PublicDisclosureAuthorizedPublicDisclosureAuthorizedPublicDisclosureAuthorizedPublicDisclosureAuthorized

WORLDBANKGROUP

EconomicPolicy

CEMAC

EconomicBarometer

December2025

2025

VOL.9

Chad

CentralAfricanRepublic

Cameroon

EquatorialGuinea

Gabon

RepublicofCongo

WORLDBANKGROUP

EconomicPolicy

CEMAC

EconomicBarometer

December2025

2025

VOL.9

2

1TheupdaterelectsinformationavailableasofSeptember2025.PleasecontactDjenebaDoumbia(

ddoumbia@

)andErickTjong(

etjong@

)foranyquestionsorcomments.

Acknowledgments

TheCEMACsemi-annualEconomicBarometerwaspreparedbya

WorldBankEconomicPolicyteamcomprisingofRobertJohannUtz

(LeadEconomist,TeamLeader),DjenebaDoumbia(Economist,Team

Leader),ErickTjong(Economist,TeamLeader),andChrisBelmert

MilindiKatindi(ETConsultant).OtherteammembersincludeSambaBa(SeniorEconomist),RickEmeryTsouckIbounde(SeniorEconomist),

DemetKaya(SeniorEconomist),AleksandarStojanov(Economist),

BlaiseEhoweNguem(Economist),FrancisGhislainNgombaBodi

(Economist),MahamatAbdramaneMoustapha(Economist),Kabinet

Kaba(Economist),andwiththesupportofIreneSitieneiandMaude

Valenbrum(ProgramAssistants)andKhalidAlouane(SeniorProgramAssistant).TheteamisthankfultoRyanRafaty(GovernanceSpecialist,WorldBank)forhiscontributionstothespecialtopicchapterandto

Jean-ClaudeNguemeni(DirectorofMultilateralSurveillance,CEMACCommission)forhiscommentsandsupport.ThereportwasclearedbyCheickFantamadyKante(DivisionDirector).1

–.

3

Introduction

TheCEMACEconomicBarometerisasemi-annualWorldBankpublicationthat

presentsasnapshotofrecentdevelopmentsandtheeconomicoutlookofthe

CEMACregion,followedbyabriefassessmentatthecountrylevel.TheEconomicBarometeralsoincludesafocusedtechnicalsectiononathemeofregional

relevance.Thisedition’sspecialtopicprovidespolicyoptionstomaximizethe

nationalwealthofcountriesintheCEMACregioninordertopromotesustainablegrowth.Inparticular,itexaminestheregion’sassetportfolioincludingphysical,humanandnaturalcapitalandhowthesecouldshapedevelopmentintheregion.

EconomicactivityintheCEMACregionisprojectedtodecelerateslightlyin2025

toanaverageGDPgrowthof2.8percent,belowtheaveragegrowthintheWest

AfricanEconomicandMonetaryUnion(WAEMU)whichisprojectedat6.0percent.Fiscalpressureshaveintensiiedduetodecliningoilandcommodityprices,shiftingtheregion’siscalbalancefromsurplustodeicitin2024inspiteofanincreaseinnon-oilrevenuesacrossCEMAC,andisexpectedtoremainstableat-1.3percentofGDPin2025.Fallingoilpriceshavecontributedtodeterioratedtradeandcurrentaccountbalances,withthelatterdroppingfrom7.9percentofGDPin2022to3.7

percentin2024,andfurtherdeclinesexpectedamidvolatileoilproductionand

prices.Inlationintheregioneasedto3.9percentinMarch2025,stillabovethe

CEMACEconomicBarometer–December2025(Vol.9)

3percentconvergencecriterion,moderatedbyfavorableagriculturaloutputandstablefuelprices,thoughriskspersist.Socialchallengesremainsevere,with

extremepovertyrisingto37.0percentin2024–affecting24.2millionpeople–

andstructuralissuessuchashighinformality,persistentunemployment,and

limitedprogressongovernance.Toaddressthesechallengesandimprovelivingstandardsintheregion,reformprioritiesincludestrengtheninggovernanceandpublicinancialmanagement,enhancingtransparency,investingininfrastructureandhumancapital,andpromotingeconomicdiversiicationtofosterjobcreation.Inthiscontext,itwouldbeessentialtoacceleratereformsforeseenintheregionaleconomicplans,includingCEMAC’sEconomicandFinancialReformProgram

(PREF-CEMACII)andtheupcomingRegionalEconomicProgram.

