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Global
Critical
MineralsOutlook
2025The
IEA
examines
the
full
spectrum
of
energyissuesincludingoil,
gas
and
coal
supply
anddemand,
renewable
energytechnologies,electricity
markets,
energy
efficiency,
access
toenergy,
demandside
management
and
muchmore.
Through
its
work,
the
IEA
advocatespolicies
that
will
enhance
the
reliability,affordability
and
sustainability
of
energy
in
its
32Member
countries,
13
Association
countries
andbeyond.This
publication
and
any
map
included
herein
arewithout
prejudice
to
thestatus
of
or
sovereigntyover
any
territory,
to
the
delimitation
ofinternational
frontiers
and
boundaries
and
to
thename
of
anyterritory,
city
or
area.Source:
IEA.International
EnergyAgencyWebsite:
IEA
Member
countries:AustraliaAustriaBelgiumCanadaCzech
RepublicDenmarkEstoniaFinlandFranceGermanyGreeceHungaryIrelandItalyJapanKoreaLatviaLithuaniaLuxembourgMexicoNetherlandsNew
ZealandNorwayPolandPortugalSlovak
RepublicINTERNATIONAL
ENERGY
AGENCYSpainSwedenSwitzerlandRepublic
of
TürkiyeUnited
KingdomUnited
StatesThe
European
Commissionalso
participates
in
the
workof
theIEAIEA
Associationcountries:ArgentinaBrazilChinaEgyptIndiaIndonesiaKenyaMoroccoSenegalSingaporeSouth
AfricaThailandUkraineRevised
version,
June
2025
Information
notice
found
at:
/correctionsGlobal
Critical
Minerals
Outlook
2025PAGE
|
3AbstractAbstractCritical
minerals,
which
are
essential
for
a
range
of
energytechnologies
and
for
the
broader
economy,
have
become
a
majorfocus
in
global
policy
and
trade
discussions.
Price
volatility,
supplychain
bottlenecks
and
geopolitical
concerns
make
the
regularmonitoring
of
their
supply
and
demand
extremely
vital.The
Global
Critical
Minerals
Outlook
2025
includes
a
detailedassessment
of
the
latest
market
and
investment
trends,
along
withtheir
implications
for
critical
minerals
security.
Asyear’s
Outlook,it
provides
a
snapshot
of
recentin
last
industrydevelopments
from
2024
and
early
2025
and
offers
medium-
andlong-term
projections
for
the
supply
and
demand
of
key
energyminerals,
taking
into
account
the
latest
policy
and
technologydevelopments.The
2025
Outlook
also
explores
key
techno-economic
issues
suchas
policy
mechanismsto
support
diversification;
mineral
supplychains
for
emerging
battery
technologies;
recent
innovations
inmining,
refining
and
recycling;
and
a
broader
view
on
strategicminerals
for
applications
beyond
the
energy
sector.
As
a
newchapter,
the
report
also
includes
a
comprehensive
review
of
mineralmarkets
and
policy
developments
in
different
regions.
The
reportwillbe
accompanied
byan
updatedversion
of
our
Critical
Minerals
Data
Explorer,
an
interactive
online
tool
that
allows
users
to
explore
thelatest
IEA
projections.IEA.
CC
BY
4.0.Global
Critical
Minerals
Outlook
2025Page
|
4Table
of
contentsTable
of
contentsExecutive
summary
5Introduction111. Market
review
of
2024
16Mineral
demand,
production
and
price
trends
17
Downstream
market
trends
41Investment
trends
60Sustainability
performance
tracking
72Outlook
for
key
minerals83Outlook
overview
84Outlook
for
copper
101Outlook
for
lithium
113Outlook
for
nickel
126Outlook
for
cobalt
139Outlook
for
graphite
150Outlook
for
rare
earth
elements
161Brief
review
of
other
materials
179Topical
deepdives192Policy
mechanisms
for
diversified
mineralsupplies
193Beyond
NMC
batteries:
Supply
chain
issues
for
emerging
battery
technologies
207Supply-side
technology
innovation
(mining,
refining,
recycling)
topromote
diversification
227Broader
view
onenergy-related
strategic
minerals:
What
risks
to
anticipate?
