外文文獻翻譯EarningsManagementthroughAffiliatedTransactionsPriorresearchhasprimarilytestedforearningsmanagementunderthepremisethatthediscretionallowedinrecordingaccrualsgivesrisetoearningsmanagementbehavior(HealyandWahlen1999).Thesestudieshavefoundevidenceconsistentwithmanagersusingdiscretionaryaccrualstoreportearningsinaccordancewithcertainmanagerialincentives(e.g.,avoidlosses,maintainanearningstrend,meetanalysts'forecasts,maximizebonuses,avoiddebtcovenants,minimizepoliticalcosts,increaseofferingprice,etc.).'Weextendpriorresearchbyfocusingonanadditionalsourceofearningsmanagement.Besidesaccrualmanipulations,firmsmayalsoengageinearningsmanagementthroughtransactionswithaffiliatedcompanies.Thatis,insteadofrelyingonthejudgmentaffordedbygenerallyacceptedaccountingprinciplesinrecordingaccruals,adominantcompanymayuseitsinfluentialrelationshipoveranaffiliatedcompanytostructuretransactionsbetweenthetwocompaniesinawaythatallowsprofitstobeshiftedfromtheaffiliatetothedominantcompany.Thedominantcompanyreportshigherprofitsandtheaffiliatereportslowerprofits,whiletheprofitabilityoftheeconomicentityasawholeremainsunaffected.Sincethevalueofthedominantcompanyisdirectlylinkedtotheprofitabilityandwellbeingoftheentireeconomicentity,thistypeofearningsmanagementmaycauseusersofthedominantcompany'sfinancialstatementstobemisled.Thereareseveralpotentialwaysthatcompaniescouldmanageearningsusingtransactionswithaffiliatedcompanies.Firmsmayengageinchannelstuffingbyforcingdistributorstopurchasehigherthannormalinventorylevels,thusincreasingthemanufacturer'ssalesandprofitsforthecurrentperiod.Firmscouldalsomanageearningsusingtransactionswithlessthanwhollyownedsubsidiaries.Supposeaparentcompanysellsinventorytoalessthanwhollyownedsubsidiary,whichthensellstheinventorytoanexternalpartyinthesameperiod.Theincreaseinconsolidatedearningsoccursbecauselowerprofitsareshiftedtominorityshareholders.Firmsmayalsomanageearningsusingaffiliatedtransactionsbyeithershiftingprofitsacrossdifferenttaxjurisdictions(EmshwillerandSmith2002),orusinginfluenceoversuppliers(Butters2001).Dataontheeffectsofaffiliatedtransactions,becauseoftheirverynature,aredifficulttoobtain.Transactionsbetweentheparentcompanyandaffiliatescanaffecttheindividualearningsofthecompanieswithinthegroup,butconsolidatedearningsremaingenerallyunaffected.Forexample,theparentcompanycansellassets(e.g.,inventory,land,etc.)toitssubsidiary.Theamountofthesale,aswellasthetimingofthesale,canbeinfluencedbytheparentduetoitsdominantpositionoverthesubsidiary.Theparentcompanycanreportthesaleandincreasedearningsinthecurrentperiod.Forconsolidatedpurposes,theaffiliatedtransactionwillbeeliminatedandnotaffectthefinancialstatements.Theparentcompanycouldalsoenhanceitsearningsbyshiftingadditionaloperatingcoststosubsidiaries.Totaloperatingcostswouldbeincludedintheconsolidatedreportsbutnotintheparent's.Theparent'ssignificantinfluenceoverthesubsidiary'sdividendpolicyrepresentsanothermethodbywhichtheparentcompanycouldimproveparentearningswithnocorrespondingaffecttoconsolidatedearnings.Subsidiary-to-parentdividendsincreaseparentearningsunderthecostmethod,buttheseareexcludedfromconsolidatedearnings.TheJapanesereportingenvironmentallowsforapurematch(i.e.,samecompany)betweenparentandconsolidatedearnings.Foreachcompany,wecancompareearningsmanagementforstand-aloneparentearningsplusaffiliatedtransactionstoearningsmanagementforconsolidatedearningsexcludingaffiliatedtransactions.ConsistentwithpriorresearchbasedonU.S.firms(e.g.,BurgstahlerandDichev1997;Degeorgeetal.1999;PayneandRobb2000;Beattyetal.2002;Beaveretal.2003),bothparentandconsolidatedearningsinJapanaremanagedatthreeimportantearningsthresholds:avoidinglosses,avoidingearningsdeclines,andavoidingnegativeforecasterrors.Consistentwithexpectationsbasedontheabilitytouseaffiliatedtransactions,parentearningsshowgreaterevidenceofearningsmanagementthandoconsolidatedearningsateachofthesethreeearningsthresholds.Additionaltestsindicatethattheincreasedmanagementofparentearningsaroundthesethreeearningsthresholdsisassociatedwiththeabilitytouseaffiliatedtransactions.Investorsandotherfinancialstatementusersshouldbeawarethat,inadditiontotheuseofdiscretionaryaccruals,firmsmayalsomanageearningsusingtransactionswithaffiliatedcompanies.Priorresearchhasfocusedalmostexclusivelyonearningsmanagementusingaccruals.Thisstudybringsattentiontoanadditionalsourceofearningsmanagement:affiliatedtransactions.Theabilityofcompaniestomanageearningsinthismannerislargelyunexploredintheliterature.WhileweaddressthisissueinaJapanesesettingbetweenparentandconsolidatedearnings,animportantquestionforfutureresearchis:"Towhatextentdogenerallyacceptedaccountingprinciplesinothercountriesallowfirmstousespecificaffiliatedtransactions(e.g.,channelstuffing,transactionswithlessthanwhollyownedsubsidiaries,shiftingprofitsacrosstaxjurisdictions,specialpurposeentities,influentialrelationsoversuppliers,etc.)tomanagereportedearnings?"ThistypeofearningsmanagementisnotrestrictedtoJapan,andlikelyoccursinmanyotherjurisdictionsaswell.Sincefirmvalueisdirectlyrelatedtothevalueoftheentireeconomicentity,understandinghowcompaniesenhancetheirreportedperformancebyshiftingprofitswithintheeconomicentityisimportanttousersoffinancialstatementsaroundtheworld.Inexaminingwhethermanagersengageinparentearningsmanagement,itisusefulfirsttoconsiderwhetherearningsmanagementthroughaffiliatedtransactionscangoundetected.Ifinvestorsandotherfinancialstatementusersareabletoundothemanagementeffectsofaffiliatedtransactionsinparentearningsusinginformationinconsolidatedearnings,thenincentivestomanageparentearnings,discussedlaterinthissection,areweakened.However,intheJapanesebusinessandreportingenvironment,itisunlikelythatinvestorsandotherswhocontractwiththefirmwillbeabletoeasilydetectearningsmanagementusingaffiliatedtransactions.Intheparentreports,theprofitabilityoftransactionswiththirdpartiesandtransactionswithaffiliatesarenotseparatelydisclosed.Likewise,intheconsolidatedreports,theprofitabilityoftheparentcompany'sthird-partytransactionsisnotseparatelyreportedfromtheprofitabilityoftheaffiliatedcompanies'third-partytransactions.Informationontheprofitabilityofindividualaffiliatedcompaniesmaybeunavailableiftheaffiliatedcompanyiswhollyownedornotpubliclytraded.Affiliatesmayalsohavesubsidiariesorequityinvestments,furthercomplicatingtheassignmentofprofitability.ThecorporategroupinJapanconsistsofacomplexwebofinterlockingownership,andmultiplecross-holdingsthroughsubsidiariesarecommon.Thistypeofcorporatestructure,combinedwithalackofdetaileddisclosure,makesitdifficultforfinancialstatementsuserstodeterminetheextenttowhichparentearningsareaffectedbyaffiliatedtransactions.Becauseoftheundisclosednatureofaffiliatedtransactions,wecannotdirectlycomputetheextentofaffiliatedtransactions.Infact,thelackofdisclosureonstand-aloneparentorsubsidiaryearningsmakesaffiliatedtransactionsapotentiallyusefulearningsmanagementtechnique.Duetoitsambiguousmeaning,thefirm-specificdifferencebetweenconsolidatedearningsandparentearningsisnotusedforanyofourtests.Instead,wecomparethedistributionofparentearningstothedistributionofconsolidatedearningsasameanstodetectearningsmanagement.Asdiscussedinmoredetailbelow,weexpectthedistributionofparentearningstorevealmoreevidenceofearningsmanagementthanwillthedistributionofconsolidatedearningsaroundimportantearningsthresholds,dueatleastinparttotheavailabilityofaffiliatedtransactionstomanageparentearnings.Oursampleincludesbothparentandconsolidatedearningsforeachfirmtohelpcontrolfordifferencesinfirmcharacteristicswhencomparingthedistributions.Investorsalsoseemtocareaboutparentearnings,eventhoughconsolidatedearningsarereported.Halletal.(1994)reportthatstockreturnshaveasimilarorstrongerrelationwithparentearningsthantheydowithconsolidatedearnings.Thisresultconflictswiththenotionthatinvestorsconsiderconsolidatedearningstobeamorecompletemeasureofvalue.Herrmannetal.(2001)findthatJapaneseinvestorsfixateonparentearningsanddonotcorrectlyconsidertheimpactthatconsolidatedearningshaveonfirmvalue.Ifmanagersareawareofinvestors'fixationonparentearnings,thenmanagersmayhavestock-basedincentivestomeetinvestors'expectationsofparentearnings.TheincrementalimportanceofparentearningsinJapanisfurtherevidentinfinancialanalysts'forecasts.Financialanalystsprovideforecastsofbothparentandconsolidatedearnings,indicatingthatinvestorsdemandtheadditionalinformationfoundinparentearnings.DarroughandHarris(1991)examinewhetherforecastsofparentcompanyandconsolidatedearningsinJapanconveyinformationtoinvestors.Theyfindagreaterassociationofunexpectedsecurityreturnsandunexpectedearningsbasedonparentforecaststhanconsolidatedforecasts.InprivateconversationswithI/B/E/Spersonnel,weweretoldthattheI/B/E/Sdatabase,whilecollectingdataonbothparentandconsolidatedearningsforecasts,providesforecastdatafortheearningsnumber(parentorconsolidated)thatismorefrequentlyforecastedbyanalysts.Forfirmsthatreportbothparentandconsolidatedearningsduringthe1994-2000period,wefindatotalof50,677analyst/firm/yearforecastsforparentearningsand37,241analyst/firm/yearforecastforconsolidatedearnings.Thepriorityanalystsgivetoforecastingparentearningscreatesanadditionalincentiveformanagerstoreportparentearningsconsistentwithearningstargets,regardlessoftheamountreportedforconsolidatedearnings.Whileeachofthesevariablespotentiallyprovidesanoisymeasure,allofthemshouldcorrelatewiththefirm'sabilitytomanageparentearningsthroughtheuseofaffiliatedtransactions.Usingmultiplemeasuresincreasestheconfidenceintheresultsbynotover-relyingontheoutcomeofasinglevariable.Also,agreementinresultsacrossthethreevariablesprovidesadditionalassurancethatthevariablesapproximatetheconstructofinterest,thefirm'sabilitytomanageparentearningsusingaffiliatedtransactions.Priorresearchclearlydocumentsearningsmanagementthroughtheuseofdiscretionaryaccruals.Weextendtheliteraturebyinvestigatinganadditionalsourceofearningsmanagementtransactionswithaffiliatedcompanies.Companiescanuseavarietyofaffiliatedtransactionstomanageearnings(e.g.,channelstuffing,transactionswithlessthanwhollyownedsubsidiaries,shiftingprofitsacrosstaxjurisdictions,specialpurposeentities,influentialrelationsoversuppliers,etc.)Toprovidealargecross-sectionaltestofearningsmanagementusingaffiliatedtransactions,weemployasampleofJapanesefirms.UnderJapaneseGAAP,parentearningsincludetheeffectsofaffiliatedtransactionswhileconsolidatedearningsexcludetheeffectsofaffiliatedtransactions.Weobserveearningsmanagementbehavioraroundthreeearningsthresholdsforbothparentandconsolidatedearnings:avoidinglosses,avoidingearningsdeclines,andavoidingnegativeforecasterrors.Consistentwithexpectationsbasedontransactionswithaffiliates,thedistributionsforparentearningsshowsubstantiallymoreevidenceofearningsbeingmanagedatthesethresholds.Thepercentageoffirmsthatmeetorexceedthethresholdforparentperformanceandmissthethresholdforconsolidatedperformanceisnoticeablyhigherthanthepercentageoffirmsthatmeetorexceedthethresholdforconsolidatedperformanceandmissitforparentperformance.Additionaltestsindicatethatearningsmanagementaroundthesethreeearningsthresholdsisassociatedwiththeabilitytouseaffiliatedtransactionsforparentearnings,butnotforconsolidatedearnings.Usersofparentfinancialstatementsingeneral,andJapanesefinancialstatementsinparticular,needtobeawarethatparentearningsbasedonthecostmethodforaffiliatesarelikelymanagedtoagreaterdegreethanareconsolidatedearningsduetotheimpactofaffiliatedtransactions.Futureresearchcanextendtheresultsofthisstudytounderstandhowfinancialreportingstandardsinothercountriesallowcompaniestomanageearningsusingtransactionswithaffiliatedcompanies.Consistentwithadditionalearningsmanagementthroughaffiliatedtransactions,parentearningsshowstrongerevidenceofearningsmanagementthanconsolidatedearningsateachofthesethreeearningsthresholds.Furthertestsindicatethattheincreasedmanagementofparentearningsaroundthesethreeearningsthresholdsisrelatedtothefirm'sabilitytouseaffiliatedtransactions,whilethemanagementofconsolidatedearningsisunrelatedtothefirm'sabilitytouseaffiliatedtransactions.Finally,socialdisappointmentformanagersmaybegreaterwhenparentearningsgoalsarenotmetbecausethefailurecanbereliablyassignedtothemanagementteam.SinceJapanesemanagershavemorecontrolovertheoperationsoftheparentcompanythantheydoovertheconsolidatedentity,theymayfeelagreaterresponsibilitytomeettheincome-reportingobjectivesoftheparentcompany.Conversely,whentheconsolidatedcompanyfailstomeetearningsgoals,responsibilitycanmoreeasilybeshiftedtoothercompaniesorcircumstances.Therefore,eventhoughconsolidatedearningsarereported,managersmayevaluatethemselvesandbeevaluatedbyothersinthesocietybasedmoreonparentperformance.Resource:WayneB.Thomas,DonaldR.Herrmann,andTatsuoInoue.EarningmanagementthroughAffiliatedTransactions.JournalofInternationalAccountingResearch,2004:P1-25.譯文：關(guān)聯(lián)交易下的盈余管理先前的研究主要探測在謹慎性原則下，管理部門允許發(fā)生盈余管理行為（希利和瓦列1999）。這些研究已經(jīng)發(fā)現(xiàn)了管理者基于某種管理動機，用自由決定的收益報告盈余的證據(jù)（例如，避免損失，維持一種盈利趨勢，滿足分析師的預期,最大限度的獎金,避免債務契約，減少政治成本、提高提供價格等）。我們擴大了先前的研究，著眼于盈余管理的其他來源。除了利息操縱，企業(yè)或許也會通過關(guān)聯(lián)交易進行盈余管理。也就是說，不是依靠一般公認會計原則的判斷，母公司可以使用它的影響關(guān)系，在兩家公司構(gòu)造關(guān)聯(lián)交易，允許利潤從子公司轉(zhuǎn)移到母公司。母公司報告較高的利潤，子公司報告較低的利潤，而經(jīng)濟實體的盈利能力保持不受影響。因為母公司的價值與盈利能力、經(jīng)濟實體的定位有直接聯(lián)系，這種類型的盈余管理會引起母公司財務報表使用者的誤解。通過關(guān)聯(lián)方交易，公司有幾個潛在方法進行盈余管理。公司也許會通過強制分享者購買高于正常庫存水平的東西，從而增加當期制造商的銷售和利潤。公司也可以使用交易對那些非全資子公司進行盈余管理。假如母公司把產(chǎn)品庫存出售到非全資子公司，然后在同期將庫存銷售給外部企業(yè)。合并收入的增加是由于低利潤都轉(zhuǎn)移到了少數(shù)股東。公司也可能通過關(guān)聯(lián)交易進行盈余管理，比如通過將不同的稅收管轄權(quán)的利潤加以轉(zhuǎn)化（哈姆斯韋勒和史密斯2002），或者通過供應商的影響（巴特斯2001）。對關(guān)聯(lián)交易影響的數(shù)據(jù)，因為其本質(zhì)特性，所以很難獲得。母子公司之間達成的交易會影響公司這個團體的利益，然而合并收入水平不受影響。例如，母公司可以出售資產(chǎn)（如：庫存、土地等）給其全資子公司。由于母公司較其全資子公司占優(yōu)勢地位，因此子公司的銷售數(shù)量和銷售時間會受影響。母公司可以在當期報告銷售和增加盈余。為了達到合并的目的，關(guān)聯(lián)方交易會被消除，但不影響財務報表。母公司還可通過將額外的營運成本轉(zhuǎn)移到子公司來提高其盈余。全部營運成本都將被收錄在匯總報告，而不是在母公司的報告。母公司對子公司股利政策的顯著影響代表了另一種方法，這種方法可以提高母公司的收入，而不相應地影響合并收入。子公司對母公司的股利在成本法下增加了母公司的收入，但不包括在合并收入中。日本曾經(jīng)允許一個純粹的比賽（例如，一個公司），在母公司收入和合并收入之間。對于每家公司，我們可以比較獨立母公司通過關(guān)聯(lián)方交易的盈余管理和不通過關(guān)聯(lián)方交易的盈余管理。與基于美國公司的先前研究相一致（例如，伯格斯托勒和迪砌茀1997；迪格瑞格1999；佩恩和羅柏2000；比特2002；比茀2003），在日本母公司收入和合并收入被賦予三個重要的盈余管理目標：避免損失，避免收益減少，避免消極的預測誤差。符合基于能力來進行關(guān)聯(lián)交易的期望，母公司收入在盈余管理方面提供了比合并收入更多的證據(jù)。額外的測試表明，圍繞這三個盈利目的對母公司收入增加管理，與使用關(guān)聯(lián)交易的能力有關(guān)。投資者及其他財務報表使用者應該知道，除了使用審計師變更，企業(yè)也可以通過關(guān)聯(lián)方交易進行盈余管理。之前的研究已經(jīng)基本上集中在利用應計利潤來盈余管理。本研究使人關(guān)注盈余管理的另一來源：關(guān)聯(lián)方交易。公司用這種方式盈余管理的能力是在文字里探索不到的。當我們解決關(guān)于母公司收入和合并收入這一問題，未來研究的一個重要問題是：在多大程度上其他國家接受一般公認會計原則并允許公司使用特別的關(guān)聯(lián)交易（例如填塞分銷渠道，與非全資子公司交易，在稅收管轄權(quán)上轉(zhuǎn)換利潤，特殊目的的存在，供應商間有影響的關(guān)系等）來管理報告出來的收益？這種類型的盈余管理是不受限制于日本，而且在許多其他司法管轄區(qū)都有可能會出現(xiàn)。因為公司的價值與整個經(jīng)濟實體的價值直接相關(guān)，了解公司如何用經(jīng)濟實體轉(zhuǎn)換利潤來提高報告的性能，對世界各地財務報表的使用者來說是很重要的。審查管理者是否從事母公司盈余管理，先考慮利用關(guān)聯(lián)交易進行盈余管理是否會被對方發(fā)現(xiàn)是很有用的。如果投資者及其他財務報表使用者能夠解開關(guān)聯(lián)交易于母公司收入與合并收入的管理效果，然后鼓勵管理母公司收入，后在這段時間中討論，那么利用關(guān)聯(lián)方交易進行盈余管理的行為就會被削弱。然而，在日本商業(yè)和報告環(huán)境中，它是不可能的，投資者和