1、Chapter 11Pricing with Market Power本章論題攫取消費者剩余價格歧視跨期價格歧視和高峰定價兩部收費制捆綁銷售廣告2Chapter 11前言沒有市場勢力（完全競爭）的價格是由市場供給和需求決定的單個生產(chǎn)者必須能夠預(yù)測市場，然后專注于管理生產(chǎn)（成本）以使利潤達到最大化3Chapter 11前言有市場勢力的定價（不完全競爭市場）需要廠商懂得更多的需求的特點4Chapter 11攫取消費者剩余所有的定價策略都是攫取消費者剩余并將其轉(zhuǎn)移給生產(chǎn)者的手段在利潤最大化點價格為P*、產(chǎn)量為Q*但某些消費者愿意支付的價格可能高于P* 提高價格將失去一些消費者，導致利潤降低降低價格能

2、爭取一些消費者，但會降低利潤5Chapter 11攫取消費者剩余Quantity$/QDMRPmaxMCPCThe firm would like to charge higher price to those consumers willing to pay it - AP*Q*AP1Firm would also like to sell to those in area B but without lowering price to all consumersBP2Both ways will allow the firm to capture more consumer surplus

3、6Chapter 11攫取消費者剩余價格歧視（Price discrimination） 是對同一商品向不同的消費者索取不同的價格這要求能鑒別不同的消費者，并讓他們支付不同的價格其他一些定價技術(shù)也能讓企業(yè)獲得更多的消費者剩余兩部收費制和捆綁消費7Chapter 11價格歧視一級價格歧視向每個消費者索取不同價格：消費者愿意支付的最大價格或保留價格企業(yè)如何獲利？企業(yè)生產(chǎn)Q* MR = MC企業(yè)的可變利潤忽略固定成本的利潤MR和MC之間的區(qū)域消費者剩余是需求曲線與價格之間的區(qū)域8Chapter 11價格歧視如果企業(yè)能夠?qū)嵭型耆珒r格歧視，它索取的價格正好是消費者愿意支付的價格MR曲線不再是產(chǎn)量決策的一

4、部分增加的收益就是每單位產(chǎn)品銷售的價格需求曲線生產(chǎn)并銷售一單位產(chǎn)品的利潤現(xiàn)在是需求曲線和邊際成本之差9Chapter 11P*Q*Without price discrimination,output is Q* and price is P*.Variable profit is the area between the MC & MR (yellow).一級價格歧視Quantity$/QWith perfect discrimination, firm will choose to produce Q* increasing variable profits to include purp

5、le area.Consumer surplus is the area above P* and between0 and Q* output.PmaxD = ARMRMCQ*PC10Chapter 11一級價格歧視實際上，完全價格歧視幾乎是不可能的向每個消費者索取不同的價格是不可行的（除非消費者人數(shù)極少）企業(yè)通常不知道每個消費者的保留價格但企業(yè)可以不完全歧視可以根據(jù)對保留價格的估計索取一些不同的價格11Chapter 11一級價格歧視當企業(yè)能夠在某種程度上分割市場，并索取不同的價格時，就出現(xiàn)了不完全的價格歧視。例如：律師、醫(yī)生、會計師企業(yè)銷售人員 （15% 的利潤空間）大學（不同的財務(wù)援助

6、）12Chapter 11實踐中的一級價格歧視QuantityDMRMC$/QP2P3P1P5P6Six prices exist resultingin higher profits. With a single priceP*4, there are fewer consumers.P*4Q*Discriminating up to P6 (competitive price) will increase profits.13Chapter 11二級價格歧視在一些市場，消費者在一段時間內(nèi)要購買許多單位某種商品但隨著消費量的增加，該商品的需求下降電力、水、取暖燃料企業(yè)可以實施二級價格歧視（s

7、econd-degree price discrimination）是對同一種商品或服務(wù)不同購買量索取不同的價格14Chapter 11二級價格歧視二級價格歧視的一個例子是數(shù)量折扣例如：大包裝的便宜分段定價（Block pricing，階梯式定價） 是對商品的不同數(shù)量“區(qū)段”制定不同的價格例如電力、自來水15Chapter 11二級價格歧視$/QWithout discrimination: P = P0 and Q = Q0. With second-degree discrimination there are three blocks with prices P1, P2, & P3.Q