2434. Regional
snapshot
258Europe
259North
America
263Central
and
South
America
267
China
270Asia
(excluding
China)
273Australia
277Africa
280Middle
East
283Annex
286Key
projection
results
292IEA.
CC
BY
4.0.Global
Critical
Minerals
Outlook
2025Executive
summaryExecutive
summaryIEA.
CC
BY
4.0.Page
|
5Global
Critical
Minerals
Outlook
2025Page
|
6Executive
summaryExecutive
summaryDemand
for
key
energy
minerals
continued
to
grow
strongly
in2024.
Lithium
demand
rose
by
nearly
30%,
significantly
exceedingthe
10%
annual
growth
rate
seen
in
the
2010s.
Demand
for
nickel,cobalt,
graphite
and
rare
earths
increased
by
6-8%
in
2024.
Thisgrowth
was
largely
driven
by
energy
applications
such
as
electricvehicles,
battery
storage,
renewables
and
grid
networks.In
the
caseof
copper,
the
rapid
expansion
of
grid
investments
in
China
has
beenthe
single
largest
contributor
to
demand
growth
over
the
past
twoyears.
For
battery
metals
such
as
lithium,
nickel,
cobalt
and
graphite,the
energy
sector
accounted
for
85%
of
total
demand
growth
over
thesameperiod.Despite
this
rapid
demand
growth,
major
supply
increases
–
ledby
China,
Indonesia
and
the
Democratic
Republic
of
the
Congo–
exerted
downward
pressure
on
prices,
especially
for
batterymetals.
The
swift
increase
in
battery
metal
production
highlighted
thesector’s
ability
to
scale
up
new
supply
more
quickly
than
for
traditionalmetals
like
copper
and
zinc.
Since
2020,
supply
growth
for
batterymetals
has
been
twice
the
rate
seen
in
the
late
2010s.
As
a
result,following
the
sharp
price
surges
of
2021
and
2022,
prices
for
keyenergy
minerals
have
continued
to
decline,
returning
to
pre-pandemiclevels.
Lithium
prices,
which
had
surged
eightfold
during
2021-22,
fellby
over
80%
since
2023.
Graphite,
cobalt
and
nickel
prices
alsodropped
by
10
to
20%
in
2024.Despite
strong
expectations
for
future
demand
growth,investment
decisions
today
face
significant
market
andeconomic
uncertainties.
Investment
momentum
in
critical
mineraldevelopment
weakened
in
2024,
with
spending
rising
by
just
5%,down
from
14%
in
2023.
Adjusted
for
cost
inflation,
real
investmentgrowth
was
just
2%.
Exploration
activity
plateaued
in
2024,
markinga
pause
in
the
upward
trend
seen
since
2020.
While
explorationspending
continued
to
rise
for
lithium,
uranium
and
copper,
it
declinednotably
for
nickel,
cobalt
and
zinc.
Start-up
funding
is
also
showingsigns
of
a
slowdown.
Today’s
low
mineral
prices
are
not
providing
thesignal
to
invest,
and
projects
involving
new
entrants
have
beenmostaffected
by
the
uncertainty.Diversification
is
the
watchword
for
energy
security,
but
thecritical
minerals
world
has
moved
in
the
opposite
direction
inrecent
years,
particularly
in
refining
and
processing.
Between2020
and
2024,
growth
in
refined
material
production
was
heavilyconcentrated
among
the
leading
suppliers.
As
a
result,
thegeographic
concentration
of
refining
has
increased
across
nearly
allcritical
minerals,
particularly
for
nickel
and
cobalt.
The
averagemarket
share
of
the
top
three
refining
nations
ofkey
energy
mineralsrose
from
around
82%
in
2020
to
86%
in
2024
as
some
90%
of
supplygrowth
came
from
the
top
single
supplier
alone:
Indonesia
for
nickeland
China
for
cobalt,
graphite
and
rare
earths.IEA.
