IMFCountryReportNo.24/59

BOTSWANA

March2024

FINANCIALSECTORASSESSMENTPROGRAM

TECHNICALNOTEONFINANCIALSECTORSAFETY

NETS,CRISISMANAGEMENT,ANDBANK

RESOLUTIONFRAMEWORK

ThispaperonBotswanawaspreparedbyastaffteamoftheInternationalMonetaryFundasbackgrounddocumentationfortheperiodicconsultationwiththemembercountry.ItisbasedontheinformationavailableatthetimeitwascompletedonJanuary18,2024.

Copiesofthisreportareavailabletothepublicfrom

InternationalMonetaryFund?PublicationServicesPOBox92780?Washington,D.C.20090

Telephone:(202)623-7430?Fax:(202)623-7201

E-mail:

publications@

Web:

InternationalMonetaryFund

Washington,D.C.

?2024InternationalMonetaryFund

PreparedBy

MonetaryandCapitalMarketsDepartment

January18,2024

BOTSWANA

FINANCIALSECTORASSESSMENTPROGRAM

TECHNICALNOTE

FINANCIALSECTORSAFETYNETS,CRISISMANAGEMENT,ANDBANKRESOLUTIONFRAMEWORK

ThisTechnicalNotewaspreparedbyIMFstaffinthecontextoftheFinancialSectorAssessmentPrograminBotswana.Itcontainstechnicalanalysisand

detailedinformationunderpinningtheFSAP’s

findingsandrecommendations.Furtherinformation

ontheFSAPcanbefoundat

/external/np/fsap/fssa.aspx

BOTSWANA

2

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

CONTENTS

Glossary

3

EXECUTIVESUMMARY

4

INTRODUCTION

9

FINANCIALSAFETYNET

11

A.EarlyInterventionandRecoveryPlanning

11

B.ResolutionFramework

12

C.EmergencyLiquidityAssistance

14

D.DepositInsurance

17

CRISISPREPAREDNESS

19

A.EffectiveCoordinationthroughtheFSC

19

B.Cross-BorderIssues

22

C.Simulations

23

CRISISMANAGEMENT

24

BOXES

1.BankResolutionSequencing

11

2.ELAforNon-BankFinancialInstitutions

16

3.CommunicationsinBankResolution,CrisisPreparednessandManagement

19

4.CentralBankandMoFRolesintheFSC

21

TABLES

1.KeyRecommendations

7

2.DepositDistributionSurvey

18

APPENDICES

I.Statusof2017TAReport(asofJanuary2023)

26

II.SomeObservationsontheDraftRevisedBankingAct—SelectedIssues

28

III.SomeObservationsontheDepositInsuranceSchemeofBotswanaRegulation—Selected

Issues

31

IV.ExampleofaCountryContingencyPlanOutline

33

V.ExampleofaBankRecoveryPlanOutline

35

BOTSWANA

3

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

Glossary

BABankingAct1995

BoBBankofBotswana

BoBABankofBotswanaAct

BoBAABankofBotswanaAmendmentAct,2022

BSDBankSupervisionDepartment

DRBADraftRevisedBankingAct

DICPDepositInsuranceCorePrinciples

DISBDepositInsuranceSchemeofBotswana

DISRDepositInsuranceSchemeRegulation

D-SIBsDomesticSystemicallyImportantBanks

ELAEmergencyLiquidityAssistance

FIAFinancialIntelligenceAgency

FSBFinancialStabilityBoard

FSCFinancialStabilityCouncil

FSNFinancialSafetyNet

IADIInternationalAssociationforDepositInsurers

IDTInsuredDepositTransfer

KAFSBKeyAttributesofEffectiveResolutionRegimesforFinancialInstitutions

MCMMonetaryandCapitalMarketsDepartment

MOUMemorandumofUnderstanding

NBFINon-bankFinancialInstitution

NBFIRANon-bankFinancialRegulatoryAuthority

NB-SIFINon-BankSystemicallyImportantFinancialInstitutions

NPLNonperformingLoan

OAOfficialAdministration(orAdministrator)

PCAPromptCorrectiveAction

P&APurchaseandAssumptionTransaction

RAResolutionAuthority

RUResolutionsUnit

RRPRecoveryandResolutionPlans

SIFIsSystemicallyImportantFinancialInstitutions

TATechnicalAssistance

TMTemporaryManagement

BOTSWANA

4

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

EXECUTIVESUMMARY

1

ThefinancialsafetynetframeworkinBotswanaisincomplete,whilecrisispreparednessandmanagementstructuresmustbeexpanded.

