April2025

Tariffs,thedollarandtheUSeconomy

Jean-PierreLandau

SciencesPo

INTRODUCTION

AnalystsandpolicymakersalignedwiththenewUSadministrationareproposingtofundamentally‘reconfigure’theglobaltradingandfinancialsystem,tobetteralignitwithUSeconomicinterests.

Theirapproachdepartsfromtraditionalprotectionism.Theysupportandadvocatetheintensiveuseoftariffs,butasarevenue-raisingandburden-sharinginstrument.Theydonotdisputethemainstreamargumentthattradedeficitsreflectmacroeconomicimbalances.Onthecontrary,theyembraceit.TheyseeacloseconnectionbetweentheUnitedStates’tradeandcurrencyregimes.CentraltotheiranalysisistheargumentthatpersistentcapitalinflowsintotheUnitedStateshaveledtoachronicovervaluationofthedollar,underminingUSindustrialcompetitivenessandresultingincurrentaccountdeficits

Intheirview,theseinflowsaredrivenbytwomainfactors.First,theyreflectdomesticdistortionsinsurpluseconomies–mostnotablyChina–whichgenerateexcesssavingsthatspilloverintotheUSeconomy.Second,theystemfromtheUSdollar’sstatusasthedominantglobalreservecurrency,whichcreatesastructuraldemandfordollar-denominatedassets.

Theirpolicyrecommendationsarenotconventional.Mostnotably,theyproposethattheUnitedStatesimposepenalties–oruserfees–todiscourageforeigngovernmentsfromaccumulatingdollar-denominatedforeignexchangereserves.Whileothersseethedollar’sstatusasa‘privilege’,theseeconomistsseeitasaburden.Adiminishedinternationalroleforthedollaris,intheirview,anacceptablecostforachievingtheirprimaryobjectives:revitalisingUSindustryandbalancingthecurrentaccount.

CEPRPOLICYINSIGHTNo.142

ThisPolicyInsightmainlyreferstotwopapers(Miran,2024;PettisandHogan2024),jointlycharacterised,forthesakeofsimplicity,asrepresentingthe‘newarrangement’.Thefirstpartdiscussestechnicalaspectsoftheiranalysisandrecommendations.Inthesecondpart,theirproposalsareevaluatedfromthepointofviewoflong-termUSeconomicinterests.

ADISCUSSIONOFTHEMAINARGUMENTSANDPROPOSALS

Threemainargumentsunderpinthereasoning:(1)China’sdomesticpoliciesaremainlyresponsibleforglobalimbalancesandtheUScurrentaccountdeficit;(2)tariffscanimproveUSwelfarethroughbetterfiscalburdensharingwithforeigners;and(3)theroleofthedollarasareservecurrencyisdirectlyresponsibleforUSdeindustrialisation.

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ChinaandtheUScurrentaccountdeficit

Theanalysisstartswithtwofundamentaltruths:first,thecurrentaccountisthemirrorimageofthedomesticsaving–investmentbalance;second,thisbalancedoesnotonlyreflectprivatesectordecisionsbutisdirectlyorindirectlydistortedbydomesticpublicpolicies.

AgoodargumentcancertainlybemadethatChina’scurrentaccountissignificantlyinfluencedbypublicpolicies.China’soverallsavingrateisexceptionallyhighandpersistentlyso.Householdsareincentivised–and,insomecases,compelled–tosave,duetotheabsenceofacomprehensivesocialsafetynetandtheunderdevelopmentofcreditandsavinginstruments.Also,thelabourshareofnationalincomeinChinaiscomparativelylowandhasdecreasedoverthelastdecade.Thecounterpartishighprofitabilityofcorporations,animportantcontributiontoaggregatesavings.Astheargumentgoes,incomedistributionpolicieseffect‘indirecttransfers’tothebenefitofcorporationsandexporters.Inthatsense,alldomesticpolicies“actasaformoftradepolicy”(PettisandHogan,2024).Finally,throughstate-ownedenterprises(SOEs)andpublicsubsidies,theChineseauthoritiesexertsignificantinfluenceovertheallocationandsubsidisationofcapital.

However,thisisnotthewholestory.Chinaalsobenefitsfromadeeper,morestructuraladvantage:thesizeanddiversityofitseconomy.China'scurrentGDPiscomparabletothatoftheentireglobaleconomyinthe1980s,attheheightofglobalisation.Sizenaturallygenerateseconomiesofscaleandlearning-by-doingeffects–bothofwhicharefurtherreinforcedbystatesupport.

