1、PAGE PAGE 9本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯外文題目： Competitiveness in High-Tech Fields and Nanotechnology 出 處： 2003 NRI Papers 作 者： Naoki IKEZAWA 原 文：Competitiveness in High-Tech Fields and NanotechnologyNaoki IKEZAWADuring the so-called “l(fā)ost decade” of the 1990s, Japans competitiveness sharply declined in such representa

2、tive high-tech areas as semiconductors and liquid crystal applications, accelerating a hollowing-out of core technologies. Despite various measures taken in recent years to remedy this situation, there is still a long ways to go before we will see any fruitful results in terms of industrial competit

3、iveness. Accordingly, the realization of a new paradigm towards the acquisition of competitiveness is required among both companies and the government. This means the establishment of new business models in the case of companies, and a thorough overhaul of the vertically divided administrative struc

4、ture in the case of the government. 1.Shift Towards the Basics Began in the 1980s(1) Criticizing Japans alleged free ride in basic researchJapan began to rapidly improve its technological competitiveness in the 1970s and started to pose a major threat to leading companies in the United States and Eu

5、rope, which had long been the targets of Japans efforts to catch up. Indeed, the exact situation that Japan is facing, i.e., declining competitiveness and the hollowing-out of domestic industries, was taking place in Europe and, particularly, in the United States. The domestic measures mounted in th

6、e United States to reverse these trends included a strengthening of research and development investment in such leading-edge fields as information and biotechnology, where the prospects for industrialization were unclear at the time. Such measures also included the vitalization of universities and t

7、he implementation of various steps to link the results of academic research to industry. In terms of external measures, a survey organization known as the Japanese Technology Evaluation Center (JTEC) was established in 1983 and exclusively charged with monitoring developments and analyzing the backg

8、round of Japans efforts to improve its competitiveness. This represented the classic approach of knowing ones enemy and learning what should be learned.At the same time, the developing trade friction between Japan and the United States over television sets and semiconductors led to an increase in cr

9、iticism since the 1970s about what the United States saw as Japans industrial development policies. In other words, the United States regarded Japans policies as using the full efforts of the nation to support selected industries, or so-called targeting policies, and increased its criticism by using

10、 the term Japan Inc. This criticism became especially acrimonious over the issue of basic research, with many Western observers claiming that Japan was taking a free ride in basic technology. As the results of basic research are seen as the public domain of the world at large, it is a widely accepte

11、d notion that every nation should make appropriate contributions to its formation. Accordingly, the crux of the argument was that Japan was enjoying industrial success by utilizing the results of basic research (acquired from the United States and Europe), but was doing little to fulfill its interna

12、tional responsibilities with respect to creating basic research results. (2) Shift towards basic research by both the government and private sector companiesWhile some doubt still remains over the validity of such criticism, there was a shift by both the government and private sector companies in Ja

13、pan towards carrying out more basic research. The government moves included the steps taken in 1981 to inaugurate the Technology Research and Development Program for Next-Generation Industrial Infrastructures to replace the Development Program for Large-Scale Industrial Technology (known as the “l(fā)ar

14、ge projects”), which had led to major successes in catching up with leading Western companies in the computer industry since its establishment in 1996. This new program was set up with the aim of further improving originality and creativity by regarding the former large projects category as represen

15、tative of efforts to catch up in technological terms. Since then, the weight of basic research has been increased under projects led by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. Another move taken in 1981 was the establishment of the Exploratory Research for Advanced Technology (ERATO) by th

16、e Science and Technology Agency. As evidenced by the fact that projects under this program took on the names of individual researchers, the emphasis has been placed on the ideas of the inventors and researchers involved rather than their ultimate purposes and applications. This has served to strongl

17、y orient the program towards the basics.This national policy of focusing on basic research has had a major positive impact in terms of enhancing the infrastructural technology that supports the basics in various areas of industry.(3) Two problems in the shift towards basic researchFrom the viewpoint

18、 of industrial competitiveness, however, this shift towards basic research has raised two problems. The first relates to what many see as an excessive emphasis on basic over applied research in many areas. This has led to a significant cutback in the number of large-scale research and development pr