8、uantityDMRMCACP0Q0Q1P11st BlockP2Q22nd BlockP3Q33rd BlockDifferent prices are charged for different quantities or “blocks” of same good.16Chapter 11三級價格歧視是將具有不同需求曲線的消費者分為兩組或更多組，并對每組索取不同的價格。將市場分為兩組每組有不同的需求函數(shù)17Chapter 11三級價格歧視三級價格歧視是最常見的價格歧視類型例如：打折機票、優(yōu)惠與不優(yōu)惠的烈酒、對學生和老人的折扣、冷凍與罐頭食品18Chapter 11三級價格歧視可以根據(jù)消費

9、者的一些特征來將其分組最典型的，是根據(jù)需求彈性大學生和老人因為收入低，通常支付意愿比其他人低而這些人可以很容易地通過身份證件區(qū)分出來19Chapter 11創(chuàng)造消費者群體如果三級價格可行，那企業(yè)又如何決定每一組到底定價多少呢？總產(chǎn)量必須在各組之間進行分配，以使每一組的MR相等必須選擇總產(chǎn)量，使每一組的MR與生產(chǎn)的MC相等20Chapter 11三級價格歧視代數(shù)表示為：P1: 第一組的價格P2: 第二組的價格C(QT) = 生產(chǎn)總成本QT = Q1 + Q2利潤： = P1Q1 + P2Q2 - C(QT)21Chapter 11三級價格歧視企業(yè)必須把產(chǎn)量提高到每一組銷售的最后一單位產(chǎn)品的邊際利

10、潤為零令第1組的邊際利潤=022Chapter 11三級價格歧視對第一組的消費者，滿足：MR1= MC同樣，對第二組，滿足：MR2 = MC合并兩個結(jié)論，得到：MR1 = MR2 = MC23Chapter 11三級價格歧視確定相對價格考慮每一組應(yīng)該索取的相對價格，并將它們與需求的價格彈性聯(lián)系起來，要容易一些24Chapter 11三級價格歧視確定相對價格令MR1 和MR2 相等可以得到下面的價格必須滿足的關(guān)系式對需求彈性降低的消費者，應(yīng)該索取較高的價格25Chapter 11三級價格歧視例子E1 = -2 and E2 = -4P1 應(yīng)該是P2的1.5倍26Chapter 11三級價格歧視Q

11、uantityD2 = AR2MR2$/QD1 = AR1MR1Consumers are divided intotwo groups, with separatedemand curves for each group.MRTMRT = MR1 + MR227Chapter 11三級價格歧視QuantityD2 = AR2MR2$/QD1 = AR1MR1MRTMCQ2P2QT: MC = MRTGroup 1: more inelasticGroup 2: more elasticMR1 = MR2 = MCTQT control MCQ1P1MC = MR1 at Q1 and P1Q

12、TMCT28Chapter 11不向較小的市場銷售即使三級價格歧視是可能的，但有時同時向兩組銷售是不可行的某一組的需求非常低，價格要降得很低才能在該組銷售，但過低的價格可能導致企業(yè)無利可圖29Chapter 11不向較小的市場銷售QuantityD2MR2$/QMCD1MR1Group one, with demand D1, is not willing to pay enoughfor the good to make price discrimination profitable.Q*P*MC=MR1=MR230Chapter 11優(yōu)惠券和返還的經(jīng)濟學價格彈性更大的消費者，在購買產(chǎn)品時比

13、更常使用優(yōu)惠券和返還政策優(yōu)惠券和返還政策可以使企業(yè)實施價格歧視31Chapter 11優(yōu)惠券和返還的經(jīng)濟學大約20 30%的消費者會使用優(yōu)惠券或返還這使企業(yè)獲得那些需求彈性較高的消費者來購買商品。否則他們是不會購買的表11.1說明了使用與不使用優(yōu)惠券和返還的消費者的需求彈性的差異32Chapter 11優(yōu)惠券使用者與不使用者的需求價格彈性33Chapter 11機票定價需求彈性不同意味著一些顧客愿意支付更高的機票款商務(wù)旅行者幾乎沒什么選擇，他們的需求較為缺乏彈性休閑的旅客和家庭對價格更敏感，因此更有選擇性34Chapter 11航空旅行的需求彈性35Chapter 11機票定價每條航線都有多種