Thecombinationofscaleeffectsandindustrialpolicygenerateseconomicdynamismandmarketdistortions.IdentifyinganddisentanglingthesedistortionsisessentialforeffectivepolicyresponsesandshouldbeapriorityforChina’seconomiccompetitors.

Closelyrelatedisanother,morequestionableclaimthatChina’sexcesssavings‘force’dissavingintheUnitedStates(PettisandHogan,2024).TheargumentpositsthatChina’ssurplusinevitablyleadstoreducedsavingsbyUShouseholdsandcorporates.ItsuggeststhattradeandfinancialrelationswithChinadeprivetheUnitedStatesofits‘economicagency’andthatUSpolicymakersinfacthavelittlecontroloverdomesticmacroeconomicoutcomes.

Thisviewismisguided.Evenifcapitalflowsare‘pushed’intotheUSeconomy,theyonlyimposeareductioninnetsavings(S–I),notingrosssavings.Simplearithmeticrevealsthatadeclinein(S–I)canbeachievedinoneoftwoways:

1.areductioninUSsavings,or

2.anincreaseinUSinvestment.

Therelativeimportanceofthesetwochannelsremainsamatterofongoingdebate.Inhisseminalpaperonthe‘globalsavingsglut’hypothesis,BenBernankearguedthatthesecondmechanismdominates:capitalinflowsandnetsavingsaredrivenbyincreasedinvestmentopportunitiesintheUnitedStates.

Othereconomistshavedifferentviews,butallwouldagreethattheactualoutcomedependsnotonlyonChina’sbehaviourbutalsoonUSdomesticpolicies.USfiscalpolicydirectlyinfluencestheconsumption–savingsequilibrium.Financialpoliciesandregulationsalsoshapesavingsandinvestmentbehaviourthroughcreditconditionsandallocation.

Tariffs,reciprocityandfiscalrevenues

Tradetheoryviewstariffsastoolstopromotecompetitiveness,investmentandlong-termgrowth–byreallocatingresourcesfromconsumerstoproducers.Theyshouldbemodulatedandcarefullytargeted.Bycontrast,proponentsofthenewarrangementsee

tariffsaspurerevenue-raisinginstruments.Therationaleistotaxforeignexporters,therebypotentiallyeasingthedomestictaxburden.Tariffsshouldbeindiscriminateandimplementedacrosstheboard.

Thisraisesthequestionofincidence:who,ultimately,bearsthecost?Theanswercriticallyhingesonimportpriceelasticities.Whendemandisinelastic,foreignproducerspassthecosttoUSconsumersthroughhigherprices.Ifdemandiselastic,exportersmustabsorbthetariffthroughpricereductions,andtheUStermsoftradeimprove.

Butelasticitiesvaryacrossgoodsandsectors.Theimplicationsareclear.First,uniformtariffswillmostlikelycreatesignificantdistortionsandwelfarelosses–throughhigherconsumerpricesintheimportingcountry.Second,optimaltariffsareproductspecific.Tariffpolicymustalignwithacountry'seconomiccharacteristics.Thereisno‘onesizefitsall’schedule.Eachcountryhasauniqueconfigurationofoptimaltariffswhichdependsdependingonitsproductionstructure.

Bycontrast,UStradepolicyisnowguidedbythedoctrineof‘reciprocity’.UStariffsarebilaterallyadjustedtocloselymirrorthoseofitstradingpartners.Itiscertainthatsuchtariffswillhitproductswithlowelasticityandleadtosignificantincreasesinimportprices.

‘Reciprocity’,therefore,hasthedoubleeffectofraisingbarrierstotradeand,atthesametime,pushingthecountryawayfromitsoptimaltariffstructure.Bycontrast,multilateraltradenegotiations,forinstanceintheWTOframework,arebasedonadifferentprinciple:reciprocal(andmutuallybeneficial)concessions.Thebeautyofthemultilateralapproachisthatitallowseachcountrytoreachitsoptimaltariffsandstillbringdownbarriers.Considertwocountriesstartingwithhightariffsandverydifferentoptimaltariffs.Inafirststage,theycanbothlowertariffsonproductswheretheiroptimaltariffsarelow–which,byassumption,arenotthesame.Then,oncethisisdone,theycanlookatadjustingproportionallytheirhightariffs,againbringingdownbarrierswhilekeepingunchangedthestructureoftheirrelativeprotection.Thenegotiationprocessaccommodatesasymmetricpreferencesandcomparativeadvantages.