2

TheBankofBotswana(BoB)lacksanemergencyliquiditysupportmechanismforcommercialbanks,bankresolutionandliquidationremainundertheCompaniesAct,andthereisnodepositinsurancesystem.A2016TAmission

3

on“Banking

SectorSafetyNetandCrisisManagement”identifiedmanydeficiencies.Todate,therehasbeenlimitedprogressinachievingtherecommendations.

Theauthoritiesare,however,poisedtosignificantlyimprovetheFinancialSafetyNet(FSN)andCrisisManagementframework.Specificlegalreformsinclude:(1)theimplementationoftheBankofBotswanaAmendmentAct,2022(BoBAA)willgivetheBoBpowertoprovideliquidity

assistancetobanksandsetupadepositinsurancescheme;(2)theDraftRevisedBankingAct(DRBA),whichwill,interalia,establishaspecialbankresolutionregimeincludingexpanded

resolutionpowersisatanadvancedstage;and(3)thedraftDepositInsuranceSchemeofBotswanaRegulation(DISBR)

4

isalmostcomplete,andaimstoestablishanarrowmandate“payboxplus”theDepositInsuranceSchemeofBotswana(DISB).

5

Atthesametime,furtherimprovementsappear

warrantedineachoftheselegalinstrumentsasdescribedsubsequentlyinthisFSAPTN.

Advancingthereformsforoperationalizingsafetynetsandimplementinganeffectivecrisis

managementandresolutionframeworkareachievableincasetheBoBAA,theDRBA,andtheDISBarealignedwithgoodpractices.TheBoBshouldseektoaddressrelevantdeficienciesin

relationtothepreemptioninbankruptcymattersintheDRBA.Intandem,thenewbankResolutionUnit(RU),workingwiththebanksupervisorsshoulddeveloppolicies,proceduresandmanualsfor

bankinterventionandresolution.Additionally,implementinganeffectiveDISBshouldbecreatedbylawinordertoensurestabilityandlegalcertainty.

Theauthoritiesshouldprioritizeoperationalizationofthe“saleofassetsandtransferof

liabilities,”betterknownasaPurchaseandAssumption(P&A)transaction.AP&Atransactionshouldbeconsideredthepreferredresolutiontoolfornon-systemicbanks.AP&Atransaction

entailsinsureddepositsandcertaingoodassetsbeingtransferredtoahealthybank.Whenthereare

1ThisTechnicalNote(TN)waspreparedbyDavidParker(MCM,ExternalExpert).TheFSAPmissionwouldliketothanktheauthoritiesfortheirfullcooperationtowardsthecompletiononthisassessment.

2TheFSAPreviewcommencedinMay2022andreferencedthelawsandregulations,namely,theBankingAct(BA),1995,andtheBankofBotswanaAct(BoBA),1996whichwereinforceinJanuary2023atthetimeoftheassessment.TheBankofBotswanaAmendmentAct(BoBAA),2022,waspassedbytheParliamentinAugust2022anditseffectivedateisFebruary2023.TheBankingAct,2023waspublishedviatheBotswanaGovernmentGazetteonJanuary13,

2023.

3“BankingSectorSafetyNetandCrisisManagement”,IMFTAReport,February2017.

4ThemissionhasrecommendedthattheDepositInsuranceSchemeofBotswanabecreatedvialawinordertoenhancestabilityandlegalcertainty.

5AdditionalobservationsontheDRBAandDISBR,specificallyrelatedtofinancialsafetynets,crisispreparednessandmanagementareoutlinedinappendices.

