國(guó)家標(biāo)準(zhǔn)GB/T13631-XXXX《核電廠輔助控制點(diǎn)設(shè)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則》編 制 說(shuō) 明（征求意見(jiàn)稿）20223月核電廠輔助控制點(diǎn)設(shè)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則一、任務(wù)來(lái)源及計(jì)劃要求本標(biāo)準(zhǔn)制定/2021（國(guó)標(biāo)委發(fā)〔2021〕41）20214991-T-469，項(xiàng)目名稱為《核電廠輔助控制室設(shè)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則》，由中國(guó)核電工程有限公司主編，要求于2023年6月完成本項(xiàng)目。二、標(biāo)準(zhǔn)編制組組成本標(biāo)準(zhǔn)編制組成員及任務(wù)分工見(jiàn)表1。表1：標(biāo)準(zhǔn)編制組成員及分工序號(hào)姓名單位職務(wù)/職稱任務(wù)1張帆中國(guó)核電工程有限公司高工全文修改2田暉中國(guó)核電工程有限公司高工全文修改3俞光衛(wèi)中國(guó)核電工程有限公司研高全文修改三、編制過(guò)程本標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的制定/報(bào)批稿編寫(xiě)階段。3.1前期準(zhǔn)備（2019年6月-2021年2月）收集相關(guān)資料、調(diào)研分析IEC60965:2016《核電廠控制室不進(jìn)入主控制室實(shí)現(xiàn)針對(duì)輔助控制點(diǎn)與控制室進(jìn)行了區(qū)分、設(shè)計(jì)擴(kuò)展工況、人體工學(xué)原則參考ISO11064GB136303.2征求意見(jiàn)稿編寫(xiě)（2019年9月-2022年5月）2015120199并進(jìn)行了補(bǔ)充修訂。2019927/全國(guó)核儀器儀表標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化技術(shù)委員會(huì)秘書(shū)處。20225了補(bǔ)充修訂。202257術(shù)委員會(huì)秘書(shū)處/全國(guó)核儀器儀表標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化技術(shù)委員會(huì)秘書(shū)處。四、制修訂背景和編寫(xiě)原則標(biāo)準(zhǔn)制定/修訂背景ISOHAF102編寫(xiě)原則本標(biāo)準(zhǔn)編制/調(diào)一致。本標(biāo)準(zhǔn)編制/成共識(shí)。本標(biāo)準(zhǔn)編制/情及技術(shù)的可實(shí)施性。五、主要技術(shù)內(nèi)容國(guó)內(nèi)外相關(guān)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)現(xiàn)狀HAF102-2016IEC60965-2016IEC609652016了升版。采標(biāo)說(shuō)明IEC60965:2016制室實(shí)現(xiàn)反應(yīng)堆停堆的輔助控制點(diǎn)》編制。IEC60965:2016IEC60965:2016前言部分對(duì)第三版取代2009年第二版所涉及的重大技術(shù)變更進(jìn)行了描述，如下：與輔助控制室（SCR）定期試驗(yàn)相關(guān)的要求；評(píng)估反應(yīng)堆安全但無(wú)人值守的可用時(shí)間要求，以便從主控制室（MCR）SCRSCR投入運(yùn)行；SSR-2/1SRMR功能隔離（包括電氣隔離和實(shí)體隔離；SCR的通道上提供放射性屏蔽。DS431在一組預(yù)定的位置設(shè)置至少兩種不同的通信手段；應(yīng)提供對(duì)電廠重要參數(shù)的趨勢(shì)監(jiān)督能力。SCR的角色、功能能力和魯棒性的要求。IEC60965:2016GB-T-13631章節(jié)升版修訂內(nèi)容是否影響GB-T-13631修訂1ScopeThisInternationalStandardestablishesrequirementsfortheSupplementaryControlRoomprovidedtoenabletheoperatingstaffofnuclearpowerplantstoshutdownthereactor,wherepreviouslyoperating,andmaintaintheplantin1.強(qiáng)調(diào)了“先前運(yùn)行工況”下停閉和維持。“先前運(yùn)行工況”在標(biāo)準(zhǔn)中無(wú)針對(duì)或排他。不需修asafeshut-downstateintheeventthatcontrolofthesafetyfunctionscannolongerbeexercisedfromtheMainControlRoom,duetounavailabilityoftheMainControlRoomoritsfacilities.ThedesignhastoensurethattheSupplementaryControlRoomisprotectedagainstthehazards,includinganylocalizedextremehazards,leadingtotheunavailabilityoftheMainControlRoom.Thisrelates,forexample,tofactorssuchastheconsistencybetweenthesupplementarycontrolroomandthemaincontrolroom,theergonomicapproach,theautomationlevelandtheinformationtechnology,andtheextentofmodificationstobeimplementedinI&Csystems.