Reciprocaltradeliberalisationisnotaboutsymmetry,butaboutmutualgain.Thenegotiationallowseachcountrytoretainprotectivemeasureswheretheyaremostneeded,whileachievingnetwelfareimprovementsforall.

Thedollar,foreignexchangereservesanddeindustrialisation

Theargumentonthedollarandforeignexchangereservesisthemostconsequential.Itgoesasfollows:

?CapitalinflowsintotheUSleadtoarealappreciationofthedollarandacurrentaccountdeficit.Theyareadragontheeconomyratherthan(asconventionallyassumed)apositivetransferofresourcesfromforeigntoUSresidents.

?Thisistrueofinflowscausedbythebuildupofforeignexchangereserves.Thosearetheprimaryreasonforthedollar’sovervaluation–andindirectly,thecauseofUSdeindustrialisation.

?Reserveinflowsaregoingtopersistandamplify.Thereasoninginvokesamodernadaptationofthe‘Triffindilemma’wherethesupplyofgloballiquiditybytheUnitedStatesleadstounsustainableimbalances.Today,asthenarrativegoes,thedemandforforexreservesgrowswiththesizeoftheworldeconomy.ButitmustbeabsorbedbytheUSeconomy,whoseshareinworldGDPisdecreasingorconstant.TheUScurrentaccountdeficitmustthereforeconstantlyincreaseasapercentageofUSGDPtomaintainequilibrium.

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Again,thereasoningisbasedonaconfusionbetweengrossandnetcapitalflows.ThecounterpartoftheUScurrentaccountdeficitarenetinflowsofcapital.Thosenetinflowsarethealgebraicsumofallgrossinflowsandoutflows.BothgrossUScapitalinflowsandoutflowsdrivethemovementsoftheexchangerate.

Reserveinflowsrepresentonlyone(relativelysmallandirregular)componentoftotalgrossinflows.Thereisnoclearreasontoassertthatthey,ratherthanothercapitalflows,aretheprimarydriverofexchangeratemovementsandthecurrentaccount.Infact,reserveinflowsmaybetheleastsensitivetoexchangeratefluctuations,astheyaredrivenbyforeigngovernments’precautionarydecisions,ratherthanbymarketforces.IfreserveaccumulationwereindeedtheprimarydriveroftheUStradedeficit,onewouldexpectastrongcorrelationbetweenreserveinflowsandtradeimbalancesovertime.Yet,sucharelationshipisnotconsistentlyobserved,asillustratedFigure1.

Figure1Dollareffectiveexchangerate(leftscale)versusforeignexchange

115

110

105

100

95

90

reservesindollars(rightscale),2016onwards

CEPRPOLICYINSIGHTNo142April2025

Dollareffectiveexchangerate

Foreignexchangereserves

inUSdollars(US$trillions)

7.50

7.00

6.50

6.00

5.50

5.00

2016201720182019202020212022202320242025

Source:Author’scalculations.

Themisdiagnosisisimportantandseriousbecauseitdrivesthemostradicalproposalofthenewarrangement,namely,thatforeignholdingsofUSTreasuriesshouldpaya‘userfee’(basedeitherontheoutstandingamountortherevenue),thusinternalisingthebenefitsthatforeigncountriesdrawfromtheiraccesstotheUSfinancialmarket.

Theessenceofanewarrangement

Proponentsofthenewarrangementaimtoachievetwoobjectives:theywanttodepreciatethedollartorevitaliseUSindustry;and,atthesametime,theyseekbetterfiscalburdensharingfortheUnitedStatesthroughincreasedfundingandcontributionsbyothercountries,includingthroughtariffs.

Meetingbothgoalswouldrequireadelicatebalancingact.ForeigncapitalinflowsintheUnitedStatesmustbediscouragedbecausetheydrivedollarappreciation,butforeignpurchasesofUSTreasuriesmustbeencouragedtofinancetheUSdeficit.

Thereisanobvioustension,andeconomicforcesaloneareunlikelytodeliverthisoutcome.Theessenceofthearrangementistostronglyincentivise–orpotentiallycoerce–othercountriestocontinueusingthedollarasthedominantreservecurrency,evenasitsattractivenessisdeliberatelyreduced.