CC
BY
4.0.Global
Critical
Minerals
Outlook
2025Page
|7Executive
summaryOur
detailed
analysis
of
announced
projects
suggests
thatprogress
towards
more
diversified
refining
supply
chains
issetto
be
slow.
Looking
ahead
to
2035,
the
average
share
of
the
topthree
refined
material
suppliers
is
projected
to
decline
only
marginallyto
82%,
effectively
returning
to
the
concentration
levels
seen
in
2020.China’s
stronghold
extends
beyond
refining;
two-thirds
of
globalbattery
recycling
capacity
growth
since
2020
has
been
in
China.Mining
activity
shows
a
similar
trend,
though
it
remainssomewhat
less
concentrated
than
refining.
Most
recent
growthinmining
output
stemmed
from
established
producers
such
as
theDemocratic
Republic
of
the
Congo
(DRC)
for
cobalt,
Indonesia
fornickel,
and
China
for
graphite
and
rare
earths.
As
a
result,
theaverage
market
share
of
the
top
three
mining
countries
for
key
energyminerals
rose
from
73%
in
2020
to
77%
in
2024.
Lithium
was
anotable
exception,
with
a
major
portion
of
supply
growth
coming
fromemerging
producers
like
Argentina
and
Zimbabwe.
Looking
ahead,some
diversification
is
coming
into
view
for
the
mining
of
lithium,graphite
and
rare
earths.
However,
geographical
concentration
isexpected
to
intensify
for
copper,
nickel
and
cobalt.
Overall,
the
shareof
the
top
three
producers
is
projected
to
decline
slightly
to
the
levelsseen
in
2020,
similar
to
trends
observed
in
refining.Projected
supply-demand
balances
through
to
2035
areimproving
compared
with
a
few
years
ago,
but
major
concernsremain,
especially
for
copper.
The
growing
number
of
mining
andrefining
project
announcements
promises
a
notable
increase
in
futureproduction
volumes.
For
nickel,
cobalt,
graphite
and
rare
earths,expected
supplies
are
catching
up
with
projected
demand
growthunder
today’s
policy
settings,
if
planned
projects
proceed
onschedule.
However,
copper
and
lithium
are
major
exceptions.
Despitestrong
copper
demand
from
electrification,
the
current
mine
projectpipeline
points
to
a
potential
30%
supply
shortfall
by
2035
due
todeclining
ore
grades,
rising
capital
costs,
limited
resource
discoveriesand
long
lead
times.
For
lithium,
near-term
markets
appear
well-supplied,
but
rapidly
growing
demand
is
expected
to
push
the
marketinto
deficit
by
the
2030s;however,
the
prospectsfordeveloping
newlithium
projects
are
much
more
favourable
than
for
copper.Today’s
markets
may
appear
well-supplied,
but
exportrestrictions
and
risks
to
security
of
supply
are
proliferating.Amid
rising
supply
concentration,
an
expanding
number
of
exportcontrol
measures
on
critical
minerals
have
been
introduced,particularly
since
2023.
In
December
2024,
China
restricted
theexport
of
gallium,
germanium
and
antimony,
key
minerals
forsemiconductor
production,
to
the
United
States.
This
was
followed
byfurther
announcements
in
early
2025,
including
restrictions
on
tungsten,
tellurium,
bismuth,
indium
and
molybdenum
and
on
seven
heavy
rare
earth
elements.
In
February
2025,
the
DRC
announced
afour-month
suspension
of
cobalt
exports
to
curb
falling
prices.Currently,
more
than
half
of
a
broader
group
of
energy-relatedminerals
are
subject
to
some
form
of
export
controls.
Theserestrictions
are
not
only
increasing
in
number
but
also
expanding
inIEA.