19、ojects that entail shared final objectives (e.g., high-performance mainframe computers, large-capacity memory systems, and superhigh-density LSI applications).Moreover, this trend of shifting towards the basics has not been limited to government efforts only. Similarly, private sector companies have

20、 seemingly responded en masse to the nations shift towards basic researcha phenomenon that is perhaps best symbolized by the number of basic research laboratories established by major Japanese companies. Like the boom in setting up central laboratories that occurred in the high growth era of the 196

21、0s, a similar rush to open laboratories devoted to basic research started to take place. For example, Hitachi, Ltd. established a basic research laboratory under its central laboratories in 1985. While one would assume that the relative importance of basic vs. applied research is not a matter to be

22、determined by the proximity of commercially feasible applications, some companies were so caught in this basic research boom that they tended to neglect research and development activities in fields that were only steps away from practical realization. As a result, efforts to strengthen competitiven

23、ess in typical high-tech products such as semiconductors, magnetic memories, optical communications, and liquid crystal displays (LCDs) were neglected.The second problem in the shift towards the basics by the government and the private sector was the climate of pushing forward almost blindly without

24、 fully digesting the essence of basic research or adopting a methodology for its promotion. In short, a mindset began to take hold that saw the success of basic research as wholly dependent on the skills of those conducting such research. This scenario essentially discouraged any effort to evaluate

25、the progress of research during the process itself on the grounds that everything should await the final stage once the researchers had been selected and their skills identified.For example, the Technology Research and Development Program for Next-Generation Industrial Infrastructures adopted an imp

26、lementation period of ten years for each theme. The program divided this period into two phases, with an evaluation at the end of the first phase to determine the appropriateness of continuing the research. As it turned out, however, this evaluation system had never worked effectively when it was fi

27、rst adopted.Consequently, the situation became one in which there were many small, independent basic research themes, which offered creativity but had little objective review from the outside. As a result, the system led to the establishment of a plethora of what were essentially isolated outposts s

28、pread across an extensive field of basic research. While some of them housed excellent researchers, predominance among the various independent entities could only be maintained by competition. Yet a structure that consisted of scattered outposts is simply not effective from the standpoint of industr

29、ialization and business development, in which the combined strength of many researchers and entities determines success or failure. As described above, these two problems created a tendency to avoid competition in the main high-tech arenas of industrial and corporate competitiveness. And because com

30、petitiveness is fostered through competition, Japans competitiveness in various high-tech fields inevitably started declining after the 1980s as a result of these trends. (4) The matter of Japans hubrisIn addition to the shift towards the basics, another factor that should be cited as part of the ba

31、ckground to this declining competitiveness was the blatant hubris on the part of Japan. In essence, regardless of how fierce the criticism from overseas became, the pendulum would not have swung so far away from applied research and towards basic research if this sense of arrogance had not been so p

32、ronounced. Indicative of the self-congratulatory tenor of the times, many of those associated with the production lines turning out semiconductor LSI devices echoed a shared belief that the research and development divisions were useless and not really necessary, as future developments in silicon LS

33、I applications were secure as long as the manufacturing division keeps doing what it should do. There were actually some companies in which the business division handled all silicon-related matters including research and development, with laboratories relegated to carrying out research related to co

34、mpound semiconductors. Those spouting such comments at the time could not even imagine that LSI production would be shifted to Korea, Taiwan and even to China only ten short years later.2.Changing Competitiveness in the High-Tech FieldIt is important to note that this declining competitiveness in th

35、e high-tech field involved not only a shrinking market share, but also the acceleration of a more ominous hollowing-out of Japans technological capabilities in these areas. Let us examine this in greater detail by looking first at the semiconductor field with respect to the decline in market share.