AssessingthepoliticalfeasibilityofthisapproachliesbeyondthescopeofthisPolicyInsight.Nevertheless,substitutingcoercionforattractivenessininternationalmonetaryrelationswouldraisesignificantchallenges.Forcingtheuseofaninternationalcurrencyinafree-marketenvironmentisdifficult.Initsmostextremeform,ithasonlybeendoneinregionalgroupingssuchastheComecon,whereinter-countryrelationswerenotgovernedbymarketforcesandwhichweredominatedmilitarilybyonecountry.Acasecanalsobemadethat,duringtheBrettonWoodseraandtheearlyColdWar,USallies–especiallyinEurope–avoidedpoliciesseenashostiletodollarstability.

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Buttoday'scontextisfundamentallydifferent.Itwouldmakeanyformof‘globalfinancialrepression’moredifficulttoimplementandsustain.Theworldismultipolar.Potentialalternativesexisttothedollar,atleastinthelongrun.Thedigitalisationofmoneywillchangethecompetitiveenvironment.AchangeintheUSapproachtothedollarroleanditsstatuswouldalmostcertainlyopenthedoortoincreasedcompetitionfromothercurrencies,particularlyfromregionsandcountriesthathavelongresentedthedollar'ssupremacyanddominance.

THENEWARRANGEMENTANDUSLONG-TERMECONOMICINTERESTS

Proponentsofthenewarrangementrecogniseitsinherenttrade-offs.TheyarepreparedtoacceptadiminishedinternationalrolefortheUSdollarinordertorevitaliseUSindustryandredressitscurrentaccount.

Thecorequestioniswhetherthepotentialbenefitsofthisstrategyoutweighitscosts.OnthebenefitsofthenewarrangementfortheUSeconomy

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Thosebenefitsareexclusivelymeasuredwithtwonarrowyardsticks:theshareofindustryinGDP,andthecurrentaccountbalance.ThesemaynotprovideontheirownanadequatemeasureofUSfundamentalinterests.

Itiseasyandtemptingtopresentthecurrentaccountdeficitasadragontheeconomy.Reducingthedeficit(increasingnetexternaldemand)seemsagoodwaytoboosteconomicactivityandcreatejobs.

However,thismaybemisleading(Obstfeld,2024).Considertwohypotheticalsituations:

?oneinwhichproductionishigh,butdomesticdemandisevenhigherandthecurrentaccountisindeficit;and

?anotherinwhichthecurrentaccountisinsurplus,butdomesticdemandislowandoutputremainswellbelowpotential.

Surely,thefirstscenarioispreferable–providedthattheexternaldeficitremainsmanageableandeasilyfinanced.Fromapolicystandpoint,therefore,thecurrentaccountshouldbeseenasaconstraint,notapolicyobjective.Infact,theUnitedStatesmaybetheeconomywherethisconstraintisleastbindingduetoitsreservecurrencystatusanddeepfinancialmarkets.

Considernow,theprioritygiventoindustryasanengineofgrowth.Itiscommon,evenamongsteconomists,tothinkthatindustryis‘special’.Butwhyisitso?Theimplicitassumptionisthatindustrycarriesspecificexternalitiesfortherestoftheeconomy,suchastechnologycreationanddiffusion,training,orlearningbydoing.

Astheworld’stechnologicalfrontiereconomy,theUnitedStatesalreadypossessescomparativeadvantagesinsectorswheresuchexternalitiesaremostsignificant,notablyAIandthedigitaleconomy.ThoseadvantagescanbethreatenedbystrategiccompetitionwithChinaandmayneedtobereinforced.Concernsabouteconomicsecuritymayalsojustifyselectiveinterventionssuchastargetedsubsidiesorstrategictradepolicymeasures–semi-conductorsbeingagoodexample.

Theconsensusintheliteratureisthatrealdepreciation(orpermanentundervaluation)oftheexchangerateisfavourabletolong-termgrowthandcompetitivenesswhenittransfersresourcesfromthenon-tradabletothetradeablesector,helpingthelattertoinvestandinnovate(Rodrik,2008).Thisreasoningisveryclosetothetraditional‘infantindustryargument’.Itisfullyvalidformedium-sizeddevelopingandemergingeconomiesseekingtocatchupwithmoreadvancedcountries.