訂。2.SCR設(shè)計(jì)應(yīng)確保免受危害，包MCR不可用的局部極端危害。此描述體現(xiàn)于4.3.1設(shè)計(jì)基準(zhǔn)和設(shè)計(jì)擴(kuò)展工況“如果擴(kuò)展設(shè)計(jì)基準(zhǔn)為解決極端危險(xiǎn)或低概率故障組合，則設(shè)計(jì)應(yīng)確保即使在這種情況下，主控制室和輔助控制室不會(huì)同時(shí)喪失。控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移至輔助控制室的實(shí)施，應(yīng)適當(dāng)考慮來(lái)源于設(shè)計(jì)基準(zhǔn)和設(shè)計(jì)擴(kuò)展假設(shè)修訂。3.補(bǔ)充了儀控系統(tǒng)中實(shí)施的修改程度這個(gè)因素。此描述體4.3.4控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移，控制優(yōu)先權(quán)和安全“主控制室的軟件修改中使用的所有程序也應(yīng)適用與輔助控制室的采納并修訂。2 NormativereferencesIEC62646,Nuclearpowerplants–Controlrooms–Computerbasedprocedures1.NB/T20267核電廠計(jì)算機(jī)化運(yùn)行規(guī)程系統(tǒng)設(shè)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則（NB/T20267-2014，IEC6266:212。采納并修訂。ISO11064(allparts),ErgonomicdesignofcontrolcentresISO11064-1,Ergonomicdesignofcontrolcentres–Part1:PrinciplesforthedesignofcontrolcentresISO11064-3,Ergonomicdesignofcontrolcentres–Part3:ControlroomlayoutISO11064-6,Ergonomicdesignofcontrolcentres–Part6:Environmentalrequirementsforcontrolcentres2.ISO11064可由GB/T13630核電廠控制室的設(shè)計(jì)（GB/T13630-2015，IEC60964:2009，MOD）IAEASSR-2/1:2012,Safetyofnuclearpowerplants:Design3.IAEASSR-2/1:2012IAEANS-G-1.3由HAF102-2016核動(dòng)力廠設(shè)計(jì)安全規(guī)定替代。采納并修訂。3Termsand3.2designextensionconditions設(shè)計(jì)擴(kuò)展工況（designdefinitionspostulatedaccidentconditionsthatextensionconditions）arenotconsideredfordesignbasisaccidents,butthatareconsideredinthedesignprocessofthefacilityinaccordancewithbestestimatemethodology,andforwhichreleasesofradioactivematerialarekeptwithinacceptablelimits.Designextensionconditionsincludeconditionsineventswithoutsignificantfueldegradationandconditionswithcoremelting不在設(shè)計(jì)基準(zhǔn)事故考并且該事故工況的放射性物質(zhì)釋放在可接受限值以內(nèi)。設(shè)計(jì)擴(kuò)展工況包括沒(méi)有造成堆芯明顯損傷的工況和堆芯熔化（嚴(yán)重事故）工況。依據(jù)HAF102-2016核動(dòng)力廠設(shè)計(jì)安全規(guī)定修訂。3.6supplementarycontrolroom……Note1toentry:Forexistingplants,the多數(shù)情況下是由開(kāi)關(guān)SupplementaryControlRoommaybeaspecialcontrolroom,butinmanycases柜設(shè)備間或者類似區(qū)comprisessetsofcontrolpanelsand域中的一組控制盤臺(tái)displaysinswitchgearroomsorsimilarareas.Inthelattercase,theterm及顯示設(shè)備組成。針對(duì)‘supplementarycontrolpoint’isusedinthis后者，本標(biāo)準(zhǔn)中使用standard.“輔助控制點(diǎn)”。采納并修訂。5Designprinciples5.1GeneralRequirement66ofIAEASSR-2/1states:“Instrumentationandcontrolequipmentshallbekeptavailable,preferablyatasinglelocation(asupplementarycontrolroom)thatisphysically,electricallyandfunctionallyseparatefromthecontrolroomatthenuclearpowerplant.ThesupplementarycontrolroomshallbesoequippedthattheHAF102-2016的電氣隔離和功能隔離的一個(gè)獨(dú)立地點(diǎn)設(shè)置reactorcanbeplacedandmaintainedinashutdownstate,residualheatcanberemoved,andessentialplantvariablescanbemonitoredifthereisalossofabilitytoperformtheseessentialsafetyfunctionsinthecontrolroom.”