CC
BY
4.0.Global
Critical
Minerals
Outlook
2025Page
|8Executive
summaryscope
to
cover
not
just
raw
and
refined
materials
but
also
processingtechnologies,
such
as
those
for
lithium
and
rare
earth
refining.High
market
concentration
increases
vulnerability
to
supplyshocks,
particularly
if,
for
any
reason,
supply
from
the
largestproducing
country
isdisrupted.
When
the
largest
supplier
and
itsdemand
is
excluded,
the
overall
market
balances
become
starklydifferent.
For
battery
metals
and
rare
earths,
supplies
outside
theleading
producer
meet
on
average
only
half
of
the
remaining
demandin
2035.
This
means
that,
even
in
a
well-supplied
market,
criticalmineral
supply
chains
can
be
highly
vulnerable
to
supply
shocks,
bethey
from
extreme
weather,
a
technical
failure
or
trade
disruptions.The
impact
of
a
critical
minerals
supply
shock
can
be
far-reaching,
bringing
higher
prices
for
consumers
and
reducingindustrial
competitiveness.
A
sustained
supply
shock
for
batterymetals
could
increase
global
average
battery
pack
prices
by
as
muchas
40-50%.There
is
already
a
major
battery
manufacturing
cost
gapacross
regions.
Prolonged
supply
disruptions
could
widen
costdisadvantages
for
other
battery
manufacturers
vis-à-vis
China,potentially
hindering
efforts
to
diversify
manufacturing
supply
chains.Extending
ouranalysisto
abroaderrangeof
20energy-related,multisectoral
minerals
highlights
additional
vulnerabilities.These
minerals
play
a
vital
role
across
sectors
such
as
high-tech,aerospace
and
advanced
manufacturing.
While
the
market
sizes
forthese
minerals
are
relatively
small,
supply
disruptions
can
haveoutsized
economic
impacts.Major
risk
areas
for
this
broader
group
of
strategic
mineralsinclude
high
supply
chain
concentration,
price
volatility
and
by-product
dependency.
China
is
the
dominant
refiner
for
19
of
the
20minerals
analysed,
holding
an
average
market
share
of
around
70%.Three-quarters
of
these
minerals
have
shown
greater
price
volatilitythan
oil,
and
half
have
been
more
volatile
than
natural
gas.
Aroundhalf
are
produced
as
by-products,
limiting
the
flexibility
of
supply
torespond
to
market
signals.
Substitution
options
are
also
limited;
manyminerals,
such
as
tantalum,
titanium
and
vanadium,
have
fewviablealternatives
without
major
cost
or
performance
trade-offs.Policy
makers
have
woken
up
to
these
energy
securitychallenges
with
a
wave
of
new
policy
initiatives.
Governmentsaround
the
world
are
intensifying
efforts
to
secure
critical
mineralsupplies
through
publicfunding,
strategic
partnerships
and
domesticpolicy
reforms.
The
United
States
issued
a
series
of
executive
orders
to
expedite
permitting
and
increase
investments
in
domestic
projects.The
European
Commission
designated
47
strategic
projects
underthe
EU
Critical
Raw
Materials
Act
to
fast-track
development
andenhance
financing
access.
The
International
Energy
Agency
haslaunched
a
new
Critical
Minerals
Security
Programme
to
address
keyvulnerabilities.
Australia,
Canada
and
other
nations
have
launchedmajor
funding
programmes.
Meanwhile,
resource-rich
countries
areimplementing
policies
to
retain
greater
economic
value
from
theirmineral
resources.IEA.
CC
BY
4.0.Global
Critical
Minerals
Outlook
2025Page
|9Executive
summaryDiversificationwill
not
materialisethrough
market
forcesalone;well-designed
policy
support
and
partnerships
are
essential.Capital
costs
for
projects
in
diversified
regions
are
typically
around50%
higher
than
for
incumbent
producers.
These
higher
costs,combined
with
price
volatility
and
economic
uncertainty,
are
makingit
difficult
to
build
up
diversified
supply.
Public
financing
support
canhelp
to
bring
forward
new
projects,
but
rule-based
marketmechanisms
are
also
required
to
support
their
operation.
