ernance,ownershipstructureandperformanceofSMEsinGhanaimplicationsfornancingopportunities【外文翻譯外文題目:Corporateernance,ownershipstructureandperformanceofSMEsinGhana:implicationsfor?nancingcorporateernanceJoshuaAborandNicholasBiekpeEntrepreneurial?rmsrequireexternal?nancingto?nancetheirgrowthandinvestmentsinordertoachievefullpro?tspotentialofthebusiness.Theyalsorequireinputsonbusinessoperations,goodstrategyandbestpracticesintheindustrialsector.Theseresourcescanbeprovidedforthroughthepresenceofnon-executivedirectorsorexternalboardmembersasinthecaseoflisted?rms.Researchonlisted?rmshasshownthatstrategyin?uencescorporateperformanceandexternalboardmemberschallengestrategiesbymanagement.ItisalsoarguedthatgoodcorporateernancepracticesassistSMEsinimprovingontheirprospectsofobtainingfundingfrominvestorsand?nancialinstitutions.Thisisanexactconsequenceofproperbookkeeandaccountingpracticesandinformationdisclosureincreasethecon?denceofinvestorsinthe?rm.TheSMEwillalsohaveahealthiergrowthandbecommittedtobusinessef?ciencyduetothepresenceofexternalsupervisoryparties.Thestructureoftheremainderofthepaperisasfollows:Thesecondsectionprovidesareviewoftheextantliture.Sectionthreeexinsthemethodologyemployedforthestudy.Theempiricalresultsarepresentedanddiscussedinthesection.Section?veconcludesthediscussion tureTheoreticalunderpinningsfortheextantresearchincorporateernancecomefromtheclassicthesis,‘TheModernCorporationandPrivateProperty’byBerleandMeans1932.Thethesisdescribesafundamentalagencyprobleminmodern?rmswherethereisaseparationofownershipandcontrol.SincetheseminalworkbyBerleandMeans1932,differenttheorieshavebeenpropoundedinexiningthe ernanceissue.Theseincludetheagencytheory,the stakeholderJensenandMeckling1976de?neagencyrelationshipandidentifyagencycosts.Agencyrelationshipisacontractunderwhich‘‘oneormoresprincipalengageanotheragenttoperformsomeserviceontheirbehalf,whichinvolvesdelegatingsomedecision-authoritytotheagent’’.Agencycostsincludemonitoringexpendituresbytheprincipalsuchasauditing,budgeting,controlandcompensationsystems,bondingexpendituresbytheagentandresiduallossduetodivergenceofinterestsbetweentheprincipalandtheagent.Thesharepricethatshareholderspayre?ectssuchagencycosts.Toincrease?rmvalue,onemustthereforereduceagencycosts.Thisisonewaytoviewthelinkagebetweencorporate ernanceandcorporateperformance.Fama1980aptlycommentsthatseparationofownershipandcontrolcanbeexinedasaresultof‘‘ef?cientformofeconomicThestewardshiptheory,ontheotherhandsuggeststhatmanagerialopportunismisnotrelevant.Theaimofmanagementistoimizethe?rm’sperformancesincethatspeaksofthesuccessandachievementsofmanagement.DonaldsonandDavis1991arguethatmanagerialopportunismdoesnotexistbecausethemanager’smainaspirationis‘‘todoagoodjob,tobeagoodstewardofcorporateassets’’.ThisclearlyrecesthelackoftrusttowhichtheagencytheoryreferswiththerespectforauthorityandinclinationtoethicalCorporateernancehastraditionallybeenassociatedwithlargercompanies.Thisismainlyduetotheseparationbetweenownershipandcontrolofthe?rm.Itistemptingtobelieve