制室應(yīng)能在控制室喪失執(zhí)行重要安全功能應(yīng)堆進(jìn)入并保持在停堆狀態(tài)，排出余熱以及監(jiān)測(cè)核動(dòng)力廠的重要參數(shù)?！币罁?jù)HAF102-2016核動(dòng)力廠設(shè)計(jì)安全規(guī)定修訂。NOTE3Completefunctionalseparationofpathsfromhuman-machineinterfacecontrolpointsouttoenddevicesmaybedifficulttoachieveforallI&Cfunctions,especiallyforexamplewhenasharedactuatorrequiresacommonprioritylogiccontrollertoselectbetweenMCRandSCRcontrol.Anysuchcommonequipmentisacceptableifadequateredundant,backup,orfieldequipmentexiststhatcanachievetherequiredactuationfunctionandissufficientlyseparatedfromcommonhazardstominimizetheriskthatthefunctionmaybecompletelydisabled.“尤其當(dāng)執(zhí)行器需要MCR和SCR和SCRMCRSCR控制之訂。5.2MainobjectivesTheSCRshallbeprovidedwiththemeanstotripthereactorandbringtheplanttoasafestateandmaintainitin……1.HAF102-2016核定中安全狀態(tài)一致，2.HAF102-2016核定中一致，訂。TheSCRisrequiredwhentheabilitytoperformsafetyfunctionsintheMCRislost.……ThedesignbasisPIEandsequencesofeventsforwhichuseoftheSCRisnecessaryshallbeidentified.ThisshallincludeidentificationandjustificationoftheassumedconditionsthroughouttheplantandthecorrespondingdurationsforwhichtheSCRmaybe時(shí)間的呼應(yīng)，修訂。人體工學(xué)原則。并修訂。的記錄功能。修訂。補(bǔ)充多控制點(diǎn)的任務(wù)與監(jiān)控信息匹配required.……ItshallbepossibletodeterminethecompletesafetystateoftheplantfromoutsidetheMCR.ThisshouldpreferablybefromtheSCR.TheSCRshouldthereforeenablethemonitoringofthestateoftherelevantplantsystemsandkeyplantparameters.AllinformationpresentedshouldcomplywiththeergonomicprinciplespresentedintherelevantpartsofISO11064.Forthepurposeofefficientmonitoringandlateranalysisoftheevents,keyplantparametersshouldberecordedtoallowdisplayoftrendsandlateraccessforofflineanalysis.Automaticrecordingisrecommended.IftheMCRandSCRareassumednottobestaffedforanextendedperiodoftime,automaticrecordingshallbeprovided.……Iftwoormoresupplementarycontrolpointsareprovidedforanexistingplant,eachsupplementarycontrolpointshoulddisplayallinformationneededtoperformtheoperatortasks.Computer-basedinformationdisplaysintheSCRshouldprovidethesamefunctionalityforthepresentationofinformationimportanttosafetyasthecorrespondingdisplaysintheMCR.ThecontentofthedisplaysforagivenplantstateandforgivenoperatortasksshouldbethesameasintheMCR.……Wherethelatterapplies,thefacilitieslocationshallhaveahazardwithstandcapabilityequivalenttothatoftheSCR.采納并修訂。險(xiǎn)耐受能力的需求。訂。5.3.1Designbasisanddesignextensionconditions采納并修訂。Ifthedesignbasisisextendedtoaddressextremehazardsorlowprobabilityfailurecombinations,thedesignshouldensurethattheMCRandSCRwillnotfailtogetherevenundersuchcircumstances.TheimplementationofthetransferofcontroltotheSCRshalltakedueaccountofthepracticalconstraintsarisingfromthedesignbasisordesignextensionassumptionsforuseoftheSCR.Theaboverequirementfornon-susceptibilityoftheMCRandSCRtothesamedesignbasisor1.