1、The existence of an agency problem in a corporation due to the separation of ownership and control has been widely studied in literatures. This paper examines the effects of management compensation schemes on corporate investment decisions. This paper is significant because it helps to understand th

2、e relationship between them. This understandings allow the design of an optimal management compensation scheme to induce the manager to act towards the goals and best interests of the company. Grossman and Hart (1983) investigate the principal agency problem. Since the actions of the agent are unobs

3、ervable and the first best course of actions can not be achieved, Grossman and Hart show that optimal management compensation scheme should be adopted to induce the manager to choose the second best course of actions. Besides management compensation schemes, other means to alleviate the agency probl

4、ems are also explored. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest two ways for reducing the agency problem: competitive market mechanisms and direct contractual provisions. Manne (1965) argues that a market mechanism such as the threat of a takeover provided by the market can be used for corporate control. Ex-p

5、ost settling up by the managerial labour market can also discipline managers and induce them to pursue the interests of shareholders. Fama (1980) shows that if managerial labour markets function properly, and if the deviation of the firms actual performance from stockholders optimum is settled up in

6、 managers compensation, then the agency cost will be fully borne by the agent (manager).The theoretical arguments of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Haugen and Senbet (1981), and empirical evidence of Amihud andLev (1981), Walking and Long (1984), Agrawal and Mandelker (1985), andBenston (1985), amon

7、g others, suggest that managers holding of common stock and stock options have an important effect on managerial incentives. For example, Benston finds that changes in the value of managers stock holdings are larger than their annual employment income. Agrawal and Mandelker find that executive secur

8、ity holdings have a role in reducing agency problems. This implies that the share holdings and stock options of the managers are likely to affect the corporate investment decisions. A typical management scheme consists of flat salary, bonus payment and stock options. However, the studies, so far, on

9、ly provide links between the stock options and corporate investment decisions. There are few evidences that the compensation schemes may have impacts on the corporate investment decisions. This paper aims to provide a theoretical framework to study the effects of management compensation schemes on t

10、he corporate investment decisions. Assuming that the compensation schemes consist of flat salary, bonus payment, and stock options, I first examine the effects of alternative compensation schemes on corporate investment decisions under all-equity financing. Secondly, I examine the issue in a setting

11、 where a firm relies on debt financing. Briefly speaking, the findings are consistent with Amihud and Levs results. Managers who have high shareholdings and rewarded by intensive profit sharing ratio tend to underinvest.However, the underinvestment problem can be mitigated by increasing the financia

12、l leverage. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section II presents the model. Section HI discusses the managerial incentives under all-equity financing. Section IV examines the managerial incentives under debt financing. Section V discusses the empirical implications and presents t

13、he conclusions of the study.I consider a three-date two-period model. At time t0, a firm is established and goes public. There are now two kinds of owners in the firm, namely, the controlling shareholder and the atomistic shareholders. The proceeds from initial public offering are invested in some r

14、isky assets which generate an intermediate earnings, I, at t,. At the beginning, the firm also decides its financial structure. A manager is also hired to operate the firm at this time. The manager is entitled to hold a fraction of the firms common stocks and stock options, a (where 0a I), it shows

15、that the manager with high shareholding will underinvest in the project. This is inconsistent with the best interests of the atomistic shareholders. However, the underinvestment problem can be mitigated by increasing the financial leverage.The results and findings in this paper provides several test

16、able hypotheses forfuture research. If the managers underinvest in the projects, the company willunderperform in long run. Thus the earnings can be used as a proxy forunderinvestment, and a negative relationship between earnings andmanagement shareholdings, stock options or profit sharing ratio is e

17、xpected.As the underinvestment problem can be alleviated by increasing the financialleverage, a positive relationship between earnings and financial leverage isexpected.在一個(gè)公司由于所有權(quán)和控制權(quán)的分離的代理問題存在的文獻(xiàn)中得到了廣泛的研究。本文探 討了對(duì)企業(yè)投資決策管理補(bǔ)償方案的影響。本文重要是因?yàn)樗兄诶斫馑鼈冎g的關(guān)系。 這種理解允許的最佳管理補(bǔ)償方案以使管理者對(duì)目標(biāo)公司的最佳利益的設(shè)計(jì)。格羅斯曼和哈 特（1983）的