ernancewouldnotapplytoSMEssincetheagencyproblemsarelesslikelytoexist.Inmanyinstances,SMEsaremadeupofonlytheownerwhoisthesoleproprietorandmanagerHart,1995.Basically,SMEstendtohavealesspronouncedseparationofownershipandmanagementthanlarger?rms.ItissometimesarguedthatbecauseSMEshavefewemployeeswhoaremostlyrelativesoftheownerandthusnoseparationofownershipandcontrol,thereisnoneedforcorporateernanceintheiroperations.Also,thequestionofaccountabilitybySMEstothepublicisnon-existentsincetheydonotdependonpublicfunds.Inspiteofthesearguments,thereisaglobalconcernfortheapplicationofcorporate ernancetoSMEs.ItisoftenarguedthatsimilarguidelinesthatapplytolistedcompaniesshouldalsobeapplicabletoSMEs.Theextantempiricalli tureoncorporateernanceofSMEsfocusesonanumberoffactorsincludingboardsize,boardskilllevel,boardcompositionandcontrol,CEOduality,percentageofsharescloselyheld,familyownership,andownershipDataandempiricalThedatausedintheempiricalysiswasderivedfromthe?nancialstatementsofSMEsinboththeindustrialandservicessectorsduringasix-yearperiod,1998-2003.Informationonandownershipissueswasalsoobtainedthroughinterviewsfromthemanagementofthe?rms.Thestudysampled120?rmswithlessthanhundredemployeesfromthedatabasesoftheNationalBoardforSmallScaleIndustriesandtheAssociationofGhanaIndustriesforthisPro?tabilityisusedasameasureofperformanceandisde?nedintermsofreturnonassets.TheindependentvariablesincludeboardSize,boardcomposition,boardskill,managementskill,CEOduality,insideshareholding,familyownership,andforeignownership.Themeasureforboardsizeisthenumberofboardmembers.Boardcompositionistheproportionofnon-executivedirectors.InsideownershipisthepercentageofsharesownedorcontrolledbytheemployeesaswellastheCEO.Familyownershipisadummyvariablethatequalsoneifthe?rmisfamilyowned.Familyownershipisde?nedbyamajorityownershipmorethan50percentheldbyafamilyorafamilygroup.whiletheyarefamily-owned-and-managedifownersarealsomanagersfordailyoperationofthe?rms.Thisde?nitionisconsistentwiththede?nitiongivenbyDyer1986,awidelyacceptedde?nition,butnoinformationaboutthesuccessionissueproposedbyChuaetal(1999).Foreignownershipisalsoadummyvariablewithoneifitisaforeign?rmandzeroifitisaGhanaian-owned?rm.Inadditionwecontrolfor?rmsize,?rmage,anddebtratio.Sizeisde?nedasthelogoftotalassets.Ageisthenumberofyearstheobservationyearandthe?rm’syearofincorporation.DebtistheratiooftotaldebttototalThisstudyemploysapanelregressionmodelwhichinvolvesthepoolingofobservationsonacross-sectionofunitsoverseveraltimeperiodsandprovidesresultsthataresimplynotdetectableinpurecross-sectionsorpuretime-seriesstudies.Thepanelregressionequationdiffersfromaregulartime-seriesorcrosssectionregressionbythedoublesubscriptattachedtoeachvariableEmpiricalresults:TableIpresentsthedescriptivestatisticsforallthevariables.Theaveragemedianpro?tabilityis11.6percent8.77percent,meaningtheaveragereturnonassetsstandsatapproximay12percent.AverageboardsizeforthissampleofSMEsisabout4.Theaverageboardcompositionisgivenas46.27percent.Themeanboardskillis2andthemeanmanagementskillisalsoshownas2.Thismeans,ontheaveragethereare2boardmemberswithdegreeorprofessionalquali?cationandalso2membersofmanagementwithdegreeorprofessionalquali?cation.Most86.02percentoftheSMEshavetheCEOalsoactingaschairontheboard.Furtherysisofthedatashowedthatahighproportion81.67percentofsharesisownedbyemployeesofthe?rmsorinsiders.Theresultsalsoindicatethatoursampleinclude68.01percentand7.45percentfamily-ownedandforeign-ownedbusinessesrespectively.Theaveragevalueofthe?rms’is3.05e+09Ghanaiancedisandaveragenumberofyearsthe?rmshavebeeninbusinessis9.6years.Theaveragemediandebtratioisalsoshownas0.38230.3192.ConclusionandTheimportanceofcorporate