ButapolicyofsustaineddollardepreciationwillnotyieldrealbenefitsinadvancedsectorswheretheUnitedStatesisalreadyapricemaker.Theemphasisontheexchangerateactuallyrevealsthetruepriorityunderlyingthenewarrangement:itismainly

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focusedonrevitalisingtraditionalindustries,thosethathavebeenparticularlyhitbythe‘Chinashock’.Itistryingtorecreatethejobsthathavebeenlostasaconsequence.Externaleconomicpolicymaynotbethebesttoolforachievingthatresult.

AstrongdollarandUSeconomicinterests

Astrongdollar

Standardtheorytellsusthatastrongcurrencypenalisesexportsbuthelpsthedomesticeconomythroughlowerinterestrates.Theoverallbalancedependsonthedegreeofopenness.TheUnitedStatesisarelativelyclosedeconomy(asmeasuredbytheratioofimportsoverGDP)andthereforemayrelativelysufferfromacombinationofhigherinterestratesandadepreciateddollar.Thisrealitymayhaveguidedmostpreviousadministrations,whichrepeatedlyaffirmedthat“astrongdollarisintheinterestoftheUnitedStates”.

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Proponentsofthenewsystemtakeanoppositeview.Theytendtominimisethebenefitsofastrongdollar.Technically,theybasetheirassessmentonthecasualobservationthatUSlong-terminterestrateshavenotbeensignificantlylowerthanratesinothercountriesinrecentyears(Miran,2024).

Butthisisnotthepropercomparison.First,therightcounterfactualwouldbetoconsiderthelevelofUSinterestrateswithoutthedollarreservestatus,takingintoaccountthecurrentfiscalsituationandperspectives.Second,andmoretechnically,theyieldonlong-termUS

Treasuriesiscomposedoftwocomponents:theprojectedshort-termratesandthetermpremium.Whenassessingthebenefitsofthedollar’sreservestatus,therelevantmetricisnottheabsoluteleveloflong-termrates,butratherthetermpremiumcomponent.Figure2showsthatthelevellong-termrateshavebeenmostlydrivenbyexpectationsoffutureshort-termrates.InanenvironmentwhereUSgrowthexpectationsarehigherthanthoseofothereconomies,itisentirelynaturalforlong-terminterestratestobeelevatedaswell.

Itsaysnothingaboutthebenefitsandcostsofbeingareservecurrency.Ifanything,thetermpremiumhasremainedsignificantlycompressedduetotheglobaldemandforsafe,dollar-denominatedassets.

Figure2Treasuryyieldpremiums

6

5

10-yearzero-couponyield

Avg.exp.shortratenext10years10-yearzero-coupontermpremium

4

3

2

1

0

-1

202020212022202320242025

Source:FederalReserveBankofSanFrancisco.

True,thecomponentsinthetermpremiumattributabletothedollar’sreservestatusanditsconvenienceyieldarenotdirectlyobservable.StudiescitedinZhangandMartínezGarcía(2024)estimatethatforeignpurchasesofUSTreasuriesintheamountof$100billionwouldhaveanimmediateimpactonlong-terminterestratesof10to60basispoints.AccordingtomorerecentestimatesbyAhmedandRebucci

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(2024),a$100billionflowshockwouldmoveUSyieldsbyabout100basispointswithinamonth,implying,forinstance,thata1%reductioninthedollarshareofChina’sreservescouldraiselong-termUSyieldsbyabout20basispoints.

Benefitsandcostsofareservecurrency

Today,theUnitedStatesdominatestheinternationalmonetaryandfinancialsystembecauseitissuesthesafestassetsintheworld.Ofcourse,beingasupplierofsafeassetsfortheworldentailssomeconstraints.Thecapitalaccountmustbefullyandunconditionallyopen.Thelegal,taxandinstitutionalenvironmentmustprovidepredictabilityandtransparency.Thecentralbankmuststandreadytoprotecttheliquidityofcoremarketsifandwhenneeded.MostoftheproposedmeasureswouldreverseincentivesorcreatedisincentivesforforeignerstoinvestinUSTreasuries.Whatwouldthecostsbe?

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Firstnotethat,despiteanegativenetinternationalinvestmentposition,theUnitedStatesconsistentlygeneratesapositivenetincomefromabroad,whichcontributestoGDP.ThisreflectsthespecificroleoftheUnitedStatesasanissuerofliquid,low-yieldingliabilitieswhileitsforeignassetsearnhigherreturns.

