IncollaborationwithAccenture

GlobalEconomicFutures:Productivityin2030

WHITEPAPERJANUARY2025

Images:GettyImages,Unsplash

Contents

Foreword3

Executivesummary4

1Introduction:Understandingproductivity6

1.1Theproductivityslowdown6

1.2Keydriversoffutureproductivity8

2Scenarios11

2.1Framework11

2.2Fourfuturesforproductivityin203013

3Industryexposureandimplications17

3.1Mappingindustryexposure17

3.2Implicationsacrossselectedindustries19

4Strategiesforthefuture23

Appendices25

A1Methodology25

Contributors27

Endnotes28

Disclaimer

Thisdocumentispublishedbythe

WorldEconomicForumasacontributiontoaproject,insightareaorinteraction.

Thefindings,interpretationsand

conclusionsexpressedhereinarearesultofacollaborativeprocessfacilitatedand

endorsedbytheWorldEconomicForumbutwhoseresultsdonotnecessarily

representtheviewsoftheWorldEconomicForum,northeentiretyofitsMembers,

Partnersorotherstakeholders.

?2025WorldEconomicForum.Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproducedortransmittedinanyformorbyanymeans,includingphotocopyingandrecording,orbyanyinformation

storageandretrievalsystem.

GlobalEconomicFutures:Productivityin20302

January2025

GlobalEconomicFutures:Productivityin2030

Foreword

AengusCollins

Head,EconomicGrowthandTransformation,WorldEconomicForum

Theglobaleconomicbackdropisoneofweak

growth,complexgeoeconomicsanddeepening

policyuncertainty.Thequestionisnolonger

whethertheeconomiclandscapeisgoingtoevolve,buthowdecision-makerscanrespondtothese

shifts.Cantheyharnessthiswaveofchangetobuildmoreinnovative,inclusive,sustainableandresilienteconomiesandbusinesses?

Tohelpdecision-makersunderstandandanticipatechange,theWorldEconomicForumandAccenturearelaunchingthisnewseriesofpublicationsentitledGlobalEconomicFutures.Theseriesusesscenarioanalysisasatooltounderstandfuturetrends,

vulnerabilitiesandopportunities,andtoidentifystrategiesthatcanshapebetteroutcomes.

Thisfirsteditionoftheseriesexploresthefutureofproductivity,acriticaltopicattherootofchallenges

KathleenO’Reilly

SeniorManagingDirector,Accenture

aroundboostingeconomicgrowthand

livingstandards.Thepapersetsoutfour

scenariosexploringtheinteractionoftwocoredriversofproductivity:technologyandhuman

capital.Italsopresentsadata-drivenassessmentofhowbusinessesindifferentsectorsmay

beaffected.

Theaimisnottopredictwheretheworldwillbe

in2030.Instead,theseriesencouragesleaderstothinkcritically,creativelyandpurposefullyaboutthefutureandtodriveactiononthekeyissues.The

paperoffersasetofactionablestrategiestohelpbusinessesandgovernmentsnotonlyadapttochange,butalsoshapeit.

Wehopethispaperandserieswillbeausefulresourcefordecision-makersastheynavigateanincreasinglycomplexgloballandscape.

GlobalEconomicFutures:Productivityin20303

Executivesummary

Thefutureofproductivity–centraltoeconomicgrowthandlivingstandards–willbeshapedbytechnology,humancapitalandadaptivebusinessmodels.

Productivityhashistoricallybeenacritical

driverofglobalgrowth,increasinglivingstandardsandeconomicdynamism.However,productivitygrowthhascometoavirtualstandstillinrecent

decades,andmorethanhalfofthedecelerationofglobalgrowthsince2008canbeattributedtothisslowdown.

Keytrendsshapingfutureproductivity

Thereislittleconsensusonthepaceofproductivitygrowthinthecomingyears,butmanytrendswill

influenceit,includingtechnology,skills,labourmarkets,demographics,finance,regulation,infrastructureandgeoeconomics.

Forexample,thecommercializationofdisruptive

technologieshasthepotentialtotransformproductivity,althoughtherateofadoptionandlevelofimpact

remainuncertain.Inthecaseofartificialintelligence(AI),businessexecutivesinhigh-incomeeconomiesratetheproductivity-boostinguseofthetechnologynearly40%higherthantheirpeersinlow-incomeeconomies.Sectorally,theyexpectAItobeharnessedthemostininformationandtechnologyservices,financial

servicesandenergytechnologyinthecomingyears.