4

Thisspecialtopicchapterintroducesacomprehensiveassessmentofnational

wealthintheCEMACregion,highlightingtheimportanceofwealthaccountingasacomplementtotraditionaleconomicindicatorslikeGrossDomesticProduct(GDP).

WhileGDPmeasuresthevalueofgoodsandservicesproduced,itdoesnotcapturetheconditionorevolutionoftheunderlyingassetsthatsupportfutureprosperity.Byintegratingmeasuresofnationalwealth–includinghuman,produced,andnatural

capital–thischapterprovidesamorecompletepictureofeconomichealthand

sustainabilityintheregion.Between1995and2020,CEMAC’stotalwealthroseby75percent,fromUSD593billiontoUSD1,029billion(inreal2019USD),drivenlargelybygainsinproducedandhumancapital.However,percapitawealthdeclinedby

20percentoverthesameperiod,aspopulationgrowthwasfasterthanthepaceof

assetaccumulationandeconomicdiversiicationremainedlimited.Overthesame

period,producedcapital,thoughthesmallestcomponentoftotalwealth(12percent),grewthefastestat172percent,whilerenewablenaturalcapitalfellfrom49percentto32percentoftotalwealth,relectingecologicaldegradationandweakresource

management.Cameroon,withnearlyhalfofCEMAC’spopulation,contributedover53percentoftheregion’stotalwealth.Toaccountforchangesinnationalwealth,

theWorldBankcalculatesadjustednationalaccountsindicatorssuchasAdjusted

NetSavings(ANS)andAdjustedNetNationalIncome(ANNI)whichcanbeusedto

tracksustainabilityofeconomicgrowthtrends.FindingsshowthatwhileCameroonmaintainspositiveANS,countrieslikeGabon,EquatorialGuinea,andCongoexhibitnegativetrajectories.Thechapteralsopresentsrecentestimatesofthevalueof

theecosystemservicesthattheforestsprovide–suchasprovisioningservices

(wood,bushmeat),tourismservices,carbonsequestration,hydrologicalregulation,andbiodiversitypreservation.About99percentoftheseforestecosystemservicesaccruetotheglobalcommunitycontributingtoclimateresilienceandsustainable

development.Atpresent,CEMACcountriesremainlargelyuncompensatedfor

CEMACEconomicBarometer–December2025(Vol.9)

theseservices.Aforward-lookingpolicyagendaemphasizesscalingupinvestmentinhumancapitalandinfrastructure,strengtheningresourcegovernanceand

transparency,promotinglocalvalueaddition,andmobilizingclimateinance.ThesemeasuresareessentialtoreversedecliningpercapitawealthandbuildafoundationforsustainedprosperityandresilienceacrossCEMAC.

Credits:aktureronShutterstock

5

CEMACEconomicBarometer–December2025(Vol.9)

SECTION1—

CEMACUpdates:

Recenteconomicdevelopments,outlookandkeydevelopmentchallengesintheCEMACregion

SECTION1—CEMACUpdates7

I.RecenteconomicdevelopmentsandoutlookintheCEMACregion

Table1/CEMACKeyIndicators

2024

Population,milliona

65.4

GDP,currentUSDbilliona

125.9

GDPpercapita,currentUSDb

1,924.3

Internationalpovertyrate(USD3/day)a

37.0

Lowermiddle-incomepovertyrate(USD4.2/day)a

54.3

Uppermiddle-incomepovertyrate(USD8.3/day)a

81.3

Lifeexpectancyatbirth,yearsc

62.3

Source:WDI,MacroPovertyOutlook,andofficialdata.

(a)TotalforCEMACcountries.