Welldesigned
price
stabilisation
schemes,
such
as
contract-for-differences
and
cap-and-floor
models,
can
help
smooth
out
pricevolatility
and
mobilise
private
investment
without
imposing
excessivefiscal
burdens.
Volume
guarantee
mechanisms
can
also
supportinvestment
by
providing
greater
demand
certainty
for
new
projects.Standards-based
market
access
policies
are
another
option,enabling
only
minerals
that
meet
certain
sustainability
or
productioncriteria
to
qualify
for
accessing
specific
market
segments,
such
asstrategic
reserves
or
public
procurement
channels.
For
instance,targeted
incentives
for
cleaner
nickel
production
could
unlocksizeable
supply
volumes
outside
today’s
dominant
producers
andreduce
global
market
concentration
by
7%
by
2035.Global
collaboration
remains
essential
to
diversifying
supplysources,
linking
resource-rich
countrieswith
those
possessingrefining
capabilities
and
downstream
consumers.
Majoropportunities
existfor
cross-border
partnerships
and
collaboration
inhighly
concentrated
supply
chains.
For
example,
African
nations
suchas
Madagascar,
Mozambique
and
Tanzania
hold
around
a
quarter
ofglobal
graphite
resources,
while
Germany,
Japan,
Korea
and
theUnited
States
have
the
capacity
and
plans
to
produce
graphite
anodematerials.
Similarly,
ample
rare
earth
resources
exist
in
Australia,Brazil,
Viet
Nam
and
others,
while
Europe,
Malaysia
and
the
UnitedStates
are
investing
in
separation
facilities.
Permanent
magnetmanufacturing
capacities
are
being
developed
in
Europe,
Japan,Korea
and
the
United
States.
Mapping
out
opportunities
forconnections
across
the
whole
supply
chain,
rather
than
focusingsolely
on
a
single
part
of
the
value
chain,
can
help
realise
the
potentialof
partnerships
in
diversifying
supply
sources.
This
needs
to
befollowed
by
cooperative
frameworks
such
as
co-investment,
offtakeagreements,
and
shared
de-risking
mechanisms.New
technologies
in
mining,
refining
and
recycling
hold
majorpotential
to
scale
up
diversified
supplies.
A
range
of
emerginginnovations
have
the
potential
to
transform
mineral
production.
Inmining,
these
include
AI-based
exploration,
direct
lithium
extraction,the
processing
of
ionic
adsorption
clays,
and
the
re-mining
of
tailingsand
mine
waste.
In
refining
and
recycling,
advances
such
as
novelsynthetic
graphite
production,
sulphide
ore
leaching
and
advancedsorting
technologies
could
represent
promising
breakthroughs.
Forexample,
innovations
such
as
AI-based
geological
exploration
couldreduce
drilling
costs
by
up
to
60%
and
as
much
as
quadruplediscovery
success
rates.
Technologies
that
enable
rare
earthextraction
from
ionic
adsorption
clay
deposits
could
significantlyreduce
capital
intensity
and
waste
generation,
opening
up
newproduction
opportunities
in
countries
such
as
Australia,
Brazil
andIEA.
CC
BY
4.0.Global
Critical
Minerals
Outlook
2025PAGE
|
10Executive
summaryUganda.
International
collaborations
can
also
play
a
vital
role
inaddressing
technologybottlenecks
in
building
diversified
supplies.Emerging
battery
technologies
are
challenging
the
incumbentnickel-based
lithium-ion
batteries,
and
these
are
not
immunetohigh
supply
concentration
and
volume
risks.
Lithium
ironphosphate
(LFP)
batteries
have
surged
in
recent
years,
coveringnearly
half
of
the
electric
car
market,
up
from
less
than
10%
in
2020,and
emerging
technologies
like
sodium-ion
and
manganese-richlithium-ion
batteries
are
also
gaining
traction.
However,
the
supplychains
for
these
technologies
are
significantly
more
concentratedthan
those
for
nickel-based
batteries.