Humancapitaldevelopmentwillalsobecriticaltoreversingtheproductivityslowdown,not

leastbecauseofitsimportantroleinunlocking

technologicalgains.Nearlyhalfofglobalbusiness

executivescitealackofworkforceskillsandvisionaryleadershipastheprimaryobstaclestoAIadoption.

Fourscenariosforproductivityin2030

Scenarioanalysisoffersastructuredprocessforexploring,understandingandnavigating

uncertainty.Thepurposeofthisanalysisis

nottopredictwheretheworldwillbein2030,buttoencouragedecision-makerstothink

critically,creativelyandpurposefullyaboutthefuture.

Lookingattheinteractionofpotentialaccelerationandslowdownontwokeyproductivitydrivers

–technologyandhumancapital–resultsinthefollowingfourfutures:

1

ProductivityLeap:Avirtuouscircle

betweenwidespreaddisruptiveinnovationandrapidhumancapitaldevelopmentleadstosignificantandbroad-basedproductivitygainsandamarkedimprovementin

2

livingstandards.

AutomationOverload:Technological

advancementsoutpacehumancapital

development,leadingtoa“winner-takes-all”dynamicandaneconomycharacterizedbyincreasedconcentrationofwealthandpower.Productivitygapswidenbetweenleadingandlaggingfirms,sectorsandregions.

3

HumanAdvantage:Humancapital

developmentoutpacestechnological

advancement,centringeconomicactivity

onpeople.Productivitygrowthisslowanduneven,drivenmorebycreativeuseof

existingtechnologiesthanbreakthroughs.

Productivitygainshingeontheabilityto

attracttalentthatcanmaximizethepotentialoftechnology.

4

ProductivityDrought:Asimultaneousslowdownintechnologicalinnovation

andhumancapitaldevelopmentstallsproductivitygrowth.Economiesstruggletosustainpreviouslevelsofprosperity,leadingtostagnationinlivingstandardsandsocioeconomicprogress.

GlobalEconomicFutures:Productivityin20304

Industryexposureandimplications

Eachofthesefutureshasthepotentialtoreshapesectorsanddisruptindividualbusinesses.Across12sectors,fourbroadclustersareidentified

basedonanalysisofthedifferingheadwindsandtailwindsforcorporateoutputandprofitability

acrossthescenarios.Fivesectorsareanalysedclosely,eachcharacterizedbyvaryinglevelsofexposuretotechnologicalandhumancapitaltrends:informationtechnologyanddigital

communications;financial,professional,and

realestateservices;manufacturing;energyandmaterials;andeducation.

Strategiesforthefuture

Thepaperoffersaseriesofhigh-levelstrategic

recommendationsdesignedtohelpbusinessesandgovernmentsmaximizeopportunitiesandmitigateriskswhileharnessingtheproductivitypotentialoftrendsintechnologyandhumancapital:

–Promotesynergiesbetweentechnologyandhumancapitaldevelopment

–Strengthenanticipatoryanddata-drivendecision-making

–Future-proofeducationandtrainingsystems

–Anticipatetalentneedsanddevelopworkforcetransitionpolicies

–Accelerateadoptionanddiffusionofemergingtechnologies

–Investinthetrustworthinessofemergingtechnologies

–Strengthencriticalinfrastructure

–Bridgeregionalandsectoralgapstomitigateproductivitydivergence

–Strengthenresiliencetogeopoliticaldisruption

GlobalEconomicFutures:Productivityin20305

1

Introduction:

Understandingproductivity

Revivingproductivitygrowthrequires

tacklingstructuralbarrierssuchasaccesstocapitalandtalent,infrastructuregapsanddiffusionofinnovation.