況的考慮。訂。designextensionconditionshallbeextendedtotheirrespectivesupportingfunctions,systemsandequipment.2.工況不敏感的要求。5.3.2FunctionalityandqualificationTheSCRequipmentshallbesuitablefortheenvironmentalconditionsapplicabletoitsintendeduse.TheequipmentshallbequalifiedforthedesignbasisPIEandrelevantsequenceofeventsinaccordancewithitssafetyclassification.Supplementarytestsoranalysesmaybenecessarytoprovideassuranceofadequatereliabilityandrobustnesstowithstandthestressesfromdesignextensionconditions.補(bǔ)充了對(duì)輔助控制室采納并修訂。5.3.3AccessibilityandoperatortransfertimeThedesignshallallowadequatetimeforcontrolroomstafftoreachtheSCRaftertheMCRbecomesunavailable.Theactionsanddurationofunattendedautomaticoperationofthesafetyfunctions,afterinitiationattheMCR,inordertomaintainplantsafetyuptothetimewhentheSCRbecomesoperational,shouldbeshowntobesatisfactoryforthistransfer.Thisshallincludetimeforaccesscontrolandtimetoassess1.采納并修訂。theplantstateattheSCR.AnnexAaddressestheaspectsthataretobeconsideredfortheoreticalassessmentofthesafetransfertimewindow.2.窗口理論評(píng)估原則。5.3.4Controltransfer,controlprioritisationandsecurityTheyshallbedemonstratedashighlyreliableand,ifrequired,demonstratedtocomplywiththesinglefailurecriterion.PossiblefailuresinSCRsecurityandtheinfluenceofSCRcybersecurityflawsonI&Csecurityshallbeanalysedandtakenintoaccount.對(duì)儀控影響的考采納并修訂?？煽啃缘脑O(shè)計(jì)考慮。NOTETheaboveexcludesanyrequirementtodisabletheMCRmanual‘reactortrip’function.……TheSCRshouldincludeameanstoidentifythecontrolstatusoftheSCRandoftheMCRcontrols(i.e.whether“enabled”or“disabled”).I&CsystemsshallbesodesignedtopreventboththeMCRandSCRfromtakingcontrolofplantsystemsimultaneously.……AmalfunctionoftheequipmentcontrollingthetransferofcontrolfromtheMCRtotheSCRcouldleadtounintendedisolationoftheMCR.Therefore,thefailuremodesoftheequipmentthatimplementsthecontroltransferfunctionshallbeanalysedandshowntobeacceptable.ThisanalysisshallconsiderallPIEsforwhichoperationfromtheMCRiscredited.……的定期驗(yàn)證的考慮。保持一致。訂。WhereanSCRisunattendedduringnormalplantoperation,theSCRshallberegularlyverifiedtoensurethattheassignedlevelofsecurityisbeingmet.AlltheproceduresusedduringMCRsoftwaremodificationshallbealsoappliedtothemodificationofSCRsoftware.5.3.5OperationalconsiderationsTheoperatingproceduresforactionstobetakenfromtheSCR(e.g.plantcooldown)shallbesimpleandclear.TheyshallbebasedonthesameprinciplesandthewayofpresentationastheMCRoperatingprocedures,andshalldeviateonlywheredifferencesareimposedbythelocalcontrolfacilitiesandbytheavailablecontrolmeansandsystems.AdditionaltrainingshouldbeprovidedwheneveranSCRoperatingproceduredeviatesfromtheequivalentMCRoperatingprocedure.1.