility.Thewrongdoingofnegligenceconsistsinrunningthesubstantialandunjustifiableriskofcausingharm.Responsibilityforrunningtheriskisresolvedbytheinquiryintowhatareasonablepersonwoulddounderthecircumstances.Withthisstructuraldistinction,however,wehavenotresolvedthequestionwhethertheactor-specificissueofresponsibilityshouldbeunderstoodobjectivelyorsubjectively.Andonceagain,theterminologyitselfbreedsconfusion.Oneargumentisthattheveryinvocationofthereasonablepersonentailssome“objectification”anabstractanddepersonalizedstandardthatisperseunjust.Theimplicationofthiscritiqueisthatthejuststandardisonethatis“subjective.”Thefactisthateverystandardforresponsibilityisexternalorobjectiveacommunitystandardofresponsiblebehavior.Theonlycoherentbasisforblamingsomeoneforengaginginharmfulaction(e.g.,takingasubstantialandunjustifiableriskofharm)istocomparethesuspectsdecisiontoactwithastandardofproperbehavior.Evenwheretheactor“chooses”toengageintherisk,thechoiceprovidesanadequategroundforcriminalresponsibilityonlyifthechoicedeviatesfromtheexpectedbehaviorofareasonableperson.AccordingtotheMPCsdefinitionofrecklessness,anactoriscriminallyresponsibleforchoosingtodisregarda“substantialandunjustifiablerisk,”onlyifthe“disregardoftheriskinvolvesagrossdeviationfromtheactorssituation.”Theterm“l(fā)aw-abidingperson”takestheplaceofthe“reasonableperson”；buttheprincipleremainsconstant:Theonlywaytojudgeresponsibilityforrecklessandnegligentrisk-takingistomeasuretheactorsconductagainstcommunityexpectations.Thechoicetodisregardtheriskisnotperseculpable；itisculpableonlyifitfallsshortofthecommunitystandardofreasonablelaw-abidingbehavior.Sincethecriterionof“choice”doesnoteliminatetheproblemofjudgingconductagainstacommunitystandard,thenaggingquestionremains:Howdowedistinguishbetweenajustandanunjuststandardofnegligence?Isitclearlybetter,morejust,toindividualizethestandardofresponsibilitytoincludeallthefactorsthatbearontheactorsdecisiontoruntherisk?Indeed,shouldweindividualizethestandardofjudgmenttothepointthatweconsider“theinfinitevarietiesoftemperament,intellectandeducation”thatleaddifferentpeopletoactdifferently.InassessingwhethersomeonelikeBernhardGoetzreasonablyperceivedariskofdangerandreasonablyperceivedariskofdangerandreasonablyreactedtohisperception,hispriorexperiencewithcrimeinhtsubwaybecomesrelevant；ifmuggedinthepast,hewouldunderstandablyandreasonablyperceivetheearlystagesofapossiblemuggingasthreatening.Ifasmallwomanisattackedbyalargeman,thesedifferencesingenderandsizebecomerelevantinassessingwhetherherresponsetotheperceivedattackisreasonableunderthecircumstances.Myclaimhereisnotthatthestandardshouldbe“subjective”(dependentontheactorsgoodfaith)butratherindividualizedinordertoachieveafairstandardofjudgingindividualbehavior.Manytheoristsdespairofthepossibilityofajuststandardofnegligencebecausetheythinkthatitisimpossibletoindividualizethestandardofjudgment.Ifthe“reasonableperson”isadjustedtotheinfinitevarietyofindividualdifferences,thestandardforjudgingwouldcollapseintotheobjecttobejudged.Wewouldbeforcedtoembracethesloganofinfiniteunderstanding:Toutcomprendre,cesttoutpardoner.Ifweknoweverythingaboutthedefendant,wemustexcusehim.Therefore,ifwemakethestandardofjudgmenttooparticular,wehavenochoicebuttoexcuseormitigatethecrime.Ifthereasonablepersonweredefinedtobejustlikethedefendantineveryrespect,hewouldindeeddoexactlywhatthedefendantdidunderthecircumstances.Butthisexcessiveindividualizationrestsonamistake.Objectivefactorsbearingonthedecisiontoactmightberelevant,butitwouldnotfollowthatallthefeaturesofthedefendantscharacterwouldenterintotheequation.Ifthedefendantsheadinjuryorimpotenceisconsideredinassessingthelikelybehaviorofareasonableperson,itdoesnotfollowthat“theactorssituation”includeshisinsensitivity,greed,zealforadventure,orevenhiswickednessasaperson.Excessiveandmistakenindividualizationderivesfromthefailuretoattendcloselytothetypesofcharactertraitsthatproperlysubjectwrongdoerstojudgmentsofblame.Supposethatoutofazealforthrillsandadventure,amotoristhabituallydrives100mph.Isshesubjecttoblameforthisexcessiverisk-t