14、票價通過對機票設(shè)定不同的限制，將市場進行細分必須在周六住一晚提前21天、提前14天基本限制只能在特定的日期內(nèi)改簽最貴沒有限制頭等艙36Chapter 11其他類型的價格歧視跨期價格歧視是將需求函數(shù)不同的消費者劃分到不同的市場，并在不同的時點索取不同價格的行為。首發(fā)產(chǎn)品，其需求是缺乏彈性的精裝書與平裝書首映的電影新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品37Chapter 11跨期價格歧視一旦市場已經(jīng)產(chǎn)生了最大利潤，企業(yè)再降低價格吸引更富有彈性的需求我們可以用兩組不同的消費者的圖示來說明一組愿意現(xiàn)在買、一組愿意等38Chapter 11跨期價格歧視QuantityAC = MC$/QOver time, demand beco

15、mesmore elastic and price is reduced to appeal to the mass market.MR2D2 = AR2Q2P2D1 = AR1MR1P1Q1Initially, demand is lesselastic, resulting in a price of P1 .39Chapter 11其他類型的價格歧視高峰定價是在因能力限制導致邊際成本更高的高峰期索取高價的定價策略。一些產(chǎn)品的需求在某些特定時間會出現(xiàn)高峰交通高峰期的道路和隧道夏天傍晚的電力周末的滑雪勝地40Chapter 11高峰價格高峰定價的目標是通過向消費者索取更接近邊際成本的價格以提

16、高效率因MC上升，MR必須上升，這意味著價格上調(diào)因為價格更接近MC，所以總剩余更大高峰定價能提高效率41Chapter 11高峰價格三級價格歧視下，所有市場的MR是相等的高峰定價時并非如此，因為兩個市場間并無相互影響每個市場的價格和銷量是獨立的例如：電力、影劇院42Chapter 11MR1D1 = AR1MC高峰價格P1Q1Quantity$/QMR2D2 = AR2Q2P2MR=MC for each group. Group 1 has higher demand during peak times.43Chapter 11如何給暢銷小說定價如何給首次發(fā)行的精裝書定價？精裝書和平裝書是出

17、版商進行價格歧視的手段出版商如何給精裝書和平裝書定價呢？他們?nèi)绾螞Q定合適發(fā)行平裝書呢？44Chapter 11如何給暢銷小說定價出版商必須將消費者分為兩組：愿意購買昂貴精裝書的愿意等待平裝書出版的這就需要確定精裝書發(fā)行后，何時再出平裝書？出版商一般等12至18個月45Chapter 11如何給暢銷小說定價出版商必須用過去同類書的出版情況來給新書定價所以很難確定新書的需求因此，大多數(shù)新書的定價都差不多平裝書的需求更富有彈性，所以其價格低些46Chapter 11兩部收費制Form of pricing in which consumers are charged both an entry an

18、d usage feeEx: amusement park, golf course, telephone serviceA fee is charged upfront for right to use/buy the productAn additional fee is charged for each unit the consumer wishes to consumePay a fee to play golf and then pay another fee for each game you play47Chapter 11兩部收費制Pricing decision is se

19、tting the entry fee (T) and the usage fee (P)Choosing the trade-off between free-entry and high-use prices or high-entry and zero-use pricesSingle ConsumerAssume firm knows consumer demandFirm wants to capture as much consumer surplus as possible48Chapter 11Usage price P* is set equal to MC. Entry p

20、rice T* is equal to the entire consumer surplus.Firm captures all consumer surplus as profit.T*只有一個消費者的兩部收費Quantity$/QMCP*D49Chapter 11兩個消費者的兩部收費Two consumers, but firm can only set one entry fee and one usage feeWill no longer set usage fee equal to MCCould make entry fee no larger than CS of consu

21、mer with smallest demandFirm should set usage fee above MCSet entry fee equal to remaining consumer surplus of consumer with smaller demandFirm needs to know demand curves50Chapter 11D2 = consumer 2D1 = consumer 1Q1Q2The price, P*, will be greater than MC. Set T* at the surplus value of D2.兩個消費者的兩部收