補(bǔ)充了規(guī)程編寫(xiě)的Evenifcomputer-basedprocedures(CBP)areimplementedfortheSCR,paper-basedproceduresshallbeavailable.ThisallowsfailureoftheCBPequipmenttobemitigatedandcombinationsofactivitiesintheSCRandlocalactionstobemoreeasilymanaged.ForguidanceonthedesignofCBP,seeIEC62646.ThedesignershallspecifytheregulartestingandinspectionoftheSCRequipmentrequiredtomeetthedesignandsafetyprinciples.Requirementsforregulartestingandinspectionaregivenin7.9.化規(guī)程的設(shè)計(jì)指南。檢查的要求。修訂。5.4HumanfactorsengineeringprinciplesThehuman-machineinterfaceintheSCRshallfollowthesamedesignrulesasthatfortheMCR,particularlyinrelationtothehuman-machineinterfacedesignforthemonitoringofthekeyplantparameters,andshouldcomplywiththeergonomicprinciplesaspresentedinISO11064.。補(bǔ)充監(jiān)控電廠重要參數(shù)相關(guān)的人機(jī)界面的訂。6DesignprocessDefinethedesignbasisanddesignextensionscenarios,theirgoalsandfailurecriteria(see5.2).補(bǔ)充設(shè)計(jì)擴(kuò)展場(chǎng)景的考慮。采納并修訂。7Functionaldesign7.2HumanfactorsAnthropometricconsiderations,populationstereotypes,intensityofaudiblesignals,visualandviewinganglesaswellaspreferenceforanalogueordigitalindicationsshallbechosenconsistentlywiththosefortheMCR,andshouldcomplywiththeergonomicprinciplesaspresentedinISO11064.AnadequatelevelofilluminationshallbeprovidedtoensurethatvisibilityissufficientfortaskperformanceonacontinuousbasiswithoutunduefatigueandshouldcomplywiththerequirementsofISO11064-6.TheauditoryenvironmentshallenableclearverbalcommunicationtobeheldandshouldcomplywiththerequirementsofISO11064-6.補(bǔ)充人因設(shè)計(jì)原則。采納并修訂。7.3Locationandaccessroute隔離要求。訂。補(bǔ)充功能隔離中對(duì)電纜、通風(fēng)的細(xì)化補(bǔ)充設(shè)計(jì)擴(kuò)展工況。NOTEThepracticalimplementationoftheabovefunctionallocationrequirementisfortheSCRareatobephysicallyandelectricallyseparatedfromtheMCRarea.AdequateseparationofcablesoftheMCRandSCRshallbeachievedaspartoffunctional(physicalandelectrical)separation.Thesignallingoncablesto/fromthefieldequipmentshouldbesentto/fromtheSCR,notviatheMCR,andviceversus.TheventilationsystemsshallalsobeconsideredaspartofthefunctionalseparationandindependencerequirementsfortheMCRandSCR.……accessroutesandcables,shouldbemadeforotherdesignbasisanddesignextensionconditionsforwhichtheSCRistobeused.TheassessmentofthecableroutesshoulddemonstrateindependenceoftheSCRcablesfromtheMCRcables.……itsevacuationandbyroutesavoidingtheMCRandavoidinganyotherareaspotentiallyaffectedbyhazardsfollowingwhichuseoftheSCRisrequired.Considerationshouldalsobegiventotheneedforprotectionagainstradiationalongtheseaccessroutes.4.