1、公司治理與高階經(jīng)營團(tuán)隊(duì)ISU 企四B 戰(zhàn)略管理 Lecture 102021.12.02.公司治理定義 The relationship among stakeholders that is used to determine and control the strategic direction and performance of organizationsMechanisms by which stakeholders of a corporation exercise control over corporate insiders and management such that th

2、eir interests are protected (John & Senbet, 1998)使企業(yè)體透過法律的制衡管控與設(shè)計(jì)，在企業(yè)一切權(quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán)分離的組織體系當(dāng)中，有效監(jiān)督其組織活動(dòng)，以及如何健全其組織運(yùn)作，防止脫法行為之經(jīng)營舞弊，以實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任之高度目標(biāo)OECD.Implications from Definitions (1)Protect whos interest?Stakeholder 利害關(guān)係人) or Shareholder (股東What are the purposes for board?Identifying ways to ensure that strat

3、egic decisions are made effectivelyReflecting and enforcing the company valuesEnsuring that the interest of top-level managers are aligned with the interests of the shareholders.Implications from Definitions (2)Separation of Ownership and ManagementAgency theory 代理理論Managers are the agent of firms o

4、wners (principle)Managerial opportunismThe mechanism of aligning the interest of managers and firms ownersAgency cost & Governance mechanismThe control role of directorsImperfect means of controlling managerial opportunism.Implications from Definitions (3)代理理論代理理論討論的是當(dāng)主理人principle必須委託代理人agent執(zhí)行特定事務(wù)時(shí)

5、，代理人因?yàn)橥稒C(jī)主義或本人利益考量，能夠與主理人利益發(fā)生不一致現(xiàn)象，進(jìn)而能夠呵斥主理人利益的損失大型現(xiàn)代公司因?yàn)橐磺袡?quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán)分離，呵斥經(jīng)理人員代理人與股東主理人之間能夠存在代理問題，是多數(shù)代理理論所討論的代理關(guān)係。.Implications from Definitions (4)利害關(guān)係人利益會(huì)遭到企業(yè)營運(yùn)所影響的成員內(nèi)部利害關(guān)係人：如股東、員工、管理者、董事會(huì)成員外部利害關(guān)係人：顧客、供應(yīng)商、政府、社區(qū)、銀行、特定社會(huì)大眾確認(rèn)誰是利害關(guān)係人，並且以其重要性，加以管理各國法令保護(hù)利害關(guān)係人的規(guī)定與程度均有所不同.Corporate Governance Mechanisms: Owners

6、hip ConcentrationLarge-block shareholdersOwn at least 5% of a corporate sharesFamily, Founder, Institution, ManagersOwnership and Monitoring股權(quán)愈分散，監(jiān)督力愈薄弱，經(jīng)理人員會(huì)愈傾向採取投機(jī)行為進(jìn)行高度非相關(guān)多角化盲目擴(kuò)大企業(yè)的規(guī)模在職消費(fèi)股權(quán)集中，監(jiān)督力就比較好嗎？利益收斂觀點(diǎn) V.S. 掠奪觀點(diǎn).Corporate Governance Mechanisms: Ownership ConcentrationInstitutional Owners 機(jī)構(gòu)

7、股東，或法人股東The active role for institutional ownersThe incentives of institutional ownersThe attitude of institutions in takeoverManagerial Owners 經(jīng)營權(quán)與一切權(quán)集中Link the managerial pay with the performance of a firmThe attitude of managers in agency theory and stewardship theory管家理論當(dāng)經(jīng)營權(quán)與一切權(quán)集中時(shí)，經(jīng)理人員就好似股東的管家一

8、樣，切實(shí)守護(hù)公司資產(chǎn).Corporate Governance Mechanisms: Board of Directors 董事會(huì)A group of elected individualsAct in the owners interests by formally monitoring and controlling the corporations TMT Classifications of DirectorsInsiders, related outsiders, outsidersThe compositions of directorsThe Effectiveness of

9、the BoardThe collective function of board.董事會(huì)特質(zhì)Composition組成Inside & outside directors, Male & femaleCharacteristics 特徵Age variation, Background diversity Process 董事會(huì)運(yùn)作過程How the board is held? Trust & conflict among directorsStructure 董事會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)Specialization, formality, centrality.董事會(huì)角色ServiceService fo