(b)WeightedaverageforCEMACcountries.

(c)SimpleaverageforCEMACcountries.

EconomicactivitiesintheCEMAC(Economic

andMonetaryCommunityofCentralAfrica)

regionexpandedin2024by3.0percent,up

from2.0percentin2023.Thepickupinregionalgrowthwassupportedbyincreasesingrowth

ratesinEquatorialGuinea(+6percentage

points,ppts),Gabon(+0.9ppt),andtheCentral

AfricanRepublic(CAR)(+0.8ppt)comparedto

2023.In2024,CameroonandChadwerethe

topperformersintheregion,eachregistering

agrowthrateof3.5percent.In2025,regional

growthisforecasttoeaseslightlyto2.8percent,belowtheaveragegrowthintheWestAfrican

EconomicandMonetaryUnion(WAEMU)whichisprojectedat6.2percent.Growthdynamics

remainunevenacrosstheCEMACregion.InCAR,

GDPgrowthisprojectedtoacceleratefrom1.5

percentin2024to2.7percentin2025,supportedbybetterfuelandelectricitysupply.InCameroon,growthisexpectedtoreach3.7percentin2025,drivenbyhigherpowersupply,andrisingpublicandprivateinvestment.Incontrast,economic

activityinGabonissettodecelerateslightly

duetoslowergrowthintheoilsectorwhilein

EquatorialGuinea,GDPisprojectedtocontractby1.6percentin2025asthehydrocarbonsectordeclines.Inpercapitaterms,CEMACincome

growthisprojectedtoedgeupto0.2percentin2025(from0.1percentin2024),drivenbyslowerpopulationgrowth,butremainingwellbelowtheWAEMUaverage(3.5percent).

Theregion’siscalbalanceturnedintodeicit

in2024duetodecliningoilpricesandlower

commodityrevenues,aswellashigherpublic

spendingacrossCEMAC,andisprojectedto

deterioratefurtherin2025.In2024,iscal

balancesdeclinedacrossallCEMACcountries,mainlyduetolowercommodityrevenues,

keepingCameroon,Chad,andCARiniscaldeicitandpushingEquatorialGuineaandGaboninto

CEMACEconomicBarometer–December2025(Vol.9)

iscaldeicit,whileCongomaintainedaiscalsurplus.Onaverage,CEMAC’siscalbalanceisprojectedtoremainstableat-1.3percentofGDPin2025,withanexpecteddeteriorationinCameroonandEquatorialGuinea.2Thepublicspending-to-GDPratioissettoincreasein

CEMACtoanaverage20.2percentofGDPin2025,upfrom19.8percentin2024.Averagerevenuesareprojectedtoincreaseataslowerpace,from18.6percentofGDPin2024to18.8

2Gabon’sdraft2026budgetlawsetsastronglyexpansionaryspendingpolicy,which,whilebeingpartlyrelectedintheWorldBankOctober2025AnnualMeetingsprojectionsfor2026-27,couldleadtoarapidincreaseinfiscaldeficitsanddebtlevels,aggravatingsustainabilityrisks.

8SECTION1—CEMACUpdates

percentofGDPin2025,drivenbyanincreasein

non-resourcerevenues.In2024,theaveragedebt-to-GDPratioinCEMACremainedelevatedat52.5

percentandisprojectedtodecreaseto52.2percentin2025,withincreasesexpectedinCameroon,

ChadandtoalesserextentGabonandEquatorialGuinea.In2024,estimateddebtlevelsinCongo

(93.5percentofGDP)andGabon(74.7percent

ofGDP)surpassedtheregionalconvergence

thresholdof70percentofGDP,atrendexpectedtopersistin2025.FiscalspaceandliquidityremaintightacrossCEMAC,limitingtheregion’sability

toabsorbfurthereconomicshocksandeffectivelymanagepublicdebt.CEMACcountriescontinuetofacemajorchallengesintaxrevenuecollection,

withaveragetaxrevenuesbelowthe15percentofGDPthreshold3typicallyneededtofundbasicpublicservices.Thisissueiscompoundedbya

heavyrelianceonvolatileresourcerevenues,

underscoringtheurgentneedtostrengthenpublicinancialmanagementacrosstheregion.