Productivityismorethananabstracteconomicstatistic.Forbusinesses,itdeterminesprofitability

andmarketviability.Foreconomies,itisa

fundamentalmeasureofeconomichealthandthefoundationoflong-termgrowthandimprovementsinlivingstandards.Differencesinproductivityarewhatexplainswhycountrieswithsimilarresourceendowmentscanexhibitvastlydifferenteconomicoutcomes.Forexample,morethanhalfofglobaldisparitiesinGDP(grossdomesticproduct)per

capitacanbeattributedtocountries’differinglevelsofproductivity.1

Ultimately,productivitygrowthreflectstheabilitytoproducemorewithless,owingtonewideas,innovationandthecapacityofhumancapitaltoharnesstechnologicalprogress.2

Withoutproductivityimprovements,economic

growthbecomesreliantonexpandinglabourand

capitalinputs–anapproachthatisunsustainableinaworldconstrainedbyenvironmentallimits,a

dwindlingworkforceandtighteningfinancialbuffers.

Theremainderofthisintroductionlooksatglobalproductivitypatterns,outliningthesluggish

dynamicsofrecentdecadesandconsideringtheglobaltrendsthatwillshapefutureproductivity.

Therestofthispaperwillthenbuildonthisanalysis

byconceptualizingfourscenariosforthefutureofproductivityin2030(seeChapter2),assessing

industryexposuretochangingproductivity

dynamics(seeChapter3)andidentifyingaseriesofstrategicrecommendationsforbusinessesandgovernments(seeChapter4).

1.1

oMorethanhalfofthedecelerationinglobaleconomicgrowthsincethe2008-2009globalfinancialcrisis

canbeattributedtoaslowdown

inproductivity.

Theproductivityslowdown

Historically,productivityhasfollowedapattern

ofboomsandslowdowns.Forexample,inthe

early-andmid-20thcentury,industrialization,masselectrificationandrapidinfrastructuredevelopmentfuelledasurgeinproductivity.Similarly,therapid

developmentofnewinformationtechnologiesanddigitalinfrastructureinthelate20thcenturyspurredsignificantproductivitygains,creatingnewmarketsandreshapingindustriesfromretailtofinance.Thesewavesofinnovationandincreasingproductivity

werekeydriversofGDPgrowth,risingincomesandimprovedlivingstandardsoverthelastcentury.

Morerecently,however,despitetheacceleration

oftechnologicaldevelopment,productivitygrowthhasremainedsluggishinmanyeconomies–whatiscommonlyreferredtoasthe“productivityparadox”.

Newtechnologieshavedeliveredsignificant

productivitygainstofrontierfirms,butthewider

productivityimpacthasbeenmeagre.3Infact,basedonAccentureanalysis,nearly40%oflargecompaniesrecordednegativeproductivitygrowthinrecentyears.4

Country-leveltrends

TheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)estimates

thatmorethanhalfofthedecelerationinglobal

economicgrowthsincethe2008-2009global

financialcrisis(GFC)canbeattributedtoaslowdowninproductivity.5Globally,growthintotalfactor

productivity(TFP)–ameasureoftheeffectiveness

withwhicheconomicinputsarecombined,

reflectingdriverssuchasefficiency,innovationand

organizationalchange–hasslowedfromanannual1.6%intheearly2000stojust0.6%forthepost-

GFCperiod(seeFigure1).Inadvancedeconomies,TFPgrowthhalvedto0.4%overthisperiod,while

theslowdownhasbeensteeperforemerging-marketandmiddle-andlow-incomeeconomies,where

averageTFPgrowthdroppedfromabove2%intheearly2000sto0.6%after2008,settlingnear0%inlow-incomeeconomiessince2020.6

GlobalEconomicFutures:Productivityin20306

ContributionofcomponentsofGDPGrowth,1995-2023

FIGURE1

Percent

Figure1.2Advancedeconomies

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

1995-20002001-20072008-20192020-2023

RealGDPpercapita

Note:Growthdecompositionsamplecomprises140countries.Contributionsofcapitalgrowthandlabourgrowthreflectoutputshareofrespectivefactorinputsandthegrowthrates;EMMIEs=emergingmarketandmiddle-incomeeconomies;LIDCs=low-incomedevelopingcountries,TFP=totalfactorproductivity.

Source:WorldEconomicForumandAccenturebasedonInternationalMonetaryFund,April2024.

Figure1.3EMMIEsandLIDCs

LabourTFP

1995-20002001-20072008-20192020-2023

1995-20002001-20072008-20192020-2023

Figure1.1World

RealGDP

●Capital

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

3

2

1

0

7

6

5

4

7

Thereisalsoastarkdivergenceinlabour

thethreeleastproductiveregions(CentralAsia,SouthernAsiaandSub-SaharanAfrica).