BOTSWANA

5

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

insufficientgoodassetstocoverinsureddeposits,thecontemplatedDISBwouldadvancefundstobalancethetransaction.Theotherassetsandliabilitiesremainintheliquidationestateofthefailedbank.TheP&Aistypicallylesscostlythandirectpayoutinaliquidationandcausesmuchless

disruptiontodepositorservices.BoBshouldprepareoperationalmanualsandprocedurestotimelyenactsuchresolutionmeasures.Recoveryplanrequirementsforallbanksandresolutionplansfor,atleast,systemicbanksshouldbeimplemented.Importantly,expandingsupervisoryMOUswithallhomecountriesthatincludealternativeoptionsofbankresolutionwouldbeappropriategiventhedominanceofforeign-ownedbanksinBotswana.

ImplementingasuitablelawfortheDISBandpreparingtheactionplanforits

operationalization,includingclearfundingarrangementsthroughbankcontributionsanda

publicbackstop,areneeded.Importantly,theoperationalindependenceoftheDISBshouldbe

assuredbyestablishingaseparateandindependentunitthatreportsdirectlytotheBoBBoard,withtheBoardoverseeingthefund’sactivitiesandensuringthatresourcesareusedasprescribedina

futureDISBlaw.

OncetheBoBAAiseffectivetheBoBneedstodevelopthepoliciesandproceduresfortheELAframework.ELAshouldbereservedasafundingsourceoflastresortforsolventbuttemporarily

illiquidbanksthatareadequatelyregulatedbytheBoB.Solvencyassessmentsshouldbeforward-lookingaccompaniedbyanticipatedfundingplan;withtheBoBhavingasufficientlywiderangeofeligiblecollateralwithasuitableriskmanagementframework.TheframeworkcouldbenefitfromclarifyingthatELAshouldbesubjecttoapenaltyinterest—i.e.,higherthanthepolicyrateorthe

prevailingmarketinterestrate.Additionalrecommendationsfromthe2007FSAPandpastIMFtechnicalassistanceremainrelevant.

Developingthesesafetynetsthatcharacterizegoodinternationalpracticesinthefinancial

regulatoryarchitecturewillrequiretheFinancialStabilityCouncil(FSC)toprioritizeworkoverthenear-tomedium-term.TheFSCisuniquelypositionedtoengageincrisispreparednessand

managementactivitiesandshoulddevelopaneffectiveandcomprehensiveimplementation

framework,includingforcommunicatingontheseactivities.TheresponsibilitiesoftheFSCwilllikelycascadetothetechnicalworkinggroups,comprisingthesupervisors,financialstabilitystaffandforthedepositinsurance.

TheFSCshouldbeexpandedtoincludeacrisispreparednessandmanagementmandate

whichisinlinewithitsstatutoryresponsibilitiesoutlinedintheBoBAA.TheFSCwouldoverseehigh-levelmonitoringofthefinancialsystem,analyzingtherisksaffectingthesystem,and

discussingtheappropriatepoliciestomitigatethoserisks.TheFSCisnotadecision-makingbodybutbuildsoneachauthority’sstatutoryduties.FSC’scurrentMOUcallsforsemi-annualmeetings;however,itwouldbemoreeffectivewithregularquarterlymeetings,whiletechnicallevelworkinggroupswouldmeetmorefrequently.Crisissimulationsshouldbeconductedregularly,andanex-antecommunicationsframeworkestablished.

BOTSWANA

6

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

TheFSCshouldalsoformallyintroducesystem-widecrisismanagementprotocolstoplanandimplementsolutionsintheeventofacrisis.Noeffectiveunderlyingframeworkcurrentlyexists.However,theDRBA,afterfurtheramendmenttoalignwithgoodpractices,willhelpimprovethe

bankresolutionframework,byprovidingabroadmenuofresolutionmeasures.Theauthorities

shouldstandreadytoprovidefinancialassistanceinacrisissituationsubjecttorobustsafeguardsandconditions,including,interalia,thatshareholderstakethefirstloss,managementischanged,compensationlimits,nodividendsandanexitstrategy.TheMinistryofFinanceshouldalsobe

enabledtoexerciseextraordinarypowersinacrisissituation,includingguaranteeinguninsureddepositors.

BOTSWANA

7

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

Table1.Botswana:KeyRecommendations

Recommendations

Timeline1/

Initiativeor

ResponsibleParty

EnhancingFinancialSafetyNets

1.