補(bǔ)充通道輻射防護(hù)7.4SCRenvironmentTheenvironmentalconditionsintheSCRshallmeettherequirementsderivedfromthesafetyanalysisfornormalandemergencyconditionsandshalltakeintoaccountNationalrules,includingthesecurityplanintherespectivecountry.Exceptwhereshowntobeunnecessarybyanalysis,protectionagainstradiationshallbeprovidedfortheSCRanditsaccesspoints.Thisshallincludeconsiderationofaccessfromoff-siteaswellasfromtheMCR.ForthedesignbasisconditionsrequiringuseoftheSCR,theenvironmentalconditionsshownbythesafetyanalysisfortheintendedlocationofanSCRshallnotexceedthosefornormalunprotectedhumanaccess.WhereanSCRmayberequiredforuseinadesignextensioncondition,involvingthenationalsecurityplan,thelocationshouldbeshowntobesuitablefornormalhumanaccessinthoseconditions.Notwithstandingthis,1.補(bǔ)充輔助控制室及出入口的輻射防護(hù)radiationmonitoringshallbeprovidedfortheSCR.AbatterypoweredemergencylightingsystemshallbecontinuouslyavailableintheSCRevenuponfailureofthenormallightingsystemoritspowersupply.……Provisionsshallbemadefortheuseofportablebatteries,broughtfromoff-site,torestoresuppliestothelightingandtoanyotherfacilitiesneededforcontinueduseoftheSCRintheeventoflong-termfailureofthenormalpowersupplysystem.PowersuppliesfortheequipmentintheSCRandthelightingshallbedesignedinlinewiththesafetyclassandthescenariosfortheuseoftheSCR.Thiswilltypicallycomprisesupplybyanemergencyuninterruptiblepowersupply.DependingonthescenariosfortheuseoftheSCR,additionalprovisionsshouldbemadeforconnectiontoanexternalsupplementarypowersupply.Thismayincludetheuseofportablechargingequipmentandtherunningofcables,localsuppliesoftoolsthatmaybeneededforconnectionofthesupplementarypowersupplyandassuranceofcompatibilityofconnectionsforthispurpose.Theconsiderationsforthesupplementarypowersupplyforthecontrolrooms(MCR,SCR)shallbeinlinewiththeprovisionsforthesupplementarypowersupplyfortheplantequipment(valves,motors,etc.)necessaryforstationblackout段的考慮。訂。慮。scenarios.7.5SpaceandconfigurationTheSCRconfigurationshallenablepromptmobilisationbytheoperatingstaffupontheirarrivalattheSCR.ISO11064-1offersguidanceonprocessandISO11064-3offersguidanceonroomlayoutprinciples.參考標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。。7.6InformationandcontrolequipmentThepresentationofcontrols,indicationsandmimicdiagramsselectedfortheSCRshallfollowthesamelayoutanddesignprinciplesasappliedfortheMCR.……Whereforanexistingplantasinglesupplementarycontrolpointdoesnotprovidetheredundancyneededwithinitself,andthatredundancyisnototherwiseprovidedbyanalternativesupplementarycontrolpoint,useofalocalcontrolpointcan,forsomeplantdesigns,providethenecessaryindicationorcontroltomitigateafailureofthesupplementarycontrolpointfunctionality.Forexceptionalconditions,ifthisisrequiredbythesafetyarguments,thisshouldbeconsideredasanengineeringsolutionratherthanextendingthesupplementarycontrolpointfacilities.Forsuchexceptionalconditions,accessibilitytotheLCPandtimerestraintsforaccesstotheLCPshallbeshowntobeacceptable.一致的要求。修訂。SCPSCR別。7.7CommunicationsystemsIfmorethanonesupplementarycontrolpointisnecessaryforanexistingplant,communication1.此處保留SCP的描述以示與SCR的區(qū)betweenthesesupplementarycontrolpointsshallbeprovided.