However,whenlookingatproductivitygrowth

ratesratherthanlevels,theeconomiesofAsia–inparticularCentralAsia,EastAsiaandSouthAsia–havesignificantlyoutpacedtherestoftheworld

since2010(seeFigure2.1).

productivityaccordingtoincomelevels,withhigh-incomeeconomiesonaveragenearlyfifteentimesmoreproductivecomparedtotheirlow-income

peersoverthe2010-2024period.7Adivergencecanalsobeseenintheregionaldata(seeFigure2.1),wherethethreemostproductiveregions

(NorthAmerica,EuropeandEastAsia)are,onaverage,nearlyfivetimesmoreproductivethan

Productivitytrends,byregionandbysector

FIGURE2

Productivitylevel,average2010-2024

(constant2017international$,PPP)

Productivitygrowth,annualized

average2010-2024(%)

Percentagepoints

GlobalEconomicFutures:Productivityin20307

Figure2.2Sectoralcontributiontoproductivitygrowthbetween2003-2008and2013-2017

1

60

2.5

40

-2

1.5

-3

20

-4

AEsEMDEsLICs

0.5

0

NAEUREAOCMENALATACSEACASASSA

Note:NA=NorthernAmerica,EUR=Europe,EA=EasternAsia,OC=Oceania,MENA=MiddleEastandNorthernAfrica,LATAC=LatinAmericaandthe

Caribbean,SEA=South-easternAsia,CA=CentralAsia,SA=SouthernAsia,SSA=Sub-SaharanAfrica.

Source:WorldEconomicForumandAccenturebasedonInternationalLabourOrganization(ILO)modelledestimates,outputperhourworked(GDP,constant2017international$,purchasingpowerparity).

Note:“Otherindustry”includesmining,utilitiesandconstruction;“Otherservices”includesgovernmentandpersonalservices.

Allmedians.

Source:WorldBank,2020.

Figure2.1Labourproductivity2010-2024(levelandgrowth),byregion

Manufacturing.Otherindustry

FinanceoOtherservices

●Agriculture

.Transport

●Trade

3.5

30

50

70

10

-1

0

0

Businesstrends

Sector-specifictrendshavehadasignificant

impactonoverallproductivitypatternssincethe

globalfinancialcrisis,particularlyinagriculture,

trade,financeandmanufacturing(seeFigure2.2).Thishasbeenparticularlytrueforlow-income

economies,whereagricultureandtradehaveeachaccountedformorethan1percentagepointof

theoveralldecelerationofproductivitygrowth.

Thefinanceandbusinessservicessectorexerted

thestrongestdragonproductivitygrowthamongadvancedeconomies,whileforemerging-marketanddevelopingeconomies,itwasmanufacturing.

Atthelevelofindividualbusinesses,thegap

betweenfrontierfirmsandlaggardshasnearly

doubledinrecentyears,increasingfrom6.3

percentagepointsto11.8percentagepoints

between2016and2023,accordingtoAccenture

estimates.8Alagintechnologydiffusionisakey

reason,withmanyindustriesandfirmsyettodeployandharnessnewtechnologies.

1.2Keydriversoffutureproductivity

Thereislittleconsensusonthepaceof

productivitygrowthinthecomingyears,butit

islikelytobeshapedbytrendsinanumberof

keyglobaldevelopments–includingtechnology,demographics,policyandgeopolitics–andbytheresponsesofpolicy-makersandbusinessleaders.

generativeAItoolsin2022.Overtime,AIiswidelyexpectedtodeliverasystemiceconomicboost,althoughcurrentestimatesoftheextentofthis

boostaresubjecttosignificantuncertainty.10

Thelong-termimpactofAIonglobalproductivitygrowthwilldependheavilyonhowrapidlyand

effectivelybusinessesacrossdifferentsectorsandregionscanintegrateitintotheirbusinessmodels.