22、費Quantity$/QMCBCAT*51Chapter 11有許多消費者的兩部收費No exact way to determine P* and T*Must consider the trade-off between the entry fee T* and the use fee P*Low entry fee: more entrants and more profit from sales of itemAs entry fee becomes smaller, number of entrants is larger and profit from entry fee will

23、 fall52Chapter 11有許多消費者的兩部收費To find optimum combination, choose several combinations of P and TFind combination that maximizes profitFirms profit is divided into two componentsEach is a function of entry fee, T assuming a fixed sales price, P53Chapter 11有許多消費者的兩部收費TProfit:entry fee:salesT*Total prof

24、it is the sum of the profit from the entry fee andthe profit from sales. Both depend on T.54Chapter 11兩部收費Rule of ThumbSimilar demand: Choose P close to MC and high TDissimilar demand: Choose high P and low TEx: Disneyland in California and Disney world in Florida have a strategy of high entry fee a

25、nd charge nothing for ride55Chapter 11變形的兩部收費制Entry price (T) entitles the buyer to a certain number of free unitsGillette razors sold with several bladesAmusement park admission comes with some tokensOn-line fees with free timeCan set higher entry fee without losing many consumersHigher entry fee c

26、aptures either surplus without driving them out of the marketCaptures more surplus of large customers56Chapter 11寶麗來相機In 1971, Polaroid introduced the SX-70 cameraPolaroid was able to use two-part tariff for pricing of camera/filmAllowed them greater profits than would have been possible if camera u

27、sed ordinary filmPolaroid had a monopoly on cameras and film57Chapter 11寶麗來相機Buying camera is like entry feeUnlike an amusement park, for example, the marginal cost of providing an additional camera is significantly greater than zeroIt was necessary for Polaroid to have monopoly If ordinary film cou

28、ld be used, the price of film would be close to MCPolaroid needed to gain most of its profits from sale of film58Chapter 11寶麗來相機Analytical framework:59Chapter 11寶麗來相機In the end, the film prices were significantly above marginal costThere was considerable heterogeneity of consumer demands60Chapter 11

29、移動電話費率In most areas in US, consumers can choose cellular providers: Verizon, Cingular, AT&T and SprintMarket power exists because consumers face switching costsWhen they sign up with a firm, they must sign a contract with high costs to breakPlans often exist of monthly cost plus fee extra minutesCom

30、panies can combine third-degree price discrimination with two-part tariff61Chapter 11移動電話費率62Chapter 11移動電話費率63Chapter 11捆綁銷售Bundling is packaging two or more products to gain a pricing advantageConditions necessary for bundlingHeterogeneous customersPrice discrimination is not possibleDemands must

31、be negatively correlated64Chapter 11捆綁銷售When film company leased “Gone with the Wind,” it required theaters to also lease “Getting Gerties Garter”Why would a company do this?Company must be able to increase revenueWe can see the reservation prices for each theater and movie65Chapter 11捆綁銷售Renting th

32、e movies separately would result in each theater paying the lowest reservation price for each movie:Maximum price Wind = $10,000Maximum price Gertie = $3,000Total Revenue = $26,000Gone with the Wind Getting Gerties GarterTheater A$12,000$3,000Theater B$10,000$4,00066Chapter 11捆綁銷售If the movies are b

33、undled:Theater A will pay $15,000 for bothTheater B will pay $14,000 for bothIf each were charged the lower of the two prices, total revenue will be $28,000The movie company will gain more revenue ($2000) by bundling the movie67Chapter 11相對評價More profitable to bundle because relative valuation of tw

34、o films are reversedDemands are negatively correlatedA pays more for Wind ($12,000) than B ($10,000)B pays more for Gertie ($4,000) than A ($3,000)68Chapter 11相對評價If the demands were positively correlated (Theater A would pay more for both films as shown) bundling would not result in an increase in

35、revenueGone with the Wind Getting Gerties GarterTheater A$12,000$4,000Theater B$10,000$3,00069Chapter 11捆綁銷售If the movies are bundled:Theater A will pay $16,000 for bothTheater B will pay $13,000 for bothIf each were charged the lower of the two prices, total revenue will be $26,000, the same as by

36、selling the films separately70Chapter 11捆綁銷售Bundling Scenario: Two different goods and many consumersMany consumers with different reservation price combinations for two goodsCan show graphically the preferences of consumers in terms of reservation prices and consumption decisions given prices charg