36、By 1990, Japanese companies had essentially established a dominant position in the DRAM (dynamic random access memory) chips that make up the general-purpose memories of semiconductors as of 1990. However, Korean companies such as Samsung began eating into this lead as the decade progressed. Even In

37、tel, the company that had developed the DRAM chip, had been forced to withdraw from this field under the early onslaught of Japanese companies. Following this withdrawal, however, Intel shifted its focus to the microprocessor field and has roared back to reassert its overwhelming competitiveness in

38、this market.Indeed, despite the fact that Japanese companies had long been warned of the need to shift from DRAM production, steps to reduce their reliance on DRAM technology made only very slow progress. While the reasons for these delays were multifold, one of the factors was a shortage of effecti

39、ve R&D and technological development that could support such a shift. And despite the fact that various national projects related to semiconductor technology were implemented even during the 1990s, it is obvious from the results noted above that these projects have not been as effective as they shou

40、ld have been. Turning next to the accelerating hollowing-out of Japans technological capabilities, lets look at the situation with respect to active LCDs, which are most representative of display technology. As manufacturing output in the Asian region includes LCD production under capital alliances

41、and technology transfers involving Japanese companies, it show that it cannot be directly linked to any conclusions concerning a decline of competitiveness among Japanese companies. However, the continuing hollowing-out of Japans technological base is clearly indicated. While the government provided

42、 effective support to the semiconductor field from the initial stages as discussed previously, work in the area of liquid crystal displays has not received any such government supportmainly because Japans technological standards were considered to be high enough at the advent of LCDs. This meant tha

43、t a high market share (for example, 91% in 1994) was garnered purely on the basis of the competitive strengths marshaled by the private sector. Unlike the case with semiconductors, moreover, one of the features that distinguish the LCD field is the rapidity of product turnabouts. In contrast to an a

44、dherence on DRAMs in the semiconductor field, efforts to develop new products are being made on a continuous basis in the liquid crystal market in order to maintain competitiveness.As a matter of fact, this difference essentially overviews the advantages and disadvantages of industrial support by th

45、e government. Yet the hollowing-out of Japans technological base is steadily moving forward even in the liquid crystal displays, a field that has been developed under the initiatives taken by the private sector. 本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯外文題目： Competitiveness in High-Tech Fields and Nanotechnology 出 處： 2003 NRI Pap

46、ers 作 者： Naoki IKEZAWA 譯 文：高新科技領(lǐng)域和納米技術(shù)領(lǐng)域的競爭力20世紀(jì)90年代以來所謂的“失去的十年”期間，在以半導(dǎo)體和液晶應(yīng)用領(lǐng)域?yàn)榇淼母咝驴萍碱I(lǐng)域內(nèi)，日本的競爭力明顯大幅下降，加速了核心技術(shù)的空洞化。盡管日本近年已經(jīng)采取了很多補(bǔ)救措施來改善這一現(xiàn)象，但是為取得在工業(yè)競爭力方面的成就還有很長的一段距離。因此，需要企業(yè)與政府之間形成一種新模式來實(shí)現(xiàn)競爭力的提升。這意味著需要公司建立新的商業(yè)模式，政府則需要調(diào)節(jié)垂直型的行政結(jié)構(gòu)。1、20世紀(jì)80年代基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)的轉(zhuǎn)移（1）對日本基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施免費(fèi)使用批判的基礎(chǔ)研究在20世紀(jì)70年代，日本已經(jīng)開始改善和提高國家技術(shù)競爭力，以努

47、力趕上美國、歐洲領(lǐng)先企業(yè)為目標(biāo)，也對這些企業(yè)造成了一定的威脅。事實(shí)上，日本國內(nèi)產(chǎn)業(yè)面臨的是競爭力的不斷下降以及空洞化，這也發(fā)生在歐洲尤其是美國。在產(chǎn)業(yè)化前景還不是很清楚的情況下，美國為扭轉(zhuǎn)這些趨勢所采取的國內(nèi)措施包括加強(qiáng)信息和生物技術(shù)領(lǐng)域的研究和開發(fā)投資。這些措施還包括大學(xué)的不斷擴(kuò)建和行業(yè)內(nèi)學(xué)術(shù)研究成果、措施的落實(shí)。在外部措施方面，一個成立于1983年的調(diào)查機(jī)構(gòu)日本技術(shù)評價中心（JTEC），專門負(fù)責(zé)預(yù)測未來的發(fā)展以及分析日本提高其競爭力的背景。這就體現(xiàn)了一句古話“知己知彼”。與此同時，20世紀(jì)70年代以來，美國認(rèn)為日本的工業(yè)發(fā)展政策使得兩國在電視機(jī)和半導(dǎo)體行業(yè)的發(fā)展上存在著貿(mào)易摩擦，導(dǎo)致產(chǎn)生了