China
produces
75%
of
theworld’s
purified
phosphoric
acid,
essential
for
LFP
batteries,
and95%
of
high-purity
manganese
sulphate,
a
key
input
formanganese-rich
and
sodium-ion
battery
chemistries.
These
twomaterials
are
emerging
as
key
chokepoints,
with
current
projectpipelines
indicating
the
potential
for
major
supply
gaps.
Plannedprojects
for
purified
phosphoric
acid
are
insufficient
to
meetprojected
demand
from
around
2030.
High
purity
manganesesulphate
supplies
from
announced
projects
meet
only
55%
ofexpected
2035
demand
under
today’s
policy
settings.
Sodium-ionbatteries
offer
some
upstream
diversification
potential,
with
theUnited
States
and
Europe
playing
active
roles
in
soda
ash,
causticsoda
and
biomass
supplies.
Yet
the
downstream
supply
chain
–
forcells,
cathodes
and
hard
carbon
anodes
–
remains
dominated
byChina.
Giventhegrowing
competitiveness
andmarket
shareof
LFPand
other
emerging
technologies,
it
is
becoming
increasinglyimportant
for
policy
makers
to
pay
close
attention
to
supply
chainvulnerabilities
in
these
new
technologies.Sustainability
reporting
continues
to
gain
traction
across
majorproducers.
Around
85%
of
the
25
major
mining
companies
disclosedperformance
across
10
key
environmental
and
social
indicators
in2023,
rising
from
60%
in
2020.
While
environmental
indicators
suchas
emissions,
water
usage
and
waste
have
started
to
improve
afterseveral
years
of
stagnation,
advances
in
social
metrics,
such
asworker
safety,
appear
to
be
slowing.
Water
and
climate
risks
presenta
major
issue;
in
2024,
7%
of
global
copper
supply
was
at
risk
ofdisruption
due
to
floods
or
droughts,
a
figure
that
is
set
to
rise
in
thefuture.
Traceability
systems
can
help
meet
various
policy
goals,including
contributing
to
the
development
of
sustainable,
responsibleand
secure
mineral
supplychains.In
a
world
of
high
geopolitical
tensions,
critical
minerals
haveemergedas
afrontline
issue
insafeguardingglobalenergy
andeconomic
security.
The
wave
of
recent
export
restrictions
highlightsthe
strategic
urgency
of
strengthening
the
resilience
and
diversity
ofcritical
mineral
supplies
as
the
world
moves
towards
a
moreelectrified,
renewables-rich
energy
system.
Through
its
CriticalMinerals
Security
Programme,
the
IEA
is
scaling
up
efforts
to
bolstermineral
security
by
building
systems
to
enhance
resilience
againstpotential
disruptions,
supporting
the
acceleration
of
projectdevelopment
in
diverse
regions,
and
deepening
market
monitoringcapabilities.IEA.
CC
BY
4.0.Global
Critical
Minerals
Outlook
2025IntroductionIntroductionIEA.
CC
BY
4.0.PAGE
|
11Global
Critical
Minerals
Outlook
2025PAGE
|
12IntroductionIntroductionCritical
minerals
markets
experienced
another
turbulent
year
in
2024.While
some
base
metal
prices
saw
a
slight
increase,
many
continuedto
decline
as
supply
growth
outpaced
demand.
Battery
metal
pricesremained
particularly
subdued,
though
the
pace
of
decline
was
lesssevere
than
in2023.Security
of
supply
is
far
from
guaranteed
even
in
today’s
relativelywell-supplied
markets.
Growing
geopolitical
tensions,
marked
by
aseries
of
export
controls
on
key
materials
and
technologies,
haveheightened
supply
risks:
disruptions
and
restrictions
to
flows
of
criticalminerals
are
not
just
a
theoretical
concern.
However,
the
low-priceenvironment
presents
significant
challenges
to
supply
diversificationefforts,
disproportionately
affecting
prospective
projects
locatedoutside
the
main
incumbent
producers.
These
developmentsunderscore
th
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