18、委托代理問題的探討。由于代理人的行為是不可觀察的行為，最好首先當(dāng)然 是無(wú)法實(shí)現(xiàn)的，格羅斯曼和哈特表明優(yōu)化管理補(bǔ)償方案應(yīng)通過誘導(dǎo)經(jīng)理選擇行動(dòng)的第二好的 課程。除了管理補(bǔ)償方案，其他的手段來緩解代理問題進(jìn)行了探討。Fama和延森（1983） 提出降低代理問題的兩個(gè)方面：市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)機(jī)制和直接的合同條款。曼尼（1965）認(rèn)為，市 場(chǎng)機(jī)制，如收購(gòu)市場(chǎng)提供的威脅可以用于企業(yè)的控制。"；事后解決"；的管理勞 動(dòng)市場(chǎng)也可以約束管理者，促使他們追求股東利益。法瑪（1980）表明，如果勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng) 的管理功能，如果該公司的實(shí)際業(yè)績(jī)從股東最佳偏差是解決了在高管薪酬，然后代理成本將 完全由代理人承擔(dān)（經(jīng)理

19、）。延森和 Meckling 理論論證（1976）和 Haugen 和 Senbet（1981），與 Amihud andlev經(jīng)驗(yàn) 證據(jù)（1981），步行和長(zhǎng)（1984），Agrawal 和 Mandelker（1985），andbenston（1985）， 其中，建議管理者持有普通股和股票期權(quán)的管理激勵(lì)的重要作用。例如，審查發(fā)現(xiàn)在經(jīng)理人股票價(jià)值的變化大于其年度就業(yè)收入。Agrawal和Mandelker發(fā)現(xiàn)執(zhí)行安全持有量 減少代理問題的作用。這意味著股權(quán)與經(jīng)理股票期權(quán)可能會(huì)影響到企業(yè)的投資決策。一個(gè)典 型的管理方案，包括固定工資，獎(jiǎng)金和股票期權(quán)。然而，到目前為止研究，只提供股票期 權(quán)與投資

20、決策之間的聯(lián)系。很少有證據(jù)表明補(bǔ)償方案可能會(huì)對(duì)企業(yè)投資決策的影響。本文的 目的是研究管理的補(bǔ)償方案對(duì)企業(yè)投資決策的影響提供了一個(gè)理論框架。假設(shè)補(bǔ)償方案包括 固定工資，獎(jiǎng)金，股票期權(quán)，我首先檢查替代補(bǔ)償計(jì)劃的影響在所有的股權(quán)融資在企業(yè)投資決策。其次，我在一個(gè)公司依靠債務(wù)融資環(huán)境問題的審視。簡(jiǎn) 要地說，該研究結(jié)果與Amihud和利的結(jié)果一致。管理者持股和獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)高密集的利潤(rùn)分享率傾 向于減少投資。然而，投資不足問題可以通過增加財(cái)務(wù)杠桿減輕。本文的其余部分安排如下。 第二部分介紹了模型。第三部分論述了管理激勵(lì)下的所有股權(quán)融資。第四部分探討管理層激 勵(lì)條件下債務(wù)融資。第五部分論述了經(jīng)驗(yàn)的影響，并提出了本文

21、的研究結(jié)論。我認(rèn)為一三日的兩階段模型。在時(shí)間T0，建立上市公司?，F(xiàn)在的公司，兩種業(yè)主即，控股 股東和外部股東。從首次公開募股收益投資于一些高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的資產(chǎn)所產(chǎn)生的中間收入，我，在 T，。一開始，該公司還決定其財(cái)務(wù)結(jié)構(gòu)。經(jīng)理也聘請(qǐng)了經(jīng)營(yíng)的公司在這個(gè)時(shí)候。經(jīng)理有權(quán) 持有普通股的股票和股票期權(quán)的公司的一部分，一個(gè)（其中0VL），在第一期的開始。在時(shí) 間t，公司收到中間收入，用我，從最初的資產(chǎn)。同時(shí)，一個(gè)新的投資項(xiàng)目是提供給公司。 為簡(jiǎn)單起見，該模型假定公司需要的所有中間收入，我，投資于新項(xiàng)目。如果項(xiàng)目是公認(rèn)的 在T，它產(chǎn)生一個(gè)隨機(jī)的收益，在T2,使得y =俄+ X，X ，問題Y=I + x = P和問題Y =X = 1-P，分別。的概率，P，是一個(gè)間隔均勻的密度范圍從0到1。最初，該模型還假定 凈收益，X，低于初始投資，即這樣的假設(shè)是合理的大多數(shù)投資無(wú)法獲得超過100%的回報(bào) 率。后來，這個(gè)假設(shè)是放松的探討非常有利可圖的投資對(duì)結(jié)果的影響。為簡(jiǎn)單起見，還假定 是為了錢而沒有紅利沒有時(shí)間值將支付在T2。如果項(xiàng)目被拒絕，在T，中間收入，我，會(huì) 保留在公司和T2值將等于島效應(yīng)的補(bǔ)償方案對(duì)企業(yè)投資決策管理過度投資和投資不足風(fēng)險(xiǎn)中性的投