Technology

Asof2024,theuseofAItoenhanceproductivityremainspatchy,accordingtotheWorldEconomic

Thecommercializationofdisruptiveemerging

technologieshasthepotentialtoredefinethefutureofproductivity.TheWorldBankestimatesthata

technologyshockcanraiseproductivityby1.5%inadvancedand4.5%inemergingeconomies

overa10-yearperiod.9Thisisparticularlyrelevanttodevelopmentsinartificialintelligence(AI),the

archetypalcurrentexampleofafrontiertechnologyshock,whichhasexplodedintothepublic

consciousnesssincethelaunchofnumerous

Forum’slatestannualsurveyofover10,000

executivesglobally(seeFigure3).Respondentsin

high-incomeeconomiesratetheadoptionofAIto

boostproductivitynearly40%higherthanthosein

low-incomeeconomies,althoughitisnotablethatnocountriesperformveryhighly.Regionally,Northern

America,OceaniaandSouth-easternAsiaareseenashavingthehighestuseofAIforproductivity.Atthecountrylevel,Norway,theUSAandFinlandarethemaingloballeaders(seeFigure4.1).

FIGURE3

PerceptionofthebusinesscommunityabouttheadoptionofAIamonglocalbusinessestoenhanceproductivity

LatinAmerica andtheCaribbean

MiddleEastandNorthernAfrica

South-easternAsia

SouthernAsia

NorthernAmerica

Byregion

Sub-SaharanAfrica

CentralAsia

Europe

Oceania

EasternAsia

Byincomegroup

Lowermiddleincome

Highincome

Lowincome

Uppermiddleincome

Source:WorldEconomicForum.ExecutiveOpinionSurvey2024.GlobalEconomicFutures:Productivityin20308

2.03.04.05.06.0

<>

LowlocaladoptionScore1-7(high)Highlocaladoption

servicessector.Theenergytechnologyand

utilitiessectorisalsoseenasaleadingadopterofAI.Amongotherindustries,morethanone-

fifthofexecutivesexpectcompaniesinadvancedmanufacturing,engineeringandconstructiontoleverageAIinthenearterm.

Thesamesurveyrevealsthatservice-related

sectorsaretheonesmostexpectedtouseAItoinnovatenewproductsandbusinessmodelsinthecomingyears(seeFigure4.2).NearlyhalfofrespondentsexpectinformationandtechnologyservicescompaniestogenerateAIopportunities,closelyfollowedbycompaniesinthefinancial

FIGURE4

TopcountriesandsectorsexpectedtoleverageAIopportunitiesaccordingtobusinessexecutives

Figure4.1Top10economiesbyuseofAIamonglocalbusinessestoenhanceproductivity

1Informationandtechnologyservices

2Financialservicesandcaptialmarkets

3Energytechnologyandutilities

4Telecommunications

5Accommodation,foodandleisureservices

6Advancedmanufacturing

7Educationandtraining

8Mediaandpublishing

9Engineeringandconstruction

10Medicalandhealthcareservices

MiddleEastandNorthernAfrica●NorthernAmerica

South-easternAsia

Source:WorldEconomicForum.ExecutiveOpinionSurvey2024.

Figure4.2Top10sectorstogenerateAIopportunities

7UnitedArabEmirates

4Indonesia

6Philippines

5Israel

1Norway

●Oceania

●Europe

3Finland

NewZealand

Switzerland

Australia

USA

10

8

9

2

Realizingthefullproductivitypotentialofnew

technologiesrequiresaddressingstructuralbarrierssuchasaccesstocapitalandtalent,digital

infrastructuregapsanddiffusionofinnovation.

Whilebreakthroughsatthefrontiercarrysignificantpotential,improvedaccesstosimplerandmore

readilyavailabletechnologiescanunlockwider

productivitygainsacrossfirmsandcountries.Forexample,thediffusionofimprovementsinenergy

andirrigationtechnologiesisexpectedtodrive

sizeableincreasesinagriculturalproductivity,11withtheuseofprecisionfarmingboostingcropyieldsbyasmuchas15%12insomecases.