TheCEMACregion’stradebalanceasashareof

GDPhasbeenfurtherdecliningfrom8.6percentin2023to6.5percentin2024,asCEMAC’sexternalpositionremainedstronglydependentonglobal

oilprices.Nonetheless,unliketheWAEMUzone,

CEMACcontinuestorecordtradeandcurrent

CEMACEconomicBarometer–December2025(Vol.9)

accountsurpluses,supportedbystrongcommodityexports.Theregion’sdependenceoncommodity

exportsmakesitvulnerabletopriceluctuations,asdemonstratedbytheadverseimpactoffallingoil

pricesonitstradebalance.Between2022and2024,CEMAC’scurrentaccountbalancedeclinedfrom7.9percentto3.7percentofGDPasoilpricesfellfromUSD97.1toUSD80.8,withafurtherdroptoUSD68expectedin2025.Thisdownwardtrend,coupled

withanticipatedproductiondeclinesfrommaturing

oilieldsinGabonandEquatorialGuinea,

threatenstoweakentheregion’sexternalpositionandreservesamidanincreasinglyuncertainglobaltradeenvironment.

Inlationcontinuedtoeaseintheirstquarterof2025butremainsabovetheregional

convergencecriterionof3percent.Average

annualinlationreached3.9percentinMarch2025,comparedwith5.1percentayearearlier.Thisdeclineisdrivenbyseveralinternalandexternalfactors.Domestically,thistrendcanbeattributedtoastrongagriculturalseason

inChadandCameroon,stablefuelpump

pricesinseveralmembercountries,andtheeffectsofthetightmonetarypolicyinplace.

However,regionalinlationremainsabovetheconvergencecriterionandfacesseveralrisksofrenewedupwardpressure,duetoupward

fuelpriceadjustmentsinCameroonand

Chad,persistentlyhighshippingcostslinked

toRedSeageopoliticaltensions,andrising

domesticdemandinChadfollowingtheinluxofSudaneserefugees.ThesefactorshaveslowedthepaceofdisinlationobservedinCEMAC

formorethanayear.Comparedwithitsmainpartners,CEMACcontinuestopostunfavorableinlationdifferentialsasofend-March2025:1.0percentagepointsaboveWAEMU,0.9points

abovetheeuroarea,and3.1pointsabove

China.Toeasereinancingcosts,improve

accesstocredit,andsupportinvestment,BEACbeganlooseningmonetarypolicy,lowering

itspolicyratefrom5percentto4.5percent

inMarch2025.Butinlationaryrisksremain

tiltedtotheupside.Potentialshocksfrom

globalenergymarkets,renewedgeopolitical

tensions,orfurtherclimate-relateddisruptions

3Choudhary,Rishabh;Ruch,FranzU;Skrok,Emilia.2024.TaxingforGrowth:Revisitingthe15PercentThreshold.PolicyResearchWorkingPaper10943.Washington,DC:WorldBank.

SECTION1—CEMACUpdates9

inChadandnorthernCamerooncouldreignitepricepressures.Meanwhile,therealeffectiveexchangerate(REER)inmostCEMACcountriesstrengthenedintheirstsemesterof2025,driveninpartbya

reboundinoilproductionrelativetothepreviousyear.4

Despitemoderateeconomicgrowthanddeclininginlation,overathirdofthepopulationinthe

CEMACregionstilllivesinextremepoverty.TheshareofpeoplelivingonlessthanUSD3per

day(in2021PPP)rosefromanestimated36.6

percentin2023to37.0percentin2024,whereastheextremepovertyrateinWAEMUstoodat29.7percent.Thismeansthat24.2millionpeoplestillliveinextremepovertyinCEMAC.Povertylevelsvarywidely,withthehighestratesintheCentralAfricanRepublic(67.5percent)andtheRepublic

ofCongo(51.8percent),comparedtolowerlevelsinGabon(4.1percent)andEquatorialGuinea

(9.4percent).Whenmeasuredbasedonother

thresholds,suchastheuppermiddle-incomerateofUSD8.3perday,povertyinCEMACiseven

higher,at81.3ofthepopulationin2024.Persistentpovertyacrosstheregionhighlightsthekey

challengesofachievingmorerobustandjob-basedgrowth,thatwouldbecapableofliftingmore

peopleoutofpoverty.Investinginstronger,largersocialprotectionsystems,alongwithworkforce

trainingandreformstoimprovethebusinessclimatewouldalsobeessential.