……Inadditiontotheabove,diversemeansshallbeprovidedforcommunicationbetweentheSCRandspecificlocationsasrequiredbytheplantemergencyplan.Thesediversecommunicationmeansshouldbe:designedsuchthatonlyonecommunicationmeansmaybeaffectedbythesamefailure,hazardorPIE,andcapableofoperatingindependentlyoftheon-siteandoff-sitepowersystems.別。采納并修訂。2.補(bǔ)充根據(jù)電廠應(yīng)急計(jì)劃的要求，提供多樣化通訊手段的7.9TestingandinspectionRegulartestingshallbeundertakenofthefunctionsrelatedtouseoftheSCR.Thisshallincludetestingofthefollowing:emergencylightingalongtheoperatortransferroutesfromtheMCRtotheSCRandfromoff-sitetotheSCR;SCRaccesscontrolandassociatedsecurityfunctions;c)MCRtoSCRcontroltransferfunction;SCRmanualcontrolforreactorshutdown;SCRmanualcontrolformaintenanceofasafestate;f)SCRmonitoringfunctions,includingforsimulatedrepresentativescenarios;g)SCRcommunicationfunctions;h)SCRotherservicefunctions(e.g.ventilation,lighting,powersupplies(includingtheemergencyinstallationofportablebatteries)).Thefrequencyoftestingshallfullysupporttheassumptionsofthe補(bǔ)充定期試驗(yàn)和檢查的考慮。safetyanalysis.Thetestingarrangementsshallbeshowntonotadverselyaffectplantsafetyoravailability.Inadditiontotheabove,routineinspectionsshouldbeundertakenofthefollowing:theabsenceofobstaclespreventingsafetransferalongtheroutesfromtheMCRtotheSCRandfromoff-sitetotheSCR;thegeneralconditionandstateofreadinessoftheSCRanditsfacilities.Whereverappropriate,operationalstaffshallbeinvolvedinthetestingandinspectionactivitiesandtheirfeedbacktakenintoaccount.AnnexAAnnexA(informative)Assessmentofsafetransfertimewindow補(bǔ)充對(duì)安全轉(zhuǎn)移時(shí)間窗口的評(píng)估的考慮。采納并修訂。Itisstatedin5.3.3that“thedesignshallallowadequatetimeforcontrolroomstafftoreachtheSCRaftertheMCRbecomesunavailable”.Thisannexaddressesthefactorsthatmaybeconsideredinordertodemonstratethis,whichareasfollows:a)assumptionsregardingcredible‘lossofMCR’scenarios–e.g.thecauseandformofthe‘lossofMCR’,theimpactonthecontrolroomstaff(i.e.whetherornottheyareavailabletotransfertotheSCR)andtheambientconditionsinthevicinityoftheMCRandontheroutestotheSCR;b)assumptionsregardingautomaticcontrolofplantatthetimeofMCRtoSCRcontroltransfer–e.g.relatedtoautomaticprotectionactionsfollowingmanualreactortrippriortoevacuationoftheMCR,orautomaticcontroloftheuntrippedreactorifnosuchmanualtripwasachieved;analysisofthedurationsofsafetransfertimewindowsfordifferentcrediblescenarios–i.e.foreachscenario,thetimeforwhichtheanalysisshowsthatnooperatoractionisrequiredforsafety;analysisofthetimerequiredforsafetransferofstaffandSCRmobilisationfordifferentcrediblescenarios–i.e.thetimefromthepointofevacuationoftheMCRuntiltheoperatingstaffhavetransferredtoandmobilisedintheSCR,andthenfullyassessedtheplantstatus(andarethusreadytotakeanyactionrequired);substantiationthatthetransfercanbeaccomplishedreliablyandwi