10、r Stakeholder or shareholderStrategic ContributionEstablish the Major Strategic DirectionsControlMonitor TMT, CEO succession, CEO CompensationBusiness EthicsMaintain the ethics and Corporate Value.Corporate Governance Mechanisms: 高階經(jīng)理人薪酬設(shè)計(jì)A kind of Governance MechanismBased on the argument of agency

11、 theorySeeks to align the interests of managers and owners through salaries, bonuses, and long-term incentive compensationCompensation committeeLevel of pay vary by regionsDeficit of compensation based on stock or stock options.Corporate Governance Mechanisms: 市場(chǎng)治理機(jī)制Market for Corporate ControlTakeo

12、ver, merger and acquisitionOften Trigger by poor performanceDeficiency of external corporate control管理者抵抗惡意收購的技巧Golden parachute 金色降落傘Poison pill 毒藥丸Greenmail 綠色郵件.International Corporate Governance: GermanyNo Agency ProblemThe owner and the manager are the sameBank is at the center: Monitoring & Co

13、ntrollingTwo-tiered Board StructureManagement board: Executive the function of direction & managementSupervisory tier: Appointment to the management board, executed by union members, employees.International Corporate Governance: JapanThe Importance of Obligation, Family and ConsensusKeiretsu 經(jīng)連 as a

14、 system of relationship investments和臺(tái)灣的集團(tuán)企業(yè)類似Employee is one member of the company familyConsensus among TMT or Board of directorsBank plays important roleBank-based financing and monitoringThe changing of corporate governance in Japan.International Corporate Governance: America The Separation of Ow

15、nership and ManagementThe agency problemThe Important Role of CEO Individualism cultureThe Committee in Board of DirectorsThe Restricted Role of Bank in Corporate Governance.International Corporate Governance: Comparison美國 英國 加拿大 法國 德國 股權(quán)分散 非常高 高 低中等低股權(quán)比例 個(gè)人退休基金共同基金 退休基金共同基金 家族企業(yè)公司 公司政府 銀行公司 董事身份 經(jīng)理

16、人外部董事 經(jīng)理人外部董事 所有者經(jīng)理人外部董事 所有者員工 所有者員工 股東權(quán)力 低低中等高高接管威脅 高高中等低低融資方式 股票股票股票/債券 債券/股票 債券.Corporate Governance in TaiwanThe Family-owned structureThe non-separation of Ownership and managementThe monitoring and controlling role of board of directors is restrictedCEO succession is restricted on the family m

17、embershipThe relationship among shareholders, directors and managers is different from AmericaStewardship theory is useful or not?.Corporate Governance in TaiwanThe Dominance of the Family in the business is totally declined or is contingent on the industry structure 家族不一定在一切的產(chǎn)業(yè)當(dāng)中都吃得開The independent

18、 director is useful in Taiwans business environment or notHow to protect the minor shareholders right 小股東權(quán)益如何透過制度設(shè)計(jì)，降低大股東家族與小股東之間的資訊不對(duì)稱程度information asymmetry.理想董事會(huì)運(yùn)作調(diào)查1 理想的董事會(huì)規(guī)模 (1)3或5人（9.8%） (2)7或9人（59.1%） (3)11或13人（19.6%） (4)15人以上（6.4%） (5)其他（5.1%） 您認(rèn)為董事組成應(yīng)該包括哪些人 (1)大股東（87.0%） (2)公司高階主管，如總經(jīng)理（87.4

19、%） (3)獨(dú)立外部董事（60.3%） (4)員工代表（35.1%） (5)其他（4.2%） 認(rèn)為董事會(huì)最能發(fā)揮功能之處 (1)行使獨(dú)立監(jiān)督權(quán)，設(shè)法維護(hù)各方利益（22.2%）(2)考核公司高階主管（10.3%）(3)公司大方向、策略，與財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效的監(jiān)控（83.8%）(4)企業(yè)價(jià)值、倫理的維持（5.1%） 贊不贊成所謂的外部董事 贊成（60.8%）、反對(duì)（38.8%） 贊不贊成所謂的員工董事 贊成（47.5%）、反對(duì)（52.0%） 對(duì)目前有關(guān)公司法中任期規(guī)定之看法 (1)太長（0.9%） (2)太短（1.9%） (3)適中（96.7%） (4)其他（0.5%） .理想董事會(huì)運(yùn)作調(diào)查2相關(guān)法規(guī)看法選任