ImplementremainingrecommendationsfromtheFebruary2017Technical

AssistanceReportonBankingSectorSafetyNetandCrisisManagement(seeAppendixI);includingmakingfurtheramendmentstoaligntheDRBAwith

goodinternationalpracticesandestablishingtheDISBbystandalone

legislation[?15,?25]

I

FSC:(BoB,MoF,

NBFIRA,FIAand

DISB)

2.

EnsurethatDRBAsupersedesotherlaws,particularlytheCompaniesActandInsolvencyAct.[?7]

ST

BoB

3.

Prepareearlyintervention,resolutionandliquidationplansforanyCAMELS4-and5-ratedbanks,aswellasbanks,thatshownoimprovementintheirsituation(CAMELS3-ratedbanks).[?11]

ST

BoB

4.

Developcomprehensive(i)bankinterventionmanuals;(ii)bankresolutionmanuals;(iii)detailedinstructionsincludingconservativeoperating

proceduresforbridgebankmanagers;and(iv)wide-rangingandthoroughdirectionsforliquidators.[?18]

MT

BoB

5.

DevelopResolutionPlansforsystemicbanksandforeignbanksubsidiariesinBotswana.[?19]

ST

BoB

6.

DevelopanELAframeworkforanexpansionofacceptablecollateral(with

appropriatehaircuts),otherappropriatesafeguards,andguaranteesfromthegovernmentifneededinsystemiccircumstances(oncetheBoBAAcomes

intoforce).[?20-24]

ST

BoB

7.

EnsurethatDRBAandDISRareharmonizedtoestablishlicenserevocationasthetriggerforinsureddepositrepayment,inaccordancewiththeDISBlaw.

[?26]

ST

BoB

8.

EnsurethatDRBAandDISRstipulatethatinsureddepositorrepaymentsbeautomatic,basedonthefailedbank’srecordsandinaccordancewiththe

DISBlaw.[?26]

ST

BoB

9.

Developasimulationprogramfornon-systemicbankresolutions.[?29]

MT

BoB,DISB

CrisisPreparedness

10.

Prepareexante,a“one-voice”methodofeffectivecommunicationwiththepublic,wherebyallspokespersonswouldusethesamesetofagreeduponfactsandassumptions.[?29]

ST

FSC:(BoB,MoF,

NBFIRA,FIAand

DISB)

BOTSWANA

8

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

Table1.Botswana:KeyRecommendations(concluded)

Recommendations

Timeline1/

Initiativeor

ResponsibleParty

11.

EnhancecrisispreparednessandmanagementregimebyenablingtheFSCtoengageinsimulationsthatinformcrisismanagementprocedures,and

developmanualsandchecklistsforcrisismanagement.[?32,?34]

MT

FSC:(BoB,MoF,

NBFIRA,FIAand

DISB)

12.

ExpandextantsupervisoryMOUsordevelopresolutionMOUstoincludecooperationregardingrecoveryandresolutionissuesandaskhome

authoritiesforforeignbanks’recoveryandresolutionplanstodetermineiftheyareacceptablefortreatmentofthelocalsubsidiaries.[?36]

MT

BoB

13.

Seeklettersfromparentbankscommittingtoprovidesufficientliquidityandcapitaltothelocalsubsidiariestomeetpotentialrisks.[?37]

ST

BoB

14.

Conductperiodicandcomprehensivesimulationstoensurethatliquidityassistancecanbemobilizedinatimelymanner.[?39]

MT

BoB

CrisisManagement

15.

Considertheuseofsupervisorsonsiteatproblembanks,withcleartermsofreference,topreventasset-stripping,documentdestructionandtogather

informationfortheRA.[?11]

ST

BoB

16.

RequireallbankstopreparecomprehensiveRecoveryPlans,updatedannually,respectingproportionality.[?13]

MT

BoB

17.

