LegalSystemonInternationalFinancialRegulationChapter13LegalSystemonInternationalCooperationinRegulatingtheBankingIndustryChapter14LegalFrameworkonInternationalSecuritiesRegulationChapter15Chapter16AcasestudyonthePotentialUS-ChinaExchangeRateDisputeChapter13LegalSystemonInternationalCooperationinRegulatingtheBankingIndustry

Section1TheHardLawundertheIMFSystemwithregardtoInternationalMonetaryRegulation(includingGlobalBankingRegulation)1.BackgroundtheArticlesofAgreementoftheInternationalMonetaryFundwascreatedforthereconstructionoftheinternationalfinancialorderaftertheSecondWorldWar.2.EvolutionoftheIMFRegulatorySystem2.1TheBrettonWoodsSystemwithregardtoInternationalMonetaryRegulation2.1.1TheDouble-pegGoldStandard(1)USdollarwasestablishedasthecurrencyforinternationalreserveandpeggedtogold.(2)theIMF,apermanentinternationalmonetaryandfinancialinstitution,wasestablished;(3)waysforissuanceandconversionofthedollarwasstipulated;(4)thefixedexchangeratesystemwasdefined;(5)financialintermediationprogramswereputforward.2.1.2AdvantagesoftheBrettonWoodsSystem2.1.3Collapse2.2TheJamaicaSystem(1)diversificationofinternationalreserveresultsintheinstabilityofinternationalmonetaryorder;(2)thefloatingexchangeratesystemintensifieschaosandturbulenceoftheinternationalfinancialmarketandsystem;(3)diversificationofmonetarymediationmechanism….Section2TheSoftLawunderBaselSystemwithregardtoInternationalBankingRegulationTheBaselSystemreferstothelegalframeworkwheretheBaselCommitteeonBankingSupervisionregulatesbanksofdevelopedcountriesaccordingtothecoreregulatoryprincipleofcapitaladequacyratio.1.TheBaselCommitteeIn1974,G102.theBaselSystem3.1BasicNormoftheBaselConcordat(1)suggeststhatoverseasestablishmentofanybankshouldnotavoidregulation;(2)definesregulatoryresponsibilitiesofthehomeandhostcountriesofthebanks.3.2BasicNormsoftheBaselAccordTheuniformminimumcapitaladequacyrequirementforallbanksoftheMemberStates.Accordingtothisaccord,minimumcapitaladequacyratioforallbanksoftheMemberStatesissetat8%.一、國(guó)際銀行資本充足率原那么世界經(jīng)濟(jì)合作與開展組織巴塞爾會(huì)議?巴塞爾協(xié)議?對(duì)國(guó)際性銀行監(jiān)管主體缺位的問題提出建議：〔1〕任何銀行的國(guó)外機(jī)構(gòu)都不能逃避監(jiān)管；〔2〕母國(guó)和東道國(guó)應(yīng)共同承擔(dān)監(jiān)管職責(zé)。二、國(guó)際銀行資本充足率監(jiān)管資本充足率不得低于8％；核心資本〔價(jià)值比較穩(wěn)定、流動(dòng)性高的資本〕構(gòu)成計(jì)算公式的分子局部，分母局部由銀行有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的資產(chǎn)構(gòu)成。3.3TheNewBaselAccordIn1999,theBaselCommitteeputforwardthefirstdraftoftheNewCapitalAccordthatfeaturesthe“threepillar〞concept:(1)minimumcapitalrequirements(addressingrisk);(2)supervisoryreview;and(3)marketdisciplinetopromotegreaterstabilityinthefinancialsystem.三、國(guó)際銀行信用管理原那么〔一〕信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理1.信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)監(jiān)管領(lǐng)域“貸款風(fēng)險(xiǎn)集中程度和大額貸款的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)〞、“關(guān)聯(lián)貸款的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)〞、“國(guó)家風(fēng)險(xiǎn)〞2.監(jiān)管方法國(guó)際間信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)預(yù)警系統(tǒng)，信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理原那么〔二〕大額貸款披露制度1、大額貸款監(jiān)控2、貸款領(lǐng)域集中監(jiān)控〔三〕利率風(fēng)險(xiǎn)監(jiān)管Chapter16AcasestudyonthePotentialUS-ChinaExchangeRateDisputeTextbookp.431-440.(1)WhatarethepotentialactionsthatcouldbeusedbytheUSAbypunishingChina’sallegedmanipulationofitscurrency?Whatwouldberesultoftheseactions?(2)WhatisthecontentofthepunitivelegislationintroducedbySenateSchumer?IsitpossiblefortheUSCongresstoadoptsuchlegislationagainstChina?Why?(3)WhydidJamesBacchuspredictthattheUSmightlosethecaseintheWTOtoChinaiftheUScongressdecidedtoadoptsuchlegislationagainstChina?WhydidheconcludethatthepotentialUS-ChinadisputebeforetheWTOcoulddoharmtotheWTO?(4)Why