1、商業(yè)銀行的公司治理與組織架構(gòu),1,什么是公司治理,公司治理: 按照威廉姆森的說(shuō)法，所謂公司治理“就是限制針對(duì)事后產(chǎn)生的準(zhǔn)租金分配的種種約束方式的總和，包括所有權(quán)的配置、企業(yè)的資本結(jié)構(gòu)、對(duì)管理者的激勵(lì)機(jī)制，公司接管，董事會(huì)制度，來(lái)自機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的壓力，產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，組織結(jié)構(gòu)等等”。 哈佛大學(xué)的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家Shleifer和Vishny進(jìn)一步把公司治理定義為“研究如何保證公司的出資人可以獲得他們投資帶來(lái)的收益，研究出資人怎樣可以使經(jīng)理將資本收益的一部分作為紅利返還給他們，研究怎樣可以保證經(jīng)理不吞掉他們所提供的資金、不將資金投資于壞項(xiàng)目。一句話，公司治理就是要解決出資者應(yīng)該怎樣控制經(jīng)理

2、、以使他們?yōu)樽约旱睦娣?wù)”,2,所謂公司治理就是解決信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)條件下公司股東與經(jīng)理層之間的委托代理難題的制度安排。而公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)包括兩個(gè)方面：一是內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制，二是外部治理機(jī)制。 1、內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制。所謂內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制，是指公司內(nèi)部協(xié)調(diào)委托人與代理人利益的制度，實(shí)際是就是通常所說(shuō)的公司法人治理結(jié)構(gòu)。公司內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制是基于委托代理理論和產(chǎn)權(quán)理論，對(duì)代理人實(shí)施激勵(lì)機(jī)制從而在公司的各個(gè)利益主體之間進(jìn)行剩余控制權(quán)與剩余索取權(quán)有效配置的一套產(chǎn)權(quán)制度安排。 2、外部治理機(jī)制。外部治理機(jī)制，則是指約束代理人行為的市場(chǎng)壓力和監(jiān)管壓力，即委托人與代理人以外的機(jī)制。這些主要有：金融市場(chǎng)特別是股票市場(chǎng)對(duì)業(yè)績(jī)的評(píng)估，專(zhuān)

3、業(yè)化信息市場(chǎng)（降低股東監(jiān)督的成本），經(jīng)理市場(chǎng)，企業(yè)控制權(quán)市場(chǎng)，產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)。,3,治理失效,2001年安然、世通等美國(guó)公司接連爆發(fā)的財(cái)務(wù)丑聞，促使美國(guó)頒布撒克斯奧克斯利法案(Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 )。該法案從加強(qiáng)信息披露和財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)處理的準(zhǔn)確性等方面對(duì)美國(guó)現(xiàn)行證券、公司法律進(jìn)行了重大調(diào)整。,4,從單邊治理理論向共同治理理論,OECD(2004)將公司治理定義為：“公司管理層、董事會(huì)、股東以及其他利益相關(guān)者之間的一整套關(guān)系。公司治理還通過(guò)制定公司目標(biāo)、確定實(shí)現(xiàn)這些目標(biāo)和監(jiān)督執(zhí)行的手段來(lái)構(gòu)成治理架構(gòu)。良好的公司治理應(yīng)當(dāng)提供適當(dāng)?shù)募?lì)，以使董事會(huì)和管理層追求符合公司和股東利

4、益的目標(biāo)，并應(yīng)便于實(shí)施有效的監(jiān)督。無(wú)論是在單個(gè)公司內(nèi)部，還是對(duì)一國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)整體而言，有效公司治理機(jī)制都一定程度有助于提高信心，這對(duì)于市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的穩(wěn)健運(yùn)行是十分必要的?！?5,銀行治理的特殊性（1）,商業(yè)銀行公司治理的特殊性在于銀行的特殊性： 一是商業(yè)銀行資本結(jié)構(gòu)的高負(fù)債性。商業(yè)銀行資本結(jié)構(gòu)的高杠桿性特征，股東對(duì)剩余索取權(quán)的追求下，而常有更大的冒險(xiǎn)沖動(dòng)。 二是商業(yè)銀行合約的不完全性。存款人與銀行、股東與銀行都存在信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)，使之無(wú)法有效了解銀行的經(jīng)營(yíng)。從存款人來(lái)說(shuō)，存款人是高度分散的，這種債權(quán)人的監(jiān)督不太有效，相應(yīng)地小股東們也無(wú)法低成本地了解銀行信息。 三是銀行產(chǎn)品的特殊性。銀行主要的產(chǎn)品貸款質(zhì)量的好