Planforthepossibleneedofextraordinaryresolutionandguaranteepowerswithstrongsafeguardsforasystemicrisk.[?43]

MT

FSC:(BoB,MoF,

NBFIRA,FIA,and

DISB)

1/I:Immediately=within6months;ST:shortterm=lessthan1year;MT:mediumterm=1–5years

BOTSWANA

9

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

INTRODUCTION

1.ThebankingsectorofBotswanaisconcentrated,andrelativelysmall.Itconsistsofninecommercialbanksandtwostate-owned“statutorybanks”(speciallycharteredbanks),andone

buildingsociety.Twocommercialbanksaccountfor46percentofthebankingsectorassetsand

havebeendesignatedDomesticSystemicallyImportantBanks(D-SIB).TheeightcommercialbanksareforeignownedasdirectsubsidiariesofUnitedKingdom,SouthAfrica,Namibia,Malawi,and

India.Nonperformingloans(NPL)arerelativelylowandstableincomparisontopre-pandemiclevels.NPLstototalloanswere3.7percentasofJune2022comparedwith4.3percentin2020.

2.TheNBFIsector(includinginsurancecompanies,andretirementfunds)isgrowingfastandraisesfinancialstabilityconcerns.TheNBFIsectorreflectsanassetsconcentrationinretirementfundsat43percentofthesector.InterconnectednessbetweenbanksandNBFIscanposeacontagionrisk.NBFIs

holdnearly20percentofthedepositsfundingthebankingsystemandalsohaveotherinvestmentsinbankbondsandequities.

3.Anefficientfinancialsafetynet(FSN)canhelpmitigatetheriskofseverefinancial

crisesbypreventingsmallerfinancialsectorproblems(e.g.,failureofanon-systemicbank)fromsnowballingintoacrisissituation.Effectivecrisismanagementpreparation,including

throughtheestablishmentofproceduresandpoliciescanhelpmitigatetheconsequencesof

financialcriseswhentheyoccur.TheFSNcoversemergencyliquidityassistance

6

(ELA),early

intervention,bankresolution,depositinsurancesystems(DIS),andliquidation.Crisispreparedness

andmanagementinvolvesplanningandpreparationactivitiesforfacingsystem-widefinancialcrisis,includingpreparingeffectivecommunicationstrategiesexante(Box3),cooperationand

coordinationarrangements,bothamongdomesticauthoritiesandwithforeignauthorities,whencross-borderactivitiesaresignificant.

4.TheBoBplaysakeyroleinthecontingencyframeworkforcrisispreparednessand

managementastheprudentialsupervisorandfutureresolutionauthority.TheFSCprovidesaforumfortheinvolvementoftheMinistryofFinance(MOF)withBoB

7

regardinginformationsharingandcooperationforcrisispreparednessandmanagement.DepositprotectionwillbeprovidedoncethedraftDISBRcomesintoeffect.

5.Botswananeedstoimproveitsfinancialsafetynettoprovideaneffectivelenderoflastresortprocess,introduceadepositinsurancesystem,developeffectiveoperational

policiesandprocedurestoaccompanythelegislativeframeworkforbankresolution,andestablishcrisispreparednessandmanagementprotocols.Theseimprovementsshouldbe

underpinnedbyasoundlegalframeworkforbankresolutionthatisalignedwithgoodpracticesand

6AlsoreferredtoasLenderofLastResortfacilities(LOLR).

7OtheragenciesincludingNBFIRA,FIAandthesoontobecreatedDISBareFSCmembers;however,experiencehasshownthatthecentralbankandministryoffinancearethemajorplayersinresolvingasystemiccrisis.

BOTSWANA

10

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

theFSAP’srecommendations.Inaddition,effectivebanksupervisionneedstoincludeprogressiveenforcementmeasuresandallowancesforearlyinterventionbeforeabank’scapitalisdepleted.

6.AnIMFTechnicalAssistance(TA)report

8

onBankingSectorSafetyNetandCrisis

ManagementidentifiedmanydeficienciesintheFSNandCrisisManagementareas.Relativelyfewoftherecommendationshavebeenfulfilledandremainvalid(AppendixI).ThependingBankofBotswanaAmendmentAct2022(BoBAA)

9

andDraftRevisedBankingAct(DRBA)willfulfillmanyofthepreviousIMFTArecommendations.However,thereareremainingdeficienciesintheDRBAthatdonotrepresentgoodinternationalpracticesasnotedthroughoutthetextofthisTechnicalNote

(TN)andsummarizedinAppendixII.ThisTNwillnotrepeattheanalysis,discussion,and

recommendationsofthe2017IMFTAreport,butratherbuildsonthoserecommendationsinordertoimprovetheFSNandCrisisPreparednessandManagementpractices.