48、不同的意見。換而言之，美國認(rèn)為日本用國家全部的力量來支持工業(yè)行業(yè)的這一政策或所謂的“靶向政策”，并通過使用“日本公司”一詞來增加對其的批判。這種批判成為了一個激烈的基礎(chǔ)研究問題，許多西方學(xué)者批判日本采取的“基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施免費(fèi)使用”的政策?；A(chǔ)研究的結(jié)果被看作是整個世界的公共領(lǐng)域，它是一個被廣泛接受的概念，每個國家應(yīng)當(dāng)適當(dāng)?shù)淖龀鲐暙I(xiàn)。因此，爭論的焦點(diǎn)是，日本正在充分借鑒從美國和歐洲的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，獲得了基礎(chǔ)研究的成功，但是從國際關(guān)系來進(jìn)行基礎(chǔ)研究的成果還比較少。（2）政府和私營企業(yè)的基礎(chǔ)研究的轉(zhuǎn)變雖然對這種批判的有效性還存在一些疑問，日本政府和私營企業(yè)在基礎(chǔ)研究方面做出了一定的轉(zhuǎn)變。政府措施包括在1981年采

49、取的技術(shù)研究和發(fā)展計劃，只是為下一代工業(yè)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施所提出的，從而來取代傳統(tǒng)的大型工業(yè)技術(shù)（被稱為“大項(xiàng)目”的），這個措施取得了重大的成功，自1996年發(fā)展的計算機(jī)行業(yè)，日本已經(jīng)能在這方面追趕上西方一些領(lǐng)先的公司。這一新計劃成立，目的是進(jìn)一步改善技術(shù)方面的大型項(xiàng)目類別的不同想法和創(chuàng)造力。自此以后，國際貿(mào)易和工業(yè)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下項(xiàng)目的基礎(chǔ)研究程度在不斷增加。1981年采取的另一舉措是由科學(xué)與技術(shù)部門建立對先進(jìn)技術(shù)的探索性研究（ERATO）。事實(shí)上，這個項(xiàng)目下的研究以個別研究人員的名字命名，重點(diǎn)是在于參與者和研究者的想法，而不是其最終的目的和應(yīng)用程序。這有助于基本操作程序的研究。這項(xiàng)國家政策的重點(diǎn)在于基礎(chǔ)研究對

50、提高基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施技術(shù)建設(shè)以及各個領(lǐng)域的基礎(chǔ)知識有重大的積極影響作用。（3）在基礎(chǔ)研究轉(zhuǎn)變過程中的兩個問題從產(chǎn)業(yè)競爭力的角度，基礎(chǔ)研究轉(zhuǎn)變過程中出現(xiàn)了兩個問題。第一個問題是許多人認(rèn)為作為基礎(chǔ)研究，過度的注重于很多領(lǐng)域的應(yīng)用研究。這已顯著削減了涉及共同最終目標(biāo)的大規(guī)模的研究與發(fā)展項(xiàng)目的數(shù)量。例如，高性能大型計算機(jī)，大容量內(nèi)存系統(tǒng)，以及超高密度集成電路的應(yīng)用。此外，這種對基礎(chǔ)研究的轉(zhuǎn)變不能僅僅只是限于只有政府的努力。同樣地，私營企業(yè)認(rèn)為國家對于基礎(chǔ)研究的這一現(xiàn)象也許是好的轉(zhuǎn)變，漸漸地日本公司建立的基礎(chǔ)研究實(shí)驗(yàn)室的數(shù)量在不斷增加。在20世紀(jì)60年代高增長時期，中央實(shí)驗(yàn)室的建立，類似于基礎(chǔ)研究的實(shí)驗(yàn)室在不斷出現(xiàn)。例如，日立公司在1985年成立了基礎(chǔ)研究實(shí)驗(yàn)室。雖然基礎(chǔ)與應(yīng)用研究對比的相對重要性是不能由商業(yè)上可行的應(yīng)用程序所確定的，一些公司因此陷入了這個基本研究的熱潮，他們往往忽視實(shí)際的領(lǐng)域研究和開發(fā)活動。因此，典型高科技產(chǎn)品