5、壞需要一段時(shí)間才能看出，銀行貸款產(chǎn)品并不存在活躍的交易市場(chǎng)，銀行可以其會(huì)計(jì)處理方便地隱藏不利信息，外部判斷銀行的好壞并不容易。由此，銀行公司治理應(yīng)當(dāng)比一般公司的治理要求更嚴(yán)，也就更強(qiáng)調(diào)信息披露，更強(qiáng)調(diào)外部監(jiān)管。,6,銀行公司治理,銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理的重要性。 銀行公司具有很強(qiáng)的外部性。 銀行形象的重要性。 在20世紀(jì)80年代末和90年代初美國(guó)的銀行業(yè)出現(xiàn)的不負(fù)責(zé)任甚至是構(gòu)成犯罪的行為產(chǎn)生了巨大的損失，最后導(dǎo)致儲(chǔ)蓄貸款存款保險(xiǎn)公司的損失。 在美國(guó)貨幣監(jiān)理署（OCC)1988年對(duì)1979到1987年國(guó)民銀行倒閉案所做的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)大約有 (1988) 其中有三分之一的與內(nèi)部人的錯(cuò)誤行為有關(guān)。而美國(guó)總會(huì)計(jì)辦公

6、室（U.S. General Accounting Office）在1989年所做的同期研究表明有50%的銀行倒閉案中存在內(nèi)部人行為不當(dāng)有關(guān)。,7,加強(qiáng)銀行公司治理的原則,國(guó)際清算銀行于1999年發(fā)布了加強(qiáng)銀行組織的公司治理(Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organizations)，從銀行價(jià)值取向、戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)、責(zé)權(quán)劃分、管理者相互關(guān)系、內(nèi)控系統(tǒng)、特別風(fēng)險(xiǎn)監(jiān)控、激勵(lì)機(jī)制和信息透明度等八個(gè)方面闡述了良好的銀行公司治理機(jī)制所必備的基本要素。 在此基礎(chǔ)上，國(guó)際清算銀行于2006年又發(fā)布了加強(qiáng)銀行公司治理的原則。 2010年10月，國(guó)際清算銀行發(fā)布

7、了 Principles for enhancing corporate governance加強(qiáng)銀行公司治理的原則 。 2015年7月，國(guó)際清算銀行發(fā)布了銀行公司治理指引（Guidelines Corporate governance principles for banks）,8,Sound corporate governance principles,Principle 1: Boards overall responsibilities The board has overall responsibility for the bank, including approving and

8、 overseeing managements implementation of the banks strategic objectives, governance framework and corporate culture. Principle 2: Board qualifications and composition Board members should be and remain qualified, individually and collectively, for their positions. They should understand their overs

9、ight and corporate governance role and be able to exercise sound, objective judgment about the affairs of the bank.,9,Principle 3: Boards own structure and practices The board should define appropriate governance structures and practices for its own work, and put in place the means for such practice

10、s to be followed and periodically reviewed for ongoing effectiveness。 Principle 4: Senior management Under the direction and oversight of the board, senior management should carry out and manage the banks activities in a manner consistent with the business strategy, risk appetite, remuneration and o

11、ther policies approved by the board.,10,Principle 5: Governance of group structures In a group structure, the board of the parent company has the overall responsibility for the group and for ensuring the establishment and operation of a clear governance framework appropriate to the structure, busine

12、ss and risks of the group and its entities. The board and senior management should know and understand the bank groups organisational structure and the risks that it poses. Principle 6: Risk management function Banks should have an effective independent risk management function, under the direction

13、of a chief risk officer (CRO), with sufficient stature, independence, resources and access to the board,11,Principle 7: Risk identification, monitoring and controlling Risks should be identified, monitored and controlled on an ongoing bank-wide and individual entity basis. The sophistication of the

14、banks risk management and internal control infrastructure should keep pace with changes to the banks risk profile, to the external risk landscape and in industry practice. Principle 8: Risk communication An effective risk governance framework requires robust communication within the bank about risk,

15、 both across the organisation and through reporting to the board and senior management.,12,Principle 9: Compliance The banks board of directors is responsible for overseeing the management of the banks compliance risk. The board should establish a compliance function and approve the banks policies a

16、nd processes for identifying, assessing, monitoring and reporting and advising on compliance risk. Principle 10: Internal audit The internal audit function should provide independent assurance to the board and should support board and senior management in promoting an effective governance process an

17、d the long-term soundness of the bank.,13,Principle 11: Compensation The banks remuneration structure should support sound corporate governance and risk management. Principle 12: Disclosure and transparency The governance of the bank should be adequately transparent to its shareholders, depositors,

18、other relevant stakeholders and market participants。 Principle 13: The role of supervisors Supervisors should provide guidance for and supervise corporate governance at banks, including through comprehensive evaluations and regular interaction with boards and senior management, should require improvement and remedial acti