7.Thebankresolutionandcrisismanagementframeworkhasseensomeimprovements,includingcreationoftheFSC,andwillbefurtheredwithpassageoftheBoBAAandtheDRBA.

Forexample,bankresolutionunderthecurrent1995BankingAct(BA),iscourtbased,whichisslow,unwieldyandrisksfinancialinstabilitywhenpromptresolutionactionscannotbetaken.TheDRBA,willestablishbankresolutionasanadministrativefunctionundertheBoB,providingforirreversibleresolutionactions,enablingswiftandirreversibleresolutionactions.

10

Withthecreationofthe

contemplatedDISBR,andalongwithDRBA,theauthoritieswouldbepoisedtobeabletoconductaswiftnon-systemicbankresolutionaction(licenserevocationandclosing)andpromptlyrepay

insureddepositors,mitigatingpotentialcontagionanddepositruns.TheDRBAshouldsupersedeallotherlegislationinrelationtobankinterventionandresolution,particularlytheCompaniesActandInsolvencyAct.Nevertheless,thelatterinstrumentsmaybesupplementarytotheDRBAtoensure

therearenogapsinthelegalframework,providedthattherearesoundprovisionsonresolvingconflictsamongtheselaws.

8.Despiteprogresstodate,theauthoritiesneedtoensurethatthedraftBoBAAandDRBAandDISBRarerevisedforgreateralignmentwithgoodinternationalstandardsandpractices.Accordingly,theresolutionregimeandthedepositinsuranceschemewereevaluatedagainstthestandardsoftheFinancialStabilityBoard’s(FSB),viz,KeyAttributesofEffective

ResolutionRegimesforFinancialInstitutions(KAs),andtheInternationalAssociationofDeposit

Insurers’(IADI),RevisedCorePrinciplesforEffectiveDepositInsuranceSystems(DICPs),respectively.

9.TherestofthisTNisorganizedasfollows:SectionIIdiscussestheFSNincludingEarlyIntervention,RecoveryandResolution,EmergencyLiquidityAssistanceandDepositInsurance.

SectionIIIcoversCrisisPreparednessandManagement.

8IMFTechnicalAssistanceReport,February2017

9WhiletheBoBAAwaspassedbytheNationalAssemblyinNovember2022,itseffectivedateisFebruary2023.

10Aggrievedpartiesstillhavedueprocess;however,anysuccessfulchallengewouldbesubjecttomonetarycompensationandnotreversaloftheresolutionaction.

BOTSWANA

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND11

FINANCIALSAFETYNET

A.EarlyInterventionandRecoveryPlanning

10.BoBcurrentlylacksaneffectiveearlyinterventionregime,butitspowerswillbe

significantlyimprovedwithpassageofDRBAonceitisfurtheralignedwithgoodpractices.An

effectiveprogramofcorrectivemeasuresshouldincludeearlyinterventionabilitybasedon

quantitative(mandatory)triggerswithqualitative(andinherentlymorejudgmental)elementsto

guideearlyinterventionmeasuresforproblemfinancialinstitutions,whichwouldenableBoBtotakeoverabankbeforebalancesheetcapitalfallstozero.Thebestcorrectiveactionisthemeasurethataccomplishesthebank’simprovementwiththeleastintrusion.BoBshouldcloselymonitorCapital

adequacy,AssetQuality,Management,Earnings,LiquidityandSensitivitytomarketrisk(CAMELSorBoBequivalent)particularlyforbanksrated4and5,aswellasbanksthatshownoimprovementin

theirsituation.Suchintensescrutinywouldbeexpectedtoresultinimposingcredible,time-boundplanstocorrectoutstandingdeficiencies,alongwithaclearmessagecitingtheBoBenforcement

actionsthatwillbetakenifproblembanksdonotimprovetheirconditionandoperations.

Box1.BankResolutionSequencing

CAMELS3RatingCAMELS4-5Rating

Strongerenforcementmeasures

Placeexaminer(s)on-sitefu