Between2022and2024,jobpatternsinCEMACshiftedfromagriculturetowardindustry

andespeciallyservices,butthisstructural

transformationhasnottranslatedinto

suficientqualityjobcreation.Mostnewjobsareconcentratedintheinformalservicesector,

whichismarkedbylowproductivity,limited

jobsecurity,andlowwages,offeringlittle

potentialforinnovationorlong-termgrowth.

Informalityaffectsover65percentofjobs,

andunemploymentremainshigh–averagingaround9percentoftheactivepopulation,morethanfourtimestherateintheWAEMUzone

–underscoringtheurgentneedforreformstogeneratedecentemploymentforCEMAC’syoungandgrowingpopulation.

WhileregionalGDPisprojectedtoexpandby

3.2percentin2025-2027,CEMAC’seconomic

outlookremainssubjecttoimportantrisks.

Decliningoilprices,globaltradeshocksand

geopoliticaltensionsthreatenexportearningsandcouldweakentheregion’siscaland

externalbalances.Spendingpressuresremainhigh,andoilproductionwoulddeclineinviewofmaturingoilields,aggravatingiscaland

debtvulnerabilitiesandposingchallengesfortheregion’siscalcapacitytopromotegrowth,provideessentialpublicservicesandsupportthemostvulnerable.Meanwhile,tighterglobalinancialconditionsmightintensifyinancing

pressuresandcompromiseinvestments,withnegativeconsequencesespeciallyforhighly

indebtedcountries.Additionalrisksinclude

CEMACEconomicBarometer–December2025(Vol.9)

potentialslowerreformmomentuminview

ofthepoliticalagendaincertaincountries,

securityconcernsinareasofcountrieslikeCARandCameroon,andclimaticshocks.

4Anincreaseintherealeffectiveexchangerate(REER)ofacountrymeansanappreciationofthecountry’slocalcurrencyagainstthebasketofitstradingpartners’currencieswhileadecreaseintheREERrelectsadepreciation.

CEMACEconomicBarometer–December2025(Vol.9)

10SECTION1—CEMACUpdates

GDPgrowthinCEMACisexpectedtoslowdownin2025,remainingbelowitspotentialandthatoftheWAEMUregion.

Meanwhile,percapitagrowthisforecasttoremainnegativeinhalfofCEMACcountries.

Figure1/RealGDPGrowth(inpercent)inCEMAC

andWAEMU,2020-2027

Figure2/RealGDPpercapitagrowthinCEMACcountries(inpercent),2024-2025

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

-1

-2

6.16.05.85.9

3.5

3.0

3.2

2.8

202020212022202320242025f2026f2027f CEMACWAEMU

4.0

2.0

0.0

-2.0

-4.0

Cameroon

Chad

CAR

Congo,Rep.

Eq.Guinea

Gabon

2024

CEMAC,2024

2025f

WAEMU,2024

Thankstooilexports,CEMAC’stradebalanceremainsinsurplus,buthasbeendecliningduetoagradualdecreaseinoilpricesandmaturingoilieldsacrosstheregion.

CEMAC’siscalpositionhasexperiencedongoingdeteriorationsince2023,withtheaverage

spending-to-GDPratiorisingwhiletheaveragerevenue-to-GDPratiohasdeclined.