Second,fromapurelyfiscalstandpoint,theissuanceofsafeassetsyieldsfortheUnitedStatesaninvisibleseignioragemanytimeslargerthananyrevenuespotentiallyraisedfromproposedburden-sharingmechanisms.

AslongasTreasurydebtisconsideredsafeandliquid,itisheldvoluntarilybyforeignersatalowinterestratedespitepersistentandgrowingfiscaldeficitsprojectedoverthelongrun.Thevalueoftheseassetsderivesnotonlyfromtheirprojectedcashflows,butalsofromtheirunparallelledsafetyandtradeability.Brunnermeieretal.(2022)havecharacterisedthisasa‘bubble’componentinthevaluationofthisdebt.Thatbubblecanbeprofitably‘mined’intheformofhigherandcheaperdebtissuanceinthefuture.AccordingtoDangetal.(2024),thesafe-assetqualityofUSTreasuriesallowstheUnitedStatestoissue30%morepublicdebtthanotherwisewouldbepossible,everythingelseequal.

Otherbenefitsarelesstangiblebutnolessreal.Becauseofitscurrency’sreservestatus,theUnitedStatesistheultimateliquidityproviderintheworld.Intimesofcrisis,itgreatlyinfluencestheoutcomesandconditions.Inordinarytimes,theterm‘Washingtonconsensus’aptlycapturesasubtlesituationwherethereisgenerallygoodalignmentbetweentheUSTreasury’sviewsandthosedevelopedbyinternationalfinancialinstitutions.

CONCLUSION

Externaleconomicpolicymustultimatelybejudgedbythedefinitionofitsobjectivesanditsabilitytoachievethem.Inthecurrentgeopoliticalenvironment,itmaybejustifiedthattraditionalgainsofexchangecomesecondtobroadersecuritygoals.Policymakersmaybemorewillingtosacrificeconsumerwelfareinordertoreducevulnerabilities,reshorecriticalindustries,regaincontroloversupplychains,orsimplytoprojectpower.Ashiftinemphasisawayfromshort-termeconomicefficiencyisnotwithoutrationaleprovidedconsumersarewillingtobearthecost–throughhigherpricesorreducedaccesstoglobalmarkets.

However,erodingtheUSdollar’sroleastheworld’sprimaryreservecurrencywouldnotserveanyofthoseobjectives.Theproposalstodosocanonlycomefromabiasedappreciationofthecostsandbenefits.Lookingatissuesfromapurelyfiscalangledistortstheperspective.Thepolicyaimsatsolving‘old’deindustrialisationproblemsbyrestoringformercomparativeadvantagesthathavebeenlostthroughthe‘Chinashock’andtheevolutionoftechnology.Itdoesnothingtoaddressthedistortionsthatothercountries’domesticpoliciesmaycreateintheglobaltradesystem.

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Erodingthedollar’srolewillaggravateratherthanreducetheasymmetriesthatexistintheinternationaleconomy,tothedetrimentofboththeUnitedStatesanditspartners.Itwoulddeprivetheworldofthesafeassetsitneedsfortheefficiencyandstabilityoftheglobalfinancialsystem.

Overall,theconjunctionofpolicychangesenvisagedinthe‘newarrangement’mayprove,fortheUnitedStates,veryself-defeating.Manyofthecountry’scompetitorswouldbehappytoparticipateandassistinthedollar‘sdemise–somethingwhichhasbeenastrategicobjectiveforsomeofthemforthelasttwodecades.

REFERENCES

Ahmed,R.andA.Rebucci(2024),“DollarreservesandU.S.yields:Identifyingthepriceimpactofofficialflows”,JournalofInternationalEconomics152.

Brunnermeier,M.K.,S.A.Merkel,andY.Sannikov(2022),“DebtasSafeAsset”,NBERWorkingPaperNo.29626.

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Choi,J.,D.Q.Dang,R.Kirpalani,andD.Perez(2024),“ExorbitantPrivilegeandtheSustainabilityofU.S.PublicDebt”,NBERWorkingPaperNo.32129.

Miran,S.(2024),AUser’sGuidetoRestructuringtheGlobalTradingSystem,HudsonBayCapital.

Obstfeld,M.(2024),“MistakenIdentitiesMakeforBadTradePolicy”,PIIEPolicyBrief24-13.

Pettis,M.andE.Hogan(2024),TradeInterventionfor