ernancehasbeendiscussedmostlywithinthecontextoflarge,publiclylisted?rms.However,lessattentionhasbeenpaidtotheareawithrespecttoSMEs.Thiscurrentpaperinvestigatedtheeffectsofcorporate ernance,andownershipstructureontheperformanceofSMEsinGhana.Theresultsofthisstudyshowthatboardsize,boardcomposition,managementskill,CEOduality,insideownership,familyownership,andforeignownershiphavesigni?cantlypositiveimpactsonpro?tability Theresultsofthisstudygenerallysuggestthattheadoptionofcorporate structureshassomeimportantimplicationsforGhanaianSMEs.CorporateernancecangreatlyassisttheSMEsectorbyinfusingbetter auditing, opportunitiesforgrowthandnewstrategicoutlookthroughnon-executivedirectors.Onemajorimplicationofawellfunctioning ernancesystemiseasieraccesstofundingfrominvestorsand?nancialinstitutions.SMEshavegenerallybeennotedtoencountergreaterdif?cultyingainingaccessto?nancingduetoproblemsofinformationasymmetryandmoralhazards.Ensuringproperpractices,internalcontrolsystems,adequateinformationdisclosurearelikelytoincreasethecon?denceofinvestorsinthe?rm,reducetheproblemsassociatedwithinformationasymmetryandmaketheSMElessriskytoinvestinTheexistenceofnon-executivedirectorscouldleadtobettermanagementdecisionsandhelpSMEstoattractbetterresources.Also,non-executiveboardmembersmayhavegoodknowledgeorusefulinformationon?nancingfacilities.Small?rmsareparticularlyweakandoftenignorantofsourcesof?nanceopentotheir?rms.Mostofthetime,theydonotknowhowtopositionthemselvescorrectlytobeviewedfavorablybythesesourcesof?nanceproviders.Corporateernancealsoallows?rmstopreparefortheirpendinginitialpublicoffering.Oftenbusinessesseekingnewfunds?ndthattheyhavemuchworktodobeforecon?dentlygoingtothemarket.Aconsistenttrackrecordofgoodernancewillgreatlyassistwhenthatpointcomes.Forexample,inGhana,earlyintroductionofcorporateernancewouldprepareanSMEwellenoughevenbeforeitgetslistedundertheprovisionallistingregime.TheexistenceofaboardwillinducerapidgrowthstrategiesintheSMEforrapidpro?ts;thiswillatapointrequirethe?rmgoingpublicformoreThus,thetransitionfromasmalltomediumand?nallycouldbesmoothlyaidedbyaneffectivecorporate ernancesystem.ThisstudyhasshedsomelightontherelevanceofcorporateernanceforSMEsinGhana,however,furtherresearchisnecessaryinordertofurtherdevelopsomeoftheinsightsdeliveredbythisstudyandtobecon?dentthatthereisanysimpleandsystematicstructurethatprovidesbestpracticeguidetohowcorporateernancestructurescanbeeffectivelyemployedwithinthe?rmorshouldbeconsideredasadirection.外文題目:Corporateernance,ownershipstructureandperformanceofSMEsinGhana:implicationsfor?nancingopportunities出處: ernance作者:JoshuaAborandNicholas創(chuàng)業(yè)型企業(yè)需要外部來資助其增長和投資,以實現(xiàn)企業(yè)潛力,獲得充該的其余部分的結構如下:第二部分提供了現(xiàn)存的文獻。第三部分解釋從經典 來獲取先有的公司治理研究的理論基礎,BerleMeans(1932)的“現(xiàn)代公司與私有財產”本文介紹了在現(xiàn)代企 問題的根理論都致力于研究公司治理問題這些措施包括理論,管家理論,資源依賴理Jensen和Meckling(1976)定義了關系,并確定了費用。關系是一個合同下,''一人或多人(本金)從事另一人(人)代表他們來執(zhí)行,其中涉及一些下放決策權力,行使一些服務''成本包括如審計,預算,控制和賠償制度,由人和剩余損失之間的委托人和人的利益支出主要大化,因為公司的業(yè)績表現(xiàn)了公司管理的成功與所取得的成績。Donaldson和Davis1991