Figure3/Oilprices(rhs)andexternalpositionin

CEMAC(lhs),2019-2027

Figure4/Fiscalposition(%ofGDP)inCEMACand

WAEMU,2020-2027

20

15

10

5

0

-5

-10

202020212022202320242025f2026f2027f

CurrentAccountBalance(%ofGDP)-CEMACTradeBalance(%ofGDP)-CEMAC

CurrentAccountBalance(%ofGDP)-WAEMUTradeBalance(%ofGDP)-WAEMU

Crudeoilprice,average(US$/bbl)(rhs)

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

25

20

15

10

5

0

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6

-8

-10

202020212022202320242025f2026f2027f

Totalexpenditure-CEMAC(lhs)Totalrevenue-CEMAC(lhs)

Fiscalbalance-CEMAC(rhs)

Fiscalbalance-WAEMU(rhs)

SECTION1—CEMACUpdates11

Thepublicdebt-to-GDPratioisexpectedto

decreaseslightlyto52.2percentin2025(from

52.5percentin2024).

BEACbegantoeaseitsmonetarypolicystanceinMarch2025,withthepolicyratebeingreducedfrom5percentto4.5.

Figure6/EvolutionofpolicyratesinWestandCentralAfricaandintheEU,2020-2025*

Figure5/Publicdebt(%ofGDP)inCEMACand

WAEMU,2020-2027(%ofGDP)

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

5.0

4.5

4.0

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

20202021202220232024e2025f2026f2027f

5.5

Jan-20

May-20

Sep-20

Jan-21

May-21

Sep-21

Jan-22

May-22

Sep-22

Jan-23

May-23

Sep-23

Jan-24

May-24

Sep-24

Jan-25

May-25

Sep-25

CEMAC

WAEMU

……Debt-CEMACconvergencecriteria

WAEMUCEMACECB

TherealeffectiveexchangerateofCEMAC

countrieshasincreased,onaverage,intheirstsemesterof2025,relectingtheappreciationofCFAFrancagainstthebasketoftradingpartners’currencies.

120

115

110

105

100

95

90

Figure7/CEMAC:RealEffectiveandNominalUSD-CFAFExchangeRates,2020-2025

2020Q1

2020Q3

2021Q1

2021Q3

2022Q1

2022Q3

2023Q1

2023Q3

2024Q1

2024Q3

2025Q1

REER,WAEMUNEER,WAEMU

REER,CEMACNEER,CEMAC

CEMAC’sregionalreservesincreasedslightlyto4.7monthsofimportsin2024,upfrom4.6monthsin2023,andareprojectedtoreach4.8

monthsin2025.

Figure8/Grossreservesasmonthsof

imports

CEMACEconomicBarometer–December2025(Vol.9)

6

5

Numberofmonths

4

3

2

1

0

WAEMUCEMAC

u2021u2022u20232024u2025*

CEMACEconomicBarometer–December2025(Vol.9)

12SECTION1—CEMACUpdates

Averageannualinlation(12-monthmoving

average)intheCEMACregiondeclinedfrom5.1percentinMarch2024to3.9percentinMarch2025.

Duetomodestgrowthandlackofjob

opportunities,povertyremainsstagnantandhigh,affectingoverathirdofCEMAC’spopulation.

Figure9/AverageinlationinCEMAC(percent),

2021-2025*

Figure10/PovertyratesinCEMAC(USD3/day)in2021PPP

11

9

7

5

3

1

-1

Jan-21

Mar-21

May-21

Jul-21

Sep-21

Nov-21

Jan-22

Mar-22

May-22

Jul-22

Sep-22

Nov-22

Jan-23

Mar-23

May-23

Jul-23

Sep-23

Nov-23

Jan-24

Mar-24

May-24

Jul-24

Sep-24

Nov-24

Jan-25

Mar-25

Foodin?ationEnergyin?ationCorein?ation

CEMACHeadlinein?ation

---CEMACConvergencecriteria-In?ationWAEMUHeadlinein?ation

Gabon

Eq.Guinea

Cameroon

Chad

Congo,Rep.

CAR

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

20232024e

CEMAC2024oooooWAEMU2024

Hightariffsandotherlogisticalchallenges

increasethecostoftransportandinputs,reducingthecompetitivenessofCEMACcompanies.

