1、譯文一個硬幣的兩面：誠實，謙卑和環(huán)相可201328：幾個標準,的互動。在此在擴展以往的。1.。適用于一個值得注意的各種設(shè)置譯文一個硬幣的兩面：誠實，謙卑和環(huán)相可201328：幾個標準,的互動。在此在擴展以往的。1.。適用于一個值得注意的各種設(shè)置,2002會科學(xué)家（克羅克，1998；奧斯特羅姆，1999；斯內(nèi)德，1985，（2002（1998等，2004 年，第 281 。因此它可以被視為一個 ; 5.。引發(fā)1965差2012，HEXACO 等，2004 年，第 281 。因此它可以被視為一個 ; 5.。引發(fā)1965差2012，HEXACO 其他玩家進行合作的可能性 - 以及合作的方式（T 回報

2、（差。雖然目前的研究結(jié)果持續(xù)增加到越來越多的支持誠信、謙卑因子在概念化HEXACO 中， 上幾乎就沒有影響（例如，奔尼珥，克萊默，及征費，2008；布拉呢斯 差。雖然目前的研究結(jié)果持續(xù)增加到越來越多的支持誠信、謙卑因子在概念化HEXACO 中， 上幾乎就沒有影響（例如，奔尼珥，克萊默，及征費，2008；布拉呢斯 - 外文原文Two of one coin: HonestyHumility and situational ldilemmalPrisoners Recently,the In particular, iality factor of HonestyHumility has attr

3、acted substantial attention. snot only been shown to predict several criteria, but also to entail a pattern eraction with situational ldilemmalPrisoners Recently,the In particular, iality factor of HonestyHumility has attracted substantial attention. snot only been shown to predict several criteria,

4、 but also to entail a pattern eraction with situational factors. xtend previous research on findings in linking HonestyHumility to the essential l dilemma, the dilemma. In three investigations, we found supportt those high in HonestyHumility were more likely to cooperate.so long as this was sensible

5、 in any way. Those low HonestyHumility, by contrast, tended to defect lly when this behavior wastempting but not risky. Thus, Honesty Humility shows promise as a cru l Cooperation is a vital ingredient in all eractions n individuals, anizations, societies,and nations. The e of cooperation s to notew

6、orthy variety of settings which span from everyday behavior in dyads to life-deathtfrom various disciplines investigate the antecedents and of cooperation, le evolutionary theorists (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Nowak, 2006;Wedekind Braithwaite, 2002), l scientists (Kollock, 1998;Ostrom, 1999; Snidal,

7、1985), (Dawesler, 1988;Fehr & Gchter, 2002), and behavioral scientists (Colman, Dijk & Wilke, 1995; Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004).Despite such several disciplines have long converged on investigating cooperation in (and by means so-called l dilemmas (Dawes, 1980; Kollock, 1998). These are broadl

8、y defined situations in which individual ization and collective efficiency are at Specifically, in corresponding situations,individual rationality s non-free-riding, or exploiting others whereas es ized if deci (Weber et al., 2004, ality (Ashton & makers cooperate. Clearl,sol dilemmas are everywhere

9、281)and it can thus be considered a lingeringsituations in which individual ization and collective efficiency are at Specifically, in corresponding situations,individual rationality s non-free-riding, or exploiting others whereas es ized if deci (Weber et al., 2004, ality (Ashton & makers cooperate.

10、 Clearl,sol dilemmas are everywhere281)and it can thus be considered a lingering challenge to 2007; Ashton et al., 2004; Lee & Ashton,2008), and lay with situational factors cooperative5. GeneralNot surprisingly, the vital e of when and why humans cooperate has attracted attention and continues to d

11、o so. From a , many investigations have used so l dilemma games, espe lly the Prisoners Dilemma Game (PDG), as represen ions of situations in which cooperation may be threatened by individualistic motivations (Dawes &Messick, 2000; Rapoport & Chammah, 1965). the large and diverse body of studies exa

12、mining what cooperation in PDGs, lay of the two surprisingly little research has attempted important groups of antecedents, namelyHerein, we took such anby Ashton and Lee (2007) on basicinvestigate the and situation. More precisely,building on recent work ality structure, we provided predictions on

13、individual in HonestyHumility eract with situational .In light of related prior work on cooperation (in situations n PDGs; Hilbig & 2009; Hilbig et al., 2012),we t HonestyHumility explains both who . Specifically, Honesty Humility should cooperate and under which itively linked with the probability

14、of cooperation eract with situational factors the following manner: Individuals low in HonestyHumility should seek to exploit others particularly when they need not expect retaliation or punishment. Those high in Honesty Humility should cooperate even if they could take advantage of others without f

15、acing severe To summarize the results of three investigations reported herein, the predictions from the HEXACO and prior experiments were largely , a itive link n HonestyHumility and cooperation was replicated and extended to PDG. Second, HonestyHumility was in fact the only ality factor to variance

16、 in PDG .As such, our results also replicate the previous t Five)Agreeableness is not consistently ted with cooperation in l Moreover, HonestyHumility explained variance both beyond the remaining Five, respectively. Third, and factors of the HEXACO and the entire importantly, we obtained support for

17、 the low in HonestyHumilityshiftedfrom defectionto cooperation oncetheformer becameless tempting and more risky. Those high in HonestyHumility cooperated consistently, even if defection was quite tempting and not particularly risky. Finally, strengthening the innings of HonestyHumility, it was ruled

18、 t those high in are merely oblivious to n situations or erms of the strategic of l dilemmas.Specifically, these individuals adapted their behavior in the PDG to probability with which the other player was expected to cooperate and did so in cooperative manner (cooperating once expecting cooperation

19、). Their arts low HonestyHumility, by contrast, opted for the tempting T-payoff (by defecting) even if the other player was expected to cooperate. So, in summary,Honesty Humility individualdifferen in cooperation and entails erdependencies with Although the current findings add to a consistently gro

20、wing body of evidence in support of the usefulness of the HonestyHumility factor as conceptualized within the HonestyHumility, by contrast, opted for the tempting T-payoff (by defecting) even if the other player was expected to cooperate. So, in summary,Honesty Humility individualdifferen in coopera

21、tion and entails erdependencies with Although the current findings add to a consistently growing body of evidence in support of the usefulness of the HonestyHumility factor as conceptualized within the m, several es certainly deserve further attention in future and anonymous gamesfullydefined payoff

22、matrix such astheprisonersdilemmaherein certainly do not cover all aspects of real-life situations. However, it should be t HonestyHumility has already been shown to account for ore real-inpress),ch as ecologically ehavior (Hilbig, Zettler, Moshagen, & ermsof self-Second, investigations of HonestyHu

23、mility in l dilemmas so far have hypothetical settings n real monetary incentives or, potentially more eraction partners. So, despite the converging support, one may call for using incentives and espe n in Experiment lly eraction (optimally,including a more balanced as well as larger le sizes in general).