Humancapital

Theadoptionanddiffusionofadvanced

technologiesareinextricablylinkedtohuman

capital.RecentWorldEconomicForuminterviewswithbusinessexecutivesrevealthatthesuccessfuldeploymentofAIdependsasmuchormore

onpeopleasonthetechnologyitself.13This

isinlinewiththefindingthatfirmscanboost

productivitygainsfrom4%to11%iftheyleveragecomplementaritiesbetweendata,technologyandtalent,ratherthanfocusingsolelyondataand

technology.14Yetdespitetheclearimportanceof

humancapitalinmaximizingproductivitygainsfromtechnology,bothpublicandprivatespendingon

workforcetraininghasdeclinedinrecentyears,withspendinginOECD(OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment)countriesfallingfrom0.2%to0.1%ofGDPsince2008.15

Humancapitalisalsoseenasthemainobstacle

toAIadoptionbybusinessleaders.Nearlyhalf

ofrespondentscitealackofskillsastheprimarybottleneck,while43%pointtoalackofvision

amongmanagersandleaders.16Bycontrast,fewerthanone-thirdofexecutiveshighlightthecostof

AIproductsandservices,andonlyone-fifthseeregulatoryconstraintsaskeybarriers.17

Ongoingdigitizationisacceleratingashifttowards

ahigh-skill-intensiveworkforce,whereboth

technicalexpertiseandnon-cognitiveskills–suchasleadershipandcommunication–areincreasinglycritical.Thelevelofskillsandtheircomplementarity

GlobalEconomicFutures:Productivityin20309

OGlobaleconomicfragmentation

andfinancial

constraintsalso

poseachallengetosustained

productivitygains.

areparticularlystrongamongfirmsatthe

productivityfrontier.Onaverage,frontierfirmshavetwicetheshareofhigh-skilledworkerscomparedtolaggardfirms.18However,theirdifferentiationrests

notonlyonworkforcecompositionbutonthedepthanddeploymentofspecificskills.Forexample,

frontierfirmsexhibitalmosttwicethelevelof

managementandcommunicationskillscomparedtolaggardsandmorethandoubleinICTskills.19

Closingtheskillsgapsandenhancingthequalityofeducationandjobtrainingcouldunlocksignificantproductivitygains.20

Demographictrendsarealsoreshapingproductivityprospects,withtheratioofworking-ageindividualstothoseagedabove65projectedtoshrinkfrom

6.4in2024to3.9by2050.21Migrationislikelyto

playapivotalroleinmitigatingtheseheadwinds.

Beyondaddressinglabourshortages,migrationalsodrivesknowledgediffusionandfacilitatescross-

borderproductivityspillovers.However,tighteninglabourmarketsandincreasinglyselectivemigrationpoliciesarelikelytoreshapetheglobaltalent

landscapeintheyearsahead.

Businessenvironment

Theevolvingbusinessenvironmentpresentsbothopportunitiesandrisksforproductivitygrowthinthecomingyears.

Industrialpoliciesareincreasinglybeingusedtostimulatedomesticindustries,promote

technologicalleadershipandsecuresupply

chains.However,theirlong-termimplicationsfor

allocativeefficiency,marketdynamics,firmsize

andproductivityareuncertain.Atthestartof2024,theWorldEconomicForum’sChiefEconomists

Outlookflaggedconcernsaboutdomesticmarketdistortionsandglobalsupplychainredundancies

arisingfromsuchinterventions.22Forexample,pastmisallocationsofcapitalandlabourhavealready

causeda0.6percentagepointdragonannual

productivitygrowth,anditisestimatedthatTFP

growthcouldhavebeen50%higherinrecentyearswithouttheseinefficiencies.23

Globaleconomicfragmentationandfinancial

constraintsalsoposeachallengetosustained

productivitygains.By2021,businessinvestmentinOECDcountrieshadfallenby40%from

pre-GFClevels.24Thisdeclinelimitstheability

offirmstoadoptnewtechnologiesandscale

productivity-enhancinginnovations.Theglobal

fiscalenvironment,shapedbyhighlevelsof

publicandprivatedebt,risksexacerbatingthissqueezeonproductivity-enhancinginvestments,includingpublicspendingoncriticalareassuchasworkforcetraining,infrastructureandresearchanddevelopment.Thegeopolitically-driven

reconfigurationofsupplychainsalsorisksreducingtheeconomiesofscaleandcostadvantagesthatunderpinproductivitygrowth.

GlobalEconomicFutures:Productivityin203010

2

Scenarios

Thepurposeofthesescenariosisnottopredictthefuture,buttounderstandhowtechnologyandhumancapitaldynamicsmayaffecteconomiesandsectors.

2.1

OThenarrativespresentedinthischapterallow

decision-makerstoanalysehow

thepossible

futuresandthe

assumptions

underpinning

themplayout

acro