Logisticsgaps,highporttimesandhightrade

costshamperthepotentialforstrongertradeandintegrationintoregionalandglobalvaluechains.

Figure11/Tariffrates(%ofimportedgoods),

average2017-2022

Figure12/LogisticsPerformanceIndex(ranking)

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

Eq.Guinea

Congo

Gabon

Cameroon

Chad

CAR

CEMACWAEMUWorld

Benin

Nigeria

Congo,Rep.

Togo

Ghana

CAR

Gabon

Chad

Cameroon

Eq.Guinea

Sources:Nationalauthorities,BEAC,Bruegel,WorldBank,IMF,andWorldBankstaffcalculations.

Notes:FiguresshowweightedaveragesforCEMACandWAEMU,basedoncountries’sharesofeachregion’sGDP.PovertydataisbasedonnowcastandforecastprojectedbasedonactualdatafromnationalhouseholdsurveysforCameroon(2014),CentralAfricanRep.(2021),Chad(2018),Congo(2011),Gabon(2017)andEquatorialGuinea(2022).DataonregionalreservesarebaselineprojectionsfromtheBEAC(June2025report),andtheIMFarticleIVfortheWAEMUregion(May,2025).ExternaldataforEquatorialGuineaarefromtheBEACandIMF.Thecountryweightsusedtoconstruct

SECTION1—CEMACUpdates13

theaggregatecommunityindexforinlationaredrawnfromtheNoteonInlationinCEMACMemberCountries(2025).5Accordingtothisnote,data

onaverageinlationintheCEMACregionarebasedonhouseholdindividualconsumptionexpenditure,asdefinedunderthe2017International

ComparisonProgram.DataontheLogisticsPerformanceIndexisbasedon2023countryrankings,exceptforEquatorialGuinea(2018)andChad(2018).

II.KeydevelopmentchallengesandreformprioritiesinCEMAC

Boldandacceleratedeconomicreformsareneededtosigniicantlyimprovelivingstandardsand

reverserisingpovertytrendsinCEMAC.CEMACcountriesfacearangeofstructuralchallengesincludingrelianceoncommodities,governanceconstraints,alargeinformalemployment

sector,highunemployment,limitedinvestment

inhumancapital,andgapsininfrastructure

andpublicservices,asoutlinedinTable2.Key

reformprioritiesinCEMACincludestrengtheninggovernance,improvingpublicinancial

management,andenhancingtransparencyand

accountabilityinbothnaturalresourcerevenues

andpublicspending.Complementaryeffortssuchascreatingqualityjobs,investingininfrastructureandbusinessconditions,andadvancinghuman

capitalthroughbettereducationandskillstrainingareessentialtosupportirmgrowth,economic

diversiication,resiliencetoexternalshocks,and

long-termsustainabledevelopment–guidedbytheCEMAC’sEconomicandFinancialReformProgram(PREF-CEMACII)andtheupcomingRegional

EconomicProgramandphaseIIIofthePREFCEMAC.

Overthepastthreeyears,progressinkey

structuralindicatorshasbeenlimited,withmostCEMACcountriespositionedinthelowertercileoftheirincomegroups.Table2highlightsthis

trend,especiallyregardinggovernanceindicators.AlthoughmanyCEMACcountriesexperiencea

stablepoliticalenvironmentandlowlevelsof

violence,datafrom2021to2023indicateminimalchangerelatedtoanti-corruptionmeasuresand

governanceeffectiveness.Governancechallengescontinuetohinderreformimplementation,eficient

resourcemobilization,andeffectivepublicservicedeliveryacrossCEMAC.

CEMAC’sgrowthandjobcreationpotential

isconstrainedbylimitedinvestmentin

humancapital.Publicspendingoneducation

remainslow,averagingjust2.3percentof

GDP,comparedtotheSub-SaharanAfrica

averageof4.1percent–underminingefforts

toboostlaborproductivityandbuildaskilledworkforcecapableofsupportingeconomic

diversiicationandcompetitiveness.Skills

mismatchesinCEMAC