37、edr1 is reservation price of consumer for good 1r2 is reservation price of consumer for good 271Chapter 11保留價格r2r1 $6$3.25Consumer A$10$10Consumer C$8.25$3.25Consumer BFor example, Consumer A is willing to pay up to $3.25 for good 1 and up to $6 for good 2.72Chapter 11產(chǎn)品分開銷售時的消費決策r2r1P2IIConsumers b

38、uyonly Good 2P1Consumers fall intofour categories basedon their reservationprice.IConsumers buyboth goodsIIIConsumers buyneither goodIVConsumers buyonly Good 173Chapter 11產(chǎn)品捆綁銷售時的消費決策r2r1Consumers buy the bundlewhen r1 + r2 PB (PB = bundle price).PB = r1 + r2 or r2 = PB - r1Region 1: r PBRegion 2: r

39、 PB)IIConsumers donot buy bundle(r PB)74Chapter 11產(chǎn)品捆綁銷售時的消費決策The effectiveness of bundling depends upon the degree of negative correlation between the two demandsBest when consumers who have high reservation price for Good 1 have a low reservation price for Good 2 and vice versaCan see graphically

40、looking at positively and negatively correlated prices75Chapter 11保留價格r2r1P2P1If the demands are perfectly positivelycorrelated, the firmwill not gain by bundling.It would earn the sameprofit by selling the goods separately.76Chapter 11保留價格r2r1If the demands are perfectly negatively correlated, bund

41、ling is the ideal strategy all theconsumer surplus can be extracted and a higherprofit results.77Chapter 11電影的例子r2r1Bundling pays due to negative correlation.(Wind)(Gertie)5,00014,00010,0005,00010,00012,0004,0003,000BA78Chapter 11混合捆綁銷售Practice of selling two or more goods both as a package and indi

42、viduallyThis differs from pure bundling when products are sold only as a packageMixed bundling is good strategy whenDemands are somewhat negatively correlatedMarginal production costs are significant79Chapter 11混合捆綁銷售舉例Demands are perfectly negatively correlated but significant marginal costsFour cu

43、stomers under three different strategiesSelling good separately, P1 = $50, P2 = $90Selling goods only as a bundle, PB = $100Mixed bundling: Sold individually with P1 = P2 = $89.95Sold as a bundle with PB = $10080Chapter 11混合捆綁銷售舉例We can see the effects under different scenarios in the following tabl

44、e:81Chapter 11混合捆綁與純捆綁r1102030405060708090100r2102030405060708090100C2 = MC2C2 = 30For each good, marginal production cost exceeds reservation price of one consumer.A and D will buy individuallyB and C will buy bundleABDCC1 = MC1C1 = 20With positive marginalcosts, mixed bundling may be more profitab

45、lethan pure bundling.82Chapter 11捆綁銷售If MC is zero, mixed bundling can still be more profitable if consumer demands are not perfectly negatively correlatedExample:Reservation prices for consumers B and C are higherCompare the same three strategiesMixed bundling is the more profitable option since ev

46、eryone will end up buying83Chapter 11零邊際成本的混合捆綁銷售A and D purchase individually.B and C purchase bundled.Profits are highest with mixed bundling.r1204060801001201090r2204060801001201090CADB84捆綁銷售實踐Car purchasingBundles of options such as electric locks with air conditioningVacation TravelBundling hot

47、el with air fareCable televisionPremium channels bundled together85Chapter 11捆綁銷售Mixed Bundling in PracticeUse of market surveys to determine reservation pricesDesign a pricing strategy from the survey resultsCan show graphically using information collected from consumersConsumers are separated into

48、 four regionsCan change prices to find max profits86Chapter 11混合捆綁銷售實踐r2r1The firm can first choose a pricefor the bundle and then try individualprices P1 and P2 until total profitis roughly maximized.P2PBPBP187Chapter 11一家餐館的混合捆綁銷售88Chapter 11搭售The practice of requiring a customer to purchase one g

49、ood in order to purchase anotherXerox machines and the paperIBM mainframe and computer cardsAllows firm to meter demand and practice price discrimination more effectively89Chapter 11搭售Allows the seller to meter the customer and use a two-part tariff to discriminate against the heavy userMcDonaldsAllows them to protect their brand nameMicrosoft